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1.  
Introduction 
 
 
n the 18th of June 2004 the political leaders of the 25 member states of the European Union 
(EU) agreed on a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. However, the agreement 
was reached in the shadow of a spectacular failure and was not presented as the triumph of 
European concord one might have expected. The process of creating a new foundational text for the 
EU should have been sealed when the leaders met in December of 2003, but on that occasion the 
assembled politicians could neither agree on the proposal that was on the table, nor could they reach 
a compromise or partial solution. All the heads of state and government could decide at the meeting 
in December 2003 was to spend the first quarter of 2004 probing how the pieces could be mended 
and to recommence the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the institutional arrangement for 
deciding on treaty changes, as soon as possible. As it turned out, the unsuccessful summit did not 
terminate the European constitutional process as such. Nevertheless, it halted nearly four years of 
perpetual, if sometimes almost imperceptible, movement towards refounding the EU by means of a 
single constitutional text.  
Before the December summit a proposal for a fully-fledged constitution had been 
prepared by the so-called European Convention, a temporary institution consisting of national and 
European parliamentarians and representatives of the executives. During its working period from 
March 2002 to July 2003 the Convention took on more and more features of a constitutional 
assembly, and its final proposal establishes the EU as an independent polity1 with a unique blend of 
intergovernmental and federal features. Before the 13th of December 2003 leading national and 
European politicians routinely called for an agreement that would alter the Conventions proposal 
as little as possible. After the Brussels summit political leaders by and large abandoned the lofty 
declarations of adherence in principle and settled down for the muddle of finding a passable 
compromise. The changes in the political leaders communicative interaction with each other and 
with the various national and European publics that followed from the redirection of the 
constitutional process deserve to be studied in their own right.  
                                                        
1 The term polity is used here and in the following to denote the political field  the political institutions and the society 
they represent. The courses of action adopted and pursued within the polity are termed policies, and the task of creating 
these specific courses of action is policy-making, whereas politics refers to creating and maintaining the polity.  
O 
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However, the present investigation deals with the European constitutional process 
before the fall; it is one of the aims of this study to explain how the EU got to the point in which 
agreement on the constitutional treaty had come to be expected. Through an examination of the 
early phases of what has become known as the debate on the future of Europe2 I shall seek to 
explain how the process that began as any other round of treaty revisions was moved in the 
constitutional direction. Thus, one aim of the study is to understand how it became commonly 
accepted that the creation of a constitution was the goal of the reform process, but at the same time I 
shall suggest reasons why the actual decision on the constitutional text proved so difficult to reach. I 
shall seek to explain why the constitutive momentum did not culminate in a univocal constitutional 
moment.  
One feature that marks the present round of reforms off from earlier treaty revisions is 
the very fact that the current reforms have been discussed in public. In contradistinction to earlier 
efforts the current reforms have been accompanied by a broad public debate. Moreover, European 
and national political leaders have actively sought to open up the reform process in which only 
members of the highest political echelon were formerly allowed to participate. The debate on the 
future of Europe is by and large a political initiative, an invitation to the peoples of Europe to 
participate in the discussion of what the EU should do and how it should be organised. Naturally, 
the discussion of such issues as how our societies should be organised and what role the EU should 
play in that organisation precedes the current round of treaty revisions. Nevertheless, the initiation 
of the debate on the future of Europe as this debate is now understood and conducted can be dated 
quite precisely.  
On the 12th of May 2000 Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, delivered a 
speech entitled From Confederacy to Federation  thoughts on the finality of European 
integration. In this speech Fischer synthesised and articulated a number of ideas that had been 
circulating and fermenting in European political and academic circles for quite some time, thus 
blowing the lid off Europes superstate agenda, as the British Conservatives phrased it. Expressed 
in more neutral terms, Fischer put the issues of the EUs end-goals and the possibility of expressing 
these in a written constitution on both the official political and broader public agendas of Europe. 
Thereby, he effectively framed the debate on the future of Europe, as it would henceforth develop.  
The present project takes Fischers speech as its starting point and follows the political 
and the public dimensions of the debate as it unfolded from May 2000 until December 2001, when 
                                                        
2 While some debators do recognise that the EU and Europe are not equivalent, many use the terms interchangeably.  
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the discussion was institutionalised through the creation of the aforementioned European 
Convention. Hence, it is the aim of the project to account for the temporal developments of the 
debate from its inception until its institutionalisation. 
An equally important spatial dimension accompanies the temporal focus of the present 
study. Before the Convention was set down the public discussions of European reforms did not 
have a commonly accepted centre, but were instead conducted in a great number of disparate 
settings in which different expectations and priorities prevailed, wherefore the debate actually 
consisted of a number of different discussions.3 The specific contextual articulations may contribute 
to the same chorus, but each contribution is a unique variation of the general theme. Thus, an 
examination of the debate on the future of Europe must not only be attentive to the debates 
temporal aspects, but also to how the debate was perceived and conducted in its various concrete 
contexts of articulation. The spaces to be studied in the following consist of a mix of national and 
European contexts. More specifically, the study includes British, Danish, French, German, and 
Spanish utterances  speeches by national political leaders and coverage by national newspapers  
as well as intrinsically European ones  a statement by the Commission President and two Council 
declarations. National boundaries between the member states of the EU mark the most obvious lines 
of division between arenas of debate, but the national debates are not isolated from each other. The 
focus of this study is not the insular meaning formation of each national public sphere but the 
interrelations between the different contexts. In the broadest terms possible, then, the aim of this 
project is to explain how the debate on the future of Europe is perceived and conducted in its 
distinct yet related spatio-temporal settings. 
The debate on the future of Europe is generated by and structured around a basic 
argument concerning the legitimating powers of public discussion. The argument runs as follows: 
the legitimacy of the European Union will be enhanced if the citizens come to identify themselves 
more with the European project and such identification may result from active participation in that 
project. Apart from the direct influence citizens obtain through voting, their participation in the 
European as well as any other democratic polity takes the principal form of public debate. The 
conclusion of the argument, therefore, is that an augmentation of European public debate will in 
itself enhance the legitimacy of the EU. And a further benefit, the argument continues, is that 
opening up the reform process to public participation facilitates the creation of a foundational treaty  
                                                        
3 Even when the Convention was established the discussions continued to develop in the fora and public spaces in 
which they had begun  the only difference being that there now was one common and consistent point of reference.  
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that is better attuned to the demands and expectations of the citizens and to which citizens will feel 
greater attachment. The combined claim, then, is that the process of European discussion is 
legitimating in itself and that it will produce a more legitimate EU. The analysis of the debate on the 
future of Europe is meant to provide empirical grounding for a reasoned evaluation of the validity 
of this claim.  
In order to realise this purpose the three concepts of legitimacy, identity, and public 
opinion with their corresponding processes of legitimation, identification, and public opinion 
formation are crucial. The project has an empirical aim of explaining how the three processes 
interrelate and become meaningful in the debate. Here, existing theoretical understandings of the 
processes will inform the analyses of particular utterances that take up central positions within the 
meaning formation of the debate as such. Furthermore, the project has a theoretical ambition that 
consists of investigating which general understanding of the relationship between legitimacy, 
identity, and public opinion corresponds best with the empirical reality of the debate. As Heidrun 
Friese and Peter Wagner assert: The creation of a European polity [] lays bare the limits of an 
approach to political philosophy that focuses on addressing general issues of relevance for all 
polities at all times and points to the need for politico-philosophically exploring a polity in its 
specificity, that is, its being in space and time (Friese & Wagner, 2002, pp. 342-343). It is the 
ambition of the present project to relate current theoretical discussions of what constitutional order 
is proper for the EU with the analytical findings of the study of the European constitutive debate. 
The final aim is to suggest a spatio-temporally sensitive theoretical foundation for the EU. 
The general purpose of this project, then, is to explain the debate on the future of 
Europe as it unfolds in a specific period of time and in a number of concrete contexts. The overall 
intent is to identify differences and commonalities in the opinion formation as it occurs in its 
various contexts. The temporal aspect of the investigation implies a focus on collective 
developments; it is here that the common movement towards a constitutional text will be explored. 
The spatial aspect highlights the differences between various settings, and it is through examination 
of these differences that I hope to explain the failure to create a common European constitutional 
moment.  
Within the general purpose of explaining the meaning formation of the debate a 
special emphasis is placed upon the conceptually established relationship between legitimacy, 
identity and public opinion. Theoretical understandings of the mutually constitutive dynamics 
between the three processes of legitimation, identification and public opinion formation inform the 
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investigation of the debate. The guiding question, then, is how the interdependent processes of 
legitimation, identification and public opinion formation constitute and are constituted in and 
through specific spatio-temporal instantiations of the complex and diversified network of 
communication that is the debate on the future of Europe. The analytical findings, in turn, will be 
used to nuance and strengthen the theoretical understanding of and constitutional recommendations 
for the EU.   
 
1.1. Theoretical perspective and analytical approach 
The present study focuses on the European debate as a constitutive process, and seeks to understand 
the dynamics of this process in order to explain the meaning that it creates. But the idea of the 
constitution as a product understood empirically as the new treaty and theoretically as whether a 
constitutional treaty is indeed desirable and feasible for a polity such as the EU is never far away. 
Hence, the term constitution in its various senses  as the process by which a specific utterance or 
an entire community becomes meaningful and as the textual product on which communities are 
based  is of central importance to the investigation. In fact it is so central that I shall propose the 
term constitutionism as a general label for the perspective that informs my research. The details and 
implications of the constitutionist perspective will be unfolded in the following; at present it 
suffices to say that the perspective finds its main sources of inspiration in rhetorical theories of 
meaning formation. Here, José Luis Ramírez reinterpretation of Aristotle is of particular 
importance, but generally speaking the constitutionist position begins from the basic rhetorical 
insight that no articulation of meaning can be detached from its temporal and spatial circumstances. 
Meaning  whether understood as the rhetors utterance or the audiences reception  is always 
conditioned by the space and time of its creation.  
Furthermore, the constitutionist perspective has much in common with Jürgen 
Habermas theory of communicative action, and Habermas is an influential figure throughout this 
project. Habermas offers extensive discussions of the concepts of legitimacy, identity, and public 
opinion as well as the relationship between them, and he has applied the theoretical understanding 
of the concepts and their import on the constitution of society to the context of the EU. At every 
turn of this project it is pertinent to compare and contrast my position with that of Habermas, and 
there is a debt to be acknowledged even where Habermas views are not explicitly foregrounded. 
By incorporating the Habermasian perspective as well as other legal and social scientific scholars 
conceptualisations of the European polity the project takes a decisive interdisciplinary turn. The 
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process of European integration is closely interconnected with legal and social scientific 
investigations of it, wherefore insights from these scholarly fields inform the rhetorical study, but it 
will also be argued that investigations in the rhetorical mode offer unique insights that may improve 
the understanding of European phenomena. 
As mentioned above, issues of space and time are central to my investigation of the 
debate on the future of Europe; the rhetorical understanding of the particularity of meaning by 
which the constitutionist position is guided means emphasis is placed on the here and now of each 
particular utterance. The creation of meaning depends as much on the contexts in which texts4 are 
produced as on the situations in which they are received, but the present study neither investigates 
the meanings as intended by the rhetors themselves nor as perceived by the audiences. Instead, the 
study is purely textual, and although it deals with intertextual relations it has no recourse to an 
extra-textual universe. The meanings and the opportunities for identification and further action  
communicative or otherwise  are studied as they appear in the texts. The sheer textuality of my 
investigation of the debate on the future of Europe poses an important dilemma. As there is no way 
of knowing how the audiences actually responded, nor whether that response was intended by the 
rhetor, how can I ensure that the phenomenon I am studying is not in fact my own formation of 
meaning? When conducting textual criticism there is always a sense in which the critic is in risk of 
studying her own reception of the text and not much else.  
In the case of the present study two precautions have been taken to avoid the danger of 
simply reproducing my personal understanding of the studied texts. First, the study is primarily a 
formal one; it deals with argumentative strategies, tropes, figures, and other formal features as they 
actually appear in the texts. However, in making the appeal to formality it should immediately be 
noted that a texts formal and substantial features cannot and should not be separated from each 
other, and that these interconnected features in turn reach beyond the limits of the individual 
utterance.5 The rhetors formal choices as well as his or her more substantial decisions on which 
issues to address, what arguments to pursue, and which positions to ignore bear the mark of the 
situation in which the utterance was created. As such the text is a trace of its original context, and 
                                                        
4 I use text and utterance interchangeably as general terms for a single communicative entity or what Mikhael 
Bakhtin calls a unit of speech communication, that is, a statement  whether of one word or a thousand pages  that 
elicits response thereby causing a change of speaking subjects (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 71).  
5 In the words of Michael Leff the two [form or style and content or argument] blend together within the unfolding 
development of a discourse, a development that simultaneously holds the discourse together and holds it out as a way of 
influencing the world in which it appears. Form, then, plays a decisive role in rhetorical discourse, but only as it 
promotes the function of the discourse, as it acts to produce an effect [on] auditors and to do some work in the social 
world (Leff, 1992, p. 226).   
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the textual analysis may reveal much about both the formal and substantial expectations by which 
the rhetor was constrained at the moment of production. The second precaution is that I do not study 
a single text in its exclusivity, but instead look at a debate, a series of interrelated interventions that 
comment on and respond to each other. I have selected six political speeches, two official EU 
declarations, and newspaper coverage of these eight utterances as the material to be analysed; the 
selected texts offer insight into decisive moments of the debate as these were conceived in the 
different contexts. The study of various utterances and their intertextual relations allows insight into 
the dynamic processes of the debate and thus facilitates a textual criticism that explains the 
discussants meaning formation on its own terms.   
These precautions do away with the charge of solipsism on the part of the critic, but 
do not rule out the possibility that both speakers and audiences could take other views than those 
offered and fail to act as recommended. Moreover, the investigation is subject to a lingering charge 
of elitism that is, however, a result of the chosen data, not of the approach as such. I study the 
debate on Europe as conducted in a communicative network in which politicians, academics and 
journalists are situated as the primary participants, not the sense which citizens make of this debate 
in their personal communications. Thus, the study may not deal with physical actions or private 
thoughts, but it investigates the ways in which it is possible to speak about Europe in public. The 
analysis of the selected data explains how the debate was presented to the citizens, thereby pointing 
out the ways in which citizens participation in the discussion on Europe and in the European 
project as such are restricted and facilitated.  
By coming to understand how recommended positions and actions are constituted in 
the debate, it becomes possible to hold the speakers to their words and, alternatively, to suggest 
ways of speaking that would allow other positions and actions to become meaningful. Whereas the 
principal aim of this study is not a normative one in the sense of recommending concrete ways in 
which the existing public debate on Europe may be improved, I shall as part of the theoretical 
discussion suggest how the citizens interests are best served.  
 
The Constitution of Meaning 
 8
1.2. Partitio 
The investigation of how meaning is constituted in the debate on the future of Europe is informed 
by the three above-mentioned concepts of legitimacy, identity, and public opinion as well as by a 
number of analytical tools that all aim at explaining textual-intertextual meaning formation in its 
spatio-temporality. The study proceeds as follows: first the debate on the future of Europe will be 
presented and information about the workings of the EU that is pertinent to the present situation will 
be given. Then I shall provide an overview of existing research that deals with public debate in the 
context of the EU. This overview will result in a first presentation of my constitutionist and 
rhetorical position, thereby making a basic distinction between the present study and other 
investigations of the field.   
The next main section is the theoretical one; in this chapter the rhetorical perspective 
will first be unfolded and then the concepts of legitimacy, identity, and public opinion will be 
presented. The concepts will first be discussed in the context of the EU; various theoretical notions 
of the proper European institutionalisation of the concepts will be presented in order to facilitate the 
eventual analytical evaluation of their adequacy. Secondly, the concepts will be linked to the 
rhetorical perspective, whereby they become procedural and thus may inform the analyses. In order 
to reach an evaluation of the theories it is necessary to explore how processes of legitimation, 
identification, and public opinion formation are constituted and interrelated in the debate. When the 
concrete processes have been explained it can be ascertained which general model is best suited for 
the European polity.  
The theoretical section is followed by the analytical endeavour. The analysis is 
divided into two main rounds and is preceded by a thorough introduction of the material to be 
analysed. Although the ambition of this study is to make pronouncements on the meaning formation 
of the debate in general, the study remains strictly textual, securely grounded in but also limited by 
the actual utterances that have been singled out for analysis. When I reach the analytical parts of the 
study, I shall have much more to say about the selected texts and the procedures of selection. 
However, before embarking on the various explanatory tasks that will prepare the way for the 
analyses, I wish to state clearly that the empirical material consists of six political speeches, two 
Council declarations and newspaper coverage of these eight texts stemming from five national 
contexts. The material is organised spatio-temporally so that the two declarations mark major 
transitions or turning points in the debate and each speech both represents a specific context  
typically a unique combination of national and transnational features  and a moment in the flow of 
1. Introduction 
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discussions between the two turning points. The newspaper coverage displays purely national 
characteristics, but also convergence between the different settings. Thus, the selected set of texts is 
well suited for studying the intricate spatio-temporal relationships that constitute the debate on the 
future of Europe as a meaningful communicative process. Having made this preliminary 
introduction of the texts that will eventually be analysed I now turn to the task of introducing the 
European reform process and the existing studies of European debate.  
 
  11
2.  
European debate and the study thereof 
 
 
n this chapter I shall first present information about the EU and its developments that provides 
the background for the study of the debate on the future of Europe. Second, I shall present 
already existing research on European debate in order to situate my investigation in the context of 
these studies. The aim is both to show the connections between my approach and that of other 
scholars with interests similar to mine, and to establish an important difference between the basic 
orientation of the present study and the starting point of most of the related investigations. 
 
2.1. How the EU functions and is reformed  
Discussions of visions for the future and their possible realisation in institutional arrangements have 
been important driving forces in the development of the European project from the establishment of 
the Coal and Steel Union to the present attempt to endow the European Union with a constitutional 
treaty. And in a broader sense debates on the future of Europe have always been integral to the 
conceptualisation of the continent. The questions around which European history has evolved since 
the concept of Europe was invented concern what Europe is and how this European identity should 
be realised in cultural, economic and political terms (Pagden, 2002, p. 33). Throughout its history 
Europe has witnessed grand intellectual unifying efforts as well as brute attempts to unite the 
continent by arms. It was not until the nation-states were consolidated in the 18th and 19th centuries 
that European division and the sovereignty of the nation-state came to be seen as the general norm.1 
However, the lack of stable borderlines does not mean a harmonious European unity existed. It is a 
general historical condition that the discourse of Europe is ambivalent in that it is not always about 
unity and inclusion, but is also about exclusion and the construction of difference based on norms of 
exclusion (Delanty, 1995, p. 1).  
The European project of integration that was begun in the aftermath of the Second 
World War and is today embedded in the treaties and institutions of the European Union was from 
its inception guided by the norm of national sovereignty.  And  hearkening to the original  
                                                        
1 The understanding of the Europe of nations was, however, prefigured in the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648, and 
it was in turn contested by the fascist and communist ideologies of the 20th century.   
I 
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formulation of the Treaty of Romes Preamble  the process of integration is still directed towards 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. In the fifty years of institutionalised European 
integration discussions of the European communitys identity and further developments have 
focused on the relationship between the European and the national levels of governance and 
authority (Ruttley, 2002, p. 228).  
 Important as it is for understanding the background of the current discussions, this 
project does not deal with the debate on the future of Europe in the general and long-term sense 
sketched out above. Instead, I focus on the process of European reform that was begun around the 
year 2000 and still has not found its conclusion.2 The specific aim of this process is the creation of a 
new foundational treaty for the EU, but embedded within the process are broader issues of 
European identity, the general purpose of European integration, and the citizens support for and 
participation in the European project.  
Understanding the debate on the future of Europe in the restricted sense not only 
requires an awareness of the broader issues involved, it is also premised upon some foreknowledge 
of the EUs current institutional structure and of the stipulated process for revision of the EUs 
foundational treaties. In the following I shall provide a brief overview of previous treaty revisions, 
and I will then introduce the EU institutions and the formal procedures of European reform. 
European treaty revisions are usually linked to institutional reform; they aim at 
changing the mode of decision-making within the different European institutions or altering the 
relationship between these institutions, between the member states, or between the member states 
and the EU institutions. Such shifts in the institutional balance and the procedures for decision-
making were the main results of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice (McCormick, 2002, p. 79 and 
p. 82). But the reforms may also focus on endowing the European institutions with new authority. 
This was the case with the creation of the biggest single market in the world through the Single 
European Act from 1986, and with the Maastricht Treatys establishment of the European Union in 
1992 (McCormick, 2002, p. 75 and p. 78). In both these cases the Community  and the Union in 
the latter case  were granted powers to make decisions and take actions that had previously rested 
exclusively with the individual member states. Or, to use the jargon employed within the EU 
institutions, European co-operation passed from the intergovernmental to the supranational mode, 
                                                        
2 It should be noted that the most recent round of enlargement, which was concluded on the 1st of May 2004 when ten 
new members entered the Union, has been a very important parallel to the process of treaty revision. I only deal with 
enlargement as it was presented by the participants in the debate on the future of Europe and do not discuss the 
enlargement process in its own right. 
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meaning that a transfer of sovereignty had occurred and that the individual member states were no 
longer able to veto decisions in the affected policy areas (McCormick, 2002, pp. 5-6).    
 The more recent treaty revisions have been sparked by the belief  widely held in both 
academic and political circles  that the EU institutions, which were conceived for the Community 
with its six original member, are not optimal for the Union of 15 and will be paralysed by further 
enlargement. The trouble is that the existing methods for decision-making become increasingly 
complex and opaque as the Union enlarges and that reaching agreement becomes correspondingly 
more difficult (Wallace, 1993).  
The EU institutions have been modified over the years, and new bodies have been 
added, but the basic structure has not changed since the communitys inception. At present the EUs 
institutional framework consists of five primary entities3: first, there is the Council of Ministers 
which is in fact a number of technical councils divided according to policy areas. Here the member 
states ministers (say, finance or fisheries, environment or education) meet to make the final 
decisions on policies proposed in their respective areas of competence. Second, the European 
Council consists of the member states heads of government, the foreign ministers, and the 
president and vice-president of the Commission. The European Council is an intergovernmental 
institution in which the leaders of the member states meet as masters of the treaties and discuss 
general issues of the EUs current agenda and further developments. Third, the Commission, 
consisting of nationally appointed, but supranationally charged Commissioners, is the guardian of 
the treaties and promoter of common European interests. Fourth, the European Parliament (EP) is 
the EUs directly elected legislative assembly, but the European electorate is divided into national 
entities and the EP has limited functions and powers. EU laws and policies are passed by these four 
institutions in combination, the European Council only stepping in when the normal decision-
making process, which involves the three other institutions, has become deadlocked. The fifth and 
final general institution is the Court of Justice, whose role is to clarify the decisions reached by the 
other institutions through rulings in specific cases.  
The EU institutions are perched against each other in a precarious power-balance, and 
this rather complex decision-making procedure has become even more difficult to understand and to 
operate with the introduction of the so-called pillar system that divides European policy-making 
                                                        
3 There are a number of more specialised institutions such as the European Central Bank or the Court of Auditors. 
Furthermore, there are various agencies divided into policy areas (e.g. the European Environmental Agency) and a 
number of committees of which the most important is the Committee of Permanent Representatives that acts as a link 
between the Brussels-based institutions and the member states. Most member states also have national institutions  in 
some cases ministries  devoted to the scrutiny of and participation in European affairs. 
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into three groups with different modes of operation.4 Further complications arise from the fact that 
each new treaty has not replaced the already existing foundational texts. Instead the treaties have 
been placed alongside each other so that eight compilations of primary rules are now in function. 
These eight treaties lay out a number of specific modes of decision-making, wherefore the EUs 
secondary rules or day-to-day decisions may take different forms ranging from law-like regulations 
to opinions with no binding force. The total of primary and secondary laws and policies as well as 
the rulings of the European Court of Justice is known as the acquis communitaire, and it is 
generally agreed that it now surmounts 80,000 pages. Understanding the exact procedures and the 
specific variations is not central to the present project, and knowledge of the totality of the acquis is 
of even less relevance.5 What is important, however, is to note that as masters of the treaties the 
national heads of state and government meeting in the European Council have the sole authority to 
make treaty revisions.  
Treaty revisions are prepared by so-called Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) that 
are convened at the behest of the European Council supported by the Commission and the EP. The 
final agreement on a new treaty must be reached at a Conference of Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States held in connection with a European Council summit, but 
intense preparations led by the country currently holding the rotating Council presidency6 precede 
the decisive meeting. In advance of the summit the presidency attempts to create a draft treaty to 
which all member states can agree, but the final details of the new treaty are traditionally settled in 
an ordeal of give and take as each of the national leaders defends his or her countrys interests. 
These last-minute bargains may have decisive effects on the resulting treaty, as they concern highly 
contested issues that are of great importance to some or all of the member states. More than once 
the leaders have been forced to postpone decisions on the most divisive issues in order to reach a 
                                                        
4 Or put more precisely, the first pillar works through the community method  the combination of intergovernmental 
and supranational elements that is peculiar to European decision-making  whereas the second (common foreign and 
security policy) and third (justice and home affairs) pillars are purely intergovernmental. 
5 But see the EUs official internet portal (www.europa.eu.int) and McCormick (2002), the sources on which the 
preceding account primarily relies, for more detailed explanations. As for the acquis, it is doubtful whether anyone 
would even attempt to gain insight into the full extent of it.  
6 The member states take turns at holding the Council presidency. Each presidency lasts six months during which period 
the presiding country is largely responsible for setting the EUs agenda and is responsible for preparing and chairing the 
Council of Ministers meetings as well as the European Council summits. The presiding country mediates between the 
member states and between the member states and the EU institutions, and it represents the EU in matters of foreign 
policy.   
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decision at all. The creation of such leftovers  infamously begun at Amsterdam7  and the 
necessity to deal with them as part of the preparations for the most recent round of enlargement 
partially explain the relatively frequent treaty revisions of later years. The development towards 
more and more frequent revisions seemingly culminated with the agreement on the Nice Treaty, 
which was only reached on the provision that a new reform process was immediately begun.8  
 
2.2. Existing studies of European public debate  
With the account of the formal provisions for and the dominant practices of treaty revisions the 
necessary background information on the EU and its workings has been provided. I now turn to the 
presentation of a background of a different type, namely, the already existing academic studies of 
debate in and about the EU.  
Research of this type usually focuses on the issue of public opinion formation, or 
more specifically, on public opinion, the public sphere, and public opinion formation. A slightly 
different angle is, however, provided by Philip Schlesinger, who emphasises the importance of the 
EUs cultural and media policies and focuses on the relationship between the contents of these 
policies and citizens feelings of allegiance and belonging (see Schlesinger, 1987 and 1991). 
Moreover, Christoph Meyer has, in a study of the EUs communication deficit (Meyer, 1999), 
investigated the role of the European institutions in creating this deficit and their chance of 
ameliorating it, a concern that is also at the core of Schlesingers discussion of EU policy and 
practice. Both Schlesinger and Meyer have much in common with scholars, who focus on the public 
opinion formation; most significantly, they share an interest in the relationship between collective 
identity and public communication. Yet there is an important difference between Schlesinger and 
Meyers approaches and most other studies of public opinion formation. Other studies focus on 
public communication in a broad sense and understand mass mediated public opinion formation as 
existing beyond the grasp of policy makers, be they national or European. Schlesinger and Meyer, 
in the studies cited here, emphasise the possibility of changing existing communication patterns 
                                                        
7 At Amsterdam the leaders failed to reach decisions on three issues: the size and composition of the Commission, the 
weighting of each member states vote in the Council, and the areas in which the Council was to take decision by 
qualified majority voting rather than by consensus. There is general agreement on the presentation of these issues in the 
literature, but see for instance Yataganas (2001) for a thorough review of each of them and an account of the attempt to 
deal with them that led to the creation of the Treaty of Nice. Of particular interest is the fact that all three issues remain 
troublesome  perhaps have become even more problematic  even after an entire IGC has been devoted to their 
resolution. 
8 The Declaration on the future of the Union, the statement initiating a new round of revisions that was appended to 
the Treaty, is central to the debate on the future of Europe, and it forms part of the textual material that will be analysed 
in the following. 
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through policy.9 In the following I focus on studies of public communication in the general sense as 
these are closer related to the investigation I will be conducting than are the studies of the EUs 
media and communication policies. 
Studies of public opinion are dominated by quantitative analyses of data collected in 
the Eurobarometer10 and other extensive surveys. The quantitative studies of public opinion seek 
correlations between peoples views and background variables such as nationality, age, gender, and 
education, but they do not study the processes by which the different groups come to hold their 
opinions. Illuminating as they may be (for a particularly interesting example see Niedermayer and 
Sinnott (eds.), 1995), quantitative studies of public opinion have research agendas that are very 
different from the purpose of the present project. Quantitative studies see public opinion as an 
already existing entity that is to be discovered; I see public opinion as the always momentary result 
of continuous processes of public opinion formation and seek to explain how these processes work. 
Hence, I shall not consider the studies of public opinion further, but instead turn my attention to 
research that shares my emphasis on the dynamic processes of public opinion formation.  
The questions of whether a European public sphere exists, has ever existed or is likely 
to come into existence have received a great deal of attention recently. The reason for the upsurge 
of interest in this matter is that a European public sphere is deemed to be necessary for the 
enhancement of the EUs democratic legitimacy. The issue of the existence of a European public 
sphere is studied in a variety of different ways. One starting point is the theoretical and/or 
normative enumeration and explanation of conditions that are necessary for a public sphere to arise. 
Following Jürgen Habermas path-breaking study of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1989) 
such conditions may be established generally or they may be studied in their European specificity. 
Studies of the conditions that enable a specifically European public sphere take two different 
directions. The investigations are either historical as exemplified by Hartmut Kaelbles (2002) 
review of the features that have enabled European-wide public debate at different moments in time. 
Or they turn to investigating how the specific values and tasks of the EU could be expressed in 
public communication, as in Damian Chalmers and Carlos Closas studies of the potentials of 
European deliberative governance (Chalmers, 2003) and European citizenship (Closa, 2001). 
Empirical investigations of the European public spheres possible existence are  
                                                        
9 It should be noted that Schlesinger has also done research that fuses the study of EU policy with broader investigations 
of the European public sphere (Schlesinger, 1999; Schlesinger & Kevin, 2000). 
10 The Eurobarometer is the EUs official opinion poll; for further information, see its website: 
www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion.  
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complicated somewhat by the unsettled issue of what features constitute that public sphere, but a 
number of researchers have found ways around these complications. Empirical investigations are 
usually facilitated through a simplification of the matters at hand; the empirically inclined 
researcher looks for actual evidence of European-wide public discussions or of public discussions 
of European matters rather than for indications that the general conditions of the public sphere are 
fulfilled. The Europeanisation of public communication, for which the empirical studies seek 
evidence, may be understood in a strong and a weaker sense. In the strong sense, a transnational and 
independent European public sphere is created. In the weak sense, existing national public spheres 
focus increasingly on European issues and do so in a manner consistent with the discussion of the 
same matters conducted in other national fora (Koopmans, Neidhardt & Pfetsch, 2000, pp. 2-3).  
Recognising that the strong form of Europeanisation is highly demanding and quite 
unlikely to arise, given that most means of public communication remain nationally bound, 
empirical studies usually focus on the Europeanisation of national public spheres and are often 
comparative. They investigate the media landscapes of various European countries and assess their 
differences and similarities using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, one 
may count how often European issues are mentioned in the media and compare these numbers with 
the coverage of national, regional, and local issues. Such quantitative studies tend to result in a 
negative evaluation of the European public sphere, since European issues are consistently shown to 
hold low salience (Gerhards, 2000, Porta (ed.), 2003). Interestingly, qualitative studies usually reach 
the opposite conclusion, since investigations of how European issues are reported in national media 
show that the same meaning structures are used in different national contexts (Eder & Kantner, 
2000, Trenz, 2000, Risse & Maier (eds.), 2003).  
The combined results of the quantitative and qualitative empirical investigations of the 
European public sphere are that European issues generally receive less attention than national and 
local subjects, but when the national media do report on European matters they all do so in more or 
less the same manner. The conclusion is that we are witnessing the emergence of not one, but a 
plurality of European public spheres. There is no overarching and coherent European 
communicative network, but the general national spheres converge when European issues are given 
attention, and the emergence of issue-specific and specialised public spheres that cut across national 
publics is a developing trend to be noted. The conclusions of empirical studies are sometimes united 
with the theoretically established prerequisites for the existence of a European public sphere leading 
to the creation of empirically sensitive general requirements. Three such requirements stand out: a 
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high degree of salience of European issues, similar meaning structures across national public 
spheres, and mutual awareness that the issues being discussed in one sphere are also on the agenda 
elsewhere (Risse & Van de Steeg, 2003, p. 16).  
Studies of emergent European public spheres go deeper into the actual debate than do 
the purely quantitative surveys of public opinion. Yet even the most qualitatively oriented studies of 
the meaning structures used in national representations of EU issues emphasise general tendencies 
at the expense of detailed analyses of individual utterances. Such close textual analysis is only 
found in research that focuses on the processes of opinion formation about European matters. This 
type of research typically deals with discussions of a specific issue, concentrates on the debate in 
one or a few countries, and analyses a limited number of texts. One important group of studies aims 
at locating expressions of national identity in the texts under study, sometimes focusing on one 
nationality, sometimes including a comparative aspect (research of this type abounds; representative 
examples include Anderson & Weymouth, 1999, Marcussen et al., 1999, Risse et al., 1999, Wodak 
et al., 1999, and Le, 2002). Another group of studies concentrates the investigation at the 
supranational level and seeks to identify a particularly European mode of opinion formation (this 
approach is less common, but perhaps gaining influence; see Abèlé, 2000, Hellström, 2002, and 
Herrmann, Risse & Brewer (eds.), 2004 for examples of this type of work). There are, however, 
significant overlaps between these two groups of research, as it appears that Europe has become an 
important element in the construction of distinct national identities and that national variation 
remains intrinsic to the articulation of European opinions. Processes of national and European 
opinion and identity formation are deeply interwoven and studies of these processes must take 
account of their mutual interdependence (Risse, 2001).  
 
2.2.1. Demarcation from (social) constructionism and (critical) discourse analysis 
The investigation of the debate on the future of Europe that I shall conduct in the following seeks to 
balance the European and the national perspectives and has much in common with the in-depth 
investigations of European public opinion formation mentioned above. Like the authors of these 
studies I seek detailed explanations of how public opinions are created in particular circumstances 
and through specific utterances. Furthermore, we share a basic interest in the relationship between 
public opinion formation and the creation of collective identities. However, all of the mentioned 
studies explicitly position themselves as constructionist and/or discourse analytical, two interrelated 
approaches to which my own perspective is closely connected, but from which I also wish to 
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distinguish myself. The relationship between my analytical endeavour and the aims of the 
constructionist and discourse analytical investigations of European meaning formation can best be 
illustrated through a consideration of Gilbert Weiss study of speculative talk on Europe (Weiss, 
2002).  
Weiss article is probably the published piece of research that my project resembles 
the most both in terms of the studied material and the objectives of the study. Weiss investigates 
French and German political speeches as a means of casting light on the questions of the identity 
and legitimacy of Europe. He explores the speeches along a space-time and an idea-organisation 
axis concluding that French speakers primarily establish Europe in temporal and ideational terms 
whereas Germans conceive it as a spatial and organisational entity. Weiss seeks to locate the 
dominant strategies of meaning formation of the texts under study and to explain how these 
strategies are employed in the conception of a European political society. These are also central 
concerns of the investigation I undertake, and in this sense my study can be viewed as an extension 
of Weiss that includes a larger number of national contexts as well as more texts of various genres. 
However, I do not only aim at extending the existing study, but also to deepen its conclusions.  
I believe that the choice of a rhetorical rather than a discourse analytical approach 
allows me to reach a more thorough and detailed explanation of the processes of meaning formation 
than Weiss provides. While Weiss goal is to locate discursive patterns and establish separate 
German and French types of discourse, my main interest is not to set up general categories. Instead 
I aim at explaining each utterance both as an articulation of meaning in its own right and as a 
contribution to the European debate. Where Weiss mainly seeks to compartmentalise the speeches 
he studies, my predominant aim is to provide insight into the complex interrelationships between 
them. Where Weiss seeks differences and order, I look for interdependence and nuances.  
These diverging objectives are not caused by a simple difference in analytical 
emphasis, but rather are consequences of the overall assumptions that condition our respective 
approaches: where Weiss understands meaning formation as a construction, I prefer to perceive it as 
a constitutive process. In the following, I shall first discuss the limitations of social constructionism 
and discourse analysis, and then I shall introduce the constitutionist alternative that I advocate. A 
more detailed explanation of the constitutionist approach and its analytical consequences will be 
offered as I turn to the presentation of the theoretical framework and rhetorical perspective that 
sustains and guides my investigations. 
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Both (social) constructionism11 and discourse analysis are broad terms with a variety 
of different interpretations and uses. Generally speaking, social constructionism presents an 
alternative to the positivist theory of knowledge with its ideal of scientific objectivity (Gergen, 
2001, p. 7). The common starting point for constructionists of all hues is the notion that our 
understanding of the world cannot be separated from the contexts and processes in and through 
which we perceive it. Or, to paraphrase the title of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmanns 
groundbreaking work, reality is socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1991). Constructionists 
take for granted that the human understanding of the world is never given and focus attention on the 
process of its construction, but it remains a matter of dispute what consequences this common 
starting point and emphasis should have for research. Discourse analysis offers one prominent 
answer to the latter question, holding that common understandings and general opinions of a group 
or society are the results of discursive interactions within that society and may be studied and 
explained as such (see e.g. van Dijk (ed.), 1997). Thus, one can be a constructionist without being a 
discourse analyst, but the reverse is highly unlikely.12    
The social constructionists common focus on how the human conception of reality is 
formed has led critics of the approach to charge it with idealism and relativism (Parker, 1998, pp. 1-
2). As regards the first charge, indeed some (extravagantly radical) members of the constructionist 
field may deny the independent existence of reality, although it is not at all clear what such denial 
entails.13 However, it is much more common for constructionists to distinguish between social and 
physical reality. The existence of physical reality (bodily illnesses for instance) is not questioned, 
but the human perception of it is (the feeling ill and the processes by which a certain disease, its 
                                                        
11 The term constructivism is also found in the literature, but constructionism is often preferred in order to indicate a 
difference from the constructivist approaches to cognitive processes as forwarded by the likes of Vygotski and Piaget 
(Burr, 1995, p. 2). However, the two positions remain closely related and share the fundamental presupposition that 
social relations influence the individuals understanding and knowledge of the world in which he or she lives (Gergen, 
2001, pp. 123-124).   
12 The field of discourse analysis is, however, so broad and the use of the term so varied that it is not impossible that 
there is someone out there claiming to do discourse analysis from an objectivist position. Nevertheless, I would argue 
that any non-constructionist use of the discourse analytical label would be hard pressed to justify itself. Moreover, I am 
not aware of any scholarship that defends such usage, at least not when by discourse analysis one means the study of 
phenomena existing above the level of the individual text.   
13 The most radical constructionist positions are often associated with postmodernist thinkers such as Jean Baudrillard. 
To my mind, however, the Baudrillardian claim that everything is a simulacrum is as staunch a truth claim as is the 
opposite assertion that everything is real (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 139). That is, taken to its extreme the constructionist 
position becomes the evil twin of positivism, not a viable alternative to it.   
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cause, and cure are discovered).14 Furthermore, some phenomena belong exclusively to the realm of 
social reality (the broad categories of cultural practices and political institutions spring to mind), 
and although they do have physical manifestations (museums and parliaments, say) they can be 
studied as social constructs without remainder. In this sense, social phenomena gain their very 
reality precisely because they are constructed, and even when there is a material base to the 
processes of social construction, the study of these processes is valid and worthwhile in its own 
right. The charge of idealism, then, can be overcome by pointing out that social construction is a 
very real and very central element of the human world.  
The charge of relativism, as I see it, is potentially more damaging to the 
constructionist position. Constructionists contend, and rightly so, that such phenomena as social 
norms and political practices are conditioned by the circumstances in which they arise, take on 
various shapes in different contexts, and can be altered within the specific contexts in which they 
arise. However, the sensitivity to the dynamic and contextual character of (social) knowledge may 
lead to either a naive cherishing of all norms and practices as being right and good in their proper 
contexts or a constant suspicion that no society is ever good enough.  
Multiculturalism, a popular approach to intercultural encounters in the face of the 
plurality of norms and values, provides an apt example of the first constructionist option and its 
limitations.15 Zygmunt Bauman presents the problem pointedly:  
the invocation of multiculturalism when made by the learned classes [] means: 
Sorry, we cannot bail you out of the mess you are in. Yes, there is confusion about 
values, about the meaning of being human, about the right ways of living together; but 
it is up to you to sort it out in your own fashion and bear the consequences in the event 
that you are not happy with the results. Yes, there is a cacophony of voices and no tune 
is likely to be sung in unison, but do not worry: no tune is necessarily better than the 
next, and if it were there wouldnt at any rate be a way of knowing it (Bauman, 2001, p. 
124). 
 
Thus, the constructionist position may lead to a relativistic disengagement based on the claim that 
no one is able to understand norms and practices that originate in contexts other than their own. The 
idea is that even though a certain practice may look utterly despicable from my place of perception, 
it may be perfectly acceptable in someone elses context, and I am in no position to know. This sort 
of relativism not only disallows engagement and learning between differently situated individuals, 
                                                        
14 To illustrate this point further it may be noted that the great majority of constructionists would concede that the earth 
has a certain shape independently of the form we attribute to it, but they do not think it possible to determine that shape 
independently of the processes of determination. Opining that the resulting beliefs all too often obliterate the processes 
by which they come about, constructionist researchers seek to draw attention to and explain these processes as such.  
15 For a more thorough presentation and critique of multiculturalism see Just (forthcoming).  
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but also has the slightly ironic twist of making each position anything but relative to its occupants. 
If I am not able to come to an understanding of any other positions than my own, how am I to learn 
that some of my current practices and beliefs may be less than perfect, and how am I going to be 
able to change them? If learning from others is not possible how can one learn at all?  
 The second possible constructionist take on relativism seeks to avoid the weaknesses 
of the first by focusing on the shortcomings of existing situations and emphasising how things could 
be different. Many modes of discourse analysis and particularly the influential approach known as 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) exemplify this suspicious constructionism. CDA takes its starting 
point from the insight that discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it 
constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between 
people and groups of people (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258). In studying the relationship 
between discursive action and social structures (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 9), CDA tends to focus on 
the dark side of discourse. The purpose is to highlight discursive features that usually pass 
unnoticed but contribute significantly to the creation of social reality.  
A specific emphasis is placed on the power relations embedded in predominant and 
commonly accepted discourses: discriminations that generally shared presuppositions uphold, 
discursive patterns and standard expressions that favour certain groups or obliterate possible 
alternative positions (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, pp. 4-6). Thus, CDA operates on the 
suspicion that something is always rotten; for instance, New Labours talk of reforming the welfare 
system and enhancing social inclusion by creating more job opportunities is revealed to be nothing 
but a new form of exclusion and oppression (Fairclough, 2000). The aim of CDA, most 
unambiguously in Norman Faircloughs version of it, is to explain the relationship between 
discursive and social practices in order to allow people to change their discursive practices in 
directions that will emancipate them socially (Fairclough, 1992, esp. chap. 7).  
CDA seeks to avoid the constructionist trap of relativism by focusing on the 
relationship between discourse and society and emphasising how discourses may hide or even 
excuse social injustices. Thereby, CDA becomes able to pass critical judgement on current 
situations and to create possibilities for change, but it is my contention that CDA obtains its critical 
privileges at the expense of its fundamental insight about the social constitutiveness of discourse. In 
order to perform its critique CDA must operate with a notion of what is really going on behind the 
discourse and grant itself a privileged position; the notion is that these people may think they are 
perfectly happy, but we know better, and their discourse reveals their subjugation. But if the 
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contention that social reality is discursively constituted is to be taken seriously, one should also be 
willing to take the full consequences of that claim. There is nothing behind the discursive 
constitution of the social, there is no recourse to a truer understanding of the situation with which 
the predominant discursive constructions can be compared, and there is no way of generating 
change except with the available discursive means. In its attempt to avoid the charges of relativity 
and to endow its normative position with critical bite, CDA tends to disregard the theoretical 
foundation in the constitutive nature of discourse that in my opinion is its greatest asset. 
I believe that the relativist weaknesses of the constructionist stance can be avoided 
without hampering the basic insight that human understanding is a contextually bound social and 
communicative process from which there is no escape. We are beings of space and time; always 
facing each other and the world in the concrete here and now, but while the context limits our 
actions it is also what enables us to act. Without limitations there would be no possibilities; human 
action is facilitated by the prior existence of structures and frameworks, norms and expectations that 
give us guidance on what to do and how to do it. On the one hand, it is only by means of our 
preceding understanding that we can make sense of the specific situations in which action must be 
taken, but rendering a situation meaningful is, on the other hand, a truly creative act from which 
new opportunities may spring. Social realities are continually constituted by the sense people make 
of them, and the processes of meaning formation are in turn constituted by structures and 
expectations that exist prior to the specific interaction. Social constitution contains its own dynamic 
whereby change becomes possible as a consequence of existing understandings. Our situatedness is 
what allows us to move beyond existing horizons.  
The reflection on the interdependence of limits and possibilities for the creation of 
social reality provides the starting point for an alternative to constructionism that I propose to label 
constitutionism (Just & Noergaard, 2004). This term has a decidedly Habermasian flavour; 
acknowledging his debt to Kant, Jürgen Habermas defines constitutionism as the primordial 
entwinement of knowledge, thought, and reality. Says Habermas: [the human race is] a species that 
reproduces itself under cultural conditions, that is that constitutes itself in a self-formative process 
(Habermas, 1972, p. 195). The shift from constructionism to Habermasian constitutionism is also a 
move from the language of discourse analysis to that of discourse ethics with its emphasis on  
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communicative action and intersubjective understanding.16 The constitutionist position is based on 
the claim that the world and our being in it only become meaningful through processes of 
communicative interaction. Furthermore, constitutionism focuses on the continual production and 
reproduction of meaning based on guidelines and norms that exist prior to any given interaction, but 
are only articulated in concrete communications.  
Continual meaning formation is the process that constitutes our social reality; such 
meaning formation is, of course, connected to phenomena that are not purely communicative, but 
these phenomena only become meaningful through communicative interaction. The focus of 
attention for research that adheres to the constitutionist approach is the question of how meaning is 
constituted in and through communication. Emphasis is placed on specific utterances and their 
relationship with other utterances, on the constitution of common understandings in communicative 
networks, rather than on the relationship between discursive and extradiscursive phenomena. By 
focusing on communicative norms and expectations and the creative use of these to form new 
meanings in specific situations the constitutionist researcher seeks to explain how the contexts in 
which we interact and the meanings we create are stabilised yet remain changeable.  
The constitutionist perspective, as I intend to employ it and shall present it in the 
following chapter, concentrates on the things it explains best, namely, how meaning is constituted 
communicatively. I believe that the theoretical position of constitutionism is best substantiated and 
operationalised in and through the rhetorical approach to meaning formation. The constitutionist 
framework as expressed in rhetorical criticism demarcates the present project from constructionist 
discourse analyses. While the theoretical implications are deep, the practical consequences of this 
demarcation are of nuance and explanatory emphasis rather than of kind. My investigation remains 
closely associated with the constructionist and discourse analytical research on European public 
debate and greatly indebted to its findings.  
Having presented the backdrop of my study both in terms of general information 
about the EU and in terms of existing research on European debate, I turn to the task of detailing the 
theoretical framework within which I will conduct the investigation of the debate on the future of 
Europe. Through the presentation of the rhetorical perspective I shall seek to substantiate the claims 
abut the advantages of constitutionism, and having dealt with this basic issue I shall turn to a 
                                                        
16 See for instance Habermas (1997a) for a good introduction of discourse ethics and Habermas (1984 and 1987) for a 
full presentation of the theory of communicative action. In the following I will have much more to say about Habermas 
view of the interrelationship between communication and the constitution of society, but it should already now be noted 
that Habermas sees an intimate connection between legal constitutional frameworks and social constitutive processes 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 299).  
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consideration of legitimacy, identity and public opinion, the more specific theoretical concepts by 
which this study is informed. 
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3.  
Theoretical framework 
 
 
his chapter begins with an introduction of the rhetorical perspective. Then, I shall consider 
the relationship between the rhetorical and other disciplinary approaches. Finally, the chapter 
contains a presentation of the social scientific concepts of legitimacy, identity and public opinion. 
These three concepts will be examined both with regard to their particular relevance for the 
empirical study of the EU and their theoretical relationship with the field of rhetoric. A 
consideration of the concrete procedures for selecting and investigating the empirical data will 
precede the actual analyses, but will not figure in the more general theoretical discussions that are 
the focus at present.  
In its entirety my approach to the study of the debate on the future of Europe may be 
unfolded as shown in figure 1. The present chapter discusses the rhetorical perspective and the 
incorporation of the social scientific concepts into that perspective, whereas the introduction of the 
specific analytical tools will await their implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The approach unfolded 
  
T 
The rhetorical 
 perspective: 
Meaning making as  
rhetorical action 
Theoretical concepts:
- Public opinion (formation) 
- Legitimacy/legitimation 
- Identity/identification 
Analytical tools:
- Trajectory-turning point 
- Textual-intertextual analysis 
- Personae 
- Agency 
- Topos 
- Kairos 
- Chronotope 
- Telos Criteria for selecting 
the textual material: 
- quantity, representability  
- quality, significance 
- necessity  
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3.1. The rhetorical perspective 
The study that I shall undertake has a significant interdisciplinary inclination, but its basic 
orientation is rhetorical. The overriding purpose of the investigation of the debate on the future of 
Europe is to explain how meaning is created in the interrelationships between various utterances 
and their contexts of articulation. In so far as social scientific concepts are brought into the analysis, 
they are auxiliary to the rhetorical task of explaining the communicative formation of meaning. The 
rhetorical perspective not only directs the attention of the investigation, but also expresses the 
constitutionist understanding of social reality that I advocate. An exploration of the rhetorical theory 
of how meaning is constituted therefore precedes the presentation of the social scientific concepts. 
In the following, I shall take my starting point from the classical division of rhetoric into a practical 
and a theoretical dimension, and I shall then argue that an inherently rhetorical mode of analysis 
should be added to the two classical dimensions. The goal of the ensuing discussion is to establish a 
general perspective from which rhetorical acts may be studied as being constitutive of meaning. 
 
3.1.1. Rhetoric is meaningful  meaning is rhetorical 
Rhetoric, some argue, is the practical art of persuasion, and should be distinguished from the 
hermeneutic endeavour of interpreting meaning (Gaonkar, 1997). This argument appears to find 
support in the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the 
available means of persuasion (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b). Aristotle recognises that rhetoric 
cannot be defined by its subject matter (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b and 1359b), but he also asserts 
that the rhetorical activity is productive of a specific kind of knowledge and thereby creates 
boundaries that are perhaps not very clearly defined but still limit the range of rhetoric. Rhetoric is 
not defined by the specific topics with which rhetors deal, but by the things that the speakers do to 
and with these topics, by the nature of the rhetorical endeavour. To Aristotle, rhetoric is an ability 
that has to do with doxae  the probabilities that are the means and ends of arguments conducted in 
circumstances of contingency (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1357a). The rhetor argues the plausibility of his 
or her claims to knowledge and advocates the desirability of his or her preferred courses of action; 
the aim is to win the argument here and now, but the truth and rightness of a claim is only 
established until further notice. Rhetoric is, on the one hand, the specific acts of persuasion, on the 
other hand, a set of normative guidelines concerning the rhetorical practice.   
In the Aristotelian conception, the rhetorician is either a practitioner or a teacher, and 
this understanding prevailed in the classical Latin understanding of rhetoric as either rhetorica utens 
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or rhetorica docens (Gaonkar, 1997, p. 27). Given the definition of rhetoric as a practical art 
confined to the domain of doxa, how is the introduction of the third category of rhetorical criticism 
justified? And how may the end of such rhetorical criticism come to be seen as the explanation of 
meaning? 
The basic argument for the suspension of the distinction between the interpretive1 or 
hermeneutic and the practical rhetorical task is one of reciprocity (Black, 1978, p. 10). The 
practitioners rhetorical act of formulating and uttering a statement intended to fulfil some function 
in a given social setting calls for the equally rhetorical investigation of how that statement is made 
and what purposes it serves. This argument is based on the close connection between theory and 
practice that has been rhetorics hallmark since antiquity, but the emphasis has shifted from 
effectiveness to understanding (Gaonkar, 1997, p. 27).2 The preoccupation with understanding leads 
the critic to investigate how utterances become meaningful for speakers and audiences. However, 
this investigation is still guided by the basic rhetorical question: why is the author doing this and 
what is the intended effect on readers? (Booth, 2001, p. 187).3  
The interpretive turn in rhetorical studies is premised upon a specific understanding of 
meaning according to which the rhetorical practitioners formulation of the utterance cannot be 
separated from his or her own interpretation of the world. In their pioneering article on the 
relationship between hermeneutics and rhetoric Michael Hyde and Craig Smith argue that meaning 
is derived by a human being in and through the interpretive understanding of reality. Rhetoric is the 
process of making-known that meaning (Hyde & Smith, 1998, p. 66, emphasis removed). Only in 
their articulation do understandings and opinions become truly meaningful. Such an understanding 
of the rhetorical endeavour as an expository process leads to the conclusion that hermeneutics and 
rhetoric form a symbiotic relationship with each other. The relationship defines the process of 
interpretive understanding and meaning formation that lies at the heart of our temporal existence 
(Hyde, 2001, p. 336). Or, as Hans-Georg Gadamer, the exponent of modern philosophical 
hermeneutics par excellence, puts it, the rhetorical and the hermeneutical aspects of human 
                                                        
1 I understand interpretive as a technical term designating the practice of studying and explaining the meaning formation 
of texts (for an introduction to this usage see for instance Gross & Keith, 1997, p. 11). 
2 Gaonkar is himself sceptical of the interpretive turn, but that does not make his presentation of it any less illuminating.  
3 Such a definition of the rhetorical critical task, of course, begs the question of how we gain access to the speakers 
intentions. As will be seen shortly I advocate the study of rhetorical action in its pure textuality as a way of side-
stepping this difficult issue. The leading analytical question, then, becomes not what the author meant to say, but what 
meanings are articulated in the text.  
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linguisticality interpenetrate each other at every point (Gadamer, 1985, p. 280).4 The individuals 
understanding of the world and his or her expression of it are intimately connected, and the creation 
of meaning can thus be understood as an inherently rhetorical process. 
By pointing out that the rhetorical practice is always already interpretive, Hyde and 
Smith establish the link between rhetoric and meaning. What has happened is that the rhetorical 
intention of persuading a particular audience of some specific point has been equated with the more 
general aims of discovering and communicating how one understands a given issue. This equation 
is performed through a reconsideration of what it means to be rhetorical. The redefinition not only 
marks a turn to interpretation in rhetorical studies, but also a move away from the instrumental 
understanding of rhetoric that is often implied in the singular focus on how the rhetors persuasive 
endeavour becomes most effective. In this movement the scope of the rhetorical is broadened 
considerably; the term is no longer used as a label for a certain category of utterances, but is instead 
regarded as a constitutive element of all communication. Rhetoric, as Kenneth Burke famously puts 
it, is rooted in an essential function of language itself []; the use of language as a symbolic 
means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols (Burke, 1969, p. 43, 
emphasis removed).  
The language-functional understanding of rhetoric provides the basis for viewing 
rhetoric as meaningful, but in order for the connection between rhetoric and interpretation to be 
fully established, the rhetoricity of meaning must also be recognised; a definition of meaning as a 
communicative and dynamic process must be substantiated. Although it cannot be denied that 
words have some degree of stable intentional and conventional meaning, there is an equally 
undeniable actional or communicative dimension of meaning formation. Words only become fully 
meaningful when used in utterances whose meanings, in turn, are never simply the sum of the 
employed units. Meaning is use, as Wittgenstein would have it (Wittgenstein, 2001, § 43), and only 
emerges in the act of usage. When the dynamic, communicative dimension of meaning is 
highlighted, it becomes possible to see meaning formation as being subject to the urgency and 
contingency that is characteristic of the rhetorical endeavour (Farrell & Frentz, 1979). Meaningful 
expressions are only created through adaptation of the articulations to the specific situations in 
which they are made. Hence, the articulation of meaning becomes a rhetorical act, the result of the 
meeting between a certain speaker and a particular audience, expressed in a specific way and  
                                                        
4 This understanding is echoed in the Danish rhetorical scholar Jørgen Fafners dictum that rhetoric and hermeneutics 
are connected like Siamese twins (Fafner, 1997, p. 15).  
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influenced by various factors of the given situation and the broader societal context. The speakers 
interpretive skills are prerequisite to his or her rhetorical act, and the audiences rhetorical 
capabilities are in turn inherent to the interpretation of the utterance; meaning is constituted in this 
dual rhetorical-hermeneutical process.  
The interdependency of speaking and interpreting forms the basis of the constitutionist 
approach to meaning formation. In the constitutionist view social knowledge arises in situations that 
are always already constrained by prior knowledge and expectations as well as other contextual 
factors. While the constraints limit the range of possibilities available to the actors, these very limits 
are also what facilitates choice and as such makes action possible. When given a constitutionist 
foundation rhetoric is inherently interpretive, and the aim of rhetorical criticism is to understand the 
communicative constitution of meaning on its own terms. 
 
3.1.2. Bringing Aristotle back in 
Having established the interdependencies of rhetoric and meaning and rhetoric and hermeneutics we 
are drawing nearer to the question of how the rhetorical analysis should be conducted. However, 
one issue remains open: does the interpretive turn in rhetoric imply that we should give up the 
classical foundations of the discipline? Is the possibility of rhetorical interpretation bought at the 
price of the classical concepts? Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (1997) argues that the classical 
concepts with their explicit practical and pedagogical aims are too thin for analytical purposes. 
However, I believe that the classical roots of rhetoric should be preserved, not only as part of the 
disciplines foundational myth, but as central and useful elements of present-day rhetorical studies. 
The classical rhetorical scholars both offer theoretical underpinnings for the discipline on which the 
analytical practice may be based, and they present a number of concepts that may easily and with 
great advantage be adapted for analytical purposes.  
Certainly, the interpretive use of the classical theories of rhetoric involves some 
adaptation, but the exercise of reconsidering the practical art of rhetoric from the constitutionist 
position is well worth the while, as I hope to illustrate with the following reinterpretation of 
Aristotles rhetoric. The reading to follow is greatly indebted to the Spanish-Swedish rhetorical 
scholar José Luis Ramírez, who has developed a humanistic theory of action in which the 
understanding of rhetorical utterances as creative acts that are constitutive of meaning forms the 
cornerstone. To me, Ramírez theoretical endeavour is especially appealing because it does not 
depart from Aristotles conceptions, but instead arrives at the constitutionist perspective through a 
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careful repositioning of rhetoric within the framework of Aristotles general theory of knowledge 
formation.  
Ramírez basic contention is that the articulation of meaning is a rhetorical praxis, that 
meaning is created in and through its specific formulation under particular circumstances. This 
claim is grounded in a re-examination of Aristotles understanding of knowledge. In the Aristotelian 
knowledge scheme there are two basic kinds of knowledge: episteme is the theoretical and certain 
type of knowledge that is the object of the natural sciences, and doxa is the practical kind produced 
in the multiple settings of social life. As mentioned earlier, Aristotle thinks rhetoric is productive of 
the second type of knowledge. Ramírez makes no attempt to counter this view and concentrates his 
investigation at the level of socially contingent knowledge formation. This level of knowledge is 
again divided into a productive (poíesis) and a practical (praxis) way of knowing and acting. The 
purpose (telos) of the former mode of knowing is the realisation of something by means of 
something else; the fulfilment of production lies outside the scope of the individual action, and it 
has technical ability (tekhne) as its form of knowledge.5 The latter type is conducted for its own 
sake, and its knowledge form is practical wisdom (phronesis)6 (Ramírez, 1995, p. 8). Whereas 
poíesis is instrumental, the performance of praxis implies the simultaneous realisation of the act and 
its telos, or put differently the act is the purpose. Figure 2 presents an overview of the relationships 
between the ways of knowing and forms of knowledge. 
ACTIVITY     KNOWLEDGE FORM 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Ways of knowing and types of knowledge 
(adapted from Ramírez, 1995, p. 8) 
Aristotle classified rhetorical knowledge and knowledge of rhetoric as tekhne (Conley, 
1990, p. 14), but Ramírez argues that rhetoric also has a dimension of phronesis and thereby of 
                                                        
5 The typical example here is the construction of a material object. When one builds a piece of wooden furniture, for 
instance, the individual acts of sawing, hammering, etc. are all directed at producing the furniture, but the purpose is 
only realised in the finished product that exists independently of the process by which it was created.  
6 Praxis is not as easy to exemplify as poíesis, but think of the declarative performatives of Austins famous speech act 
theory (I name this ship), and more specifically think of the illocutionary force of an utterance as opposed to its 
perlocutionary consequences (Austin, 1962). The comparison with speech act theory foreshadows the important point 
that rhetorical acts, according to Ramírez, are simultaneously productive and practical. 
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praxis. In so doing Ramírez reforms Aristotles notion of rhetoric, but he does so from within the 
broader Aristotelian categorisation of the different forms of knowledge. The connection between 
rhetoric and praxis is established by way of a pragmatic understanding of language according to 
which phronesis is articulated in logos, defined broadly as both thoughts and words. The telos of 
speech is the creation of meaning and as such it is realised in and through the utterance, but the 
rhetorical act also retains the instrumental aspect of expressing its meaning through this or that 
choice of words. As Ramírez puts it, logos is the creative force, the activity which, in order to 
intervene in the world, must be objectified and reified. Praxis is expressed in poíesis (Ramírez, 
1995, p. 204, my translation). Meaning is not identical with the words that express it, yet it can 
never arise independently of the words.7  
Having established a link between praxis and poíesis, Ramírez can redefine rhetoric as 
knowledge of how the words and the world become meaningful (Ramírez, 1995, p. 255, my 
translation). In its concrete articulation the rhetorical act unites an ethical dimension with the 
aesthetic endeavour of expressing something by means of something else, and only in this unison 
does meaning arise.8 Or, to put the matter in the simplest possible terms, the specific meaning of an 
utterance is constituted in and through its unique combination of content and form. When 
constructing the particular utterance the speaker chooses from a variety of different styles and 
arguments, and Ramírez sees these topoi  the places from where arguments and expressions are 
obtained  as providing an inventory of possible significances. Meaning, however, is only created 
as the merger of form and content in the particular moment of articulation.9 Thereby, the choice of 
topos is connected with kairos, the opportune moment, and the phronetic rhetorical act, the 
communicative interaction that fulfils its own telos, may be finally defined as the choice of the right 
                                                        
7 The affinity between this position and the starting point of Judith Butlers study of Excitable Speech is striking. Writes 
Butler: We do things with language, produce effects with language, and we do things to language, but language is also 
the thing that we do. Language is a name for our doing: both what we do (the name for the action that we 
characteristically perform) and that which we effect, the act and its consequences (Butler, 1997, p. 8). While I agree 
perfectly with the understanding of language Butler advocates here, my analytical focus is different from hers. Butler 
aims at understanding the doing and its effects, whereas I wish to explain the act and its prerequisites. However, even 
these diverging purposes are joined in the common understanding that the explanatory aims are best met in the 
investigation of how acts are performed.  
8 This conception has much in common with the view expressed in Thomas Farrells work on the relationship between 
rhetorical theory and social knowledge (Farrell, 1976 and 1993). Farrells position is of special interest to the present 
study because it is based on a rereading of both Aristotles classical rhetorical theory and Jürgen Habermas present-day 
philosophical-sociological conception of society.  
9 To Ramírez, significance is the sense of an expression which can be established independently of the particular 
context in which the expression is employed; meaning, on the contrary, only arises through the dynamic fusion of text 
and context (Ramírez, 1995, p. 222). Others have defined meaning as the stable element and viewed significance as the 
alterable dimension (see Hyde, 2001, p. 333), but I prefer Ramírez distinction and shall adhere to it in the following. 
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expression at the right time (Ramírez, 1995, p. 266).10 Thus, a mutually constitutive dynamic of the 
meaning and its articulation is established: the right utterance is that which enacts its telos, but the 
telos only becomes known in and through the utterance. There is no way of knowing which 
meaning is right in advance of its articulation, and no way of evaluating the rightness of the 
meaning independently of the articulation.  
Ramírez humanistic theory of action provides the main inspiration for the rhetorical 
perspective that informs this study. The theory, I believe, explains well why the art of persuasion 
should be regarded as an interpretive study of the creation of meaning, and it justifies the 
explanatory potential contained in this view. The reconsideration of Aristotles knowledge scheme 
and the redefinition of rhetoric as praxis expressed in poíesis enhance and refine the constitutionist 
position. The communicative creation of meaning may now be understood as both a reproductive 
and a creative process, the use of pre-existing norms and expectations to create new understandings 
and opinions. Moreover, meaning is conditioned by the situation in which it is articulated; it arises 
in the contextually bound meeting between speaker and audience and is thus a thoroughly social 
phenomenon. The ensuing understanding of the rhetorical act makes processes of meaning 
formation available for rhetorical study, and at the same time it points to the character of such 
rhetorical investigations and their results. Commonly acknowledged meanings are the goal of both 
the practical rhetorical act and the analytical rhetorical endeavour. The analyst cannot claim any 
privileged position from which certain knowledge can be announced; instead the rhetorical critic is 
committed to and bound by the acts of meaning formation that he or she seeks to explain. The 
meaning formation of the analyst is hermeneutically aligned with that of the practitioner.  
In adhering to Ramírez action-theoretical explanation of the link between rhetorical 
utterances and the creation of meaning, I am also provided with conceptual tools for the analysis of 
rhetorical meaning formation. The introduction of telos, topos, kairos, and the interrelations 
between them as central to the constitution of meaning offers clues as to how the meaning 
formation of rhetorical utterances may be discovered and explained. The three concepts will be 
central to the analysis of the debate on the future of Europe, and they will be discussed further 
before being employed (see chapter 6). However, the time has not yet come to unfold the specific 
analytical practices, as I still need to attend to the question of how the rhetorical perspective relates 
                                                        
10 The mutually constitutive relationship between concrete utterances and general norms that follows from this view is 
consistent with the position expressed in Carolyn R. Millers influential work on genre as social action (Miller, 1984) 
and her later elaboration on the cultural basis of genre (Miller, 1994). Although I shall not pursue the generic 
perspective in the present study, it is evident that the issue of how a certain utterance is shaped in order to express a 
specific meaning is inextricably linked to the expectations of the genre to which that utterance belongs.  
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to other disciplines that are of relevance to the study of the European debate. In the following I shall 
first establish the general interdisciplinary potential of the rhetorical perspective. Then I will discuss 
social scientific and rhetorical conceptualisations of legitimacy, identity and public opinion, the 
three notions that in this study serve as focal points within the overarching rhetorical-constitutionist 
approach to the formation of meaning. 
 
3.2. The interdisciplinary nature of the project 
The EU is a thoroughly researched phenomenon; there are subfields within the disciplines of 
history, law, and political science dealing exclusively with the matter, and sociological and 
anthropological investigations of life in the Union are also becoming more and more frequent. That 
the EU should be of great interest to legal, political, and social scholars11 is hardly surprising: the 
creation of a European polity endowed with a legal framework and a social base constitutes a 
unique opportunity for empirical testing of theoretically conceived hypotheses about society 
formation. Through theorisation and empirical testing the legal and social sciences have built up a 
comprehensive EU-lore which has in turn informed the practices of politicians and policy-makers 
and thus has not left its subject-matter untouched. The European political project is a remarkably 
reflexive one in the sense that academic investigations and evaluations of the EU have continuously 
influenced its developments and vice versa.12 Political and academic debates about the EUs current 
situation and about possible solutions to perceived problems have often overlapped, and no student 
of European political discussions can ignore the corresponding scholarly disputes completely. 
 The close link between political and academic discussions provides a first reason why 
legal and social scientific concepts are indispensable for the rhetorical study of the creation of 
meaning in the debate on the future of Europe. These concepts and their development form part of 
the meaning formation; they shape and inform the political debate while also providing second 
order explanations of what the debate is about. The study of the academic debate on the EU might 
well form an independent rhetorical project. However, the focus of the present study is the political 
level of debate, and the question therefore is how legal and political scientific concepts may inform 
                                                        
11 There are of course many differences between students of legal systems, political institutions, and societal 
developments, but they all share an interest in the structures and functions of society. For the sake of convenience I 
shall use the term social sciences as a collective label for the various political and social scientific disciplines. The 
expression the legal and social sciences hence refers broadly to all the disciplinary approaches with which my own 
rhetorical perspective enters into interdisciplinary contact.  
12 In the following I focus attention on the academic influence on political developments, but the reversed flow of 
information and impact is, of course, equally important.  
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rhetorical investigation. How can the rhetorical perspective and the social scientific concepts 
merge? 
The question of the possibility of interdisciplinarity hinges upon the different 
disciplines understanding of the kind of knowledge they produce. The legal and social sciences 
have typically adhered to an objective and universal ideal of knowledge; scholars in these fields 
strive for the kind of knowledge Aristotle termed episteme and therefore deny that their 
investigations have a rhetorical dimension. However, to Aristotle the study of society was the prime 
practical discipline  thoroughly steeped in praxis and productive of phronesis  and this 
understanding of the social sciences has regained influence in recent years (Flyvbjerg, 1991, pp.70-
71). Hence, the social sciences and the rhetorical discipline, as I have repositioned it in the 
preceding section, belong to the same sphere of knowledge, whereby interdisciplinary dialogue 
becomes possible. 
Some present-day scholars have taken the argument about the practical dimension of 
knowledge formation further, claiming that all knowledge is intrinsically social, that there is no 
episteme without praxis. Steve Fuller, who is the founder of social epistemology, a research 
program aimed at the normative assessment of current scientific practices of knowledge production 
(Fuller, 2002, p. ix), promotes this claim forcefully. While Fullers discussion of the status of 
knowledge production in the natural sciences is not pertinent to the present consideration of the 
possibility of merging rhetorical and social scientific perspectives, his positioning of rhetoric as a 
central element in the social epistemological program is central to this line of reasoning. In Fullers 
scheme rhetoric plays the role of facilitating interdisciplinarity. Through an investigation of the 
rhetorical strategies that various disciplines use in their construction of knowledge and a critique of 
the disciplinary boundaries that are thus constructed, rhetoric emerges as the mediator between 
disciplines. The aim of Fullers investigation is to develop a rhetoric of interpenetrability that 
displays interdisciplinary unity and conflict and may recast disciplinary boundaries as artificial 
barriers to the transaction of knowledge claims (Fuller & Collier, 2004, p. 3).  
Fuller is neither the only nor the first scholar to recognise rhetorics interdisciplinary 
powers. In medieval and renaissance times  when all scholarship was interdisciplinary  rhetoric 
was often seen as the master-study organizing and strengthening all the others (Booth, 2001, p. 
184). Furthermore, rhetoric has been seen as a generally applicable method that all disciplines 
rely on for their roadwork (Booth, 2001, p. 188). To these two interdisciplinary functions Fuller 
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adds a third: that of the mediator. Rhetoric, says Fuller, provides the means by which the connection 
between previously separated fields of study may be established. 13  
When the social epistemological argument is followed through, it may be argued that 
rhetoric itself holds the key to the merger between it and other academic disciplines. In the 
following, I shall proceed from this assumption and attempt to create interpenetration between the 
legal and social scientific concepts and the rhetorical perspective, the purpose being to establish a 
genuinely interdisciplinary analytical approach to the debate on the future of Europe. First, I shall 
present the basic concepts upon which the social scientific assumptions about the debate are based 
and the various general understandings of and recommendations for the EU that emerge from these 
assumptions. Second, I shall explore the relationship between the social scientific concepts and 
rhetorical theory.  
 
3.3. Legitimacy, identity, public opinion  and the European Union 
As mentioned above, many of the assumptions and controversies that characterise the debate on the 
future of Europe have parallel academic and political versions, and there is a high degree of 
exchange between the academic and political arenas of debate. In the following, I shall present the 
academic version of the debate; the subsequent empirical investigations will focus on the political 
enactment of the same issues. Thus, the theoretical concepts presented here will be drawn into the 
analysis of the empirical data in order to explain the processes of meaning formation, but the data 
also provides insights into how the theoretical notions are enacted in practice.  
The social scientific study of the EU is characterised by a rather stark entrenchment 
between different general theories  for instance realism and (neo-)functionalism  claiming to 
provide internally coherent and comprehensive explanations of European integration. Adherents to 
the various theories tend to deny or ignore the merits of each others positions, wherefore the most 
constructive and fruitful discussions are carried out within the individual schools of thought rather 
than between them. Here, I focus attention on discussions between academics, who all adhere to a 
deliberative understanding of democracy in general and European integration in particular. Within 
this approach political processes are conceived as deliberations, and the EUs legal, political, and 
social formations are studied from a primarily participatory perspective, concentrating on 
contributions that go into decision-making.  
                                                        
13 Taken as a whole Fullers view of rhetoric may be too instrumental to sit comfortably with the rhetorical perspective I 
have developed above (see Keith, 1995), but this discrepancy does not impinge upon the relevance of his thoughts on 
rhetorics interdisciplinary potential.  
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I have singled out the deliberative approach because I consider it to be the most 
topical to the discussions that are currently undertaken at the political level. Of the various available 
explanatory schemes the theory of deliberative democracy is arguably the most finely attuned to the 
problems and challenges that define the present moment of European integration (Eriksen & 
Fossum, 2000).14 A further reason for emphasising the deliberative model is that it is the social 
scientific approach that is most immediately compatible with my own research agenda and overall 
perspective. This is not to say that other social scientific approaches are generally invalid or 
unimportant, but simply a note of the fact that they have different concerns than those pertinent to 
the rhetorical study of meaning making. Accordingly, the presentation of the legal and social 
scientific conceptualisations will focus primarily on the discussions carried out between scholars, 
who may have little else in common, but at least agree on conducting the discussion within the 
general setting of the theory of deliberative democracy.15   
The legal and political scientific literatures that discuss the EU as a democratic polity 
and assess the future developments of that polity in terms of its deliberative potential share one 
basic assumption: legitimacy, identity, and public opinion are interdependent concepts of the utmost 
importance. This shared assumption leads to a wide variety of different conclusions about the 
relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion and its impact on European 
developments, and these conclusions spur at least as many predictions and recommendations, but 
the starting point of the argument is always the same.  
The various theoretical verdicts also begin with a common empirical observation, 
namely, that the Europeanisation of politics  the transfer to the EU of tasks that were previously 
decided and performed at the national level  has not been accompanied by an equal increase in 
citizen support for the European project. The EU in its present state is not generating the kind of 
acceptance and allegiance from its citizens that one would expect of a political project with the 
dimensions and ambitions of the Union. Citizens, it is agreed, do not feel any strong attachment to 
the European polity, and they participate very little in the political discussions that inform the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
14 As my repeated mention of the connection between academic and political levels of debate should indicate this is a 
recursive process. As the deliberative model of explanation gains supporters the political processes may in fact become 
more deliberative whereby the explanatory power of the theory is in turn enhanced. 
15 For a general introduction and discussion of deliberative democracy see Elster (ed.) (1998). The collection of essays 
in Eriksen & Fossum (eds.) (2000) provides an overview of the employment of the deliberative democratic perspective 
in studies of the EU.  
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Unions policy choices. This situation is known as the EUs democratic deficit,16 and the different 
reflections on the interdependence between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion aim at offering 
theoretical grounds for ameliorating the problematic condition of deficiency.  
In the following, I shall seek to unravel the different explanations of the relationship 
between the three concepts and the hypotheses about European polity- and policy-making that they 
lead to. In so doing, I shall begin with a presentation of the concept of legitimacy, and as I move on 
to identity and then to public opinion I shall both introduce these notions individually and seek to 
show how the three concepts are interrelated. Following the general presentations, I shall discuss 
the different consequences that the variously conceived conceptual interdependencies have for the 
understanding of the EU.17    
 
3.3.1. Legitimacy 
A political regimes legitimacy is, broadly speaking, measured by that regimes reasonableness and 
justifiability, by the degree to which the regime is commended to and accepted by its subjects 
(Banchoff & Smith, 1999, p. 4). In a slightly more specific sense of the word, the legitimate is that 
which is right according to law. However, legitimacy in this stricter sense may be seen as a 
subcategory of the general concept since it is usually required that laws be endorsed by their 
subjects; 18 legitimate laws, accordingly, have undergone successful legitimation. Although 
legitimacy can be ascribed to both specific acts and to entire systems, students of legitimacy usually 
focus on the societal level, and furthermore their studies often concentrate on the procedures and 
institutions that govern society. The study of legitimacy, then, may be characterised as the study of 
whether the modes of governance that are operative in a given society are lawful, reasonable, and 
accepted (Beetham, 1991, p. 19).  
Democratic legitimacy may be divided into three constitutive elements: juridical, 
political, and social legitimacy (see figure 3). Juridical legitimacy, or formal legality, designates the 
                                                        
16 Many discussions of the democratic deficit and how to overcome it have appeared over the past decade; see inter alia 
García (ed.) (1993), Banchoff & Smith (eds.) (1999), and Eriksen & Fossum (eds.) (2000). All the contributors to these 
edited volumes assume that the Union does indeed have a democratic deficit, yet the argument that the EU in its current 
form redresses rather than creates biases in political representation, deliberation and output (Moravcsik, 2002, p. 
603) is not entirely obsolete. 
17 In this section I only present the aspects of each concept that are necessary for understanding the relations between 
them and their importance to theories of the European polity. In the following section I shall discuss the concepts 
further as I investigate the interception between social scientific and rhetorical understandings of them. 
18 In principle there is no necessary connection between legitimacy and democracy, but in modern, Western societies 
democratic government has come to be seen as the only legitimate type of government (Verhoeven. 2002, p. 10). 
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general rules according to which political authority is acquired and established (Beetham & Lord, 
1998, p. 3); it is government of the people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Constitutive elements of democratic legitimacy 
Political legitimacy may be subdivided into input and output legitimacy. Input 
legitimacy designates modes of participation, ways of ensuring that members of society are 
represented by the political system; output legitimacy deals with the results that the political system 
delivers to its members, the solutions offered to social problems (Scharpf, 1999, pp. 7 13). Input 
legitimacy is legitimation of political power through the citizens direct participation in collective 
decisions or their representatives employment of transparent modes of decision-making (Lenaerts 
& Desomer, 2002, p. 1225). Output legitimacy may be further divided into the distinct but related 
concerns for effectivity  achieving goals and solving problems  and efficiency  doing so at the 
least possible cost (Schimmelfennig, 1996, p. 12). Put simply, input legitimacy is government by 
the people, whereas output legitimacy designates government for the people. 
It should be noted that although the issue of the EUs output legitimacy is in no way 
trivial  there is great and understandable concern about the EUs capability of action  I shall 
bracket this issue in the following discussion. This is done because output legitimacy is not related 
to identity and public opinion in the same way as legality and especially input and social legitimacy 
are. In fact, concerns for output legitimacy may obstruct or be obstructed by the employment of 
identification and public opinion formation as means of legitimation since participatory processes 
Democratic
legitimacy
Juridical legitimacy 
(Government of the people) 
Political legitimacy
Output                   Input 
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are seldom very efficient. Having observed this crack in the coherence of the conceptual framework 
I seek to establish, I shall leave it out of the following account. 
The third and last dimension of legitimacy, social legitimacy, refers to a broad, 
empirically determined societal acceptance of or loyalty to the system (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 11). 
Social legitimacy is government of the people; it is generated by the communicative processes by 
which individuals come to an intersubjective understanding of their place in the world (Habermas, 
1988, p. 14).  
Various theories of what constitutes good governance19 have prioritised one type of 
legitimacy over the others, but a governmental system is in fact only legitimated if it takes into 
account all modes of legitimation and is able to establish productive relationships between them. 
Emphasising the participatory modes of legitimation, Amaryllis Verhoeven presents the relationship 
thus: 
A system enjoys legitimacy when it achieves an identification between rulers and ruled, 
in the sense that politics can be seen as constitutive of the identity of the society. To that 
end, it is not sufficient for political systems to solicit loyalty by enhancing social 
welfare and integration. Legitimacy also requires an active citizenry, for it is in political 
participation that a society constitutes itself as a political identity. Political systems 
must, therefore, also foster inclusion and the participation of civil society in political 
affairs. [] Legitimacy becomes constructive in that it hinges on effective identity-
building (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 11). 
 
3.3.2. Identity 
It is in legitimacys social dimension that the most immediate connection between identity and 
legitimacy exists, but identity also has obvious affiliations with input legitimacy. The concept of 
identity can be divided into two main categories: individual identity that corresponds well with 
input legitimacys notion of the citizens personal participation in the democratic processes, and 
collective identity corresponding with the diffuse allegiance with the group that constitutes social 
legitimacy. The main difference between the individual and collective identities is their respective 
changeability: 
                                                        
19 Governance being a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems/conflicts in which actors 
regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating and deliberating with each other and 
cooperating in the implementation of these decisions (Schmitter, 2001, p. 7). 
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For the individual, or at any rate for most individuals, identity is usually situational, if 
not always optional. That is to say, individuals identify themselves and are identified by 
others in different ways according to the situations in which they find themselves [...]. 
Collective identities, however, tend to be pervasive and persistent. They are less subject 
to rapid changes and tend to be more intense and durable, even when quite large 
numbers of individuals no longer feel their power (Smith, 1997, p. 322). 
 
The recognition of the difference between individual and collective identity should 
not, however, lead to denial of the intrinsic relationship between individual and collective 
identities that  all useful divisions apart  is one of the main defining features of both concepts 
(Sampson, 1989, pp. 3-4). People become who they are through participation in social settings and 
although a given societal grouping exists independently of its actual members at any given 
moment, the group is ultimately dependent on the members dynamic enactment of its constituent 
traits.20  
A regimes social legitimacy depends upon the relationship between individual and 
collective identities, and is hence related to the modes of participation that also provide input 
legitimacy. The degree of social legitimacy is determined by the society members actual 
identification with the collective identity offered to them by the system, that is, by the societys 
legal framework and the politicians, who derive their authority from this framework. In the case of 
the EU there is a common understanding rooted in thorough empirical studies of both quantitative 
and qualitative nature that no strong collective identity exists for the European polity as such, and 
that most individuals primarily identify with the national community to which they belong.21 
However, the interpretation of this common insight varies according to the individual scholars 
theoretical understanding of how identities  individual and collective  come into being. There are  
                                                        
20 It should be noted that there are many different kinds of collective identities, or social groupings to which the 
individual may belong. Such collectivities are determined by nationality, religion, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, or race, 
to name but the large categories that are presently perceived as being most salient (Appiah, 1994, pp. 149-150). I focus 
on the collective identities that encompass society as such and are formally expressed in political systems. Such 
collectivities are usually equalled with national identities as explained and criticised by Gellner (1983) and Anderson 
(1991; 1st edition published in 1983) to mention but a few famous examples of the extensive literature on nationalism 
(the aforementioned study by Wodak et al. (1999) also belongs to this group).  
21 The quantitative studies are typically based on the data provided by the Eurobarometer (see for instance Niedermayer 
& Sinnott (eds.), 1995), but there are also quantitative studies of publicly mediated identities (i.e. Triandafyllidou, 
2002). The qualitative studies employ a broad range of types of data, methods of collection and modes of analysis; for 
instance qualitative interviews (Nanz, 2001), participant observation (Bellier & Wilson (eds.), 2000), and readings of 
literary texts (Passerini, 1999).  
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two opposite theoretical positions on this matter, the essentialist and the constructivist,22 and the 
disagreement arises over how to conceive the relationship between the political identity expressed 
by the system and the cultural identity of the society represented by the system (Cederman, 2000). 
The discussants have one further presupposition in common: all view political 
identities as being reflexively created and voluntarily selected. The political identity of a society is 
the societys conscious definition of itself (Neumann, 1995, pp. 2-3), the official version of which is 
inscribed in the basic law or constitution that sets down political institutions and procedures of 
collective decision and action at the level of society. The matter of theoretical dispute is whether 
there is a necessary link between cultural and political communities.  
If one believes, as do the essentialists, that a political identity reflects already existent 
cultural raw material, then the lack of a European identity means that the EU has no legitimacy as 
an independent political body. As there is no European cultural identity the EU has no people or 
demos23 to represent and to derive its legitimacy from. If, however, one takes the constructivist 
stance, one does not see any inherent hindrance in the current absence of a European people, since 
such a collective identity may be formed through active efforts by policy makers and other 
concerned members of the community to be. Although constructivists do not deny that there is some 
relationship between political and cultural identities, they believe that the two levels of 
identification can be separated because they have different functions. And furthermore they believe 
that the direction of influence goes both ways so that political identity formation may give rise to 
cultural identities and vice versa (Cederman, 2000, pp. 5-6). The full argument between these 
opposing views will be presented once the third concept, public opinion, has been introduced. 
 
3.3.3. Public opinion 
The concept of public opinion is directly related to both legitimacy and identity; the two concepts 
are internal to the dynamic process out of which public opinions emerge. The process of public 
opinion formation has at least five constitutive dimensions: publicity, publicness, the public sphere, 
the public, and public opinion. The first dimension, publicity, is the principle or norm according to 
which participation in public affairs and sharing in public goods is a human right. Second, 
                                                        
22 Constructivist is Lars-Erik Cedermanns choice of word; the general position he describes is closely related to the 
views I have earlier presented as constructionism. In the presentation of the various understandings of identity 
formation I shall use Cedermanns term in order to indicate a distinction between the constructivist views on 
identification, which I join in confronting the essentialist position, and the overall constructionist approach from which I 
have previously differentiated my constitutionist perspective. 
23 A demos may be defined as a group of people the vast majority of which feels sufficiently attached to each other 
to be willing to engage in democratic discourse and binding decision-making (Cederman, 2000, p. 7). 
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publicness refers to the state of being public; it designates the nature of an activity or space (as in 
public service broadcasting or public school). Third, the public sphere denotes a(n) (imagined) 
space of social life that mediates between state and civil society, a framework for public discourse 
that may serve the functions of social integration and/or opinion brokering. Fourth, the public is a 
social category that may act collectively; in contrast to the crowd, the public represents a reasoned 
and reasonable collective body. The fifth and final dimension, public opinion, binds the four other 
elements together and adds the dynamic feature of opining, thereby establishing the procedural 
nature of public opinion formation as a whole (Splichal, 1999, pp. 6-7). In the following I shall 
leave the dimensions of publicity and publicness aside; I focus on the public, the public sphere, 
public opinion and the relations between them as these three elements are most directly connected 
to identity and legitimacy and thus of primary concern to the present study. The presentation I shall 
give here establishes an ideal conception of public opinion formation; it does not consider whether 
the ideal is actually realisable or whether it would in fact be as ideal in practice as it is in theory. 
These issues are discussed in the coming sections as first the controversy over the possible 
emergence of a European public sphere is presented and, secondly, the connection between rhetoric 
and public opinion formation is established. 
The social collectivity of the public comes together and finds a shared identity in the 
process of discussing matters of common concern. Participants in public dialogue may come to 
recognise each other as members of the same society, thereby creating a reflexive sense of 
belonging from which the societys political system can derive its social legitimacy. The ongoing 
public discussion of political matters may bind the members of a society together as a social group, 
and it may facilitate acceptance of the governmental institutions rightful and proper representation 
of that social group (Splichal, 1999, pp. 12-13). Furthermore, the individuals public exchanges of 
viewpoints lend input legitimacy to the political system. Participation in the political debate may 
provide people with a sense of influencing political decisions directly, thereby allowing the system 
to claim to represent each person as an individual (Schimmelfennig, 1996, p. 13). The ideal is that 
the process of public debate allows participants to reach common understandings and agreements 
on specific policy issues, whereby qualitatively substantiated public opinions emerge. These public 
opinions can be regarded as expressions of a common interest  as specific articulations of the 
publics collective will (Schimmelfennig, 1996, p. 23). Public opinion in the sense of collective 
views on particular matters and common public identity in the broader sense both emerge through 
  3. Theoretical framework 
 45
the dialogic process of public opinion formation, wherefore this process serves two general 
functions: social integration and political legitimation (Glynn et al., 1999, p. 221). 
These general functions of public opinion formation are interrelated, but although the 
distinction between them is somewhat artificial it is beneficial for analytical purposes. Political 
legitimation in the form of input legitimacy is generated through the individuals participation in 
political discussions of specific matters resulting in public opinions on these matters. But the 
political institutions are also endowed with social legitimacy through the general establishment of a 
public, of the sense of belonging to a group with collective interests and common goals that is 
attained by way of the societal conversation as such. The existence of a public sphere is a 
prerequisite for legitimation in both these senses; the public sphere provides the arena for public 
opinion formation, thereby enabling both specific agreements and general common attitudes to arise 
(Splichal, 1999, p. pp. 22-23). The public sphere is a platform for participation, but it is also a 
source of information about government activities; it mediates between the political institutions and 
the individual members of society. The general sense of belonging to a society is embedded in this 
mediation  to belong means being a part of the ongoing public conversation about common 
concerns.  
The social legitimacy of a political system relies on the perceived correspondence 
between governmental institutions and the social entity established in the public conversation 
(Calhoun, 1992, pp. 7-8). A framework must exist that not only informs the individuals of 
government activities, but also keeps the flows of communication open in both directions, thereby 
allowing the individual to become an active participant in the public debate if and when he or she 
should so desire. The public sphere mediates between the government and the individual in specific 
issues thereby providing each governmental action with input legitimacy. And the public sphere 
facilitates a societal conversation that is generative of the members more general sense of 
belonging to that society. The public sphere is the framework within which the functions of public 
opinion formation are realised; here opinion formation, collective identification and political 
legitimation emerge as inextricably intertwined and continuously renewed communicative 
processes.  
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3.3.4. The relationship between the three concepts in the context of the EU 
The following is a presentation of the competing theoretical conceptualisations of the relationship 
between legitimacy, identity and public opinion in the context of the EU. The worth of the 
diverging theoretical views will not be discussed here; such evaluation will instead be the final 
outcome of the analytical endeavour. Thus, I shall establish the positions here, and will only return 
to them at the end of the analysis at which point their respective explanatory potential and 
normative power will be discussed.  
The theories to be presented here are conceptualisations of the adequate European 
constitution  theories of the product of the debate on the future of Europe. The theories that will 
inform the analysis directly are conceptualisations of the process of the debate, explanations of the 
constitution of Europe as an activity. The procedural understanding of the relationship between 
legitimation, identification, and public opinion formation will be explicated in the section 
immediately following the ensuing presentation of theoretical views of the European product. 
Because the theories to be presented here deal with recommendations for the European product, that 
is, with the EUs ground- and framework, they focus primarily on the issue of formal legality. 
Whereas the preceding introductions of the concepts relied mostly on social scientific work, the 
theoretical positions to be explored now ensue mainly from the domain of legal scholarship.     
The academic debate on the present state and future developments of the EU finds its 
crux in the question of whether or not the EUs difficulties with procuring citizen support can be 
solved by endowing the Union with a constitution. This constitutional issue is connected to the 
discussion of the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion because a 
constitution is the explicit expression of a systems formal legality. That is, a politys constitution 
provides the legal basis for the dynamic processes of legitimation through identification and public 
opinion formation in that polity. In the constitutional debate Dieter Grimm and Jürgen Habermas 
represent the extreme positions of the essentialistic argument against the creation of a European 
constitution, and the constructivist promotion of such a development. The main point of 
disagreement is whether or not the writing up of the constitutional text requires the prior existence 
of a people. Is the constitution but a formal expression of an already existing community, or can the 
act of creating the constitutional text be constitutive of the people as such? 
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Dieter Grimm  
Grimm takes his starting point from the de facto absence of a European people with a common 
collective identity and argues that this absence cannot be overcome de jure because there exists no 
transnational public discourse or European public sphere (Grimm, 1997, pp. 254-255). Furthermore, 
Grimm asserts that  
prospects for Europeanization of the communication system are absolutely non-existent. 
A Europeanized communication system ought not to be confused with increased 
reporting on European topics in national media. These are directed at a national public 
and remain attached to national viewpoints and communication habits. They can 
accordingly not create any European public nor establish any European discourse 
(Grimm, 1997, p. 252). 
 
To Grimm the lack of a common language is the main obstacle to the establishment of supranational 
public debate (Grimm, 1997, p. 253). Through this claim he reveals a romantic understanding of 
language as the bearer of a common worldview that somehow provides the glue for the 
divergent social views and interests to be found in a modern polity (Nanz, 2001, p. 34).  
Grimm does take a deliberative stance on democracy, but maintains that a community 
must exist before any legitimating public deliberation can take place. Although he explicitly argues 
against the necessity of a homogeneous ethnic community as the democratic base of society, he 
insists that collective identity must precede political institutions. And he maintains that the 
necessary collectivity only exists and can only arise within the linguistically defined boundaries of 
the nation state (Grimm, 1997, p. 254). The conclusion of Grimms argument is that the European 
public power is not one that derives from the people, but one mediated through states (Grimm, 
1997, p. 251). In this view, the establishment of a European constitution would only aggravate the 
EUs democratic deficit since the legitimation it would mediate would be a fictitious one (Grimm, 
1997, p. 257).  
 
Jürgen Habermas 
In a direct response to Grimms position, Habermas asserts that while he agrees with the diagnosis 
his political conclusion is different (Habermas, 1997b, p. 259). Habermas argues in favour of a 
European constitution because he believes the creation of such a document would facilitate the 
citizens identification with the European polity that is currently lacking. Moreover, he argues that 
the European constitution should be federal in nature. This solution is deemed to be desirable, but 
also necessary. The claim to the necessity of European integration stems from the observation that 
the nation-state has outlived its role and that societal integration and control today must be 
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conducted in a postnational constellation. Habermas believes this argument to be thoroughly 
grounded in empirical evidence concerning the effects of globalisation (Habermas, 2001a, p. 61).   
In Habermas own words:  
The ethical-political self-understanding of citizens in a democratic community must not 
be taken as a historical-cultural a priori that makes democratic will-formation possible, 
but rather as the flowing contents of a circulatory process that is generated through the 
legal institutionalization of citizens communication. This is precisely how national 
identities were formed in modern Europe. Therefore it is to be expected that the political 
institutions to be created by a European constitution would have an inducing effect. [] 
Given the political will, there is no a priori reason why it cannot subsequently create the 
politically necessary communicative context as soon as it is constitutionally prepared to 
do so (Habermas, 1997b, p. 264). 
 
In this conception the European public sphere needs not supersede the existing communicative 
context of the national media. A real advance, says Habermas,  would be for the national media 
to cover the substance of relevant controversies in the other countries, so that all the national public 
opinions converged in the same range of contributions to the same set of issues, regardless of their 
origin (Habermas, 2001b, p. 9). Furthermore, he argues that even if a common language were a 
necessary precondition, this would not be an insurmountable obstacle to the creation of a European 
public sphere, as the goal of making English the second first language is attainable (Habermas, 
1997b, p. 264).  
The argument in favour of creating a European constitutional text is premised upon 
the assumption that collective identities may arise through conscious political acts. A sharp 
distinction is made between political and cultural identities, but the political salience of culture is 
not rejected altogether.24 Habermas acknowledges that each distinct community has a political 
culture, but insists that this political culture is not founded on social practices; rather, it is expressed 
in the legal framework and universal principles of a constitutional text (Habermas, 1998, p. 118). 
Hence, the constitution not only establishes a politys legal framework but is also generative of the 
social and political legitimacy of that polity.   
This understanding of the truly constitutive powers of the legal text is labelled 
constitutional patriotism, and it combines the separation of the notions of cultural and political 
identity with adherence to a strictly procedural theory of deliberative democracy (Nanz, 2001, p. 
36). Hereby, such identity forming features as ethnicity, language, religion and traditions are 
                                                        
24 For an interpretation that privileges the role of culture in politics while remaining grounded in the Habermasian 
framework of deliberative democracy and discourse ethics see Seyla Benhabibs work on the claims of culture 
(Benhabib, 2002). 
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separated from a general political culture which every member of a society, regardless of his or her 
personal background, will be able to accept and support (Habermas, 2001a, p. 74). The non-
discriminatory and all-inclusive solidarity of the shared political identity is based on the 
interpretation of such legally constituted principles as popular sovereignty and human rights 
(Habermas, 1998, p. 118). And, according to Habermas, constitutional patriotism is the answer to 
the current signs of disintegration within societies and the existing tensions between different 
cultural groups: 
A previous background consensus, constructed on the basis of cultural homogeneity and 
understood as a necessary catalysing condition for democracy, becomes superfluous to 
the extent that public, discursively structured processes of opinion- and will-formation 
make a reasonable political understanding possible, even among strangers. Thanks to its 
procedural properties, the democratic process has its own mechanisms for securing 
legitimacy; it can, when necessary, fill the gaps that open in social integration, and can 
respond to the changed cultural composition of a population by generating a common 
political culture (Habermas, 2001a, pp. 73-74).  
 
Grimm vs. Habermas 
Habermas agrees with Grimm that a European-wide collective political identity and equally 
European processes of public opinion formation are necessary for the legitimation of a European 
federal polity, and he also concurs that these elements are not yet in existence. However, his 
insistence on the total separation of cultural and political identities and his belief in the legal texts 
capability of generating political allegiance lead him to conclude that the lacking elements may be 
contrived. The creation of a European constitution would facilitate European-wide debate  that is, 
the emergence of a European public sphere  through which citizens would come to share a 
common political culture and lend substantial legitimacy to the communitys formally established 
legal base. Grimm, on the contrary, accepts the constructed character of political identity, but argues 
that such construction is dependent upon the pre-political existence of a community of cultural 
dimensions. Thereby, Grimm is representative of the so-called no demos thesis that has raised 
considerable support at both academic and political levels of debate. The argument of the no demos 
thesis runs as follows: 
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trust and solidarity, the two fundamental socio-cultural resources of democratic 
politics, are generated from a belief in our essential sameness, [] which is based on 
pre-existing commonalities of history, language, culture and ethnicity. [] European 
integration would therefore presuppose a European people (Staatsvolk) as a cultural and 
cognitive frame of reference. Given the historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic 
diversity of its member states, there is no question for the protagonists of this argument 
that the European Union is very far from having achieved the thick collective identity 
that we have come to take for granted in national democracies. And in its absence, 
institutional reform will not greatly accelerate the formation of a European people. By 
this view, public deliberation can take place only within a pre-established demos (Nanz, 
2001, p. 23). 
 
In my opinion, Habermas argues his theoretical case more convincingly than does 
Grimm. Grimms is a blunt insistence upon the non-existence of the European demos, whereas 
Habermas is a careful consideration of how political communities  national, European, and 
otherwise  may develop. Nevertheless, Habermas position with its radically reformatory potential 
is not without weaknesses. Especially problematic is its neglect of the fact that  tendencies towards 
and effects of globalisation notwithstanding  nationally grounded communities of both cultural and 
political dimensions continue to be centrally important as both the main locus of citizens affiliation 
and as actors in their own right. Conversely, it is precisely in the affinity with the immediate 
empirical reality that Grimms position shows its strength. Grimm describes the presently dominant 
social identity formation adequately, but cannot explain it; Habermas provides a good explanation 
of how collective identities are created, but his theory is not very well adapted to current reality. In 
the following, I shall discuss a number of intermediate positions that seek to establish empirically 
justifiable theoretical propositions of how the EUs legitimacy may be enhanced. 
 
Joseph H. H. Weiler 
Joseph H. H. Weiler seeks to account for the unique nature of the EU by recognising that the demos 
has both a cultural and a political dimension. Weiler believes that both dimensions are necessary for 
the legitimation of a polity, but insists that they may be kept apart from each other and thereby 
establishes a theory of multiple demoi: the national and the supranational.  
The national is Eros: reaching back to the pre-modern, appealing to the heart with a 
grasp on our emotions, and evocative of the romantic vision of creative social 
organization as well as responding to our existential yearning for a meaning located in 
time and space. [] The supranational is civilization: confidently modernist, appealing 
to the rational within us and to Enlightenment neo-classical humanism, taming that Eros 
(Weiler, 1999, p. 347).  
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According to Weiler, the virtue of the supranational European demos is the recognition of the lack 
of unity between its members embodied in the assertion that the European polity is one of peoples 
rather than of one people. In the fundamental statement of its political aspiration, indeed of its very 
telos, articulated in the first line of the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, the gathering nations of 
Europe Determined to lay the foundations for an ever closer Union of the peoples of Europe 
(Weiler, 2001, p. 4).  
The voluntary acceptance of and submission to a community not of my people but of 
others  a principle termed constitutional tolerance  is in Weilers conception the very foundation 
of the European political construct (Weiler, 2002, p. 568). The principle of constitutional tolerance 
dictates that Europe should not aspire to become a federation of one people, but should continue to 
base itself in a treaty that subject[s] the European peoples to a constitutional discipline even 
though the European polity is composed of distinct peoples (Weiler, 1999, p. 12). In the European 
polity the authority of the common constitution is accepted voluntarily, and the sovereignty and 
authority of the EU is renewed with each act of acceptance, that is, each time the Member States 
submit themselves to EU decisions (Weiler, 2001, p. 13).  
Weiler separates the cultural and political dimensions of collective identity as sharply 
as does Habermas. But where Habermas urges the creation of a purely political European polity and 
proposes constitutional patriotism as the founding principle, Weiler suggests that the European 
community should continue to base itself on the individual cultural entities  the nation-states  
voluntary submission to supranational rule, the principle of constitutional tolerance. Weiler believes 
that the value and purpose, the telos, of the European system is found precisely in this voluntary 
submission of different peoples to the same rule.     
 
Deirdre Curtin 
A host of legal and political scientific scholars have taken the same path as Weiler and sought to 
conceptualise the EU as a multilevel polity, a political entity uniting multiple social communities 
within a constitutional framework and establishing a differentiated system of governance adapted to 
the various levels of operation. The multilevel parlance may be applied in diagnosing the EUs 
current situation, as does Deirdre Curtin in her location of multiple deficits. According to Curtin, 
the EU is not only democratically deficient in the sense of not having matched the shift in decision-
making towards the European level with a shift in methods for citizen participation and governor 
accountability. Granted, the lack of a real political arena, of a public sphere of deliberation on 
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matters of public interest, and of a European demos are serious problems in themselves (Curtin, 
1997, pp. 43-45), but they are not the EUs only cause for trouble. Curtin accounts for several other 
deficits, namely, a deficient separation of powers leading to undue empowerment of the executive, 
and a rule of law deficit meaning that bureaucrats, not politicians, have control of EU policy 
(Curtin, 1997, pp. 45-46). On the basis of her characterisation of the EUs present state, she asks: 
given this terrible here [], where can we possibly go with this here as our starting point? Is 
there a there which can be labelled, for example, postnational democracy? (Curtin, 1997, p. 48). 
Curtin answers the second of these questions in the affirmative, and the postnational conception of 
democracy is the remedy she offers for the EUs deficiency diseases.  
The introduction of postnational democracy takes us back to the division between 
cultural and political identities and Curtin displays close affinity with the Habermasian position. In 
her own words, the post in postnational is meant to express the idea that democracy is possible 
beyond the nation-state: what is being left behind in terms of political identity is the link with 
nationalism in the sense of cultural integration (Curtin, 1997, p. 51). To Curtin, the division 
between cultural and political identities is not so much a theoretical assumption as it is a normative 
principle, a goal to be achieved in order to cope with the deficiencies for which there is no national 
cure. Curtin accounts for her position thus: 
I believe that the effort of reimagining political community other than premised on an 
ethno-culturally homogenous Volk is an imperative task. The alternative is not as the 
Euro sceptic would have us believe that of a perfectly fine status quo where an adequate 
system of accountability can be assured at the national level. No, the alternative is much 
more grim and bleak []; it is the route of increasingly authoritarian and non 
participative decision-making, increasingly far removed from the by now entirely 
alienated citizen (Curtin, 1997, p. 50). 
 
Ingolf Pernice 
Taking his cue from the emergence of a necessarily postnational reality Ingolf Pernice advocates 
multilevel constitutionalism as a proper description of the European constitutional order and a 
desirable arrangement for the kind of polity that the EU is. Pernice bases his argument on the 
assumption that the social contract embedded in the constitution does not necessarily lead to the 
formation of a unitary state (Pernice, 1999, p. 709). A further premise is that people in fact have 
adopted multiple identities  local, regional, national, European  which correspond to the various 
levels of political community they are citizens of (Pernice, 2002, p. 512). On the basis of these 
assumptions Pernice defines multilevel constitutionalism as the ongoing process of establishing 
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new structures of government complementary to and building upon  while also changing  existing 
forms of self-organisation of the people or society (Pernice, 2002, p. 512).  
The purpose of the constitution is to ensure that each public decision is taken and 
carried out at the appropriate level and that all levels function properly without interfering unduly 
with each other. In this sense, Pernice contends, the European polity already has a constitution, 
namely the EUs primary laws and the national constitutions, bound together in a functional, not a 
hierarchical relationship (Pernice, 2002, p. 514 and 520). Since the EU already has a constitution, 
Pernice concludes, it is actually not in need of one. What is needed is instead assurance that each of 
the multiple constitutional levels functions correctly, and in this respect improvements are possible. 
Specifically, intermediary rooms between private individuals and public authorities as well as 
between national and European levels of governance must be created and strengthened (Pernice, 
2002, p. 522).  
Pernice side-steps the issue of the non-existence and possible creation of a European 
demos by presupposing that identification is a concentrically ordered process. Yet he cannot ignore 
the issue of how to connect the European level of identification and the corresponding 
governmental structures, and he, therefore, advocates the enhancement of participatory modes of 
government at the European level. From the perspective of multilevel constitutionalism the peoples 
participation is necessary for the continuous enactment of the European project:  
the progressive constitution of the European Union is matter, not of States but of the 
people, who through this process not only create common institutions for their common 
goals, but also define themselves as the citizens of the Union and provide themselves a 
common, European political and legal status (Pernice, 2002, p. 519).  
 
Summing up the theoretical conceptions of the EUs adequate constitution 
Common to the positions presented above is that no matter whether they advocate a purely 
intergovernmental or some form of postnational  multilevel or federal  solution to the EUs 
equally commonly perceived deficiencies they all understand citizen participation in public 
deliberation as a necessary part of the solution. The different constitutional models are all advocated 
on the basis of their champions belief that they will provide the best framework for the 
strengthening of deliberative democracy in Europe. Among the proponents of postnational models 
there is furthermore agreement that some sort of differentiation between different modes of 
identification is not only necessitated by the particular relationship between the EU and its member 
states, but is actually a prerequisite for the release of the full potential of deliberative democracy. 
Grimm argues that a shared cultural identity is a necessary precedent of political dialogue wherefore 
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such dialogue can only be conducted at the national level and the democratic legitimation of the EU 
is purely indirect. However, the other scholars agree that the severance of culture and politics 
facilitates supranational deliberation of a particularly virtuous kind.  
The deliberative supranationalism,25 which is argued in one form or another by all 
parties except Grimm, does not hinge on the assumption of macro-subjects, like the people of 
a particular community, but on anonymously interlinked discourses or flows of communication 
(Curtin, 1997, p. 54). In the deliberative perspective political participation is ongoing, dialogic, and 
individualised; it is this last feature which makes the perspective particularly attractive as a means 
of legitimation in the EU and also makes the EU a particularly attractive arena for its realisation. 
Deliberative supranationalism provides the theoretical justification for promoting a polity that is not 
culturally unified, and the EU offers the opportunity of turning the theoretical norm into practice.  
Pernice is the least deliberatively minded of the four scholars in the postnational 
group; he focuses on the possibility of establishing correspondence between different levels of 
governance and the various identities of the people (Pernice, 2002, p. 512). Weiler has it that the 
EU provides a constitutional framework for our voluntary subjection to the other (Weiler, 2002, 
p. 568). Habermas goes a step further in arguing that a common European constitution could 
provide the basis for the inclusion of the other within the political community (Habermas, 1992a, 
pp. 17-18). Both Weiler and Habermas conceive of the EU as an inherently modern project that has 
the potential of enlightening through organisation. Curtin comprehends the situation differently and 
 recounting a position originally forwarded by Ian Ward (Ward, 1995)26  suggests that the EU by 
facilitating multiperspective interconnectedness and multilevel networks of interaction shows 
itself to be the first postmodern polity (Curtin, 1997, pp. 50-51).  
Whatever the degree of radicality and the precise formulation of these claims, they all 
share the common feature of anchoring the EUs claim to legitimacy in its capacity of being a 
contested polity. That is, the EU is legitimated through institutions and procedures that allow 
different actors to participate in policy-discussions at the European level while maintaining 
previously established identities of national and subnational character (Banchoff & Smith, 1999, p. 
2). 
                                                        
25 The term was coined by Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer, but their original definition of it has been highly 
contested (Joerges, 2002, pp. 133-134). In a general sense, deliberative supranationalism indicates that interaction at the 
European level can aim at consensual solutions based on common interests and is not just a bargaining process through 
which a compromise between diverging national interests is obtained (Eriksen & Fossum, 2000, p. 22).   
26 Ward is in turn inspired by Jacques Derrida, who has suggested that Europe as such can only be understood as other 
than itself, as a non-entity perpetually moving somewhere else (Derrida, 1992).  
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As has surely emerged from the preceding presentation, my personal leaning is 
towards the postnational conceptualisation of the relationship between legitimacy, identity and 
public opinion formation. I presume that people in fact have multiple identities and that the 
legitimacy of different polities  from the local to the European level  may be recognised 
simultaneously. Also, I take for granted that peoples participation in public debate is both a direct 
source of input legitimacy and conducive of collective political identities and hence of social 
legitimacy. However, I remain doubtful as to how severely political and cultural identities may in 
fact be separated, and I wonder whether some form of prior recognition of commonality is not a 
prerequisite of political participation after all.  
Two central questions, the answering of which may help clear away that doubt, 
emerge: can public deliberation arise without the participants antecedent acknowledgement of each 
other and common understanding of communicative practices? And if public discussions may be 
generated on the basis of a thin, legally constituted sense of commonality, can these discussions, 
once begun, avoid generating collective identities in a thick sense, thereby drawing in and altering 
already existing cultural identities? These questions have an empirical bend and seeking answers to 
them will be one of the main purposes of the analysis of the political debate on the future of Europe.  
Through the analysis I shall also seek to clarify which of the different theoretical recommendations 
for the constitution of the European polity is most attuned to and suitable for the political process of 
constituting Europe. The question to be pondered is which theory or combination of theories offers 
the best explanation of the process and recommends the most desirable product.  
While the ultimate analytical ambition is to examine which constitutional proposition 
for the EU is most adequate, the analysis is also reliant on the general theoretical understanding of 
the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and opinion formation that was established before I 
embarked upon the presentation of the various constitutive theories. The analysis will aim at 
providing a detailed explanation of how the conceptual relationships are articulated at the 
communicative level of public political discussion, and it will seek to uncover the possibilities and 
limitations for political choice and action that emerge in the course of the debate. Before embarking 
upon this analytical task further theoretical consideration is, however, necessary. It must be 
investigated how the empirical relationship between the three core concepts can actually be studied, 
and to this end I shall seek to combine the social scientific concepts with the rhetorical perspective 
on meaning formation as this has already been established. I shall now undertake the task of 
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creating rhetorical and social scientific interpenetration, thereby seeking to establish a truly 
interdisciplinary platform for the empirical analyses.        
 
3.4. Public opinion formation, identification, legitimation  and rhetoric 
The central contention of this section is that public opinion formation, identification, and 
legitimation are all rhetorical processes and may be studied as such. This claim is perhaps most 
readily acceptable in the case of public opinion formation. Therefore, I shall consider the 
connection between the rhetorical and the social scientific understanding of argumentative 
exchanges in public fora before moving on to the relationships between rhetoric and identification 
and rhetoric and legitimation.   
 
3.4.1. Public opinion formation 
The social scientific study of public opinion formation is primarily concerned with exploring the 
general social and systemic conditions that enable and constrain the free exchange of viewpoints 
concerning matters of public interest. This type of research focuses on the concept of the public 
sphere as the arena in which the exchanges occur, and in spite of the harsh criticisms levelled at his 
early work and the many revisions his theory has undergone, Jürgen Habermas remains the seminal 
writer on the subject.  
Habermas first developed his theory of the public sphere in his Habilitationsschrift, 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, from 1962, which was belatedly translated into 
English in 1989. Bearing the subtitle An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society this work is 
primarily an investigation of the institutional frames and procedural norms that were constitutive of 
the public sphere in the period of early modernity. However, Habermas extends his analysis into the 
20th century, and his unveiled lament of the transformation he charts makes it difficult not to 
conclude that Habermas ascribes general value to the bourgeois norms of opinion formation. Or, as 
Michael Warner explains in his account of Habermas theory, the ideals of bourgeois society hold 
an emancipatory potential to which modern culture should be held accountable (Warner, 2002, p. 
46). One may deduce four such ideals or norms from the account given in Structural 
Transformation. First, in public deliberation all discussants are treated as if they were social equals. 
Second, the deliberation should only concern the common good, leaving out private interests and 
issues. Third, the public sphere should form a single, comprehensive whole. And fourth, a sharp 
division between civil society and the state should be maintained (Fraser, 1992, pp. 117-118).  
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In Structural Transformation Habermas concludes that the rise of the Welfare State 
and the appearance of the mass media have made it impossible to uphold the bourgeois norms. The 
argument concerning the mass media is that they transform public discussion into a commodity  
mass media audiences are spectators not participants. As regards the welfare-model, it causes the 
borders between the public and the private to blur because the state now takes up many tasks that 
were previously left to the individual. The expansion of the domain of public intervention cannot be 
accompanied by an equal expansion of public discussion because the mass media impair the 
citizens participation in public opinion formation. The combination of the heightened degree of 
state intervention into the individuals life and the commodification of public opinion leads to a 
transformation of citizens into clients and consumers (Habermas, 1989, pp. 164, 170-171, and 232-
233). This conclusion has been put into question by recent research, especially in the field of media 
studies. And, attentive to the results of this research, Habermas has recognised that the diagnosis 
of a unilinear development from a politically active public to one withdrawn into a bad privacy, 
from a culture debating to a culture-consuming public, is too simplistic (Habermas, 1992b, p. 
438).  
The critique of Habermas early understanding of the public sphere also moves 
beyond the diagnostic level in order to question the norms upon which the diagnosis depends. 
Nancy Fraser (1992) is among the most thorough critics of the bourgeois norms of public opinion 
formation; she calls each of the four assumptions into question, showing that they are contingent 
upon the historical conditions in which they emerged and partial in their distribution of rights and 
opportunities.27 Again, Habermas has been sensitive to his critics and now accepts that any 
empirically existing public sphere is partial and exclusive in one way or another. Accordingly, the 
existence of various competing public spheres and the impossibility of creating a form of discussion 
that is equally accessible to everyone are recognised (Habermas, 1992b, p. 429 and 438). However, 
Habermas maintains that universal norms for communicative exchanges can be established, and on 
this basis he continues to hold a normative view of the public sphere from the perspective of which 
comparison of actually existing processes of opinion formation with universal, normative standards 
is possible.  
Habermas presents the compiled results of the search for universal norms that has 
been a central theme throughout his academic career in the two-volume work The Theory of 
                                                        
27 Many other criticisms have been directed at the early Habermasian conception of the public sphere. See Calhoun (ed.) 
(1992) for a useful overview of various reconstructive readings of Structural Transformation and Robbins (ed.) (1993) 
for a partially overlapping but somewhat more radical critique of the concept of the public sphere.  
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Communicative Action (Habermas, 1984 and 1987). Here, the starting point is that all societal 
formations can be divided into two distinctive parts: a system governed by instrumental rationality 
and a lifeworld in which the rationality and corresponding mode of action is communicative. 
Communicative action is defined as the form of rational action in which intersubjective 
understanding is the goal. Habermas believes this goal to be integral to communication: reaching 
understanding is the inherent telos of human speech (Habermas, 1984, p. 287). Universal 
communicative norms or validity criteria, claims Habermas, can be established on the basis of this 
telos and are embedded in the so-called ideal speech-situation. The ideal speech-situation consists 
of four norms to which all participants must adhere and for which they must account if so charged: 
comprehensibility, truth, sincerity and social adequacy (Habermas, 1970). Habermas conclusive 
move is the establishment of a discourse ethics grounded in the claim that, if conducted properly, 
the interaction that is governed by communicative rationality will lead to agreement based upon 
the unforced force of the better argument.   
The end-result of his own and other scholars revisions of the original understanding 
of the concept, is that Habermas today views the public sphere as a dynamic communicative 
network: 
The public sphere is a social phenomenon just as elementary as action, actor, 
association, or collectivity, but it eludes the conventional sociological concepts of 
social order. The public sphere cannot be conceived as an institution and certainly not 
as an organization. It is not even a framework of norms with differentiated competences 
and roles, membership regulations, and so on. Just as little does it represent a system; 
although it permits one to draw internal boundaries, outwardly it is characterized by 
open, permeable, and shifting horizons. The public sphere can best be described as a 
network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing 
affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, in the process, 
filtered and synthesized in such a way as to coalesce into bundles of topically specified 
public opinions. Like the lifeworld as a whole, so, too, the public sphere is reproduced 
through communicative action, for which mastery of a natural language suffices; it is 
tailored to the general comprehensibility of everyday communicative practice 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 360). 
 
This definition takes the public spheres dependency on concrete communicative processes into 
account. It describes public opinion formation as a dynamic communicative act, and thereby it is 
directly linked to collective identity formation, as Habermas understands this process. Collective 
identity [] can today only be grounded in the consciousness of universal and equal chances to 
participate in the kind of communication processes by which identity formation becomes a 
continuous learning process (Habermas, 1974, p. 99).  
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Habermas theory of the public sphere has been greatly nuanced and improved since it 
was first launched, but one major weakness remains unamended. In spite of its understanding of the 
dynamic and continuous nature of the communicative processes that constitute present-day society 
Habermas theory contains no suggestions as to how the diverse and fragmented opinions of 
individuals come to merge into an expression of common understanding and collective will. The 
concrete communicative interactions without which any general conditions of public opinion 
formation are in reality null and void are not considered, and therefore it is not possible to account 
for the interaction between them.  
 The rhetorical understanding of public opinion formation takes the individual 
utterance as its starting point. The rhetorical scholar studies how the specific interrelations of text 
and context give rise to concrete meanings, and thus offers detailed insights into the interactions of 
which the communicative network of the public sphere consists. However, the process by which the 
many unique meanings expressed in individual utterances gather into common public opinion 
remains as elusive to the rhetorician as it does to the social scientist.28 The recognition of this 
common explanatory failure has led rhetorical scholars to suggest that a proper conception of the 
process of public opinion formation can only be found in a combination of rhetorical and social 
scientific insights. It is thus proposed that the relationship between individual utterances and public 
opinion should be seen as being recursive and mutually constitutive (Hauser, 1999, p. 33).  
The interdependence of the particular and the general may be explained as follows: 
the speakers prior understanding of what constitutes a viable position on the given subject in the 
existing situation and of how this position can be expressed shapes each particular expression of 
opinion. In speaking his or her mind the speaker thus reproduces already existing expectations 
concerning the form and content of the particular expression of a viewpoint  each utterance is an 
instantiation of public opinion in both a subject specific and a broader communicative sense. But in 
creating its unique meaning the utterance may also contribute to the alteration of existing norms 
concerning what may be said and how one may say it. The speaker always has a choice: [he or she] 
can accept the sanctioned, widely used bundle of rules, claims, procedures and evidence to wage a 
dispute. Or, the arguer can inveigh any or all of these customs in order to bring forth a new variety 
of understanding (Goodnight, 1982, p. 217). In the persisting gap between collective views and  
                                                        
28 Meaning and opinion are obviously related terms; I understand meaning as synthesising the understanding and 
attitude expressed in concrete utterances, whereas (public) opinion implies a generality and collectivity that is detached 
from any specific utterance, but remains intricately related to the individuals formation of meaning and the concrete 
articulations thereof. 
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their individual expressions lies the possibility of opining differently (Farrell, 1993, p. 228).  
The conclusion to these considerations of the recursive relationship between the 
specific and the general is that creation of public opinion is an ongoing dialogic process. Each 
utterance is conditioned by preceding utterances and in being uttered forms part of the context out 
of which subsequent utterances arise. Or, as the Russian literary critic Mikhail M. Bakhtin so aptly 
puts it, any concrete utterance is a link in the chain of speech communication of a particular 
sphere (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 91). General conditions for public opinion formation and commonly 
perceived public opinions arise in and through the interrelations of the particular utterances that 
constitute the ongoing societal conversation.  
The perception of the recursiveness of specific articulations and general conditions 
leads to a reconciliation of the rhetorical and the social scientific approaches to public opinion 
formation. In accordance with the combined rhetorical-social scientific conception public opinion 
formation should indeed be studied in its only concrete manifestations, namely specific 
communicative encounters, but the investigation should take account of the social norms, political 
institutions, and media structures that provide the broader context for each instance of 
communicative interaction. And most significantly the analysis should aim at explaining the 
relationship between the utterances, thereby reaching a deeper understanding of the formal and 
substantial commonalities and differences that are operative in the communicative network under 
study. Explaining the relations between different utterances and between the texts and their contexts 
will be an important aim of the analysis of the debate on the future of Europe.    
 
3.4.2. Identification 
The most forceful argument for the connection between rhetoric and identity has been put forward 
by Kenneth Burke, who proposes that identification should replace persuasion as rhetorics basic 
function. Says Burke: you persuade a man [sic] only insofar as you can talk his language by 
speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his (Burke, 1969, 
p. 55). Rhetorical identification, Burke points out, aims at overcoming divisions between the 
speaker and the audience he or she wishes to persuade; rhetoric is concerned with the state of 
Babel after the Fall (Burke 1969, p. 23). In order to achieve his or her goal the speaker has several 
general strategies available. First, appeal to partisanship: the speaker and the audience are united in 
their common difference from a third party (Burke, 1969, p. 22). Second, identification of the 
speakers cause with a kind of conduct already considered admirable by the audience, that is, the 
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translation of ones wishes into terms of an audiences opinions (Burke, 1969, p. 55 and 57). 
Third, there are purely formal devices of identification  argumentative patterns and procedures, 
tropes and figures that invite audience participation regardless of the specific subject matter. Such 
forms, Burke contends, have a universal appeal that, if successfully transferred to the matter at 
hand, may overpower audience resistances to a speakers proposition (Burke, 1969, p. 58). Burkes 
concept of rhetorical identification places its emphasis on how the speaker can identify with the 
audiences already existing values and beliefs, but also points to the speakers ability to change the 
audiences identity. 
 Maurice Charland has elaborated upon the idea that rhetoric is not only about adapting 
a statement to the audiences existing identities. Rhetoric, Charland proposes, may not only alter the 
views of the audience, but can in fact constitute it as a group with a common identity. In his view 
the very existence of social subjects is already a rhetorical effect (Charland, 1994, p. 211) and 
the type of rhetoric that creates this effect  that calls its audience into being  is labelled 
constitutive (Charland, 1994, p. 213). Constitutive rhetoric not only aims at creating a position for 
the speaker with which the audience already identifies, but holds up an identity for the audience to 
don.  
Such identification of the audience in the rhetorical utterance is, however, not 
necessarily restricted to the constitutive rhetoric in which a new collectivity is explicitly being 
created. Edwin Black has suggested that establishment of the second persona is basic to all 
rhetorical utterances and that it is in this move rather than in references to the speakers own 
character that the intention and value of the utterance is revealed (Black, 1970). Black proposes the 
second persona as the pivotal concept of his analysis in order to avoid falling subject to the 
intentional fallacy; instead of focusing on the relationship between the text and its author Black 
turns to the study of the audience conjectured in the text. However, Black proposes this move as a 
roundabout way of passing moral and intellectual judgement on the author, thereby implying that 
the authors identity has by no means become irrelevant or external to the text (Black, 1970, p. 
110). There are two central concepts for analysing authorial identity in the text: ethos and first 
persona. These two concepts are somewhat overlapping, but distinguishable along the following 
lines:  
ethos refers to a set of characteristics that, if attributed to a writer [or speaker] on 
the basis of textual evidence, will enhance the writers credibility. Persona, on the other 
hand, [] provides a way of describing the roles authors create for themselves in 
written [or spoken] discourse given their representation of audience, subject matter, and 
other elements of context (Cherry, 1998, p. 402).  
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The claim is that a persona is somehow more fictitious than the ethos. However, I concentrate my 
analysis entirely at the textual level, and only see the difference as being one of specificity. Whereas 
ethos refers to a predetermined set of characteristics (i.e. the Aristotelian qualities of wisdom, 
virtue, and goodwill), persona designates the multitude of traits that an author may attempt to 
present him- or herself as having.   
Following Burke it is recognised that the unity between the first and the second 
persona is often created through reference to a common other or third persona, and the textual 
establishment of the third persona, therefore, indicates the rules and norms that underlie 
communicative interaction. Philip Wander has proposed that the third persona, marked by absences 
and explicit negations, is an expression of the possibilities and restrictions that condition the 
utterance. By studying the constitution of the third persona  ignored positions, unaddressed or 
excluded groups  the critic may reach understanding of the rules for producing discourse that are 
operative in the context in which the utterance is made (Wander, 1999, p. 376).  
The presence of first, second, and third personae in rhetorical utterances draws our 
attention to the interrelations between these different identificatory categories. The agency 
established in the utterance  that is, the capability for action, which the utterance ascribes to the 
personae  is a combination of I, you, we and they positions. Or, as Michael Leff puts the 
point:  
In the interpretative frame, agency refers not just to the use of character appeals but also 
to the way rhetors place themselves within a network of communicative relationships. 
At minimum, the explication of agency requires attention to: (1) the rhetors 
construction of self, (2) the rhetors construction of audience (what Edwin Black calls 
the second persona), and (3) the enactment within the text of the relationship between 
rhetor and audience (Leff, 2003, p. 9).  
 
I suggest that the speakers establishment of the third persona and the enactment of the relationship 
between it and the other two personae should be added to this list of issues that require attention. 
The study of textually established agencies and the relations between them enables the critic to 
account for both instrumental and generative aspects of rhetorical performance (Leff, 2003, pp. 6-
7).  
Furthermore, the combination of Charlands constitutive rhetoric and Wanders 
concept of the third persona points to the recursiveness of rhetorical identification; the utterance 
both draws upon established identities and creates new possibilities of identification. The identity 
formation of individual rhetorical utterances is related to already existent collectivities with or 
against which the speaker and the audience are identified in the same manner that individual and 
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public opinions relate to each other. The speaker is neither in a position to adapt freely to the 
perceived identity of the audience, nor capable of creating the audience entirely at his or her own 
will, but is instead constrained by personal and social identities that prefigure any concrete 
utterance. However, possibilities for change arise in the speakers ability to use the identities that 
exist beforehand creatively and to reconfigure the relationships between them.  
The three identificatory strategies that Burke enumerates are means by which speakers 
may establish new collective actors and create the agency needed for altering the social and political 
context in which they speak. Analysis of the rhetorical strategies, which are employed in 
constituting the textual positions of the first, second, and third personae, begins from the 
assumption of the recursive relationship between individual utterances and social settings. The aim 
of the analysis is both to explain how the social identities existing prior to the utterance constrain 
communicative interaction, and to investigate the concrete and perhaps altered possibilities for 
collective action that arise in and through the utterance. Analysis of this kind will complement the 
study of textual and contextual relationships in the investigation of the European debate.  
 
3.4.3. Legitimation 
The preceding presentations of the rhetorically informed understandings of public opinion 
formation and identification point to the connection between rhetoric and input and social 
legitimacy; legitimation in the participatory and the social senses are rhetorical processes (Lucaites, 
1981, p. 800) and can be studied as such.29 Also, it should be clear that both juridical and output 
legitimacy are often employed rhetorically  the two forms of legitimacy provide reasons in support 
of the speakers position in arguments like the law says so or the pursued policy has led to a 5% 
cut in public spending. But can these two forms of legitimation themselves be understood as 
rhetorical processes? As before, I shall leave the question of output legitimacy aside; the 
performance of political acts, in my view, has an obvious rhetorical dimension (the implementation 
                                                        
29 For an interesting suggestion as to how this criticism should be conducted see Robert Francesconis attempt to 
incorporate Habermas theory of legitimation into the rhetorical critical practice (Francesconi, 1986). Francesconi 
recommends evaluating the legitimising functions of political communication according to four criteria: (1) 
Justifications of legitimacy should maintain consistency with the norms generated from the collective identity. (2) Such 
justifications should be criticizable and be capable of being argued rationally. (3) Justifications of legitimacy should in 
the general (or public) interest be considered rational. (4) Justifications of legitimacy should partake of procedures and 
presuppositions which have the power to produce consensus (Francesconi, 1986, p. 20). I find these criteria to be 
illuminating, but they are subject to the same criticism as the norms of the bourgeois public sphere, and therefore I shall 
not employ them directly in my analysis. Instead of taking recourse to pre-established and possibly irrelevant or even 
distorting normative principles, I shall seek to explain and evaluate the meaning formation of the debate on the future of 
Europe on its own terms.  
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of a decision demands further persuasion), but investigation of this feature is not relevant to the 
present study. Exploring the possible rhetoricity of juridical legitimacy is, however, of great 
importance. Since the status of the constitutional text is pivotal to the legal and social scientific 
evaluations and recommendations for the EU, the full connection between the rhetorical perspective 
and the legal and social scientific understanding cannot be made before the relationship between 
rhetoric and legality has been explored. Also, this exploration is a justification of the claim that the 
rhetorical study of the debate on the future of Europe may, indeed, offer insight into which 
theoretical recommendation for the constitution of Europe is to be preferred.  
The traditional view of law is that it is a collection of autonomous rules and 
principles; in this view law is separated from politics and popular discourse, and rhetoric is granted 
no constitutive role in its creation (Hasian, 1994, p. 44). Recently, however, the opinion has 
emerged that there is no legal recourse outside of culture and that the foundational legal text is thus 
not an embodiment of universal principles, but a creative expression of contextually bounded norms 
and values. James Boyd White puts the point thus:  
It [the law] is always communal, both in the sense that it always takes place in a social 
context, and in the sense that it is always constitutive of the community by which it 
works. The law is an art of persuasion that creates the objects of its persuasion, for it 
constitutes both the community and the culture it commends (White, 1985, p. 35).  
 
The claim that the legal text has a genuinely community forming capacity is also an argument for 
the rhetorical nature of formal legality. Or put otherwise, the constitutional text cannot be separated 
from the political and social processes for which it provides the formal and procedural framework. 
Quite to the contrary law and community stand in a mutually constitutive relationship30 that is 
parallel to the relationships between personal and public opinions and between individual and 
collective identities discussed above. 
The rhetorically informed understanding of the reciprocal relationship between legal 
texts and social formations at once lends support to and seems to contradict the various postnational 
arguments about the development of a European polity. On the one hand, the rhetorical perspective 
argues the dynamic and thoroughly constituted character of all communities, but on the other hand 
it casts doubt on the feasibility of separating cultural and political identities, it questions whether it 
makes sense to distinguish thin political affiliations from thick cultural ties.31 If meaning and 
                                                        
30 J. Peter Burgess (2002) gives a particularly illuminating account of this relationship, expounding how the law must 
represent the community but can never become identical with it. 
31 As stated earlier these questions must be empirically studied, but I am now providing rhetorical reasons for the doubts 
that were previously raised intuitively.  
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identity is somehow interrelated as White suggests (White, 1984, p. 3) and as Ramírez theory of 
action implicitly supports, then there is no way of upholding a cultural identity apart from the 
political discussions in which one participates.  
The creation of societal identity and the establishment as well as the legitimation of 
corresponding political structures cannot be separated from the specific contexts in which these 
processes occur. However, the understanding of the dynamic interdependencies also leads to a 
realisation that the we is not unitary but constituted and that no actor is ever entitled to speak 
for all of us (White, 1985, p. 239). Thus, the rhetorical position actually endorses the view that a 
societal formation and its political institutions are never symbiotic, and that no political system is 
ever a natural expression of a community. Rather, social collectivities, political structures, and legal 
frameworks are mutually formative, and the constitutive power lies exactly in the tension between 
the social, political, and legal dimensions. Understanding the dynamic relationship between the 
social, political, and legal dimensions that in combination constitute democratic legitimacy is a third 
objective of the study. This objective will not be reached by means of specific analytical tools. 
Instead, the issue of legitimacy will be considered in and through the analyses of opinion formation 
and identification, and the concern with this issue will find its culmination in the evaluation of the 
various theoretical conception of the European constitutional entity.  
 The consideration of possible points of interpenetration between the social scientific 
concepts and the rhetorical perspective leads to a focus on the dynamic relations between the 
individual articulation and the general manifestation of each concept and on the interdependencies 
between legitimacy, identity and public opinion. The rhetorical emphasis on the communicative 
creation of meaning in a sense puts opinion formation at the centre of attention. It would, however, 
be more correct to say that legitimacy, identity and public opinion are all regarded as results of 
interactions in the communicative network of the public sphere; all are constituted in and through 
meaningful rhetorical acts. The following study will attempt to explain how this constitution of 
meaning is achieved in the debate on the future of Europe. The recursive relationship between the 
individual utterance and the general concepts will be studied in order to show how already existent 
understandings condition the debate and how the debate in turn alters the concepts. Having 
established the theoretical perspective and the conceptual framework I can now turn to the specific 
preparations for the analytical task. Accordingly, the next chapter will present the employed 
procedures for collecting the empirical data and introduce the two analytical rounds in which this 
material is studied. 
   
 
   67
 
4. 
Procedures for selecting and  
organising the empirical material 
 
 
 final preparatory step is necessary before the analytical endeavour can be undertaken: the 
empirical material and the rationales for its selection must be presented. Such presentation is 
the purpose of the ensuing chapter, which will end with an introduction of the actual analyses.  
 
4.1. Trajectories and turning points  
The debate on the future of Europe is an ongoing and multifaceted process developing in many 
different settings  local, national, and European. In order to capture these important spatio-
temporal features of the debate I have chosen to focus the analysis upon texts originating at 
different times and in various places. As will be explained later, the analysis of texts that originate 
in purely national as well as mixed contexts provides the spatial dispersion of the study. An 
adequate temporal distribution is not achieved by a random selection of texts that were put forward 
at different times; it must be ensured that the specific studied moments represent distinct stages in 
the debate. I employ the concepts of trajectory and turning point as means of ordering the debate 
into significantly different temporal stages and have chosen texts that form part of different stages 
as well as texts that mark the boundaries between such stages.  
The notions of trajectory and turning point originate in sociological studies of 
individual life courses. Trajectories designate sequences of events that seem to run along an already 
set course, whereas turning points mark changes in the life history. As Andrew Abbott remarks: 
the smooth befores and afters are trajectories, linked by a relatively abrupt turning point. They 
are stable regimes separated by unusual transitions (Abbott, 2001, p. 247). The conceptual pair of 
trajectory and turning point has proven its worth in the study of many other phenomena than the life 
course, for instance political scientific studies of voting patterns and applied economics studies of 
business cycles (Abbott, 2001, p. 244). The concepts have also been applied to studies of meaning 
making (Mützel, 2002), and it is this usage that has inspired me to employ the notions in the study 
of the European debate. I thus understand the debate as an unfolding process consisting of various 
A 
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sequences that are internally coherent and marked off from each other by formal and substantial 
changes that occur at identifiable moments in time.  
Sociological studies are often inductive and quantitative, designed to find the exact 
locations of turning points and describe the changes they generate (Abbott, 2001, p. 245). I use the 
notion more loosely as a tool for structuring the analysis, and I presuppose rather than induce the 
turning points. The main purpose of my analysis is to explain how meaning is made in the debate, 
not to establish an exact account of the course of events. Therefore, I believe the usage of the 
concepts as a means of structuration that precedes the analysis rather than as an analytical outcome 
to be justified. I assume that the conditions of the debate change at moments of institutionalised 
European decision-making and poise European Council declarations concerning the European 
reform process as turning points of the debate. Accordingly, the discussions that go on between 
Council meetings constitute the trajectories.   
The debate on the future of Europe can be understood as a constant element in the 
process of European integration. But, as explained earlier, I have chosen to use the term to 
designate a course of events that was begun in May 2000 and will end when the EUs new 
constitutional treaty has been ratified in all member states. Moreover, I have chosen to focus on the 
first stages of this debate, ending the careful textual analysis in December 2001 when the European 
Convention was established. I understand the debate as it unfolded from May 2000 to December 
2001 as consisting of two trajectories and two turning points. I locate the turning points in the two 
Council meetings that were held in Nice in December 2000 and in Laeken in December 2001. At 
the first of these meetings the debate on the future of the EU was officially recognised and decisions 
concerning the issues to be discussed and the procedures of discussion were laid down in the 
Declaration on the Future of the Union that was appended to the Treaty of Nice. At the second 
meeting the debate was institutionalised through the creation of the Convention, and the Laeken 
Declaration set down the mandate and composition of this body. The two declarations that resulted 
from the Nice and the Laeken summits form the textual marks of the turning points and are 
analysed as such. 
The two trajectories have time-spans from May 2000 to December 2000 and from 
December 2000 to December 2001. Each of these trajectories consists of an enormous number of 
utterances, and for practical purposes I have chosen to focus on what I consider to be three decisive 
moments in each of the two trajectories. A moment, as I understand it, is a specific articulation that 
is part of a trajectory; the moment contributes to the dynamic of the trajectory without altering its 
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course. The moment is like the turning point in that it moves the process of the debate along, and it 
differs from the turning point in that it does not in itself change the process.  
Figure 4: Turning points, trajectories and moments of the debate 
The moments I have selected are occasioned by the interventions of political leaders 
into the debate.1 The first moment of the first trajectory arises with the German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischers speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin on the 12th of May 2000.2 The 
second moment consists of a speech by José María Aznar who was then Spanish President of 
Government; this speech was delivered at the French Institute of Foreign Relations in Paris on the 
26th of September 2000. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair provides the third moment with his 
speech at the Polish Stock Exchange in Warsaw on the 6th of October 2000. In the second trajectory 
the first chosen moment is occasioned by a speech held at the Maison de Radio France in Paris on 
the 28th of May 2001 by Lionel Jospin, who was then Prime Minister of France. The second 
moment arises on the following day, the 29th of May 2001, with Commission President Romano 
Prodis speech at the Institut dEtudes Politiques in Paris. The third moment is a speech delivered 
by Denmarks Foreign Minister at the time, Mogens Lykketoft, on the 23rd of August 2001 at the 
                                                        
1 Policy speeches and statements of visions by leading politicians are central in spurring the European debate on. During 
the studied period there were many other significant interventions than the six I have singled out, and as will be seen in 
the analysis these other speeches cannot be completely disregarded as they form part of the debates communicative 
network. However, as I argue below, there are good reasons for focusing on the six chosen utterances.  
2 There are strong indications that this speech marked a turning point in its own right, but since I do not include any 
preceding material I cannot confirm this claim, and instead I study the speech as part of the trajectory it may have 
occasioned. 
                 Trajectory 1                                   Turning point 1 
 
 
        Fischer Aznar  Blair             Nice Declaration 
(Berlin, 12/05/00)     (Paris, 26/09/00)        (Warsaw, 06/10/00)             (07-09/12/00) 
Moment 1               Moment 2          Moment 3 
 
                 Trajectory 2                  Turning point 2
 
 
        Jospin   Prodi               Lykketoft            Laeken Declaration
(Paris, 28/05/01)       (Paris, 29/05/01)     (Copenhagen, 23/08/01)         (14-15/12/01) 
Moment 4               Moment 5       Moment 6 
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Danish Council for Foreign Relations in Copenhagen.3 Figure 4 provides an overview of the 
temporal stages that are studied and the eight texts placement within them. 
 
4.2. Textual-intertextual analysis  
The six moments have been selected because of their dispersal over time and their setting in 
different contexts, but they have also been chosen for the similarities between them that make 
comparisons possible. Each speech is held by an incumbent national or  in the case of Romano 
Prodi  European politician and is explicitly presented as a contribution to the debate on the future 
Europe. Also, each intervention has been lifted out of its original speech situation and included on 
the EUs futurum-website,4 a nodal point in the communicative network making up the European 
debate. Three of the speeches are delivered in the speakers own national contexts whereas the three 
others were delivered abroad, and all six speeches share the characteristic of addressing multiple 
audiences of both national and European scope.5 Thus, a certain degree of transversal of the various 
national contexts and intermingling of viewpoints and arguments can be assumed. Moreover, the 
fact that three of the speeches are held in academic settings, two in political arenas of symbolic or 
consultative rather than practical status, and one in journalistic surroundings points to a close 
interconnection between academia, political circles and the media.6 The six moments, then, are 
chosen in order to study regularities within the two trajectories, but they are also meant as keys to 
studying the interrelationship between the many national and European contexts within and between 
which the debate is conducted.  
The two declarations that mark the turning points and the six speeches that constitute 
important moments in the trajectories provide a platform for exploring the spatio-temporal 
developments of meaning making in the European debate. However, an exclusive focus on a total of 
eight texts would neither provide sufficient insight into the dynamics of meaning formation nor pay 
adequate attention to the relationship between texts and their contexts. In order to overcome this 
                                                        
3 The six speeches and two declarations are all available on the internet (see bibliography for details), but they are also 
reproduced in full in the appendices of this study (see appendix 1-8). 
4 www.europa.eu.int/futurum.  
5 I do not think that the fact that three of the speeches were delivered in Paris is of great significance, neither as a 
suggestion of the debates geographical centre, nor as a weakening of the representability of the chosen texts. The 
speakers have different backgrounds and therefore relate to the Paris setting differently; Paris constitutes a unique 
context for each of them. Of course, the spatial and temporal proximity links Jospins and Prodis speeches to each 
other, but this does not mean that their specific speaking conditions were the same.  
6 I have already pointed out that the interconnection between political and academic circles is typical of European 
debate. I suspect that the media in some ways open the closed political-academic circles to the public, in some ways 
participate in creating a realm of European discussion that is set off from other areas of political debate, but this is a 
point that must be substantiated analytically. 
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deficiency I propose to conduct a textual-intertextual analysis of the kind suggested by the 
rhetorical scholar Leah Ceccarelli. In a study, the purpose of which is similar to mine although it 
deals with a different type of meaning formation, Ceccarelli proposes that the close analysis of a 
text should be supplemented with evidence of the actual responses with which the text was met. 
Ceccarellis contention is that it is possible to explain how texts work by exploring the connection 
between rhetorical strategies and their effects on historical audiences  that is, the relationship 
between texts and their intertextually established contexts (Ceccarelli, 2001, p. 6). 
In my version of the textual-intertextual analysis there are eight texts, namely the two 
declarations and the six speeches, and the intertextual responses to these texts consist of articles and 
comments published in newspapers stemming from the five national contexts that are also 
represented by the speakers.7 I have chosen to focus on the responses made in newspapers in order 
to include the broader level of public opinion formation in each of the national contexts. 
Newspapers are often hailed as being of vital importance to the nation-builders of yore (Anderson, 
1991, p. 46), and although the printed press has been experiencing some decline as a result of 
competition from the electronic media it still plays a central role as national arena for public opinion 
formation. Moreover, the production of news is today so standardised that most media follow more 
or less the same agenda; the coverage of one mainstream medium may in many respects be 
considered representative of the medias coverage as such. In the case of media coverage of 
political discussions the newspaper is arguably the most comprehensive medium: the papers 
traditional affiliation with specific political groups ensures that they take an interest in political 
issues and allows for some divergence between them. Although most newspapers have today cut 
their direct connections with political parties and as a matter of course adhere to the same news 
criteria as all other media, the papers remain the most politically involved of the news media. Many 
still overtly recognise political leanings, at least on their leader pages, and most devote more 
attention to political developments and discussions than the other media do.  
There is also a purely instrumental reason for choosing the newspapers as the source 
of intertextual responses to the eight texts: the existence of searchable electronic archives makes the 
newspapers coverage of the two declarations and six speeches readily available and allows the 
                                                        
7 In order to create total complementarity between texts and contexts, I should also have included responses from 
European news services. Such services exist  most notable is the European Voice that has an actual paper version, but 
internet services such as Agence Europe, EUObserver, and Euractive should also be mentioned. These services provide 
an inherently European level of mediation, but are mostly read by people working in or in close contact with the EUs 
institutions and do not reach a broader public. Although the slight dispersion of the European news services justifies 
their exclusion somewhat, the main reason for my omission of them is, unfortunately, one of lack of access. Articles 
from these sources that dated back to May 2000 simply were not available.  
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generation of compatible sets of data. I have employed two such archives or databases, namely 
InfoMedia in the case of the Danish context and LexisNexis for the other four.8 From the totality of 
available sources 17 newspapers were selected: three from each of the French, German, and Spanish 
contexts and four from Denmark and England9 (see table 1).  
 
Country Denmark England France Germany Spain 
News-
papers 
Berlingske 
Tidende (BT), 
Information 
(Inf),  
Jyllands-Posten 
(JP),  
Politiken (Pol) 
Financial Times (FT), 
The Guardian (Guar), 
The Independent (Ind), 
The Times (Tim) 
Le Figaro (LF), 
Le Monde (LM), 
Libération (Lib) 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 
(FAZ), 
 Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (SZ), 
 taz, die 
tageszeitung (taz) 
Cinco Días (CD), 
El País (EP), 
Expansión (Exp) 
Context10 BT, JP, and Pol 
are Denmarks 
three major 
national 
morning papers. 
Inf is a smaller, 
intellectual 
paper included 
for its full 
coverage of 
EU-matters. 
Guar, Ind, and Tim are 
major national dailies. 
The economic 
newspaper FT is 
included for its 
European scope. The 
absence of tabloids is 
especially problematic 
in the English case as 
the tabloids hold a 
large share of the 
market and are very 
outspoken on 
European issues. 
The French press 
is particularly 
politicised; Lib is 
socialist in 
inclination, LM 
reveres an ideal of 
balanced, in-depth 
coverage, but 
remains attached 
to left-of-centre 
goals, and LF has 
Gaullist 
sympathies 
The German press is 
extremely 
regionalised. FAZ, 
SZ, and taz are 
among the few 
nationally read 
newspapers, but 
having national 
readerships does not 
rule out regional 
attachments as FAZ 
and SZ immediately 
reveal in their titles. 
The Spanish press is 
also regionalised, 
but three national 
papers exist, EP 
being the largest. 
Unfortunately, the 
other two (ABC and 
El Mundo) were not 
available in the 
LexisNexis 
database. CD and 
Exp are economic 
newspapers of the 
FT type. 
Table 1: Presentation of the 17 newspapers included in the study 
All the chosen newspapers belong to the so-called serious press; there are no tabloids 
among them and thus popular opinion formation in the somewhat derogatory sense of the word is 
not represented. The lack of tabloid newspapers is, at least in some national contexts, a major 
setback for my studys claim of representing mainstream opinion formation. However, I have 
prioritised cross-national compatibility over national representability, and since I did not have 
                                                        
8 Both are electronic databases available to subscribers; I have accessed them through the library of the Copenhagen 
Business School: http://www.cbs.dk/library. 
9 Although the chosen newspapers are published in all of the UK they all have their base in London and do not 
necessarily represent Scotch, Welsh or other regional views. In order to avoid the risk of being accused of ignoring 
regional differences I term the newspapers and the viewpoints they represent English rather than British. However, the 
newspapers themselves do not seem to make this distinction, and I shall be referring to British views when the coverage 
does so, but not in my own characterisation of the coverage. A similar argument about the partiality of the represented 
nationality could be made in the case of the Spanish newspapers. These newspapers do not represent Spanish regional 
identities such as the Basque or the Catalan, but a term for Spain and the Spanish national identity in the restricted sense 
that could parallel England and English in the British case does not exist (at least not in the English language). 
Therefore, all I can do is notice that the Spanish national context presented here is a majority position from which 
significant regional minorities actively delineate themselves. 
10 The information about the national contexts is obtained from the European Journalism Centres website (www.ejc.nl), 
Kuhn (1995), and Seymour-Ure (1996).  
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access to newspapers of the more popular type from all countries I have chosen to disregard them 
altogether. The exclusion of popular media of both the printed and the electronic kind can also be 
justified on the basis of the serious newspapers special status as both strictly national media and as 
the media with the most thorough coverage of political issues  European and otherwise.11 
The papers are in a sense both the least and the most likely arenas for supranational 
opinion formation to emerge and therefore constitute a particularly interesting field of study. The 
papers offer one among several possible representations of the national publics  surely their image 
is a biased one, but just as surely it is influential. My study will not discuss internal differences of 
the various national contexts; the purpose of the investigation is to compare and contrast the 
different national versions of the debate. Hence, I will only consider features that are typical of the 
national representations and enactments of the European debate. The direction towards the 
interrelations of the contexts is caused by my interest in European opinion formation, but it is also 
an attempt to cope with the vastness of each national context. Rather than claiming in-depth 
knowledge of each of the five national contexts, I explicitly and exclusively focus on the contextual 
information that appears in the selected intertextual material. I explain the characteristics of the 
national contexts as these emerge from the transnational comparison rather than as a result of 
studies of each context in isolation. My study is textual and comparative and finds its limitation, but 
also its main justification in these two traits. At the national level, then, differences will be 
smoothed over in order to establish a general impression and understanding of emerging 
commonalities and remaining differences of the European debate as it is articulated in the national 
contexts.12 
Having selected the 17 newspapers whose coverage of the two declarations and six 
speeches is to provide the intertextual dimension of the textual-intertextual analysis, I set specific 
temporal boundaries around the surveys for intertextual references. In order to facilitate searches 
that are both precise and exhaustive, the surveyed periods for each studied moment and turning 
point were limited to ten days (see table 2). When the period is limited to ten days one can set rather 
                                                        
11 Nevertheless, the socio-demographic leanings of my data should be recognised. The opinion formation processes that 
the newspapers reflect and participate in primarily include the intellectual and political elites who beforehand can be 
estimated to be the most likely to care about European issues and most likely to engage in European debate. This puts 
restrictions on what I can claim to be studying; I may point out the emergence of common European modes of 
discussing EU matters, but cannot ascertain the depth of such Europeanisation.  However, the data does allow me to 
draw general conclusions on the limits of the convergence, the point being that if those most likely to discuss the EU in 
European terms do not do so, then there is little likelihood that such discussions are emerging elsewhere.  
12 This disregard for admittedly salient features in the name of cross-national compatibility also extends to the issue of 
party politics. I shall not seek to explain the speakers proposals in terms of party affiliations, but only as they relate to 
and seek to establish specific national and common European positions.  
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precise search terms: the speakers name and speech in the case of the six moments and the name 
of the city in which the Council meeting was held and declaration for the two turning points. The 
results include all the relevant articles published within the ten days, and the sets of data are not 
unmanageably large. See appendix 9 for a list of all the articles of the eight ten-day samples; each 
sample will be presented in detail in the course of the textual-intertextual analysis. 
 
Turning point/moment Survey period 
Fischers speech, 12th of May 2000 10/05/00  19/05/00 
Aznars speech, 26th of September 2000 24/09/00  03/10/00 
Blairs speech, 6th of October 2000 04/10/00 13/10/00 
The Nice Declaration, 7th-9th of December 2000 05/12/00  14/12/00 
Jospins speech, 28th of May 2001 26/05/01  04/06/01 
Prodis speech, 29th of May 2001 27/05/01  05/06/01 
Lykketofts speech, 23rd of August 2001 21/08/01  30/08/01 
The Laeken Declaration, 14th-15th of December 2001 12/12/01  21/12/01 
Table 2: The turning points/moments and their corresponding survey periods 
 
4.3. Scope and representability of the study 
When studying something as large and as complex as the meaning formation in the communicative 
network constituting the debate on the future of Europe one cannot possibly cover everything, and it 
is necessary to focus the investigation on specific arenas and concrete events. That is what I have 
done with my choice of the two declarations, the six speeches and the coverage of these eight events 
by newspapers published in five national contexts. The eight events and five contexts are not 
representative of the debate as such, but the in-depth study of them can yield insights into the 
specific dynamics of meaning making that are important in their own right. Moreover, the choice of 
the five national contexts means that most of the major groupings that have typically dominated the 
cross-national EU-dialogue are represented in the study.13  
                                                        
13 I here present categories that are established on the basis of features that pertain to each nation-state regardless of the 
political orientation of the incumbent government. Of course, there are also cross-national alliances based on party 
affiliations, but at the governmental level these are not always dominating. For example, it is common knowledge to 
commentators on European affairs that Blairs New Labour views and Aznars Conservative position were often in 
agreement. And the commentators also agree that when Lionel Jospin was still the French Prime Minister the social 
democratic German chancellor Gerhard Schröder nevertheless worked better with the Gaullist French president Jacques 
Chirac than with the socialist PM.   
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It is often said that the process of European integration was begun in order to prevent 
France and Germany from ever going to war against each other again. Bearing this in mind it is 
hardly surprising that both of these countries have traditionally been positive towards European 
integration and that many conceptions of the integration process view co-operation between France 
and Germany as the motor of integration. France and Germany represent the original and the 
integrationist EU-members, and like the UK they are also large member-states. England (and the 
British government, but not necessarily other British nations like the Scots or the Welsh) has since 
its entry into the EC in 1973 taken a more tentative position, and Denmark, which entered the 
community at the same time as Britain, has often held similar sceptical views. Denmark, moreover, 
is a small country and a northern one, whereas Spain is a medium-sized, southern country. Spain, 
with its entry in 1986, also represents the group of recent members with a shorter democratic 
history14 than the original and medium-term members.  
The five chosen national contexts represent large, medium and small member states as 
well as founding, medium-term and recently entered members. Furthermore, both the North-South 
and the integrationist-sceptic divides are represented. However, it should also be admitted that the 
choice of these five contexts is conditioned by my ability to understand the languages of these 
contexts, and by my realisation that five would probably be the maximum number of national 
contexts that I would be able to handle. The necessary delineation of the specific elements of the 
vast material that I have chosen to study has, then, to some extent been predetermined by these 
constraints. Nevertheless, I feel confident that the chosen texts and contexts can provide insights 
into important features of the multitudinous processes of meaning making. If a discussion of 
European matters that transcends national discourse  a European public sphere  is emergent or is 
to emerge, it will surely be as an admixture of elements that are already existent at the national 
levels. By studying the five chosen contexts, one should be able to locate synergies between 
nationally bound discussions, out of which a genuinely European debate could form, if such 
synergies exist at all. Hence, I submit that the chosen set of data is adequate for a comparative study 
of various national articulations of the debate on the future of Europe that aims at locating 
indications of the emergence of a genuinely supranational mode of discussion while remaining 
sensitive to persistent national differences. 
 
                                                        
14 The countries that entered in the 1990s  Austria, Sweden, and Finland  do not share this feature, but the Eastern 
European countries included in the present round of enlargement do.  
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4.4. Presentation of the analyses 
In my usage, the conceptual pair of trajectory and turning point and the textual-intertextual mode of 
analysis primarily serve as means of organisation, as guidelines for selecting and ordering the 
empirical material. The investigation of the selected material will consist of two analytical rounds. 
In the first round of analysis (chapter 5) the six speeches, two declarations, and the newspapers 
coverage of them will be presented. Here, I shall focus on the speaker- and audience-positions, the 
personae, and the agency options created in the eight main texts. Furthermore, I shall seek to 
establish the relationships between the texts and the responses to them, and I shall describe the 
dynamic of the debate as it unfolds chronologically. The purpose of the first round of analysis is to 
create an overview of the sequence of events and the communicative network of which the debate 
consists and to provide a first characterisation of the positions available to the participants in the 
debate.  
The former aim entails a focus on public opinion formation, and here convergences 
and persisting disparities will be established. To that end, I shall be especially attentive to the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces of the debate. The search for unifying and diversifying features is 
inspired by Mikhail Bakhtins understanding that these two opposite dynamics co-exist in any 
communicative process (Farmer, 1998, p. xviii). Analysis of these forces not only illuminates the 
different existing versions of the debate, but also points to conservative and reformatory elements of 
the discussions. In order to reach the second aim of the first round of analysis  establishment of the 
positions and proposals forwarded by the participants in the debate  I shall prioritise the issue of 
collective identity formation. In the first round of analysis I shall explore how first, second, and 
third personae are constituted in the utterances, and seek to establish how the identification of the 
various personae enables and delimits further participation in the debate. At this stage legitimation 
will be studied primarily in the speakers direct appeal to legitimacy and in the two declarations 
establishment of official positions that are perceived as being legitimate. That is, I shall be 
introducing the relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion as political actors 
addressing the broader public explicitly conceive it.  
The second round of analysis (chapter 6) concentrates on the spatio-temporal relations 
that are established within the individual utterances and on the substantial and formal features that 
link the various utterances to each other. Whereas the first round of debate is conducted 
chronologically and relies heavily on the notions of the trajectory and the turning point as well as on 
the textual-intertextual mode of analysis, the second round is conceptually guided and studies the 
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utterances according to generic categories. During this investigation the concepts of topos, kairos, 
and chronotope will take over the guiding role, which the trajectory-turning point and textual-
intertextual distinctions played in the first analytical round. The final analytical moment in which 
generic and dynamic features will be brought together will be steered by the concept of telos. These 
four analytical concepts  of which three were briefly mentioned in the establishment of the 
rhetorical perspective  will be introduced further when they are taken into use.  
The purpose of the second round of investigation is to explain how meaning is created 
within and between the utterances. General assessments of the five national versions of the debate 
on the future of Europe will be made, and it will be discussed whether and how a debate that 
transcends national contexts and takes on genuinely European proportions may be emerging. The 
analysis will culminate in an empirically informed reconsideration of the relationships between 
legitimacy, identity and opinion formation in the context of the EU, and on that basis the evaluation 
of the theories of European constitution will be conducted.  
Since both rounds of analysis deal with the same set of texts there will be some 
overlap between them. Yet the two rounds have different explanatory purposes, wherefore the 
recurrence will hopefully not become circular. To sum up the analytical procedure and the purposes 
of the two analytical rounds it could be said that the first deals primarily with the what of the debate 
and that the second focuses on the how. First, I shall be looking at what meanings are articulated in 
the different contexts and what developments occurred in the debate as a whole, establishing the 
main features of the various contexts and the general developments of the debate as such. Second, I 
shall seek to explain how the meanings were constituted and explore the various modes of national 
and European meaning formation.  
Common to both rounds of analysis is the general concern with explaining the 
meaning formation of the debate in terms of the interdependency between the general and the 
particular, the established and the emerging. Moreover, the rhetorical-social scientific 
understanding of public opinion formation, identification, legitimation and the relationships 
between these three processes constantly guides the analytical endeavour. A final unifying feature is 
that the entire study is conducted from within the constitutionist rhetorical perspective. The study is 
aimed at explaining how meaning is formed in concrete situations and processes and all analytical 
insights and conclusions remain hermeneutically bound to the utterances under study. 
   
 
   79
  
 
5.  
First round of analysis 
 
 
he first round of analysis proceeds chronologically. I shall treat each of the six moments in 
the two trajectories by first presenting the speech in question and then turning to the 
newspapers coverage of it. When analysing the reactions to the speeches, I shall divide the 
coverage according to national contexts. When studying the reactions to the two Council 
declarations that mark the turning points of the debate I shall treat the press coverage as a whole. 
This choice of analytical strategy in a sense reflects Jürgen Habermas suggestion that a common 
European public sphere emerges during Council meetings (Habermas, 2001, p. 9), but it also aims 
at discerning how convergent the coverage actually is. By treating the press coverage of the 
moments and the turning points in these two different ways I seek to emphasise both differences 
between the national contexts and European similarities.  
 A note should be made on the quotation practice employed in the analytical sections. 
When quoting from or referring to the speeches and declarations I indicate the corresponding line-
numbers of the texts as they appear in the appendices. When referring to newspaper articles I 
indicate the paper in which the article appeared and the date of appearance; further information 
enabling the reader to relocate the article in question can be found in appendix 9. In order to 
promote the readability of the text, I have relegated references to lists of articles to footnotes, and 
only include such references in the text when dealing with direct quotes. Also for the sake of 
readability, I have chosen to render all quotations in English, and readers wishing to consult the 
original texts are referred to the appendices. Although I have had recourse to English versions of all 
the speeches (except Aznars which to the best of my knowledge only exists in Spanish), the 
analyses of both speeches and articles are primarily based on the original texts, and I am myself 
responsible for the correctness of all translations. The declarations exist in all the EUs official 
languages, and I have chosen to work exclusively with the English versions of these.1     
 
                                                        
1 I recognise that the question of translation is not an unproblematic one, but I have chosen to bracket the language issue 
as far as possible in order to study differences and similarities of formal and substantial features within and between 
national contexts. If such bracketing is not performed, it seems that one has to resort to a priori acceptance of Grimms 
assertion about the lack of a European level of public debate, and in that case this study would have ended before it was 
begun.  
T 
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5.1. Trajectory one: deepening and widening 
The first of the two trajectories begins with Fischers speech from the 12th of May 2000 and ends 
with the turning point of the Nice Summit. Fischers speech and the utterances by Aznar and Blair 
mark the three moments of the trajectory. As mentioned, I shall first present the constitution of 
personae and agency of each speech and then account for the reactions to the speeches as these 
appeared in the press coverage of the five national contexts. 
 
5.1.1. Erosion or integration  Fischer in Berlin 
Presentation of the speech  
On the 12th of May 2000 the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer addressed an immediate 
audience of students, diplomats, and journalists2 at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Under the 
heading From Confederacy to Federation  thoughts on the finality of European integration3 he 
presented his visions for Europe.  
According to Fischer the EU is currently facing two main challenges: the processes of 
widening the Union by accepting new member states and deepening the political integration of the 
EU. Fischer sees these processes as being necessarily connected; he claims that enlargement, in 
itself an undeniable process, makes deeper integration necessary. The pending enlargement is one 
of the main reasons why the finality for Europe, in Fischers opinion, must be the development of a 
European Federation that is based on a constitutional text.  
 
Constitution of personae 
In the Humboldt-speech Joschka Fischer carefully points out that he is not speaking on behalf of the 
German government. He asks the audience to allow him to step out of the role of foreign minister 
for the duration of the speech (ll. 20-23) and announces his speaking position to be that of a 
convinced European and German parliamentarian (ll. 31-32). The reason for this positioning, 
Fischer says, is that he wants to contribute to the fundamental and conceptual public discussion on 
the future of Europe and the finality4 of the European project, and the official role may restrict such 
public reflection (ll. 20-32). In a second round of explicit positioning Fischer adds one more reason 
for speaking as a private person: he does not want to cause the anger or fear of anybody. Here, 
                                                        
2 According to Financial Times report from the event (FT 13/05/00).  
3 Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation  Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration. 
4 It should be noted that the conventional English understanding of finality as something completed and irrevocable is at 
odds with the French and German usage of the term, which refers to the aim or purpose of something (Walker, 2002, p. 
1).  
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Fischer appeals to all the Eurosceptics on this and the other side of the Channel and asks them not 
to produce the big headlines (ll. 196-198).  
By removing the weight of officialdom from his words, Fischer creates a speaking 
position that gives him maximum freedom to speak his mind without causing an outrage. Yet in 
assuming that his speech will be heard and taken seriously by other audiences than the immediate 
one, Fischer seems to take for granted that his position is authoritative, whereby he creates a tension 
between the pledged speaking position and the presupposed agency. Even if Fischer is speaking as a 
private person he assumes that he has the power to set the European agenda, an act that arguably 
must be performed from an official position in order to succeed.  
 The reference to the Eurosceptics is the speechs first attempt to anticipate negative 
reactions. Another anticipatory move is performed during the discussion of the federation Fischer 
sees as the ultimate aim of the European integration process (ll. 281-283). Through the two 
anticipations, Fischer positions the Eurosceptics in general and the British in particular in relation to 
the speech. He recognises that people who are resistant towards the EU may overhear the speech, 
but does not invite these people to consider whether his arguments might hold any persuasive force 
for them. Instead of engaging in dialogue with these parties, Fischer divides them off from the 
primary audience of the speech. By asking sceptics to keep quiet and telling them not to become 
annoyed at his choice of words or fear his theses (ll. 200-201), Fischer positions the Eurosceptic 
persona as a passive one, a third persona without agency in the debate that the speech seeks to 
initiate.  
The second persona that Fischer creates is decidedly pro-European, but Fischer also 
projects a sense of national identity that may appeal to hesitant and unresolved listeners. Europe is 
not a new continent, says Fischer, but full of different peoples, cultures, languages and histories. 
The nation-states are realities that cannot be thought away, and the more globalisation and 
Europeanisation create superstructures and anonymous actors remote from the citizens, the more the 
people will hold on to the nation-states that mediate security (ll. 221-226). The European citizens 
with their national identities and the nation-states that represent these identities, then, are presented 
as active personae, participants in the realisation of Fischers goals.  
 The audience, to whom the arguments about the necessity of political integration 
and the national involvement in this process are addressed, is first and foremost German. In 
the course of the historic narrative, Fischer repeatedly presents that which is generally true for 
Europe as being a fortiori true for Germany. This goes for the fatal price a backward move or 
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a standstill in integration would demand (ll. 48-52), the historical lessons about the value of 
integration (ll. 80-82), the consequences of European division and its termination (ll. 92-97), 
the damaging effect it would have if all the European states were not bound by an overarching 
order (ll. 114-117), and for the national interests inherent in enlargement (l. 160). Thus, 
Fischer consistently identifies the Germans with proposals for deeper European integration, 
thereby positioning them as the most European of Europeans. The identity Fischer envisions 
for his German audience corresponds exactly to the dual identity with which he has endowed 
himself: European and German.  
 Fischer excludes one group, the Eurosceptics, and especially the British Eurosceptics, 
from his address and identifies another, the Germans, completely with his own position. In the 
speech Fischer mentions a third national group, the French, whom he projects as being closely 
allied with the Germans in the creation of Europe. The French and the German personae are not the 
only national agents that are positioned as active participants in the realisation of Fischers vision 
for the future of Europe. However, France, Germany, and other non-specified integrationist member 
states hold especially important agencies as they may unite in a centre of gravity and constitute 
the avant-garde or locomotive for the completion of political integration (ll. 364-365). 
 Fischers positioning of himself and his main audiences is an attempt to overcome the 
division between national and European identity that Eurosceptics pose as their prime cause for 
resistance to the European project. However, Fischer does not directly aim to dissuade the sceptics 
of their present beliefs. Instead, he constitutes identities for his primary audience  defined in 
national terms as the French and the Germans  that impair scepticism as such. Fischer does not 
create one exclusive audience position, but he does attempt to set the stage for future debate in such 
a way that it requires participants to identify with a positive and constructive stance towards the EU. 
In this setting, limiting the EUs powers is not an option (ll. 12-15, ll. 48-52 and ll. 297-298), and 
the main issue for further discussion is how the European finality can best be conceptualised and 
obtained. Only speakers willing to accept these preconditions are endowed with agency in Fischers 
framing of the debate. 
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5.1.2. Fischer and the final federation  the press coverage of Fischers speech 
Germany: surveying the reactions to the speech 
The German sample consists of a total of 26 pieces, three of which are commentaries; figure 5 
provides an overview of the articles and the sequence in which they were published. The coverage 
takes its starting point in recent criticisms of Fischer: he has been accused of having lost his energy 
and power of initiative, and the speech is seen as an answer to these charges.5 On a more general 
note, Fischer is said to be responding to the citizens waning support for the European project.6 The 
articles published right after the delivery of the speech have taken up Fischer´s account of the 
double challenges of enlarging the EU and reforming its institutional structure, and they present the 
speech as an attempt to tackle these two challenges.7  
 
Later articles attend to different reactions to the speech. The groups whose voices are 
heard include: the German opposition, the French government and other French  political actors, the 
British press and British politicians of both government and opposition, a number of smaller 
member states, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.8 In the cacophony of  
                                                        
5 SZ 12/05/00, taz 13/05/00D. 
6 SZ 13/05/00A. 
7 taz 13/05/00A+C, SZ 13/05/00A. 
8 taz 15/05/00B, SZ 15/05/00B, SZ 16/05/00, taz 17/05/00, SZ 17/05/00B, SZ 18/05/00A,C,D+E, FAZ 18/05/00, SZ 
19/05/00A, FAZ 19/05/00. The reactions, with the exception of the British, are by and large presented as being positive. 
Some nuances are provided in the coverage of the German oppositions and the members of the European Parliaments 
reactions; here elements of the speech are criticised, but the initiative and the general direction of Fischers proposals 
are complimented. Only one article, entitled Europe needs no visions (taz 15/05/00B), leaves the impression that the 
speech was mostly met with scepticism. 
Figure 5: The German coverage of Fischer's speech
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voices a warm French tone of approval rings through clearly. And this tone is picked up in a 
number of articles that ponder whether Fischers speech will impact the Franco-German 
relationship positively.9  
 The possibility of implementing Fischers ideas is discussed in several articles. The 
views expressed range from the hope that Fischers initiative will spark more discussion to the 
claim that Fischers ideas will form part of a common Franco-German proposal for the institutional 
reforms that are to prepare the EU for enlargement.10 Between these extremes lie the lament that 
Fischer did not include specific proposals for the current IGC, the irritation that he did not present 
his ideas officially, and the call to transform the thoughts into action.11  
  
France: let the debate begin 
The French ten-day sample contains 28 articles in all (see figure 6); 6 of the texts are commentaries 
and there is one leader. In the French coverage Fischers speech is sometimes perceived in the 
context of preparing for enlargement.12 Also, it is presented in the context of the upcoming French 
EU-presidency and the IGC to be held during that presidency.13 But most importantly, the speech is 
seen as an attempt to launch a broad and fundamental debate on European finality.14 Fischers 
speech is said to break with a reportedly dominant minimalist or realist approach to integration 
in which only goals that are immediately realisable can be discussed. Repeatedly, it is stated that 
Fischers speech provides an opportunity, which should not be ignored.15  
Having set the context for reception of Fischers message, the French coverage attends 
to a number of reactions to the speech,16 and a substantial part of the sample is made up of first-
hand responses in the form of evaluative articles. All of the evaluative pieces view Fischers 
statement positively: they all applaud the initiative, most agree with the overall goal of the speech, 
and some take up the detailed discussion of what will be the best means of achieving the commonly 
perceived end. The tone is struck by a Le Monde leader (15/05/00A) entitled Danke schön, M. 
                                                        
9SZ 17/05/00A, SZ 18/05/00B+C, SZ 19/05/00B. 
10 SZ 17/05/00A, SZ 18/05/00A. 
11 FAZ 18/05/00, taz 16/05/00, SZ 17/05/00B. 
12 LF 13/05/00, Lib 13/05/00, Lib 16/05/00. The claim that the enlargement process must be accompanied with deeper 
political integration is widely accepted. 
13 Lib 13/05/00, LM 13/05/00B, LM 15/05/00D, Lib 19/05/00C+D. The question is whether Fischers proposals come at 
a convenient time or not. 
14 LM 11/05/00, LF 12/05/00, Lib 15/05/00, LM 15/05/00B+D, Lib 16/05/00, Lib 19/05/00. 
15 LM 13/05/00, Lib 15/05/00, LM 15/05/00B+D, Lib 19/05/00D, LF 19/05/00A. 
16 Among the mentioned reactions are those of the French, German, and British politicians of both government and 
opposition parties (LM 13/05/00A+B, LF 13/05/00, Lib 13/05/00, LM 15/05/00D-F, Lib 15/05/00, LF 18/05/00A, Lib 
19/05/00C+D, LF 19/05/00A).  
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Fischer, and it reaches its climax in Le Figaros editors call for the French government to present 
its own vision, because that which Berlin has started, France should conclude (19/05/00B). 
 
England: whos afraid of Joschka Fischer? 
The English sample has two commentaries and one letter out of a total of 19 articles (see figure 7).  
 
The one article that precedes Fischers speech sets the intervention in the context of a recent survey 
that shows the German support for the European project to be declining.17 The focus of the first four 
articles that follow Fischers speech is his attempt to strengthen the Franco-German axis.18 These 
articles all mention Fischers assurance that the ideas presented in the speech and the use of the 
                                                        
17 Tim 11/05/00. 
18 Tim 13/05/00, Ind 13/05/00, Guar 13/05/00, FT 13/05/00. 
Figure 6: The French coverage of Fischer's speech
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Figure 7: The English coverage of Fischer's speech
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term federation are not meant as a provocation and should not be feared. Yet all articles convey a 
general understanding of the speech as having a negative impact on the British governments 
relations to Germany and on the British position in the EU as such. This understanding is either 
presented as the central meaning of the speech,19 or it emerges in British reactions to it.20 The 
reactions of the British Labour government and the Conservative opposition are given equal 
attention, and both reactions seem to follow consistent patterns. The Conservatives are presented as 
being furious at Fischers proposals, but satisfied that he has blown the lid off Europes 
superstate agenda (Ind 14/05/00). The government emphasises that Fischers is a minority position 
and a personal view, but also claims that the existence of positions such as his underlines the 
importance of continued British involvement in Europe.  
Following the first days focus on the content of the speech and the immediate 
responses by the British government and opposition, the coverage is broadened to include other 
reactions and to consider the wider context of the speech. The reported reactions include those of 
French and German politicians and of the European Commission.21 Furthermore, direct responses in 
the form of commentaries now appear, and these commentaries display a willingness to take up 
Fischers invitation and discuss his proposals constructively that is not present anywhere else in the 
English coverage.22 
The vast majority of the English coverage of Fischers speech is centred upon the 
theme of whether or not the speech presents a threat to Britains position in Europe.23 Seemingly 
unable or unwilling to discuss the substance of Fischers proposals, the newspaper coverage of the 
speech and the reactions to it focuses on tactical aspects especially as they pertain to the upcoming 
summit at Nice  what alliances are being forged? What negotiating positions are available? The 
                                                        
19 Britain was given notice yesterday that it faced being isolated from a new fast-track European federation (Tim 
13/05/00). Germany is pulling away from Britain and moving closer to France again as it seeks to build up a federalist 
Europe (Ind 13/05/00).  
20 Ind 13/05/00, Tim 13/05/00, Guar 13/05/00, Ind 14/05/00. 
21 FT 16/05/00, Guar 16/05/00, FT 18/05/00, Guar 18/05/00, Tim 19/05/00A+B, Guar 19/05/00. 
22 The lone letter of the sample (Tim 17/05/00) is authored by Andrew Duff, a British Liberal Democrat member of the 
European Parliament and fervent federalist, and one commentary (FT 19/05/00A) is by Dominique Moisi, deputy 
director of the French Institute for International Relations. The identities of these commentators account for their 
willingness to participate in the debate as Fischer proposes it should be conducted. The other commentary (FT 
18/05/00) is written by two Financial Times reporters and, unsurprisingly, it also proves willing to discuss Fischers 
propositions positively.  
23 The theme of the connection between institutional reform and enlargement is mentioned in passing (Guar 13/05/00) 
or presented as one of Fischers reasons why France and Germany need to collaborate closely (FT 13/05/00). In the 
British context it is, however, also possible to use the pending enlargement as an argument against conducting 
fundamental discussions at the moment (Tim 19/05/00).  
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broader prospects of a debate on the finality of Europe is welcomed by a few enthusiasts, but 
generally it is met with a frosty silence from Britain (Guar 18/05/00). 
 
Denmark: interferences in the euro-debate 
There are nine articles in the Danish sample (see figure 8), eight news stories and one commentary. 
In the Danish coverage Fischers speech is frequently seen in the context of the upcoming Danish 
referendum on accession to the EMU and the single European currency.24 Fischers speech 
coincides with an intervention into the Danish euro-debate by Commission President Romano 
Prodi, and both statements are taken to reveal that accession to the common currency is a 
thoroughly political process. 
 
The contextualisation of the speech in terms of the Danish euro-debate includes 
Danish politicians reactions to it. The Eurosceptics and advocates of a no in the referendum are 
reported to be happy with the honesty of the proposals whereas proponents of a yes seek to 
downplay Fischers message and the role it will have.25 There is some disagreement over the 
importance and potential impact of the speech at the European level.26 However, it is characteristic 
of all the Danish coverage that it only discusses Fischers speech actively when the utterance is 
reinterpreted as a contribution to the national discussion of Denmarks affiliation with the EU in 
                                                        
24 Pol 13/05/00A+B, JP 14/05/00, Pol 14/05/00A, Pol 18/05/00. The referendum was held on the 28th of September 
2000 and resulted in a rejection of the euro by a majority of the voters (53.2 % voted against, 46.8% in favour).  
25 Pol 13/05/00A+B. The Eurosceptics, of course, disagree with everything Fischer says and only applaud his honesty. 
In a similar vein, one article reports that while the Danish supporters of further European integration emphasise the 
substantial differences between their own and Fischers views, they welcome the broader debate to which the speech 
contributes (Pol 14/05/00A). 
26 Pol 14/05/00A, Inf 16/05/00. 
Figure 8: The Danish coverage of Fischer's speech
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general and the euro in particular. The broader European debate that Fischers speech is said to 
inspire is typically reported rather than enacted.27 
 
Spain: the placid bystander 
The Spanish ten-day sample consists of only six articles (see figure 9), one of which is a 
commentary. In the Spanish coverage of Fischers speech, the discussion of European political 
integration is typically related to the thematic of how to ensure the EUs economic strength.28 
Fischers emphasis on the connection between enlarging the EU and strengthening its political 
dimension is not mentioned at all. 
 
 The most frequently emphasised issue is the question of the Franco-German 
relationship. Several articles state that Fischers speech should be seen as an attempt to revive the 
connection, and the French reception of the German invitation is also a recurrent theme.29 In all 
articles it is agreed that the Franco-German ties are no longer as close as they once were, but there 
are different interpretations of the effect Fischers speech will have on the relationship.  
The reactions of other countries than France are only mentioned one time. Here it is 
stated that although it [the speech] is hair-raising to some Eurosceptics in London and 
Copenhagen, or even Madrid, it contributes decisively to reactivating the debate on the construction 
                                                        
27 The exception to this rule is the samples lone commentary (Pol 14/05/00B). Here Politikens editor in chief discusses 
Fischers proposals from the perspective that a European Federation is a legitimate and laudable project precisely 
because it would not be based on one common European people.  
28 Exp 13/05/00, Exp 17/05/00B. 
29 EP 14/05/00, Exp 17/05/00A+B, Exp 19/05/00. 
Figure 9: The Spanish coverage of Fischer's speech
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of Europe that was languishing (EP 16/05/00).30 Fischers attempt at igniting a debate on the future 
of Europe is recorded by the Spanish newspapers but the issue is not explored at any length.  
 
5.1.3. Personae offered in and responses given to Fischers speech 
Joschka Fischer seeks to create a situation in which his own first persona is endowed with a high 
degree of freedom to address an audience of likeminded citizens. The first and second personae are 
largely identified with each other  they are individuals with national identities that neither hamper 
their pro-European sentiments nor their participation in the ongoing project of European integration. 
Fischer frames his speech as the visions of a private person thereby both seeking to put himself on 
equal terms with the European citizens at large, calling for broad public debate, and to take the edge 
off the more radical of his propositions. However, Fischer seeks to set the terms of debate so as to 
exclude Eurosceptics from the discussion, and the actual scope of the dialogue he invites may also 
be limited by the fact that only incumbent politicians inhabit the formal positions necessary to carry 
out Fischers suggestions. Although Fischer allegedly speaks as a private person the authority with 
which he makes his claims and the matter of course with which he assumes that they will make an 
impact, reveal that he himself is not willing to abandon the position of the statesman. 
 A few articles in the German coverage attend to the personal reasons Fischer may 
have for delivering the speech and thereby do see the utterance as a statement by Fischer, the 
private person. However, the majority of the German coverage and the entirety of the coverage in 
the four other national settings see the speech as an official statement by the German government, 
Fischer´s claims to the contrary not withstanding. Thus, the responses ignore Fischers postulated 
first persona, but this does not go against Fischers articulated meaning, since his words would 
probably not have the impact he envisions if they were actually stated by a nobody. However, the 
perceived incumbency of the speaker means that the ostensible address to everybody only elicits 
reactions from the highest political circles. The broad public debate is not enacted, but the dialogue 
between Europes leading politicians has begun. 
There are significant similarities between the coverage of each national press that 
indicate a common understanding and general acceptance of Fischers speech as a call for debate on 
the future of Europe. However, Fischers more specific creations of personae are reacted to  
                                                        
30 The ability of the speech to inspire further debate is also a theme in an article that judges French reactions to be 
ambiguous (Exp 19/05/00), and it is mentioned in one further article (Exp 17/05/00A).  
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differently in the various settings. The German and the French coverage by and large accept the role 
of the second persona that Fischer offers to these nations, and the presented reactions generally take 
on the agency ascribed to this persona. The English newspapers focus on the role of the third 
persona Fischer ascribes to them, but are not content with keeping quiet. Rather, they bring out the 
big headlines and warning signs, thus, speaking squarely against Fischers request. The Danish and 
the Spanish reports do not relate directly to any of the positions offered in Fischers speech. The 
Spanish coverage stays loyal to the terms of engagement set out by Fischer and reports on the 
reactions of those that are in the offered positions without identifying with these. The Danish 
reporting recontextualises the debate in terms of the pending national referendum on the euro, 
thereby endowing the speech with a meaning and assuming an agency that is decidedly outside the 
proposals and positions forwarded by Fischer. Figure 10 illustrates the relationships between the 
personae offered in Fischers speech and the reactions of the national press coverage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: The personae offered in and responses given to Fischers speech  
1st persona:
Fischer, German parliamentarian 
and convinced European 
2nd persona:
German, French and 
other pro-Europeans 
3rd persona: 
British and other 
Euro-sceptics  
Germany: 
Survey of reactions 
France: 
Applause of  
the initiative 
England: 
Reactions against the  
federalist agenda Denmark:
Insertion of speech into 
national context of  
debate on the euro 
Spain: 
Presentation of a primarily  
Franco-German issue 
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5.1.4. I am ready to share new and greater responsibilities  Aznar in Paris 
Presentation of the speech 
On the 26th of September 2000 José María Aznar, the Spanish president of government at the 
time,31 spoke at the French Institute of International Relations on the topic of the future of Europe. 
Aznar was in Paris at the invitation of the Institute; during the visit he also held unofficial meetings 
with Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin and was interviewed by Le Figaro.32  
In the speech Aznar sets his visions for Europe within the context of simultaneous 
geographical enlargement and political deepening of the Union. The purpose of the speech is to 
present solutions to the deepening-widening dilemma (l. 50). Throughout the speech Aznar 
presents himself as a pragmatic integrationist. His goal, he says, is to create a political entity that is 
as capable of action and as responsive to the citizens demands as possible  an efficient, flexible, 
and dynamic European Union.        
 
Constitution of personae 
At the opening of the speech Aznar announces that he will be setting out the Spanish orientation in 
the ongoing debate on the future of Europe (l. 13). He introduces himself to the audience by stating 
that he is a clear participant in a profound integration process and [] ready to share new and 
greater responsibilities (ll. 6-7). Aznar speaks in the name of his government (l. 19), being 
Spanish (l. 37 and 134), and his proposals are said to comply with Spanish interests (ll. 19-20). 
The speech presents the principles that form the Spanish position (l. 49), setting forth that which 
Spain aspires to (l. 68) and which Spain desires (l. 96). In sum, Aznar speaks as the Spanish 
head of state, and in doing so he identifies his own position with an official Spanish persona; it is 
the relationship between this official national persona and the European Union that is developed in 
the speech.  
Aznar initially takes a positive and active stance towards Europe, and he 
presents Spain and all other member states as being subjected to the common European 
interest saying that the EU is constituted on the basis of a deeply rooted will of belonging (l. 
38). In elaborating on the tension between the national and European levels of governance 
                                                        
31 Before the parliamentary elections of the 14th of March 2004 Aznar had announced that he would step down from 
office. However, he had surely not planned that his conservative Partido Popular would have to concede the 
incumbency to José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and his socialist party.   
32 According to the coverage by El País and Le Figaro (EP 26/09/00, EP 28/09/00, LF 27/09/00). Aznar spoke in 
French, albeit with a strong Spanish accent (EP 27/09/00); however, I have only been able to locate the speech in a 
Spanish translation, wherefore the following analysis is based on the Spanish text. 
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Aznar also seems to opt for the European side of the scale. He maintains that the formation of 
a Europe a la Carte is an undesirable development and concludes: We have to guarantee 
the common stem and avoid the birth of various Europes (ll. 78-79). 
Aznar presents his own persona as being decidedly pro-European and also offers 
a pro-European stance to his audience. Yet he recognises that European integration has its 
limits: The European states are very jealous of their national and international identities, and 
the modification in the competencies of the Union should continue to be submitted to the 
agreement of all (ll. 114-116). Although Aznar repeatedly calls for their resolution, the 
tensions between diverse national interests and the common European position run through 
the entirety of the speech. The question of how European commonality may arise remains 
unanswered, meaning that both the first and second personae that Aznar creates are ridden 
with tension. Aznar may speak of European unity as the goal, but the nation is positioned as 
the main actor, who either demonstrates European sentiment or performs on the European 
stage (ll. 247-256). 
The speech is directed to the immediate audience at the French Institute of 
International Relations, to which reference is made at both the beginning and the end of the 
intervention (ll. 3-4 and l. 255). Also, the speech directs itself to other heads of state; Aznar 
makes explicit reference to a recent intervention by French President Jacques Chirac (ll. 4-5 
and ll. 90-93), and his discussion of the terminology of federation and constitution implicitly 
refers to Fischers proposals (l. 106). Towards the end of the speech it becomes quite clear 
that Aznar sees his primary audience as the political elite rather than a larger public. He states: 
With this [the proposals set forth] I am sure that we can generate the respect and adhesion of 
our citizens, and it is up to us, the European politicians, not to disappoint this new favourable 
predisposition (ll. 245-246).  
There is very little address outside the narrow circle of academics and 
politicians. Although Aznar identifies himself with Spain, the speech does not contain any 
explicit appeal to the Spanish  they are neither asked to identify with Aznar personally or 
with the vision of Spain in Europe he sets out.33 Furthermore, Aznar identifies Spain with 
Europe, and presents his speech as an intervention in an ongoing European debate, but he 
does not specify what it means to be European, nor does he align himself clearly within the 
                                                        
33 Aznar is speaking on behalf of the Spanish not to them. The lack of invitation to active identification also means that 
the speech offers no concrete points of contestation.  
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debate. References to the European idea (l. 40), the common European interest (l. 141) 
and the like do not add up to any clear sense of Europeanness.  
Aznars self-avowed pragmatism means the position on specific matters may be 
perfectly clear, but it provides no overall sense of direction to guide the proposals for the 
future. The pragmatism makes it possible for Aznar to manoeuvre freely, but it also means 
that no stable audience persona is established in the context of the broader public debate on 
the future of Europe. There is, however, a quite clear sense of who is excluded from European 
co-operation and from participating in the debate. The first excluded group, who all EU-
members define themselves against and actively oppose, is defined explicitly as the 
enemies of democracy and freedom called nationalist exclusivity, ethnic tyranny and 
terrorism (ll. 237-238). The second silenced group is cut off from the debate through the 
strong emphasis on the co-ordination of national and European interests. Neither total 
rejection nor total embracement of Europe is an option, and uncompromising scepticism as 
well as fervent federalism is relegated to the third persona. In Aznars conception of the 
debate all tenable proposals must aim at balancing the national and the European.    
 
5.1.5. Aznar and silence  the press coverage of Aznars speech 
The ten-day surveys of Danish, English, French, German and Spanish newspapers only yielded six 
articles (see figure 11), one is the above-mentioned Le Figaro interview and the rest are news 
stories or notes, one of which appeared in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the rest in El País. 
The Danish and English press did not contribute to the sample at all. The six articles do not deal 
exclusively with the speech, but mention it along with the other items on the agenda of Aznars visit 
to Paris. Also, the theme of Europes future takes second place to the issue of the fight against 
terrorism.34  
The FAZ article is a mere note announcing Aznars visit to Paris. Le Figaros 
interview presents some information on Aznars attitude towards the EUs future developments. 
Here it is noted that in dealing with the European debate [] José María Aznar sees himself as 
being pragmatic before all else (LF 27/09/00), and Aznars main opinions and objectives are 
presented. One of the Spanish articles (EP 27/09/00B) also deals with these issues, citing both the 
main points of Le Figaros interview and of Aznars speech. This is the only article that pays any 
attention to other politicians reactions to Aznars views. It is reported that the president of the 
                                                        
34 Thus, we are reminded that this issue was on the public agenda long before the 11th of September 2001. 
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French Republic, Jacques Chirac, expressed to the journalists that his points of view and those of 
Aznar on almost the totality of the European agenda are very close (EP 27/09/00B). The three 
other Spanish articles focus almost exclusively on the theme of terrorism, barely mention that the 
upcoming summit at Nice is also on the agenda, and do not present the broader debate on the future 
of Europe at all. 
 
5.1.6. Personae offered in and responses given to Aznars speech 
Aznar positions his first persona as an authoritative statesman who speaks on behalf of the Spanish 
people and is able to act freely in the European context. The second persona that he creates is that of 
like-minded leading politicians, and the speech does not hold any invitation to broader public 
debate on the presented views specifically or the future of Europe generally. Although the speech 
does set forth the official Spanish position in Europe and on matters of future European reform, it 
does not call for discussion of these views.  
Aznar invites both the general public and the circle of politicians to take note of the 
Spanish position, but whereas the public is placed in the entirely passive role of the spectator, the 
politicians are Aznars equal partners in the realisation of the European project. Although Aznar 
does not explicitly request dialogue it is clear that the second personae of the European politicians  
and to some extent of the academics in the immediate audience  are influential partners in Aznars 
pragmatic project.  
Aznar asks everyone to identify with a middle position in which neither purely 
national nor purely European stances are feasible, and he asks his fellow politicians to participate in 
the process of negotiating solutions that are acceptable to all. However, he does not seek to enhance 
Figure 11: The press coverage of Aznar's speech
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the debate on the general questions of what the EU is and what it should be, and he does not invite 
the public to participate in such discussions. In Aznars conception of the EU and the debate on its 
future only politicians are endowed with agency. Thus, it is quite fitting and in line with the 
meaning constituted in the speech that it should be met with silence in the mediated public sphere. 
Aznars utterance is a presentation of his views not an invitation to discuss them. The relationship 
between the personae that Aznar offers and the (lacking) response to them is illustrated in figure 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The personae offered in and responses given to Aznars speech 
 
1st persona: 
Aznar, Spanish 
head of state 
2nd persona (active): 
European academics  
and politicians 
2nd persona (passive):
Spanish and  
European publics 
3rd persona (for debate): 
Euro-sceptics and European 
federalists 
All: 
Silence 
3rd persona (for EU): 
Enemies of democracy 
and freedom 
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5.1.7. A superpower but not a superstate  Blair in Warsaw 
Presentation of the speech 
On the 6th of October 2000 the British Prime Minister Tony Blair presented his vision of the future 
of Europe before an immediate audience of Polish and other Eastern European politicians 
assembled at the Polish stock exchange in Warsaw.35 Blair sets his proposals firmly within the 
context of simultaneous deepening and widening. He discusses Britains role in Europe and also 
considers the general nature of the EU. Blairs message can be summed up as follows: enlargement 
should happen as soon as possible and include as many countries as possible, Britains place is at 
the centre of Europe, and the European Union should be a strong but not a federal entity. 
 
Constitution of personae 
There is no doubt Blair is speaking in his official capacity of British Prime Minister, but he does not 
set forth an elaborate presentation of his own persona. Instead, Blairs position shines through in his 
constitution of audience personae and his presentation of Europes future. In the introductory 
paragraphs Blair addresses the immediate audience, especially the Poles, and seeks to build a strong 
relationship between Poland and Britain. Concluding the introductory positioning of the Poles as a 
free, proud, idealistic people with close links to Britain, Blair says: Few countries have contributed 
more to the fall of fascism and Soviet dictatorship in Europe. Now we want you in the European 
Union (l. 45-46). This invitation to and promise of entry is repeated twice during the speech and 
with each repetition it is extended to a broader circle of candidate countries (ll. 77-78 and ll. 417-
419). Blair consistently creates a persona for the candidate countries that allows them to participate 
actively in the European integration process and allies them closely with Britain.36   
Affirming the alliance between the UK and the applicant countries, Blair says: 
Britain will always be a staunch ally of all those European democracies applying to join the 
European Union. A staunch ally, wielding its influence at the centre of Europe (ll. 80-82). Here 
Blair speaks for Britain and presupposes its central position in the European context. However, this 
presupposition is not left unchallenged and the quoted passage marks the beginning of a discussion 
of the British relationship with Europe, a discussion that is directed as much to the British people as 
it is conducted for them. The purpose of this discussion is to shift the British position within the EU 
                                                        
35 Several articles make a note of the speech situation; good examples are FT 06/10/00A and Guar 07/10/00A. 
36 The friendly, welcoming gesture is also extended to Serbia who has just rid itself of Slobodan Milosevic, the 
authoritarian leader who now stands trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Says Blair: 
we must stand ready [] to hold out the hand of partnership to a democratic Serbia, and welcome her into the 
European family of nations (ll. 16-18).  
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from a hesitant and reactionary role to that of a confident and active player. Both Blairs own 
persona and the second persona of the British audience are circumscribed by this redefined British-
European relationship. Britains future, Blair concludes, is and will be as a leading partner in 
Europe (ll. 158-159).  
As for the European future Blair envisions for himself and the members of his 
audience it is set squarely between the opposite models of the free trade area and the 
federation: the EU should become a superpower but not a superstate (l. 248 and l. 410). Blair 
claims his reform proposals are shaped to the needs and desires of the European citizens. The 
European citizenry as Blair defines this persona has common interests, but consists of 
independent national demoi (ll. 233-241). Blair assumes the role of spokesperson for the 
citizens in setting out their demands for prosperity, security, and strength (l. 214), and he 
speaks to the citizens of Europe when arguing that his proposal for reforms is fitted to their 
priorities (ll. 272-276).   
 Blair speaks to the European citizens in general and to the peoples of the candidate 
countries and of Britain in particular. He is asking them to share with him a vision of a well-
functioning European Union that attends to their needs but does not interfere unduly. In so doing, he 
constitutes the EU as a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the supranational (ll. 
245-246), and he emphasises that the issue of institutional change should be submitted to that of the 
peoples demands (ll. 193-196). Blair does not include the possibility of discussing whether or not 
the EU should widen geographically and deepen politically  that these developments should occur 
is simply taken for granted (ll. 192-193). Furthermore, he excludes the possibility of reducing 
British participation in the European project. Thereby, he seeks to discontinue discussion of these 
issues.  
Blairs claim to knowledge of the citizens demands does not invite debate either, but 
the questions of how the EUs efficiency and legitimacy are ensured are left open. Thus, Blair 
invites his immediate and extended audiences to join him in taking a positive and constructive 
attitude towards Europe and to partake in the consideration of how the Union can most 
appropriately realise its superpower potential while remaining celebratory of unique national traits. 
He seeks to position both his first and second personae so that they may identify with these 
discussions and are endowed with the agency needed to partake in them.   
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5.1.8. England and the rest  the press coverage of Blairs speech  
Germany, Spain, Denmark, and France: contextualising the speech 
The ten-day sample of the German newspapers coverage of the speech contains five articles (see 
figure 13) all of which are regular news pieces. The German coverage places Blairs speech within 
the context of the IGC to be concluded in December 2000 and the preparatory Council meeting 
taking place on the 13th and 14th of October in Biarritz.37 The speech is also set in the context of the 
long-term discussion of European integration.38 One article presents an overview of this broader 
debate, taking Fischers appearance at the Humboldt University as its starting point:  
For a long time the second commandment was in force in European politics: You shall 
not make any images of me. There was hardly any discussion on the question of where 
the integration of the continent should lead, that is, on the finality of the Union. This 
changed on the 12th of May 2000. On this day foreign minister Joschka Fischer held his 
Berlin speech and set the European debate in motion (SZ 12/10/00). 
 
The interventions following Fischers are then presented,39 and Blairs speech is positioned as the 
most recent contribution to the developing debate.  
 
 In the surveyed period six Spanish articles refer to Blairs speech (see figure 13); two 
of these texts are of an evaluative nature. The Spanish coverage discusses the speech in the context 
                                                        
37 FAZ 10/10/00 and 13/10/00. 
38 FAZ 10/10/00 and 12/10/00, SZ 12/10/00. 
39 The viewpoints of French President Jacques Chirac, Günther Verheugen, Commissioner for enlargement, and 
Commission President Prodi are mentioned. 
Figure 13: The German, Spanish, Danish, and French coverage of 
Blair's speech
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of the Danish rejection of the euro and the happenings in Belgrade.40 But more significantly, the 
speech is related to the reform process of the current IGC and the ongoing debate on European 
finality.41 Regarding the IGC, the most troublesome issues are presented, and in a commentary by 
Felipe Gonzalez, the socialist politician and former head of government, the prospects for success 
are reviewed.42 In the context of the long-term debate Blairs speech is related to preceding 
statements of Fischer, Chirac, Aznar,43 and Prodi. In a leading article it is claimed that: Blairs 
proposals [] are primarily of interest because they come from a British responsible [politician] 
who has not been ashamed of talking about the desire for a European superpower (EP, 09/10/00).  
There are a total of nine articles in the Danish sample (see figure 13), and two of these 
are leaders. The Danish coverage primarily relates Blairs intervention to the IGC and the broader 
debate. Only one article does not mention this theme choosing instead to relate the speech to the 
events in Belgrade.44 Other articles bring in issues such as the Warsaw-setting and the consequences 
of the Danish referendum alongside the theme of European debate.45 In the dominant 
contextualisation of the short- and long-term debate Blairs proposals are compared to those of 
Fischer, Chirac, and Prodi, and the prospects for reaching agreement at Nice are pondered.46 A 
prevalent concern is whether or not the British position is in the Danish interest.47  
Although there is disagreement as to whether Blairs position is beneficial or 
damaging to Denmark, the coverage conveys a common understanding of the proposal as being an 
adequate intervention into the European debate. As one leading article concludes: In Warsaw Tony 
Blair passed the test that determines whether a top-politician is a true European: he did not oppose 
width and depth in the European co-operation. He rightly saw reforms and enlargement as two sides 
of the same issue. [] Even if Tony Blair does not have all the answers, at least he posed the right 
questions (Pol 07/10/00).  
The French sample consists of two commentaries and eight news pieces adding up to a 
total of ten articles (see figure 13). In the French coverage one article focuses on the relationship 
between Blairs speech and the recently conducted Danish referendum.48 Blairs positioning of 
                                                        
40 EP 07/10/00A+B. 
41 Exp 07/10/00, EP 09/10/00, Exp 11/10/00, EP 13/10/00.  
42 EP 13/10/00. 
43 The appearance of Aznars speech in the context of the coverage of Blairs intervention indicates that the former 
utterance has not, after all, been inconsequential. 
44 Pol 06/10/00. 
45 Inf 07/10/00A+C, Inf 05/10/00. 
46 Inf 05/10/00, Inf 07/10/00C, Pol 07/10/00A, Inf 12/10/00. 
47 Inf 05/10/00, Inf 07/10/00A+B. 
48 LM 10/10/00. 
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himself as the champion of enlargement, and the speechs aptness to its immediate audience is 
mentioned a number of times.49 The speech is also related to the upcoming IGC.50 But the context 
of the broad European debate pervades the majority of the articles.51 In the context of European 
debate, Blairs proposals are compared to the ideas put forward by Fischer, Chirac, Aznar and 
Prodi, and there is general satisfaction that the discussion of fundamental issues will lead to a 
continuation of the reform process beyond the current IGC.52 Moreover, it is lamented that France 
has not been more active in the ensuing debate.53 
 
England: now say it at home, Mr. Blair 
The ten-day survey of the English newspapers coverage of Blairs Warsaw-address resulted in a 
total of 39 articles (see figure 14); seven of these are commentaries and there are five leaders as 
well as five letters.  
 
The English coverage includes all the contextualisations mentioned above and also has several 
unique features. The coverage can be divided into four groups: three of these are established 
                                                        
49 Lib 07/10/00, LM 07/10/00, LF 07/10/00, LM 09/10/00. 
50 LF 09/10/00, LM 13/10/00. 
51 Lib 04/10/00, Lib 05/10/00, Lib 07/10/00, LF 07/10/00, LM 09/10/00, LF 09/10/00, Lib 11/10/00, LM 13/10/00. 
52 There is but one exception to the general approval of fundamental discussions and further reform: If the Unions 
latent institutional crisis bursts forth at Nice, it is not certain that a majority of the member states will be inclined to 
engage rapidly in a new round of negotiations. The European construction will then enter into a period of stagnation, 
road to regression, because the fifteen have made the mistake of responding to the recurrent question: where does one 
find the point of equilibrium between an association of nation-states conserving the essence of their free will and a 
community structure of federal vocation? (LM 13/10/00).  
53 Lib 05/10/00 and 11/10/00. 
Figure 14: The English coverage of Blair's speech
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according to temporal developments, and the fourth group, consisting of leaders, commentaries, and 
letters, runs parallel to the three others (see table 3).  
 
 Times Independent Guardian Financial 
Times 
Total articles 
in group 
Early stage 5 4 0 3 12 
Middle stage 2 0 1 1 4 
Late stage 3 1 1 0 5 
Evaluative 
articles 
1 4 4 8 17 
Total articles 
in paper 
11 9 7 12  
Table 3: The four groups of the English coverage 
The first group of articles focuses primarily on Blairs speech as a contribution to the 
ongoing debate on the future of Europe and also includes the factors of the pending enlargement, 
the Danish referendum, and the events in Serbia. The gist of this first group may be summed up as 
follows:  
When the Prime Minister originally decided to offer a speech on the future of the 
European Union [] it was to be a response to the debate opened by Joschka Fischer, the 
German Foreign Minister, and then by Jacques Chirac earlier this year. The referendum 
in Denmark and the revolution in Serbia have transformed the context in which Tony 
Blair delivered his address (Tim 07/10/00A). 
 
In the second group, covering the survey periods intermediate phase, the coverage 
attends to different reactions to the speech. The recorded reactions come primarily from the British 
Conservatives, who said that it [the speech] would undermine Britain as a nation state (FT 
07/10/00A). However, the guarded reaction of the pro-European Liberal Democrats is also noted. 
And the positive reception of the speech on the continent, especially in the Commission, is present 
in several accounts.54  
The articles of the final temporally established group primarily place the speech in the 
context of the Biarritz Council and the short-term debate on the reforms that are to be settled at 
Nice. Here, the main issue is the negotiating position Blair has created in the speech, and the 
possible outcomes of the meetings are considered. Yet there is also a general understanding that the 
meeting at Biarritz will frame the terms of debate for the future of the European Union (Tim 
13/10/00A), and thus the immediate negotiations are tied in with the broader debate.  
                                                        
54 Guar 07/10/00A, FT 07/10/00A, Tim 08/10/00. 
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The fourth group of texts, the comments published throughout the surveyed period, 
contains many of the same themes as the other three groups, but distinguishes itself by taking an 
explicit stance on the issues that are pondered. Here the content and the timing of the speech are 
discussed and evaluated. The content of Blairs proposal is the primary topic of the letters, and 
evaluations of specific elements55 as well as of the speechs general direction56 are offered. The 
commentaries tend to focus more on the process and strategic aspects of the debate than on the 
particular content of Blairs intervention. Some commentators deny the need for further discussion 
of general ideas,57 but most welcome the debate as such and find that Blairs intervention is 
particularly fortuitous.58 Also, the commentators repeatedly emphasise the need for a national 
British debate, inviting Blair to restate his European position in a British setting.59  
 
5.1.9. Personae offered in and responses given to Blairs speech 
Tony Blair seeks to create a close correspondence between his own persona and the second persona 
of the European citizenry as such as well as the more specific personae of Britain and the candidate 
countries. Blair offers to represent the citizens at the political level, but also invites them to 
participate in the public discussion on the future of Europe. In Blairs conception this is a discussion 
that is to be carried out in the intermediate space between the Eurosceptic and the federalist views 
and from which both of these extremes are excluded. 
 Blair does not seem to be speaking primarily to the political leaders of the EU member 
states; he does not address them explicitly, but instead refers to politicians from the candidate 
countries and to the nationally anchored publics of these candidate countries and of the UK. Yet the 
German, French, Danish and Spanish press coverage primarily contextualises Blairs speech as a 
contribution to the ongoing dialogue between the European leaders. This coverage both compares 
Blairs position to those of the leaders that have spoken before him and conveys the reactions of the 
leaders to Blairs proposals. Two factors may explain this common feature of these four national 
                                                        
55 The proposal to create a second chamber of the European Parliament consisting of national MPs threatens to impede 
the decision-making process of the EU as never before (Ind 09/10/00A). 
56 Blairs vision is likely to deliver less, not more, accountability (Guard 11/10/00). 
57 The answer to Europes current difficulties is not rhetoric about tomorrow but addressing the problems of today 
(FT 06/10/00B). Europe needs a pause for reflection, not an interminable round of constitutional debate (FT 
13/10/00B).  
58 Tony Blairs speech in Warsaw today [] could not be better timed (Ind 06/10/00). He has not come up with all 
the answers, but he made a good start, with all the right questions (FT 09/10/00). At Warsaw last Friday Tony Blair 
entered the real debate on the future of the EU. Not before time (FT 11/10/00A). 
59 Who knows, Mr. Blair may make his next big European speech in Britain itself (Ind 06/10/00A). What is now 
necessary is an advance into the nether reaches of British public opinion (Guar 07/10/00B). Mr. Blair should now 
debate these political issues here in Britain (FT 11/10/00A).  
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reports: firstly, the debate on the future of Europe has now become generally recognised as an 
ongoing and important process, and the coverage with its description of the debate helps consolidate 
this fact. Secondly, Blair does not address the national publics of Germany, France, Denmark, and 
Spain in the same direct way that he addresses the publics of Britain and the candidate countries, 
wherefore there may be less incentive to engage the speech in active dialogue in the four former 
national contexts.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The personae offered in and responses given to Blairs speech 
In England, however, Blairs invitation to debate is taken up, and his opinions are 
discussed. Nevertheless, the general English sentiment is that Blair has not succeeded on the 
national scene. His performance, the English coverage contends, has secured him an influential 
position in Europe, but it is doubtful whether it will have much effect on the British public opinion. 
On this latter issue the outcome hinges upon Blairs ability to follow up the speech with equally 
forceful national interventions, and, the argument continues, these forthcoming interventions must 
be more carefully adapted to the national setting with its peculiar demands and expectations. Thus, 
it is clear that Blairs attempt to reposition the British persona in relation to Europe has not effected 
any decisive change in the attitude of the English press. Moreover, the agency Blair asks his 
countrymen to allow him to exert on their behalf at the European level of action does not pass 
uncontested. However, the coverage concedes that Tony Blair has made a good start. If the PM 
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makes further efforts to occasion a national debate, the English newspapers suggest, that debate 
may foster the outcome he desires. The relationship between the personae Blair seeks to create and 
the responses forwarded in the press coverage is illustrated in figure 15.        
 
5.2. Turning point one: consolidation of the debate 
A Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the concluding session 
of the intergovernmental conference that prepares treaty revisions, was held in conjunction with the 
European Council of Nice on the 7th to the 10th of December 2000. Here the assembled leaders 
agreed to reform the Unions institutional structure and procedures of decision-making. Thereby, 
they amended the existing foundational treaties and created the Treaty of Nice. The Conference also 
adopted a number of declarations  statements of intent, acclamation, and/or explanation  to be 
appended to the Treaty. The Declaration on the future of the Union is the 23rd and second to last 
of these declarations. With this text the debate on the future of Europe is consolidated and officially 
recognised as a process that is to lead to another revision of the EUs foundational treaties. Hence, 
the Nice Declaration marks the first turning point of the debate on the future of Europe.   
 
5.2.1. A deeper and wider debate  the Declaration on the future of the Union 
The Declaration on the future of the Union presents itself as a transitory text. It states that the 
ratification of the Nice Treaty will complete the necessary preparations for enlargement (ll. 5-7), 
and goes on to proclaim that having [] opened the way for enlargement, the Conference calls for 
a deeper and wider debate about the future development of the European Union (ll. 8-9). The 
declaration then sets out the timetable and agenda for this discussion. In 2001 wide-ranging 
discussions with all interested parties (ll. 10-11) shall take place, culminating in a declaration 
containing appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process (ll. 15-16) to be signed at the 
European Council at Laeken in December 2001.  
There are four main issues for discussion: delimitation of powers between the EU and 
the member states, the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, simplification of the Treaties, 
and the role of national parliaments (ll. 18-24). These matters are addressed in recognition of the 
need to improve and to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its 
institutions, to bring it closer to the citizens of the Member States (ll. 25-27). The discussions, it is 
stated, are meant as preparations for a new IGC to be convened in 2004 (ll. 28-30). Finally, the 
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declaration ensures that this new IGC and the preparations for it will not hinder the enlargement 
process in any way and that the candidate countries will be involved in the process (ll. 31-34). 
 Given the official and declaratory nature of the text, it does not address anyone in 
particular nor speak from any particular position; the voice of The Declaration on the future of the 
Union is the voice of the EU talking to itself. This omnipresent voice functions in the manner of a 
declaratory performative (Austin, 1962, p. 7) to create what it names. In the Nice Declaration the 
EU is foreseeing its own future: a future in which the Unions democratic legitimacy and the 
peoples identification with the EU are improved. Furthermore, the declaration specifies that this 
future state is to be achieved through wide-ranging discussions of the four designated issues.  
 
5.2.2. A game of poker at the marketplace  the press coverage of the Nice Declaration 
As mentioned earlier, I deal with the coverage of the turning points en bloc rather than country by 
country. The ten-day sample of the 17 newspapers contains 194 articles in all (see figure 16); of 
these 25 are commentaries, ten are leaders, there are four letters, and the remaining 155 are news 
stories. It should be noted that a considerable number of the articles deal with the meeting at Nice as 
such and only mention the declaration and the debate on the future of Europe in passing. Although I 
include all the articles in the following analysis, I focus attention on the relationship between the 
Nice Declaration and the European debate.  
 
Figure 16: The press coverage of the Nice Declaration
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The coverage is dominated by three broad and recurrent themes around which I have 
structured the analysis (see table 4). The purpose of the analysis is to present the press 
conceptualisation of the Nice summit as a turning point in the debate on the future of Europe. How 
does the press coverage conceive of the relationship between the summit at Nice and the debate? 
And which conditions for further discussion  contexts, processes, and issues  emerge from the 
conceptualisation? 
 
 Institutional 
reforms 
National and 
European interests
Continuation of 
the debate 
Other issues 
Total 63% 44% 38% 26% 
Denmark 59% 44% 41% 25% 
England 55% 41% 41% 15% 
France 67% 52% 38% 33% 
Germany 60% 33% 23% 37% 
Spain 76% 48% 48% 18% 
Table 4: Recurrent themes of the Nice coverage 60 
 
Institutional reforms in preparation of enlargement 
The negotiations and the subsequent Treaty of Nice are most frequently placed within the 
framework of the enlargement process. The general idea is that the EU must change its institutional 
framework in order to be functional after the entrance of the candidate countries and that it is the 
task of the European heads of state and government convened at Nice to reach agreement on the 
necessary changes. Creating the new treaty is generally understood as the main goal of the summit 
and the criterion by which its success or failure should be judged. 
 The coverage of the institutional reforms can be divided into three temporal stages. 
Attention to the three stages is evenly distributed in the Danish, French and German coverage, but 
in England and Spain there are about twice as many articles covering the last stage than the two 
preceding ones, wherefore the total coverage appears skewed (see table 5). Before the negotiations 
at Nice begin, the coverage concentrates on explaining the different reforms and their significance 
                                                        
60 The table shows how many percent of the coverage dealt with the theme in question. Please note that more than one 
theme may be present within the same article (the total is more than a 100%). The category Other issues includes 
coverage of decisions that are not part of the institutional reform  for example the declaration of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Other issues also refers to coverage of demonstrations at Nice and to reports that connect the 
summit to other themes  for example a scandal regarding party subsidies that Jacques Chirac was involved in at the 
time. 
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for the enlargement process. While the negotiations take place the focus is on the process itself, the 
proposals put forward, the positions of the actors, and the rejections and concessions. Finally, the 
articles that are published after agreement is reached seek to explain and evaluate the results, 
bringing in the reactions of both the negotiating politicians and third parties such as members of the 
European Parliament and national oppositions. 
 
 Before summit During summit After summit 
Total in stage 33 30 56 
Denmark 6 5 8 
England 11 10 22 
France 4 5 5 
Germany 6 5 7 
Spain 6 5 14 
Table 5: The temporal stages of the coverage of institutional reforms 
The coverage traces a movement from enthusiastic proclamation of ambitious goals 
through the give and take of the negotiations to fatigued acceptance of the results, and it is well 
aware of this developmental path. A Le Monde article summarises the movement thus:  
Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin had repeated it ad nauseam: no agreement is better 
than a discount agreement They have not had this commitment as is demonstrated by 
the very limited results that the heads of state and government of the Fifteen have 
reached Monday morning the 11th of December, after four days of laborious 
negotiations and the longest summit in the history of European construction  
(12/12/00E).  
 
This sentiment is echoed in taz: The Treaty of Nice does not redeem any of the high demands that 
the politicians have placed on it for months (12/12/00B). Expansión presents the developments in a 
more pragmatic light: this skirmish [for the distribution of national powers], although it can be 
considered critically for its limited ambition, incorporated decisions of great interest in relation to 
some essential technical prerequisites for the functioning of the European project (13/12/00). The 
Independent takes this pragmatic line even further: agreement at Europes longest summit was 
achieved only by scrapping grandiose ambitions and satisfying basic national interests 
(12/12/00D). And the understanding common to all is represented by Jyllands-Postens laconic 
verdict: the Treaty of Nice does not fulfil the ambitious goals that the heads of state and 
government had set for themselves, but it is sufficient to keep the EUs plans for enlargement on 
track (12/12/00A). 
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National and European interests  
The orientation of the articles that take up the issue of representation of national and European 
interests undergoes a development that is parallel to the dynamic of the coverage on institutional 
reforms (see figure 17).  
 
The tension between national priorities and general European concerns is a main issue in the first 
days of the sample-period, and this is reflected in the coverage, which at this stage contains articles 
of all three orientations. The emerging common understanding of the coverage that preludes the 
Nice summit is that the relationship between different national and European interests is the steering 
dynamic of the ensuing negotiations. Le Monde exemplifies this understanding of the situation:  
These negotiations have revealed a double cleavage. The first opposes the countries that 
estimate that the moment has come to pass on to a new phase in the political integration, 
and those that are not ready; the second opposes the small and the big countries  but 
also France and Germany  over the balance to be respected between the states in the 
future Union (07/12/00).   
 
As the negotiations get under way the coverage pays more and more attention to the 
exclusively national positions. The negotiations are presented as a hard-nosed bargaining process in 
which the participants will not concede any point without being gratified on some other issue. 
Jyllands-Posten recounts the impressions of non-European journalists attending the summit: to 
them the negotiations of the heads of state and government are reminiscent of the carpet dealers in 
an Arabic bazaar (11/12/00B). And novelist Christopher Hope writing for The Guardian describes 
the scene thus:  
 
Figure 17: Primary orientations of the coverage
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Some have likened the Nice summit to a long, late-night poker game. It isnt really. 
Poker is sedentary. [] What you really see are teams of athletes fit and smiling, and 
ready to knock the hell out of the opposing teams. Summitry is a bruising contact sport 
played by consenting adults. It is ice hockey for politicians (11/12/00A).  
 
This mode of coverage complies with the communicative strategies of the politicians as an 
Information editorial presents them:  
While the process, in appropriate tumult, produces compromises, solutions, and 
common repressions, the heads of state and government are simultaneously 
preoccupied with sending their versions of the summit home to the national publics 
where their [personal] political futures are decided (09/12/00).  
 
The nationally oriented line of reportage culminates in the naming of the winners and losers of 
Nice: Histories of the European Union will remember the Nice summit as a landmark moment 
when big governments won the big arguments  and left the integrationists reeling and humiliated at 
their loss of power (Guar 12/12/00B).  
The culmination is followed by a shift in the orientation of the coverage, and national 
jubilance is tempered by the re-emergence of the European perspective. For example, Le Monde 
laments that the agreement testifies to the continued erosion of the European spirit and the rise 
of national egoism (12/12/00A). And Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung notes bitterly: when 
successes solely are summed up from a national perspective, as it has become fashion, then the 
conclusions of Nice, this one sees clearly abroad, are not all that bad for Germany. (Such a result is 
not necessarily congruent with the tableau of Germanys long-term interests) (14/12/00).  
The reports shifting emphases on national and European interests are in agreement 
with the dynamic of the summit. In the early stages both national and European expectations are 
voiced, but as the heads of state and government get down to business the European perspective is 
all but eclipsed by national interests. And after agreement has been reached the European interest is 
brought back in to evaluate the results. The question lurking behind these developments  whether 
national and European interests are indeed reconcilable  is not addressed directly, yet it is of 
paramount importance not only to the outcome at Nice, but also to the continuation of the debate on 
the future of Europe.  
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Continuation of the European debate 
In the articles preceding the inauguration of the summit several references are made to the debate on 
the future that was begun by Fischer. Here, the debate is presented as the only positive event of 
the last year (Inf 08/12/00). Also, it is suggested that the upsurge in profound debate does not come 
as a surprise, given the present insecurity and hesitancy about the nature and purpose of the EU.61 
But most significantly, the continuation of the debate is introduced as an objective of the German 
government. At the Humboldt University of Berlin foreign minister Fischer let the public know 
that the real European future does not begin until after the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice 
(FAZ 07/12/00A). Thus, the official recognition of the debate is introduced as a stake in the bargain. 
Germany is said to be willing to give up other demands in return for the inclusion of the 
Declaration on the future of the Union in the Nice Treaty.62   
As it becomes clear that the declaration will be included in the final agreement the 
coverage by and large abandons the strategic considerations of the proposal as part of the bargain. 
The agenda and timeline for the coming debate are instead presented in detail and broader 
reflections on the need for and possible outcomes of the debate appear.63 In dealing with the four 
points on the agenda of the coming debate most of the coverage is strictly referential, and although 
the presentation of the debates timetable involves some speculation on the institutional forms the 
discussions could take64 this coverage is also mainly descriptive. However, the evaluation of 
whether or not a continuation of the debate and a new treaty revision is desirable at all is one of the 
most pervasive themes. On this subject three different evaluations are offered65: scepticism towards 
the necessity and possible benefits of continuing the discussion, recognition of the need for debate 
accompanied by pessimism about the ability to make real improvements, and enthusiastic approval 
of the initiative.  
                                                        
61 EP 05/12/00. 
62 LM 05/12/00, Guar 06/12/00, Exp 08/12/00. 
63 There are exceptions to this tendency as a few articles of broader scope were published before the decision on 
inclusion of the declaration was reached, but there is a clear concentration of such articles in the second half of the 
sampled period. The German coverage, however, breaks with the general pattern: here articles that do not focus 
narrowly on the proposal as a part of the German bargaining position at Nice, are distributed evenly throughout the 
coverage. 
64 In the coverage there is general agreement that the current procedure of the IGC must change. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was created by a convention of representatives of national and European institutions who met in 
public and involved civil society in its discussions. This convention method is presented as one possible alternative to 
the existing procedures for treaty revision (FA Z 06/12/00A and 07/12/00A, F T 08/12/00A, Ind 11/12/00B, Inf 
12/12/00A, LM 12/12/00B). 
65 The coverage also includes other angles than the directly evaluative  for instance the issues of the meaning and 
importance of the earlier contributions to the debate are considered (EP 05/12/00, FAZ 07/12/00A, LM 08/12/00B, CD 
11/12/00, Ind 12/12/00B, L M 12/12/00B).  
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In several articles the first position is represented by Göran Persson, the Swedish 
Prime Minister who is to take over the EUs presidency and thus somewhat ironically will be in 
charge of initiating the process that he is sceptical of. Persson thinks that the aim of the integration 
process should be a union of nation states.66 Thereby, he questions the need for further reform and 
suggests that it is also important and an at least equally good European vision to really protect 
the EU we have decided to realise (Inf 08/12/00B). The second position is based on the 
assumptions that the Treaty of Nice does not solve all of the EUs existing problems, that further 
reform is needed, and that the debate should therefore be continued.67 However, from this point of 
view the ambivalent outcome of the European Council is not necessarily a good omen for the 
debate on the future of Europe (LM 12/12/00D).  
The third position shares the starting point of the second, but does not judge the 
prospective outcome of the debate negatively. Rather, the chance for a wider public debate is 
welcomed and the potential positive consequences of such public involvement are cherished.68 
Here, the main argument is that the EU can strengthen its legitimacy by involving the people in the 
discussion of what the Union should be and how it should act. And the concern is that the citizens 
reluctance towards the European project will continue to grow if a broad and dynamic dialogue is 
not sparked. The position is stated clearly in Süddeutsche Zeitung: we must find forms of 
European-wide debate that also bring in the people (09/12/00). And Jyllands-Posten reports the 
politicians endorsement of this position: EUs leaders hope that the next reforms of the co-
operation will build upon a very broad popular foundation. They wish to inspire a comprehensive 
public debate on the road to an EU that is more effective and easier to understand (11/12/00A). As 
is seen, the coverage both represents scepticism about the continued reforms and concern that the 
debate may be futile, yet the emerging common understanding is that the post-Nice debate and 
reform process is a worthwhile effort with a real chance of yielding positive results.   
 
                                                        
66 FT 07/12/00B. 
67 FAZ 06/12/00, LM 08/12/00B, EP 11/12/00D, FT 11/12/00. 
68 SZ 09/12/00B, BT 11/12/00B, FT 11/12/00C, Ind 12/12/00B, SZ 12/12/00B, FAZ 12/12/00C, EP 13/12/00A. 
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5.2.3. Consequences of the first turning point 
The coverage of the creation of the Nice Declaration displays a tension between the modes of 
discussion that prevail at times of institutionalised decision-making as opposed to periods of non-
binding dialogue. When the immediate goal is not to take consequential decisions the politicians 
and the reporters covering their actions have a tendency to view the debate in terms of deliberation 
 that is open-ended discussions oriented at reaching common understanding. During such non-
binding discussions there exists a common will to reach consensus and even if both European and 
national interests are considered, these are understood to be reconcilable. When the moment of 
decision-making arrives, however, the discussions become much more concrete, politicians and 
reporters now focus on exclusively national positions and priorities and the mode of interaction 
turns from deliberation to bargaining. Thus, the coverage reveals a tension between the politicians 
abstract agreement on general European goals and their specific disagreements on concrete 
intergovernmental decisions. Also, there seems to be a cleavage between the politicians common 
attempt to reach agreement and their differentiated communications to the national constituencies. 
These differences between the discussions as they are carried out at consequential as opposed to 
non-binding moments may hamper the agreement on any radical change and may lock the debate in 
already established patterns.   
In spite of these limiting conditions the leaders did reach agreement at Nice: not only 
did they create a new treaty, they also established new terms for continuing the debate. The most 
obvious consequence of the Nice Declaration is the official recognition that the stipulated 
discussions should result in yet another treaty change. The agreement that it is not only necessary to 
reform the treaty, but also the very procedure by which reforms are made is, however, more far 
reaching. The formal recognition of the debate as a round a treaty reforms changes the topics and 
goals of the discussion: the necessity of the continued reform process is now taken for granted, and 
the timeframe as well as general procedures of the ensuing discussions are established. The 
establishment of public debate as the best way to achieve reforms changes the basic way of 
conceiving the reform process and grants the debate a position of unprecedented centrality. The 
debate is now valued as both a constituent aspect of the legal reform of the EUs foundational texts 
and as a constitutive process that in itself provides the Union with input and social legitimacy. 
Thus, the form of deliberation in periods of non-binding dialogue may not change radically 
immediately after the first turning point of the debate, but the status of the deliberations and the 
expectations to them are heightened considerably. Public debate now becomes an end in itself, and 
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it is perceived as the central means of ensuring that the next round of changes will yield actual and 
substantial improvements.  
 
5.3. Trajectory two: objectives and instruments 
The agreement on the Declaration on the Future of the Union marks a turning point in the debate 
and calls the second trajectory into being. This trajectory of official, yet non-binding exploration of 
the various possible reforms  the available objectives and alternative instruments  lasted for one 
year and was ended with the Laeken Declaration, a course of events that was predetermined by the 
Nice Declaration. The three chosen moments of the second trajectory are occasioned by Jospins, 
Prodis, and Lykketofts speeches.     
 
5.3.1. I am not a tepid European  Jospin in Paris 
Presentation of the speech 
On the 28th of May 2001 Lionel Jospin, the French Prime Minister at the time, presented his visions 
of Europe in a speech held at the Centre for Foreign Journalists at the Maison de la Radio in Paris. 
The audience at the Maison de la Radio was a mix of young socialists and French and foreign 
journalists who had been notified in advance that there would be no chance to ask questions after 
the speech.69 The speech is entitled The future of the enlarged Europe,70 but the pending 
enlargement forms the background rather than the actual subject matter of the speech. Jospin 
proclaims that the debate should not deal primarily with the question of institutions and their 
reform. Rather, the concrete proposals should be based in a consideration of the kind of political 
project the EU is and should be.  
 
Constitution of personae 
The speech is both begun and ended with statements that constitute Jospins personal identity 
through a combination of European and national features. In the introduction Jospin states: I 
am French. I feel European (l. 16). And in the concluding remarks he reaffirms the European 
sentiment: Because I am not a tepid European, I do not want a bland Europe (l. 334). The 
identity, which Jospin seeks to build for his persona, presupposes the existence of an art de 
vivre that is common to all European national identities. To Jospin Europe is a civilisation,  
                                                        
69 As reported by Le Monde (29/05/01F). 
70 Lavenir de lEurope élargie. 
The Constitution of Meaning 
 114
justified by its diverse cultures that are united by the sharing of territory, history, economy 
and human values (ll. 30-35). Thus, Jospins first persona with its dual national and European 
sentiments is equivalent to the collective identity of all members of the European society that 
is posed as the main second persona of the speech. 
 The positioning of the audience is begun by recognising that in spite of the EUs many 
successes people and even some policy-makers are feeling disenchanted with and uncertain of the 
European project. A list of legitimate questions about the EUs future is presented: will enlargement 
cause the EU to fall apart? Does globalisation affect the European identity? Do reforms mean a 
reduction of the role of the nation states? How can citizens become more involved in Europe? (ll. 8-
11). Jospin sees the public debate initiated by the heads of state and government at Nice as a 
response to these questions. He offers his speech as a contribution by an incumbent politician to the 
debate now getting under way in France (ll. 12-15). The underlying premise of this passage is that 
peoples anxieties can be resolved through debate on the worrisome issues, and the speech offers a 
starting point for such resolution. In the attempt to perform the reconciliatory task, Jospin chooses 
to focus on the content of Europe, on the things that all the European nations have in common, and 
the tasks that everyone agrees the EU should perform.  
The conciliation of the national and the European that is the main premise for both 
the first and the second personae is furthered by opposing the European nations to a common 
other, namely unregulated, free-reeling globalisation and more specifically unilateral cultural, 
economic and political dominance (ll. 117-118, ll. 128-130). By references to recognised 
achievements and common others and through inclusive appeals to participation in further 
developments Jospin seeks total identification between his own and the audiences positions. The 
common identity he envisions is one in which national and European dimensions are not opposed, 
and in which both can be seen to benefit from the same initiatives. Jospin proposes the term 
federation of nation states71 as the conceptualisation of the EU that conforms to the personae he 
has created for himself and his audience.  
 Jospin seeks to construct an inclusive position to which everyone can adhere. He sets 
his speech in the context of the French public debate on the issues raised at the Nice summit, and he 
extends an invitation to the citizens to participate in the debate. However, Jospin does not offer any 
explicit opportunities for discussion since there is little trace of alternative positions and counter-
                                                        
71 According to Jospin, this term, as coined by Jacques Delors, reflects the unique mixture of national realities and 
federal ideals at which he aims: There are nations, strong, vibrant, attached to their identity that found the wealth of 
our continent. And then there is the will to unite, to build a unity that will make each one stronger (ll. 232-233). 
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arguments within the speech. On the basis of Jospins intervention the average citizen may accept or 
reject the offered vision of a reconciled European and national identity grounded in shared values 
and principles, but the speech offers little clue as to how the discussion could be continued. If 
citizens are to discuss Jospins position critically they must have recourse to alternatives 
independently of the speech. 
At one point Jospin does mention an alternative position, a recent proposal by the 
German social democrats for the constitution of a European federation along the lines of the 
German federal model (ll. 210-212). This reference and a foregoing reminder that the final decision 
on the treaty reforms will be taken by the heads of state and government in unanimity (ll. 205-207), 
indicate that Jospin is speaking as much to the decision-makers at the European level as to his 
national public. As a contribution to the discussion between high-ranking politicians and 
bureaucrats the speech may be better suited to elicit responses, since other policy-makers have prior 
knowledge of alternative suggestions and, thus, are able to provide the lacking objections. Also, the 
speech is concluded by proposing that a convention composed of different political actors be set 
down (ll. 328-332), and this proposition provides a concrete suggestion as to how the debate should 
be continued at the political level.  
These considerations do not narrow the inclusiveness of Jospins speech, but point out 
that the speech serves different functions for different audiences. The general French public is 
offered a presentation of their Prime Ministers vision of Europe; a position that can be accepted or 
rejected but hardly debated substantially. The audience of European decision-makers is provided 
with further alternatives to include in the already wide catalogue of reform proposals and with a 
constructive suggestion on the procedure for continuing the debate. 
 
5.3.2. A qualitative leap is necessary  Prodi in Paris 
Since Romano Prodis speech was delivered on the day following Jospins intervention and since 
there is a considerable overlap in the coverage of the two speeches, I have chosen to present the 
reactions to the two speeches jointly. Therefore, I shall introduce Prodis speech before turning to 
the press coverage.72 
 
                                                        
72 The coverage of  Jospins and Prodis speeches was gathered using the same procedure as in the case of the four other 
speeches. After the two ten-day samples had been collected they were joined in one eleven-day sample; within this 
sample distinctions can still be made between those articles that treat one or the other of the speeches exclusively and 
those that deal with both utterances. 
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Presentation of the speech 
Romano Prodi is Italian and had a national political career  he was Prime Minister from May 1996 
to May 1998  before he took over the presidency of the Commission in September 1999.73 Prodi 
has announced that he will return to national politics when his term as Commission president ends 
on the 1st of November 2004.74 As president of the European Commission Romano Prodi makes 
regular interventions into ongoing debates on issues that pertain to the EU, and the debate on the 
future of Europe is certainly no exception. The speech to be discussed here was held on the 29th of 
May 2001 in Paris, more specifically in the grand amphitheatre of the Institute of Political Studies, 
or Sciences-Po as this elite institution is commonly called.75 As is his custom when addressing 
primarily French audiences, Prodi delivered the speech in French,76 and the speech is entitled For a 
strong Europe, endowed with a grand project and the means of action.77 As indicated in the title, 
the speech is decidedly pro-European and deals with the nature of the EUs objectives and 
instruments. 
 
Constitution of personae 
At the very beginning of the speech Prodi identifies and positions the immediate audience: You are 
young. You have grown up after the fall of the Berlin wall. You are not prisoners of the schemata of 
the cold war: an enlarged Europe is your natural horizon. The discussion of the future of the 
European Union is above all your debate (ll. 6-9). Prodi invites the immediate audience to identify 
with the Europe that will emerge after enlargement, and to participate in the debate that is 
constitutive of this emergent Europe. However, the speech is not only directed to the students in the 
amphitheatre, but is to be seen as a contribution to the on-going political debate on the future of 
Europe. Through references to Jospins speech of the previous day (ll. 78-79, l. 309, and l. 495) and 
to a proposal by the German Chancellor Schröder (l. 502) it is indicated that Prodis speech should 
                                                        
73 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/prodi/president/cv_en.htm 
74 This announcement was first made in February 2004 and recorded in several media. See the website of  United in 
the Olive Tree (www.ulivo.it), Prodis political alliance, for his own account. Prodis successor, former Portuguese 
Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso, was appointed by the heads of state and government at their European Council 
meeting on the 18th of June 2004 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/barroso/index_en.htm).  
75 As reported by Le Figaro (30/05/01). Other speeches by Prodi that would have been suitable for study include his 
intervention at the European Parliament on the 3rd of October 2000 and a speech held at the University College of Cork, 
Ireland, on the 22nd of June 2001. The Sciences-Po-speech was chosen for its close temporal and spatial proximity to 
another of the studied speeches, as I felt it would be important to study how the press coverage reacted to such 
closeness. 
76 According to a personal communication with the Commission press corp. I was also informed that Prodi usually 
speaks to international audiences in English and that he uses Italian when addressing Italian audiences and when 
speaking to the European institutions. 
77 Pour une Europe forte, dotée dun grand projet et de moyens daction. 
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be regarded as an intervention of similar calibre. As a major statement of opinion by a member of 
the highest European political echelon, the speech is not only directed to the general public, but also 
seeks to contribute to the dialogue of the decision-makers. Thus, while the speech is explicitly 
addressed to the physically present audience at Sciences-Po, it is also an intervention into the arena 
of public debate on the future of Europe in the broad sense, and it has a more specific appeal to the 
political decision-makers. 
 Apart from the introductory remarks on the immediate audience, the speech contains 
very little direct positioning of the audience. Instead, Prodi offers his own persona as a role model 
for his audiences. The speakers position is presented as a comprehensive one whose breadth is 
achieved by circumventing false contradictions. The first contradiction is that between those who 
want more and those who want less Europe. Prodi feels that this polarisation stifles the debate and 
seeks to side-step it by advocating complementarity; local, national and European levels of 
collective action, says Prodi, are all necessary for those who wish to operate effectively in a 
globalised world (ll. 376-386). However, the recognition that the European and the national 
positions may be harmonised does not lead Prodi to suggest they are interchangeable. Thus, Prodi 
rejects the purely federal approach, but his rejection of renationalisation is just as firm (ll. 284-286). 
In fact, he contends that all in-depth interrogations, every attempt to assign objectives to the Union 
that live up to the challenge of globalisation, lead to a single diagnosis: the Union needs more 
coherence and, in many key areas, more integration. A qualitative leap is necessary (ll. 265-270).  
 The second contradiction that Prodi seeks to overcome consists of the discussants 
tendency to focus on either the EUs substance or its institutions. Prodi thinks these two areas are 
interdependent and thus should not be viewed as separate issues. However, he recognises that the 
reconciliation of objectives and frameworks is no easy task and attempts to unite the two elements 
under an overarching demand for change. It is in this spirit of synthesis that Prodi invites further 
contributions to the debate (ll. 510-511), and hereby the active participant in the discussion is 
positioned as necessarily recognising the need for change.  
In Prodis conception, agency hinges upon willingness to combine views that are often 
seen as being irreconcilable; the second persona is constituted as participating with the first persona 
in a rational process through which the best possible means of operation can be determined once the 
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objectives have become clear.78 These two personae need not agree on the specific proposals, but 
they have a common understanding of what issues should be debated and of how the discussion 
should be conducted. However, it seems that Prodi acknowledges the existence of a position that 
does not share these features and feels obliged to address this position as a second rather than a third 
persona. In introducing the issue of the EUs democratic legitimacy Prodi says: in reality, I am 
always astonished by the tenacious idea that the European institutions suffer from a deficit of 
legitimation. [] But such is the perception (ll. 443-453). Prodi concedes to the public demand for 
treatment of the issue, thereby displaying that he is willing if not to change his own position, then at 
least to address concerns that are not his own. He demonstrates willingness to engage in dialogue 
with people, who do not fit his ideal conception of the second persona.  
In its tone and general line of inquiry Prodis speech belongs to the level of debate at 
which the proposals of the different political leaders are compared in order to locate possibilities for 
reaching consensus or striking deals. Yet the inclusion of the non-ideal second persona indicates 
readiness to address issues of broad public concern even when these issues do not match Prodis 
own priorities, and thereby the possibility of a dialogue between the first persona and a broader 
public is maintained.    
 
5.3.3. Initiatives and responses  the press coverage of Jospins and Prodis speeches 
France: at long last Jospin speaks 
The 11-day sample of the French coverage of Jospins and Prodis speeches consists of a total of 30 
articles (see figure 18); two are commentaries and there is one leader, but many of the 27 regular 
news stories also have a decidedly evaluative tone. The overwhelming majority of the articles focus 
on Jospins speech, and Prodis intervention is almost exclusively considered in relation to Jospins 
utterance. The most frequently recurring theme of the coverage is that Jospins speech was 
expected.79 The main point of the articles, which concentrate on this matter, is that the speech is a 
response to a demand that has been mounting in the French public and among European policy-
makers for a long time, a demand for Jospin to break his silence on Europe. Jospin has been 
ridiculed for an attitude deemed timorous, criticised by his political friends for having let the field 
open to Jacques Chirac, and by all for having de facto substantiated the impression of an inversion 
                                                        
78 The first and second personae are thus conceptualised and united by their common difference from the third personae 
that inhabit one or the other extreme position. These third personae are the most important of the speech, but Prodi also 
refers to the other of unregulated forces of globalisation and capitalism (ll. 139-146, ll. 201-205) against which Jospin 
sought to unite his first and second personae. 
79 LM 26/05/01B, Lib 28/05/01, LF 28/05/01, LM 29/05/01F+J, LF 29/05/01, LM 30/05/01B. 
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of the tradition according to which, concerning Europe, France has explained its ideas to Germany 
who would execute them (LM 26/05/01B).  
 
 Jospins long awaited contribution is also placed in the context of the ongoing debate, 
beginning with Fischers Humboldt-speech and ending with Prodis intervention on the following 
day.80 When referring to the debate coverage presents the developments of the debate so far, and the 
positions of the different political leaders are ordered along a federal-intergovernmental continuum. 
Jospin is then positioned within the debate, and more specifically his proposals are compared to 
those of Prodi. The general opinion is that Jospin should be placed at the middle of the continuum 
and that his views are less integrationist than Prodis. In the words of Libérations reporter:  the 
president of the Commission has used the opportunity of his speech at Sciences-Po to make heard a 
more communitary music than the hymn to the reality of the nation states song by Jospin on 
Monday  (Lib 30/05/01).  
A few articles draw lines from the present into the future in order to indicate how the 
debate will be continued.81 And others place the speech in the broad historical context of general 
conceptions of Europe.82 The traditional positions are presented as follows: In the 1970s it was 
said that the French wanted a strong Europe with weak institutions, the British wanted weak 
institutions for a weak Europe, and the Germans strong institutions in service of a Europe in which 
the finality was ignored (LM 02/06/01). Jospin is thought to be continuing the traditional French 
                                                        
80 LM 26/05/01B, Lib 28/05/01, LF 28/05/01, LM 29/05/01D+F, Lib 30/05/01, LF 30/05/00. 
81 LM 26/05/01B, 29/05/01F, and 02/06/01. 
82 LM 02/06/01, LF 05/06/01. 
Figure 18: The French coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches
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line  in fact the speech is accused of being too French83  and it is doubted whether his proposals 
can overcome the paradox inherent in the French approach.84 
 Jospins speech is also perceived in more strategic terms as an attempt to claim a 
favourable position in the French presidential election campaign.85 In this campaign Jospin faces 
several EU-sceptical candidates, and the intervention is seen as a purely French electoral speech, 
intended to muffle the European debate until 2002 (LM 30/05/01A). That the speech should serve 
the function of taking the EU-debate off the French electoral agenda is rather ironic, since it is 
perceived as opening up this discussion in the context of the British electoral campaign.86 In this 
regard, it is reported that Jospins speech will not help Tony Blair, and that Jospin had been asked 
not to present views that would be too inconvenient for Blair and his Labour government. Also, it is 
stated that, the speech having been delivered, Blair attempts to turn the situation to his advantage by 
arguing that Jospins visions prove Britain has nothing to fear from Europe.87  
 There is one last recurring theme of the French coverage, namely the reactions that 
Jospins intervention brought about both nationally and in the capitals across Europe. The national 
reactions are reported to be mostly negative, with only the members of Jospins own party voicing 
genuine enthusiasm and support.88 The speech is said to have attracted much attention outside of 
France and to have been received more positively in Madrid, Warsaw, and Stockholm than in 
Berlin.89 The German reactions are explored at more length than those of other countries; in 
Germany Jospins initiative receives praise, but there is also a certain disappointment, and it is in 
the context of the German reactions that the speech is accused of being too narrowly French.90 
Although reactions are mixed, the overall judgement passed by the French press is that Jospin with 
his speech has shown European tenacity and thereby warded off the accusations made against 
                                                        
83 LM 29/05/01J and 30/05/01B+E. 
84 How to demand new integrated policies and refuse the profound reform of the institutions that would allow them to 
manage them well? (LM 02/06/01). 
85 LM 29/05/01I and 30/05/01A+E. The election was not due in another year, but already the campaign was gaining 
momentum. The first electoral round was held on the 21st of April 2002. To everyones great surprise, Jospin did not 
make it past the first round, and in the duel of the second round held on May 5th the incumbent Jacques Chirac instead 
faced right wing populist Jean-Marie Le Pen. The result was that Chirac stayed in office and could appoint a 
government of his own political hue to replace the socialist-green coalition government of which Jospin was head until 
the disaster of the presidential elections caused him to step down.  
86 British general elections were to be held on the 7th of June 2001. 
87 LM 26/05/01A, 28/05/01, and 04/06/01.  
88 LM 30/05/01A+B. 
89 Lib 30/05/01. 
90 LM 30/05/01A+E. 
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him.91 The general sentiment is summed up in a Le Monde leader: One can discuss the 
conclusions, but the step can only be approved (29/05/01J). 
 
Denmark: a Franco-German conversation 
The Danish sample consists of 12 articles (see figure 19). There are two commentaries and one 
leader in the sample, and most articles focus on Jospin or on the two speeches in conjunction  only 
one piece deals exclusively with Prodi. As was the case in the French coverage, Jospins proposals 
take the lead not only in the articles of which they are the sole focus, but also in the instances where 
Prodi is also mentioned. The Danish coverage also resembles the French in presenting Jospins 
speech as an eagerly anticipated event.92  
 
 The main theme of the Danish coverage, however, is the relationship between France 
and Germany. Although the accusations that Jospin is a lukewarm European and the context of the 
upcoming presidential elections are mentioned,93 Jospins speech is mainly viewed as a response to 
German initiatives. The coverage explains that France has lost the right of initiative on EU matters 
to Germany and presents the speech as a rejection of the German vision of a European federation. 
The German reactions to Jospins speech are also covered in depth.94 
 When Prodis speech is included in the reports it is recognised that there are other 
participants in the debate than France and Germany, but the Franco-German conversation remains 
                                                        
91 LM 29/05/01F+J, LF 29/05/01. 
92 Inf 26/05/01, Pol 29/05/01, JP 29/05/01, Inf 29/05/01. 
93 Pol 29/05/01. 
94 Inf 26/05/01, Pol 29/05/01, Inf 29/05/01, JP 29/05/01, Inf 30/05/01A, JP 30/05/01. 
Figure 19: The Danish coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches
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the main point of reference. Prodi is said to ask more than Jospin offers, and he is therefore aligned 
with the German side of the discussion. In return Jospins position is backed by the Danish 
government, and the full range of possible viewpoints is unfolded through the inclusion of the 
British stance.95 At this juncture, the debate on the future of Europe is introduced as an ongoing 
process.96 The developments of the debate from its inception and onwards to its planned conclusion 
in 2004 are traced, and a fault-line between those who want constitutional debate and those who do 
not is introduced. On this issue France and Germany are said to agree, and their active attitude is 
opposed to the passive Danish position:  
The European constitutional debate rages after the latest manifestations by the French 
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, but a 
telling silence has spread over the Danish EU-debate. Not even when the president of 
the Commission, Romano Prodi, launched the idea of a common EU-tax was there any 
particular reverberation in Denmark (Inf 05/06/01).  
 
 This Danish passivity is lamented, and the call for active participation is subtly extended beyond 
the line of leading politicians: A long European conversation has begun. It will be interesting to 
see how many others than the heads of government will participate in it in the months and years to 
come (Pol 03/06/01).  
 
Germany: a noble contest of European ideas 
There are 33 articles in the German 11-day sample (see figure 20), including two commentaries and 
four leaders. The German coverage follows the pattern of attending mostly to Jospins speech and it 
presents Prodis intervention as a response to Jospin, although it is recognised that this is not how 
Prodi intended it.97 Jospins speech is seen as a positioning in the burgeoning French presidential 
electoral campaign, but more frequently it is conceived as a response to German initiatives.98 As an 
answer to Germany, Jospins speech is reported to be a rejection of federalist ambitions, and in this 
context other member states are said to join forces with the French, not necessarily because of 
agreement with Jospins proposals, but because of common opposition to the German plans. 
                                                        
95 BT 30/05/01, Pol 02/06/01. 
96 Pol 02/06/01 and 03/06/01, Inf 05/06/01. 
97 taz, 30/05/01, SZ 30/05/01B, FAZ 30/05/01A. 
98 FAZ 28/05/01, taz 29/05/01A, D+E, SZ 29/05/01A. 
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The most dominant contextualisation, however, is that of the European debate as such. 
Germany and France may lead this debate, and the relationship between the two may form a central 
axis, but the coverage claims that the discussion is not restricted to these two countries.99 In the 
context of the general debate, special attention is paid to Joschka Fischers initiatory and agenda-
setting function, and there are summaries of the views posited so far (Fischer, Chirac, Blair, 
Schröder). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung expresses the general sentiment of this line of coverage: 
Happy Europe: since foreign minister Fischer sketched out a picture of the future 
Europe in his Humboldt-speech in May of last year, a noble contest on the best form of 
the grand conception of the European Union has been going on. [] One may regret 
that the discourse on the future architecture of Europe is limited to the political elite and 
hardly reaches the people. But it could be that it will contribute to the creation of a 
European consciousness without which the unification of Europe cannot be successful 
in the end (31/05/01B). 
 
 The understanding of the speech as an intervention into national French, Franco-
German, and European debates is reflected in the reported reactions to it. The reactions of the 
immediate audience and of the French socialist party are said to be positive, but Jospins political 
partners are not enthusiastic and the speech is criticised by his opponents.100 The German 
government reacts positively to the speech, welcoming it as an important contribution to the debate, 
but the German opposition and German MEPs express their disappointment.101 As mentioned, 
Prodis speech is treated as a reaction to Jospins, and Prodi is reported to be supportive of Jospins 
                                                        
99 SZ 29/05/01A+B and 20/05/01B, FAZ 30/05/01A and 31/05/01B. 
100 taz 29/05/01D, FAZ 30/05/01D. 
101 taz 29/05/01C-E, FAZ 29/05/01B,C+E, 30/05/01E, and 31/05/01A. 
Figure 20: The German coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches
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views.102 Furthermore, Polish reactions to Jospins proposals are said to be positive, and the Spanish 
government also expresses its support.103 Finally, the British governments response to both Jospin 
and Prodi is recorded. Tony Blair, the coverage notes, is not happy with the nourishment the 
speeches have given to the European theme in the British electoral campaign, but he says Britain 
should participate actively in the European debate in order to win the arguments on the Unions 
future shape.104  
 
England: foreign interventions into the electoral campaign 
The sample of the English newspapers yielded 34 articles covering Jospins, Prodis or both 
speeches (see figure 21). Almost two thirds of the coverage deals exclusively with Jospins speech, 
one third include both, and the few remaining pieces only mention Prodi. There are six 
commentaries, two leaders, and one letter in the sample. The most prominent contextualisation of 
the English newspapers is that of the British electoral campaign.105 In this context both speeches are 
conceived as being inconvenient for Tony Blair and his Labour party, who try to keep the European 
theme out of the campaign, and advantageous for the Tories, who are placing all their hopes in the 
electorates fear of the advent of a European superstate. 
 
                                                        
102 taz 30/05/01, SZ 30/05/01B, FAZ 30/05/01A. 
103 FAZ 30/05/01B+F. 
104 FAZ 30/05/01C. 
105 FT 26/05/00, Tim 27/05/01, Ind 28/05/01A+B, Guar 28/05/01, Tim 29/05/01C+D, Ind 29/05/01A+B, Guar 
29/05/01B, FT 29/05/01A+B, Tim 30/05/01, Guar 30/05/01C, FT 30/05/01B, Tim 01/06/01, Guar 01/06/01. 
Figure 21: The English coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches
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Although the upcoming British elections impact heavily on the coverage, the broader 
context of the ongoing European debate is also presented. Jospins and Prodis speeches are placed 
alongside the foregoing interventions of other political leaders so that the interested public can 
now ponder plans for the future ranging  for want of a more precise word  from the federal to 
the intergovernmental (FT 30/05/01A). In this context the main purpose of the English coverage 
is to place the different interventions on the continuum and to display cleavages and alliances.106 
There is general consensus on placing Prodis speech at the more integrationist end of 
the scale. Moreover, Jospins speech is commonly understood as a rejection of the German federal 
visions of Europe. However, the articles display disagreement as to how this rejection places Jospin 
in relation to the British position. Some see a close connection between Jospins and Blairs visions, 
others emphasise the differences between the British and the Continental views, and some choose to 
position Jospin as mediator between British and German views.  
Interestingly, the whole range of options is expressed in articles of the issue of The 
Times that was published on the 29th of May. A home news article entitled The real rift in Europe 
is not the Channel states: Europe is divided on its future, but not in the way that the Conservatives 
claim. [] much more important than any cross-Channel differences are those between France and 
Germany (29/05/01C). A feature article claims that far less divides France and Germany than 
divides both from the British position (29/05/01A). And the journalist covering the events from 
Paris asserts:  the French Prime Minister, yesterday laid down marks for a more Gallic-style 
union that fell between Germanys blueprint for federation and Tony Blairs vision of a European 
superpower but not a superstate (29/05/01B).  
In spite of the differences concerning the exact positioning of the players, the English 
coverage generally agrees that the ensuing debate represents a positive development. A Financial 
Times-leader puts the case clearly: all these ideas [] must be debated long and hard between now 
and 2004  the deadline for the next EU reform (29/05/01C). 
 
                                                        
106 Ind 28/05/01A+B, FT 28/05/01, Tim 29/05/01A-C, Ind 29/05/01C, Guar 29/05/01A+B, FT 29/05/01B-D, Ind 
30/05/01, Guar 30/05/01A+B, FT 30/05/01A+B, FT 01/06/01A, Tim 03/06/01. 
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Spain: presentation of various issues from different angles 
The Spanish coverage of Jospins and Prodis speeches during the sampled period consists of 24 
articles (see figure 22); of these two are commentaries and three are leaders. Although more than 
half of the Spanish articles only mention Jospin, there are proportionately more pieces that refer to 
Prodis speech in the Spanish coverage than in any of the other national reports. However, this 
distribution of attention is not an expression of any general tendency, but rather an indication of 
how dispersed the Spanish coverage is. The Spanish articles bring up a number of different themes, 
but there is no general direction of the reporting. Thus, it is mentioned that Jospins speech was 
long awaited, the two speeches interference with the British electoral campaign is noted, and the 
clash between French and German viewpoints is also a recurring theme.107 
 
In the context of the Franco-German exchange Prodi is positioned alongside France.108 
Moreover, Spain is reported to be closer to the French than to the German position,109 but the 
Spanish government is also criticised for being unclear or even inarticulate, and calls are made for 
an upsurge and reorientation of the debate in Spain.110 An El País leader discusses the situation and 
states that recent Spanish actions have left an image of an executive that has not been able to 
create a strategy that makes it possible to make the Spanish interest compatible with the common 
European interest. While Jospin, Blair, Schröder or Prodi speak of their visions for the Europe of 
the future, a general Spanish focus still has not been articulated (31/05/01). This lack of focus not 
                                                        
107 Exp 29/05/01A, CD 29/05/01, EP 29/05/01A-D+F, 30/05/01C, and 03/06/01A,B+D. 
108 CD 30/05/01B, EP 03/06/01A. 
109 EP 29/05/01D, CD 29/05/01, EP 31/05/01 and 01/06/01B. 
110 EP 29/05/01C, 31/05/01, and 04/06/01. 
Figure 22: The Spanish coverage of Jospin's and Prodi's speeches
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only defines the Spanish executives attitude, but  as the preceding presentation has shown  may 
be extended to the Spanish press coverage of the debate as well. 
 
5.3.4. Personae offered in and responses given to Jospins and Prodis speeches  
Both Jospin and Prodi seek to create positions of collective action in the form of continued debate 
on the future of Europe that are characterised by the reconciliation of national and European 
positions. Moreover, both speakers explicitly invite continuation of the debate. Jospin primarily 
sees the active discussion as a matter for the politicians and positions the public as spectator. Prodi 
primarily addresses the people and invites them to debate his views with him. On this basis it is 
perhaps surprising that Jospins speech receives the most public attention and that it is his terms of 
discussion that pervade the coverage. However, a consideration of the specific situations in which 
Jospin and Prodi speak may help explain the newspapers reception of the speeches.  
 
Figure 23: The personae offered in and responses given to Jospins speech 
Jospins speech is perceived as an answer to a demand that had been building in both 
the French public and in the European political context, and as such the statement would probably 
draw attention no matter what personae and fields of communicative interaction it were to offer. 
Jospin chooses to speak at the Maison de la Radio to an audience partially composed of French and 
foreign journalists thereby clearly demonstrating that the actual audience of his speech is the French 
and European public (see figure 23). Prodi speaks in a less salient situation; the fact that he once 
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again presents his views to one or another specific audience might have passed altogether unnoticed 
had it not been for the close proximity between his and Jospins utterances. Although the German 
press is probably right in arguing that Prodi had not intended his statement at the Sciences-Po to be 
conceived in the context of Jospins speech, it is quite understandable that the newspapers should 
make this contextualisation. In itself Prodis speech is too abstract in the positions it forwards and 
too conventional in the choice of speaking situation for the newspapers to pay it any sustained 
attention and for other actors to discuss it independently (see figure 24). 
 
 
Figure 24: The personae offered in and responses given to Prodis speech 
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5.3.5. The EU is our effective, progressive platform  Lykketoft in Copenhagen 
Presentation of the speech 
On the 23rd of August 2001 Mogens Lykketoft, who was then the Danish foreign minister, 
presented his visions for the future of Europe to the Council for International Affairs at the Danish 
parliament. The speech was entitled Europe in the world,111 and its advent had been announced in 
June when the government published a white paper on Denmarks relationship with Europe.112 The 
relationship between Denmark and the EU is at the base of all the opinions set forth in the speech. 
The vision advocated is one in which common European decisions and actions should be taken in 
many different areas. Yet Lykketoft places a fundamental restriction on the EUs development: 
however profound and extensive the co-operation may become, it should retain its 
intergovernmental dimension.  
 
Constitution of personae 
In the opening paragraphs of the speech Lykketoft performs a simultaneous identification of himself 
and his audience, not only establishing the speaking and the listening positions, but also creating 
common ground between them. He begins this task by presenting the EU as a necessary framework 
for Danish efforts to create positive developments on a global scale (ll. 5-6), but public support for 
the common project is not taken for granted (ll. 25-29). Rather, Lykketoft takes up the issue of 
peoples hesitancy towards the EU and seeks to redefine it: The doubt about the EU is probably 
not an expression of a division of the nations into two populational groups in total disagreement. It 
is rather an expression of oppositional sentiments in the minds of most of us: We both have strong 
feelings tied to the nation and a sense of the utility of European co-operation (ll. 32-36). This 
definition of doubt as an inherent trait of both speaker and audience is followed by a narrative in 
which historical developments mean that an initial scepticism towards the EU is replaced by firm 
conviction that it is the most productive forum for positive change.  
 Lykketofts position is abstractly identified as being proactive and the speech is 
addressed to an equally abstract second persona with the same basic traits as the speaker. It is from 
this vantage-point of basic commonality that Lykketoft substantiates and advocates his proposals, 
but before taking up this task he performs a move of demarcation, identifying and shutting out a 
third persona and confirming the identity of the first and second personae in the process:  
                                                        
111 Europa i verden. 
112 Says the reporter covering Lykketofts speech for Information (24/08/01B). 
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There is talk of building bridges in Danish European policy. Bridges cannot be built to 
those who deny the realities of the European co-operation and whose political lives 
depend upon nourishing prejudices and fear of the future, the foreign, and the 
foreigners. But bridges can and must be built between the national characteristics we 
want to maintain, and the European co-operation we cannot do without. My speech 
today is an attempt at such bridge building (ll. 47-53).  
 
Viewing the rest of the speech from the perspective of the bridge metaphor, it seems that a double 
connection is being sought. In presenting his vision of Europe Lykketoft both attempts to bind his 
and the audiences nationally anchored personae to each other and to the EU. Lykketoft presents a 
substantial vision of Europes future that he judges to be wholly realistic, capable of dealing with 
the existing challenges, and in accordance with the positions of the European partners (ll. 61-63). 
The third persona that is internal to the Danish context, but differentiated from the 
people whom Lykketoft invites to participate in dialogue and co-operation, is not the only position 
from which the speaker differentiates himself and his audience. An external third persona that is 
similar to the third personae of unregulated capitalism and globalisation presented by Jospin and 
Prodi is also established. However, Lykketoft does not only present the common other of the EU 
members in terms of a struggle against abstract forces, he also presents the US as the specific third 
persona in opposition to which a common European identity should be created and endorsed (ll. 
227-248).113 
  Lykketoft creates a common speaker-audience identity that is clearly national, but 
takes a constructive attitude towards the EU seeing it as the means to achieve already accepted 
goals. From this perspective the main question becomes how to organise the EU in such a way that 
it will be capable of effective action without encroaching on the member states national 
sovereignty. The question of this organisation is the issue on which Lykketoft welcomes further 
discussion, and he thereby endorses and promotes the agenda of the Nice Declaration. In his 
consideration of how the debate should be continued, Lykketoft declares his support for the idea of 
creating a convention (ll. 538-540). However, Lykketoft warns of entering into complicated debates 
about a constitution for the EU, a catalogue of competences and other technical matters; such 
discussions, he says, will only strengthen myths about secret plans of a stronger Union (ll. 616-
620). 
By following the agenda that was established at Nice, by referring to Jospins position 
(ll. 374-375) and to proposals put forward by Tony Blair and the Czech president Vaclav Havel (ll. 
                                                        
113 Jospin (ll. 166-1667 and ll. 181-182) and Prodi (ll. 139-142 and ll. 261-263) also refer to the US as part of the 
problem, but do not position it directly as a third persona.  
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659-660) Lykketoft relates to the European debate that is being conducted at the highest political 
level. However, the speech is not primarily an intervention into this context, but instead addresses a 
distinctly Danish second persona. Rather than creating a European persona for himself and his 
audience, Lykketoft establishes a Danish perspective from which the EU can be viewed positively 
and encountered constructively.  
The speech recognises the importance of presenting ones views on the European 
scene in order to influence the reform process (ll. 532-533), but the invitation to public participation 
in the debate does not transcend the national boundaries. Public discussion, in Lykketofts account, 
takes place nationally, and the politicians represent the views of their electorates at the European 
level; as Lykketoft sees it, the two domains do not overlap. In the last instance the goal of the 
speech is to create a national public opinion, a consensus on Denmarks relationship with the EU, 
on the basis of which the Danish government can seek to influence developments in Europe.       
 
5.3.6. A singularly Danish response  the press coverage of Lykketofts speech 
The ten-day survey of English, French, German, and Spanish newspapers did not yield any results 
at all,114 but the Danish sample contains 16 articles (see figure 25).  
 
 
 
                                                        
114 As will be seen from the examination of the Danish coverage, the Danish Prime Minister at the time, Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen, delivered a speech on the future of Europe at the Czech foreign ministry on the same day as Lykketoft gave 
his speech. However, a search for English, French, German, and Spanish coverage of Nyrups speech did not bring forth 
any results either. 
Figure 25: The Danish coverage of Lykketoft's speech
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The coverage presents the speech in two different contexts: it is both seen as a 
response to demands put forth in the national Danish setting and as an intervention into the 
European debate. In the national context the speech is viewed as a long awaited effort to heighten 
the quality of the EU-debate by setting out the governments position.115 In this respect the content 
of the speech is compared with a statement that the Prime Minister delivered to the Czech Foreign 
Ministry on the same day as Lykketoft made his intervention. The two speeches are judged to be 
very similar, thereby presenting a coherent impression of the governments position.116 The 
coverage briefly focuses on the content of Lykketofts  and the Prime Ministers  speech(es), and 
then moves on to cover the reactions of various actors on the Danish political scene.117 The 
individual articles focus on one or another political partys or a number of parties reactions, but all 
the texts contribute to the same general picture. An article from Jyllands-Posten provides an 
overview:  
The governments first initiative in the grand project of building bridges to those parties 
who voted no to the EUs common currency last year, is received well by SF [the 
Socialist Peoples Party]. It is received with mixed emotions by the Christian Peoples 
Party [now the Christian Democrats] and hits rock-bottom with the Danish Peoples 
Party [a right wing, populist party] and the United List [a left wing coalition of former 
communists and other radical socialist groups]. [] Among the EU-supporters in 
parliament there is only cautious criticism. [] Outside parliament, in the two EU-
opposition movements, the reaction is that the government is about to found a united 
Europe (24/08/01A). 
 
 In the European context it is noted that the Danish governments proposal replies to 
the speeches of other leading politicians, but does not set the agenda in Europe.118 Informations 
reporter comments that it is not altogether easy to contribute something new when one has chosen 
the spot as speaker number 15 in line after Fischer, Jospin, Amato, Blair, Lipponen (25/08/01C). 
Lykketofts intervention is compared with the proposals of the other leaders, and here the articles 
show some disagreement. One Politiken article sees the speech as an attempt at alignment with the 
UK, whereas the rest of the coverage emphasises the close connection with Jospins position.119 
However, the coverage agrees that the speech should be placed at the intergovernmental end of the 
scale. Also, there is general agreement that the speech is not primarily addressed to the European 
scene, but to the half of the population  or as Lykketoft perhaps more precisely put it, the half 
of all of us  that might vote no to an EU-referendum (Pol 28/08/01B). And the final verdict on the 
                                                        
115 JP 23/08/01, Inf 24/08/01A, JP 24/08/01B, Pol 28/08/01B. 
116 Pol 24/08/01B, Inf 24/08/01A+B, JP 24/08/01B. 
117 Pol 24/08/01A, Inf 24/08/01A+B, JP 24/08/01A, Inf 25/08/01B, JP 25/08/01B. 
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speech is that given the various national and European constraints120 it is a success  at least in the 
national context. Or, as an Information leader puts it: Hurray! Now there finally is some movement 
in the debate on European policy (25/08/01A). 
 
5.3.7. Personae offered in and reactions given to Lykketofts speech 
The first and second personae that Lykketoft offers are primarily national; from the Danish vantage-
point they reflect constructively on the European developments and discuss how the EU might be 
improved. Although the purely sceptic position is excluded from the dialogue Lykketoft invites and 
although he creates a specific other against which the members of the EU might unite, his appeal 
is first and foremost national.  
 
 
Figure 26: The personae offered in and responses given to Lykketofts speech 
When taking account of the personae Lykketoft creates and the opportunity for debate 
he offers, it is by no means surprising that his intervention should only elicit a Danish response. 
Lykketofts speech is directed to a national audience, and this direction combines with the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
118 Inf 24/08/01B, Pol 25/08/01. 
119 Pol 25/08/01, Inf 25/08/01A+C, Pol 28/08/01B. 
120 In addition to joining the debate late, the Danish exceptions are mentioned as impediments to an offensive Danish 
line in the European debate (Pol 28/08/01B). 
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media from other nation-states are not likely to pay much attention to utterances emanating from a 
small, notoriously foot-dragging EU-member like Denmark to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The  
Danish views do not receive much attention abroad because they are of primarily national Danish 
relevance, and Danish statements are exclusively oriented to the national context because they do 
not receive any attention abroad. Thus, the Danish press evaluation of Lykketofts speech is an 
interesting reversal of the English press judgement of Blairs intervention: successful at home, but 
a failure abroad. The relations discussed here are illustrated in figure 26. 
 
5.4. Turning point two: institutionalisation of the debate 
On the 14th and 15th of December 2001 the heads of state and government of the EUs 15 member 
states convened at the castle of Laeken just outside Brussels to hold the European Council meeting 
marking the end of Belgiums half-year of presidency over the Union. As the first annex to the 
presidency conclusions, the official record of the meeting, the Council adopted the Declaration on 
the future of the EU that sets out the agenda and procedure for the next years debate and the 
eventual assembly of the new IGC. As mentioned above, the adoption of the Laeken Declaration 
was prefigured in the Declaration on the future of the Union that was appended to the Nice 
Treaty. In the earlier declaration it was established that the purpose of the Laeken Declaration 
would be to lay down the form in which the debate begun at Nice would be continued. In fulfilling 
this purpose the Laeken Declaration marks the second turning point of the debate on the future of 
Europe. The Laeken Declaration opts for the creation of a convention, a possibility that was 
mentioned and recommended in both Jospins and Lykketofts speeches, and, hence, the debate is 
institutionalised. 
 
5.4.1. A defining moment - the Laeken Declaration 
The Laeken Declaration consists of three main parts: the first part, entitled Europe at a 
Crossroads, presents the achievements of the EU and the internal and external challenges the 
Union is currently facing. The second, Challenges and Reforms in a Renewed Union, goes on to 
pose a long list of questions about the possible changes that might improve the EUs ability to meet 
the challenges. And the third section, Convening a Convention on the Future of Europe, sets up a 
forum for debate that is to seek answers to the questions raised in the declaration. 
  The first part of the declaration establishes the understanding of the EU that 
constitutes the texts speaking position. The declaration begins with a historical account of the EUs 
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achievements culminating in the firm assessment that the European Union is a success story (l. 
14). However, the declaration goes on to place the EU at a defining moment in its existence (l. 
18), thereby indicating that past accomplishments do not vouch for equal success in the 
performance of future tasks. The pending enlargement is presented as a first reason why reforms are 
necessary: at long last, Europe is on its way to becoming one big family, without bloodshed, a real 
transformation clearly calling for a different approach from fifty years ago, when six countries first 
took the lead (ll. 21-23). Two further reasons are put forth in the form of an external and an 
internal challenge that the Union must meet. Externally, Europe needs to shoulder its 
responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power [] 
seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and 
sustainable development (ll. 47-52). Internally, the EU is faced with the challenge of moving 
closer to its citizens and corresponding better with their expectations. Citizens are calling for a 
clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach developing a Europe which 
points the way ahead for the world. [] There can be no doubt that this will require Europe to 
undergo renewal and reform (ll. 69-72). By positioning the EU between its past feats and its 
current challenges, the declaration makes the claim that the Union must be reformed if it is to 
remain a success story in the future. 
 Since the declaration is an official text its first persona is the EU as such, but instead 
of assuming an anonymous and authoritative character the declaration carefully identifies the 
community of which and for which it speaks. Like the Nice Declaration the Laeken Declaration is a 
piece of auto-communication conducted at the EUs highest political level. Yet the text is also 
aware of the citizens as a potential audience group, and it carefully positions them in relation to the 
EU persona: 
Citizens undoubtedly support the Unions broad aims, but they do not always see a 
connection between those goals and the Unions everyday action. They want the 
European institutions to be less unwieldy and rigid and, above all, more efficient and 
open. Many also feel that the Union should involve itself more with their particular 
concerns, instead of intervening, in every detail, in matters by their nature better left to 
Member States and Regions elected representatives. This is even perceived by some as 
a threat to their identity. More importantly, however, they feel that deals are all too 
often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny (ll. 26-32). 
 
The Laeken Declaration identifies the citizens as having a basically positive inclination towards the 
EU, but the text asserts that the citizens have a number of expectations, which the Union currently 
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does not fulfil, and that they are dissatisfied with certain elements of the present institutional and 
procedural structure.  
 On the basis of the initial identification of the Union and its citizens three basic 
challenges are posed: how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design 
and the European institutions, how to organise politics and the European political area in an 
enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, 
multipolar world (ll. 75-78). The declaration does not itself seek answers to these challenges, but 
poses several series of questions in each area, thereby explicating the various elements of which 
each challenge consists and pointing the search for solutions in certain directions. The answers to 
the questions are to be sought by the Convention that is set up in the third part of the declaration.  
The Laeken Declaration, thus, performs three tasks corresponding to its three main 
sections. It identifies the sentiments of the citizens towards the EU as being characterised by 
general support but also of unfulfilled expectations. On the basis of the tension between these 
sentiments the main issues of the debate on the future of Europe are located. And the debate is 
institutionalised through the establishment of the Convention. 
 
5.4.2. Once again, the debate is launched  the press coverage of the Laeken Declaration 
The ten-day survey of the 17 newspapers for coverage of the Laeken Declaration yielded 125 
articles (see figure 27).  
 
 
 
Figure 27: The press coverage of the Laeken Declaration
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Included in this set of data are 13 commentaries, nine leaders, one letter, and 102 news stories. 
There are four dominant themes of the coverage: the declaration, the Convention, the possibility of 
a European constitution, and the bargaining process of the summit (see table 6). In the following, 
each of the four themes will be presented individually. 
 
 Declaration Convention Constitution Bargaining Other issues 
Total 51% 70% 34% 20% 38% 
Denmark 48% 67% 19% 22% 30% 
England 46% 62% 40% 32% 49% 
France 50% 83% 25% 17% 42% 
Germany 38% 72% 31% 13% 28% 
Spain 71% 65% 53% 18% 41% 
Table 6: Recurrent themes of the Laeken coverage121 
 
Creation of consensus on the declaration 
In combination the articles dealing with the Laeken Declaration present a rather detailed account of 
how agreement on the text was reached. A reflection group set up by Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgian 
Prime Minister, and consisting of various political notabilities drafted the declaration.122 In 
anticipation of the Laeken summit Verhofstadt toured the member states capitals with the 
reflection groups draft declaration, taking note of the leaders comments and amending the text 
accordingly. The first draft was reportedly criticised in Copenhagen, London, Paris, and Madrid, 
whereas Berlin is said to be supportive of the text.123 Jyllands-Posten notes that the draft declaration 
gave rise to a paradoxical divide: the countries that are most eager for integration are busy scolding 
the EU, while the sceptical countries like Great Britain and Denmark are defending the Union 
(12/12/01B). Amidst the reports on the necessity to water down the declaration, the coverage 
contains several calls for an ambitious statement. It is suggested that the declaration should 
inject fresh impulse into the deeper and wider debate about the future of the European Union 
launched a year ago in Nice (FT 14/12/01A). And a sense of urgency emerges from the claim that 
                                                        
121 The table shows how many percent of the coverage dealt with the theme in question. Please note that more than one 
theme may be present within the same article (the total is more than a 100%). The category Other issues mainly 
consists of coverage of the other items that were dealt with at the Laeken summit, such as the creation of an EU rapid 
reaction force, the common European satellite project, Galileo, or the development of a European patent.  Also, there 
was mention of the upcoming introduction of the euro and the possibility of a British referendum on the common 
European currency.  
122 CD 17/12/01 and 20/12/01. 
123 JP 12/12/01B, FT 12/12/01and 13/12/01A+C, Inf 14/12/01, Tim 14/12/01, CD 14/12/01A+B. 
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the initiatives to be put forth in the declaration offer the last chance [] of strengthening the 
Union before enlargement (SZ 13/12/01). 
The declaration is to be finalised at Laeken, and as the leaders begin their discussions 
the coverage comments on the negotiating process and its possible outcome. As noted by Le Monde:  
The heads of state and government can choose to debate the text prepared by the 
Belgian presidency profoundly, or consider that it only has a relative importance in so 
far as it will pass through the mill of the Convention, then of the Intergovernmental 
Conference. All will depend on the manner in which Guy Verhofstadt has taken account 
of the remarks made by his partners (14/12/01). 
 
It soon emerges that the declaration has been toned down considerably, and agreement is promptly 
reached.124 However, it is noted that the smooth acceptance of the final version of the declaration 
does not mean everyone interprets the text in the same way.125 And the agreed text retains some 
points that are uncomfortable to the leaders of the more sceptical member states.126 A Süddeutsche 
Zeitung article suggests that political pressure was the reason why the declaration was signed in 
spite of the remaining differences: After the disaster summit last December in Nice the Unions 
ridiculousness would have been exposed once and for all, if Laeken had also been a failure 
(17/12/01A). 
Another factor, which contributes to the relatively easy acceptance of the declaration, 
is that it is now generally accepted that further debate on the future of Europe is needed. Although 
some national leaders, as noted above, continue to hold reservations about how far-going the 
reforms should be, there has emerged a common understanding of the need for both reforming the 
EU and changing the reform process itself. The politicians attitude is mirrored in the coverage: the 
necessity of reform is presupposed and the resolution to continue the debate receives almost full 
support.  
                                                        
124 FT 14/12/01B, JP 15/12/01B, BT 15/12/01, EP 15/12/01 and 16/12/01B+D, Ind 16/12/01, taz 17/12/01B, Tim 
18/12/01. 
125 JP 16/12/01B. 
126 BT 15/12/01, EP 15/12/01, FAZ 15/12/01B, EP 16/12/01C, Guar 17/12/01A+B, FT 17/12/01A+C, EP 20/12/01. 
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Setting up the Convention 
The Laeken Declaration sets up the Convention on the Future of Europe,127 designating its 
composition and mandate, and hence the question of what the Convention will look like is closely 
related to the creation of the declaration. In fact, it is generally agreed that setting up the 
Convention is the most important task of the declaration, and it is reported to be the one issue that 
gave cause to real controversy during the negotiation of the final text.128 Another general feature is 
the consistent presentation of the happenings at Nice as the reason why everyone now agrees that 
the method for reforming the EUs foundational treaties must be changed.129 The Convention is said 
to represent a procedural novelty meant to create a genuinely consensual basis for reforms rather 
than leaving the reform process at the mercy of the heads of state and government who are likely to 
put their own national interests before those of the Union. Moreover, it is reported that the purpose 
of the Convention is not only to ensure a better result, but also to strengthen peoples involvement 
in the reform; both the process and its result are to enhance the public support of the European 
project. As The Guardian puts it, the leaders most important mission [at Laeken] may be 
launching a great debate on the future of the EU  ensuring it brings some changes in its wake 
(13/12/01).  
The coverage of the entire summit is marked by a tension between hope of renewal 
and suspicion of a lapse into the problematic patterns of former meetings. However, the tension is 
especially evident in the articles dealing with the different issues that had to be settled in order to 
establish the Convention. Initial disagreements concern the agenda and mandate of the Convention, 
an issue that is closely linked to the different opinions on the general tone of the declaration. Here, 
the intergovernmentalists are portrayed as preferring a restricted agenda for a forum that is to 
deliver inspirational input to the following IGC. The federalists, on the contrary, are said to strive 
for a Convention with a broad room for discussion and to hope that its eventual recommendations 
will become impossible to ignore.130 In spite of the opposite opinions on the agenda and mandate of 
the Convention, disputes about the composition of the Convention and especially about who should  
                                                        
127 Only two articles pay any serious attention to the question of what a convention is and which historical antecedents 
the present initiative has (FAZ 14/12/01B, SZ 14/12/01A). The rest of the coverage either inserts a short explanatory 
note, usually stating that The Convention is the EUs new, broad forum for debate, or simply leaves the term 
unexplained. 
128 JP 12/12/01B, Ind 12/12/01, FT 12/12/01, Guar 13/12/01, FT 13/12/01C, taz 13/12/01A+B, JP 14/12/01A, Guar 
14/12/01, CD 14/12/01B, Lib 14/12/01, FAZ 14/12/01B, JP 15/12/01B, LM 15/12/01A. 
129 taz 12/12/01A, Pol 13/12/01, Guar 13/12/01, FT 13/12/01, Inf 14/12/01, Lib 14/12/01, LM 14/12/01, SZ 14/12/01A, 
FAZ 14/12/01B and 15/12/01B, BT 16/12/01B and 17/12/01, FT 17/12/01A. 
130 LM 12/12/01, SZ 13/12/01 and 14/12/01A, FAZ 14/12/01A, JP 16/12/01B. 
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chair it proved to be more intense, and most attention is paid to these compositional issues.  
In the souk-like atmosphere that Financial Times (14/12/01B) felt had descended on 
Laeken a decision on who should head the Convention finally had to be made. Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung accounts for the decisive events: 
As the Belgian host Guy Verhofstadt declared his intention to put forth a proposal, 
Chirac quickly broke in and appealed, immediately supported by Schröder, for his 
favourite Giscard. The Portuguese Antonio Guterres attempted once again to bring 
Delors into consideration. Then the conversation was [] deadlocked for a long while 
as there was no consensus over Giscard. [] Finally, Prime Minister Verhofstadt 
conjured up a solution à la belge: Giscard would be Chairman but surrounded as he 
later put it by two deputies: the former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato and his 
own predecessor Jean-Luc Dehaene (17/12/01A). 
 
There were no vetoes to this compromise and all other issues regarding the composition and 
proceedings of the Convention had already been settled. Thus, agreement was reached; the 
Convention was created and could begin its work in March 2002. 
 
Infamous last words 
The preceding account of Valéry Giscard dEstaings appointment as head of the Convention shows 
that the Laeken summit was not entirely purged of the bargaining that had so hampered the Nice 
summit. After the issue of setting up the Convention had been resolved the situation got even worse 
as the leaders turned to discussing the location of a number of European agencies. This discussion 
ended in a farce-like exchange of words over the placement of the European Food Authority, and the 
squabble grew so ugly that Guy Verhofstadt decided to end the meeting without locating the 
agencies, thereby leaving the issue to be settled at a future summit. Much to the delight of the 
reporters covering the Laeken Council the final exchange was subsequently leaked to the press and a 
number of articles indulge in extensive reports of the heated exchange.131  
The events of the summits concluding session lead to some scepticism about what 
was really achieved at Laeken.132 And the irony of the events is not lost on the reporters,133 as the 
introductory remarks of an article from The Times illustrate:  
                                                        
131 Tim 16/12/01 and 17/12/01, Guar 17/12/01A+B, FT 17/12/01D+E, Pol 17/12/01B, JP 17/12/01, taz 17/12/01D, SZ 
17/12/01B+E, Tim 18/12/01, BT 18/12/01, CD 20/12/01. 
132 JP 17/12/01, Pol 17/12/01B, Tim 17/12/01, Guard 17/12/01A, SZ 17/12/01E, Tim 18/12/01, CD 20/12/01. 
133 In the Danish coverage attention is paid to a further ironic twist, namely, that the agreement on the declaration that is 
to bring more openness to the EU was reached in secrecy (Inf 15/12/01, JP 15/12/01A, BT 15/12/01). 
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It speaks volumes for all that is wrong with the direction of the European Union that its 
leaders could engage in a bitter row as to where a European food safety agency might be 
located while cheerfully endorsing a major constitutional review with only the 
minimum dissent. It is as if those who founded the United States had spent hours 
arguing where some tea might be dumped in Boston Harbour and had ignored details of 
the Declaration of Independence (18/12/01).   
 
However, the lasting impression is a hesitant optimism as this quote from a Guardian article aptly 
conveys: Laeken will be remembered for its exquisite catering and unseemly haggling that left a 
familiar unpleasant aftertaste. And for creating a tempting menu of ways of providing a better deal 
 and not a backroom one  for millions of ordinary Europeans (17/12/01C).   
 
Taking the debate further  the prospect of a European constitution 
The ambivalent evaluation of the summit forms the backdrop of the attempts to foresee future 
developments. The coverage of reactions to the declaration leaves a generally positive 
impression.134 Turning to the issue of what the likely outcome of the Convention might be, it is 
noted that the Laeken Declaration is an expression of the changed terms of debate. Half a year ago 
almost no one spoke of the goal of a constitution (FAZ 14/12/01E), but with the declaration it is 
recognised as a possibility.  
With the acceptance of the Laeken Declaration the agenda of the debate seems to have 
changed radically, but Cinco Días thinks otherwise: [one] should not ignore that the answer to 
most of the imaginative challenges put forward at Laeken already appear in the speech of the 
German foreign minister at the Humboldt University (17/12/01). Although other articles also see 
some of the happenings at Laeken as mere reruns of earlier turns in the debate,135 all agree that 
Laeken constitutes at least one major novelty: the institutionalisation of the debate in the 
Convention. It is also agreed that the value of the Convention lies in the prospect of a deep and wide 
public debate. This sentiment is aptly summed up in a Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
commentarys conclusion that: the Convention is a risky institutional experiment but it brings the 
great chance of attributing the constitutional foundation of the EU to a grand débat Européen 
(14/12/01A). However, as another commentary in the same issue of FAZ points out, it remains 
                                                        
134 BT 16/12/01C, EP 16/12/01A,B+D, FAZ 16/12/01B, taz 17/12/01D, SZ 17/12/01A+C, BT 17/12/01, FT 17/12/01A-
C, Ind 18/12/01A, FAZ 17/12/01B, EP 18/12/01, FAZ 19/12/01, CD 20/12/01. Only in the English newspapers is there 
any serious questioning of whether the reform process that is institutionalised by the declaration will be beneficial (Tim 
16/12/01A-C). The sentiment expressed in these articles is that Europe is moving on. And not necessarily in the 
direction Britain would want (Tim 16/12/01C). 
135 FT 12/12/01, Exp 13/12/01, LF 13/12/01, taz 13/12/01A, FAZ 15/12/01C and 16/12/01B, taz 17/12/01A, SZ 
17/12/01C, Tim 18/12/01, CD 29/12/01. 
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doubtful whether the Convention will be able to spark any serious public debate: How many 
citizens can muster the interest, time, and leisure to follow the happenings of the Convention? 
(14/12/01B). 
 
5.4.3. Consequences of the second turning point 
Before institutionalising the debate by setting up the Convention the Laeken Declaration in a sense 
surveys the discussions that have been carried out so far, whereby the understandings and positions 
that the declaration mentions become part of the unproblematic background on which the debate 
will continue. Thus, the Laeken Declaration synthesises and endorses the personae positions and 
agency options that were presented and responded to at the six moments I have studied. The 
declaration creates a first persona of responsible politicians who are determined to ensure that the 
EU will remain successful in the future and that it will realise its full potential. The politicians will 
do this for the benefit of the second persona of the citizens who are positioned as being basically 
positively inclined towards the Union, but concerned about its recent developments and future 
challenges.  
The course of action suggested in the declaration is reform of the treaties based on 
public debate. This debate, in turn, should be conducted in positive terms  the goal is to improve 
the Union not to disassemble it. The issues to be discussed and the available proposal are all located 
between the extremes of the purely intergovernmental and the strictly federal, between the nation 
and Europe. Neither extreme is feasible, but it is equally impossible to abandon the dichotomy 
altogether. The Laeken Declaration not only stipulates what the debate should be about and how it 
should be conducted in terms of the formulation of concrete proposals, by establishing the 
Convention the declaration also sets down the procedure of the debate and defines its main actors. 
Thus, it becomes clear that politicians and members of the political circles are the primary 
participants, whereas the public at large is more of a spectator than a participant. The understanding 
of a public debate that emerges, then, is one in which political actors discuss their viewpoints with 
each other in public, not one in which ordinary citizens participate actively. 
 The press coverage of the Laeken Declaration by and large reflects the understanding 
of the debate that is laid down in the declaratory text. There is a wide acceptance of the terms of 
debate that the text establishes, wherefore these are reinforced as the basic assumptions that will 
constitute further discussions. The coverage mostly represents these ground-rules of the discussions, 
but there are some attempts at evaluating them and estimating their chances of generating the 
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desired outcome. These preliminary judgements are lukewarm. On the one hand, it is suggested that 
the debate on the future of Europe, which is now institutionalised, is a definite improvement of the 
modes of reform that have been employed so far. On the other hand, it is indicated that the 
institutionalisation of the public debate as it is now conducted may not in itself be a sufficient 
means of improving and securing the EUs legitimacy.  
The coverage that focuses on the Laeken summit rather than the content of the 
declaration and the process of the debate displays many of the same tendencies that defined the 
coverage of the Nice summit. The split between high-minded common European visions and fierce 
haggling over specific issues in which everyone seeks to protect and promote their national interests 
emerges clearly. Thus, the process of debating the future of Europe is set apart from the actual 
decision-making and it remains doubtful whether the preparatory discussions will impact and 
facilitate the actual reforms once the moment of binding decision-making arises. There is no sign of 
the emergence of stronger mechanisms of connection between the general non-binding discussions 
and the institutionalised turning points. The lack of mediation between the debate as it is conducted 
in fora that are accessible to the public and the decisions as they are made at the closed summits 
does not bode well for the prospect of basing eventual decisions directly on the debate. Thus, there 
are no strong indications that the debate will be an independent and significant source of input and 
social legitimacy for the EU.     
 
5.5. From institutionalisation to ratification  further developments of the debate136  
On the 28th of February 2002 the Convention on the Future of Europe, or the European Convention 
as it was soon officially dubbed, held its inaugural session. On this occasion the chairman,137 Valéry 
Giscard dEstaing, presented the Conventions agenda and working methods to the convened 
participants.138 Giscard dEstaing also discussed the nature of the Conventions end-result. He 
                                                        
136 This section is a strictly referential account of the events succeeding the Laeken summit. While my conclusions are 
based exclusively on the analyses of the first two stages of the debate on the future of Europe, I felt subsequent 
developments could not be entirely ignored. Therefore, I provide the following overview of major events that took place 
between December 2001 and September 2004. The articles quoted in the following are listed in appendix 9 along with 
the rest of the studied newspaper coverage; however, they were not collected in the same systematic manner as the 
coverage of the speeches and the declarations. A number of other contributions to the debate are also referred to in the 
following; the complete references to these can be found in the bibliography.  
137 In the course of the Conventions working period the title of president was employed more and more frequently 
(Norman, 2003, p. 43). This shift possibly reflects the lack of a distinction between a chairman and a president in the 
French language, but it may also be a sign of growing recognition and acceptance of Giscard dEstaings authority. 
Since the term chairman was preferred in the early stages of the debate on which I focus, I have chosen to maintain this 
term in my presentation of later events in order to avoid any confusion as to which post I am speaking of.  
138 This introductory speech as well as all the other oral and written statements that were presented to the Convention 
can be found on the Conventions website (http://european-convention.eu.int). 
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recognised that the Laeken Declaration allows the Convention to either submit one or several final 
recommendations, but stated:  
there is no doubt that, in the eyes of the public, our recommendation would carry 
considerable weight and authority if we could manage to achieve broad consensus on a 
single proposal which we could all present. If we were to reach consensus on this point, 
we would thus open the way towards a Constitution for Europe. In order to avoid any 
disagreement over semantics, let us agree now to call it: a constitutional treaty for 
Europe (dEstaing, 28/02/02).  
 
Thus, the chairman from the very outset of the Convention sought to make consensus the 
commonly assumed goal, and he also attempted to create the common presupposition that the 
eventual proposal should be constitutional in nature. Giscard dEstaing then went on to talk about 
how the desired results could be achieved, stating that: This Convention cannot succeed if it is 
only a place for expressing divergent opinions. [] the members of the Convention will have to 
turn towards each other and gradually foster a Convention spirit. So, he urged the members of 
the Convention, let us dream of Europe! And, he concluded, persuade others to share that 
dream! 
 During the course of the Conventions work there were lively discussions of both the 
substantial issues on the agenda and of the various procedural matters, not least Giscards somewhat 
autocratic style. As the work drew towards its conclusion the members of the Convention still 
disagreed on a number of central issues, but the vast majority now shared the belief that the process 
should culminate in the presentation of one and only one proposal. Therefore, they proved willing 
to compromise and to accept elements that did not correspond exactly with their own views and 
interests. Moreover, the proposals constitutional character had become part of the common 
understanding of the members of the Convention, and on the 18th of July 2003 the chairman could 
hand over the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to the Italian Presidency of the 
European Council. The Convention succeeded in taking on a dynamic of its own, and its final 
proposal went well beyond the explicitly stated suggestions of the Laeken Declaration. The 
declaration only posed the question whether this simplification and reorganisation [of the 
treaties] might not in the long run lead to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union (ll. 162-
163); the Convention ended up proposing a fully fledged constitution.  
On the 4th of October 2003 the Italian Presidency of the European Council convened 
the Intergovernmental Conference that, taking the Conventions proposal as its starting point, was 
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to endow the EU with a new foundational treaty.139 The IGC set to work amidst calls for a swift 
agreement on a Treaty that would be as close to the Conventions proposal as possible. However, it 
soon became clear that all of the heads of state and government had particular concerns and specific 
objections to the Conventions draft, and the Italian presidency received more than a hundred 
proposals for changes, which the various actors wanted incorporated into the final text.140 By the 
time the IGC reached its scheduled culmination at the European Council meeting in Brussels on the 
12th and 13th of December 2003 the leaders had come a long way towards a final agreement. 
Consensus had been created on the general structure of the new Treaty, it would indeed be 
constitutional, and most of the main issues had been resolved to everyones satisfaction. However, a 
couple of major stumbling-blocks remained  disagreements so severe they caused Silvio 
Berlusconi to state that it would take a miracle to reach agreement.141  
The leaders of the old and new Member States, the ten incoming members were 
allowed full participation in the negotiations, opened the discussions with echoes of the prelude to 
the Nice summit: rather no agreement than a bad agreement.142 But contrary to what was the case at 
Nice, the politicians now stuck to their warnings at the moment of truth. When it became apparent 
that no common position on the thorny issue of the individual countries voting weights in the 
European Council could be found, the leaders decided to end the discussions rather than to negotiate 
a complicated compromise solution. The Council simply concluded that: it was not possible for 
the Intergovernmental Conference to reach overall agreement on a draft constitutional treaty at this 
stage. The Irish Presidency is requested on the basis of consultations to make an assessment of the 
prospect for progress and to report to the European Council in March (IGC, 12/12/03).143  
 In accordance with the Council conclusions of the December summit the Irish 
government, which took over Council presidency in January 2004, took on the task of sorting out 
the various positions and creating new compromises. In March the presidency was able to announce 
that enough progress had been made for the official talks to be continued; the resumed IGC now 
aimed at a final agreement at the June European Council marking the end of the Irish presidency 
                                                        
139 Thus, the opening of the IGC was pushed forward; in the schedule originally laid down in the Nice Declaration it 
was set for 2004. 
140 As reported by Politiken (28/10/03). 
141 Quoted in Le Monde (13/12/03). 
142 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (12/12/03A) quotes Joschka Fischer for taking this stance. According to El País 
(11/12/03) this was also the Polish and the Spanish Prime Ministers positions, and even Berlusconi who reportedly 
wanted agreement more than anyone said he would not accept it at any price (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
12/12/03B).   
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(IGC, 24/03/04). And on the 18th of June the European heads of state and government experienced a 
moment of sweet relief, as they were able to announce their agreement on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. The agreement was reached on the basis of specific changes in the highly 
contentious institutional matters as well as compromises concerning the decision-making 
procedures in a number of specific policy areas (IGC, 18/06/04). These details apart, the agreed text 
was identical with the proposal that was also on the table in December, and thus the main thrust and 
central ideas of the Conventions proposal were officially accepted.  
Following the leaders agreement the constitutional treaty is to be officially signed; a 
solemn ceremony, which is scheduled to take place in Rome on the 29th of October 2004.144 The 
process then turns from creation of the new treaty to ratification of it. The treaty must be ratified in 
each of the 25 member states before it can come into effect; in some states ratification is left to the 
national parliaments while others will hold national referenda on the issue. Ratification can be quite 
a lengthy process, and it is not expected that the treaty will be ratified in all countries any earlier 
than 2006  if it is indeed ratified in all of the member states as is by no means certain.  
 
5.6. Concluding the first round of analysis: from personal thoughts to official action 
It is now time to sum up the insights that have been established by studying the speeches and 
declarations in their textual-intertextual relationship with the press coverage and in chronological 
sequence. What is at stake here is beginning to provide the why of the who, when, where, and what 
of the debate.  
Taking a birds-eye view of the developments from May 2000 until the present 
(September 2004) the debate on the future of Europe appears to contain five phases. From May 
2000 to December of that year the discussions were initiated, and with the Declaration on the 
Future of the Union, which was appended to the Treaty of Nice, the debate was officially 
recognised as another round of treaty reforms. The second phase consisted of intensified non-
binding discussions and consolidation of the available positions both in terms of the broad public 
debate and the more specific discussions among political leaders. This phase culminated in the 
institutionalisation of the debate through the Laeken Declarations establishment of the Convention. 
The third stage, institutionalised discussion, comprises the Conventions working period from 
March 2002 to July 2003. The decisive phase was begun with the inauguration of the IGC on the 4th 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
143Although it failed to agree on the constitutional treaty and thereby to conclude the task that was set up in Nice and 
institutionalised at Laeken, the Council meeting did reach agreement on a number of other issues. Among the achieved 
decisions was the allocation of agencies over which the leaders had such a hefty row at the Laeken summit. 
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of October 2003. This fourth phase was temporarily suspended after the failed summit of December 
2003, but was continued in March 2004 and concluded on the 18th of June when the heads of state 
and government reached final agreement on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The 
fifth phase of ratification only begins officially after the constitutional treaty has been signed, but 
was in practice begun as soon as agreement on the text was reached. This last phase can be 
concluded in two ways: all the 25 member states may accede to the constitutional treaty and the 
process of debating the future of Europe will then reach an at least temporary conclusion. A 
momentary silence may then prevail before discussions of the implementation of the constitution 
and its consequences are initiated, at which point it is possible that the circle of debating the future 
of Europe and proposing institutional reforms begins anew. Alternatively, one or more countries 
may reject the constitution, whereby the debate is forced into a sixth and as of yet wholly 
indeterminate and unpredictable phase. The sixth phase could include repetition of the ratificatory 
procedure in the country/ies where ratification failed, revision of the rejected text, or perhaps 
abandonment of the constitutional project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Past developments and possible future turns of the debate 
The dynamic of the debate leads from a situation in which the idea of a constitution 
for the EU is presented as a private vision for a far-off future to the present reality in which such a 
constitution has been created and is in the process of being ratified. The present investigation 
focuses attention on the two first phases of the debate and a few preliminary conclusions concerning 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
144 As announced by the Dutch presidency in a press-statement (Dutch presidency, 09/09/04). 
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these phases are due before I leave the chronological perspective and turn to the study of various 
conceptual aspects of the debate. 
 
5.6.1. Abstract commonalities, concrete differences 
The first conclusion of the first round of analysis is that an inherently European level of debate does 
exist, but that it is a rather restricted one. During meetings in the European Council national 
politicians negotiate directly and produce purely European statements. However, the decision-
making capability of the European summits remains rather restricted, not because of any lack of 
formal opportunity, but because the leaders ability to reach substantial agreements are limited. The 
inability of the leaders to produce common decisions and statements of great consequence may be 
explained by considering the discrepancies between discussions as they are conducted outside of the 
European-level forum and as they are conducted within it. What emerges is a distinction between 
abstract commonalities that are allowed to permeate the different national contexts in which non-
binding opinion formation is conducted, and the concrete differences which become visible when 
leaders meet in institutionalised settings of common will formation and decision-making.145  
The speaking positions and agencies that are constituted at different instances of the 
debate stand in a paradoxical relation to each other. When participating in non-binding and general 
discussions leading politicians are able to articulate their viewpoints in such a way that nationally 
dispersed audiences are presented with similar abstract notions of what the EU is and how it should 
be developed. In institutionalised settings designed to act out the common expectations, however, 
the politicians are restrained by prevailing notions of conflicting national interests that must be 
served. Therefore, the potential for common action that is built up through general processes of 
public opinion formation is not released when the moment of decision-making arrives. When 
speaking in national contexts the politicians attempt to persuade their audiences to adopt a European 
perspective. Yet the prevalence of nationally differentiated positions is generally accepted, and 
when appearing in European settings the politicians are obliged to represent these diversified 
positions and thereby prevented from enacting the common European position they advocate 
elsewhere.  
  
 
                                                        
145 In drawing this conclusion I am greatly indebted to Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossums work on strong and 
general publics in the EU (Eriksen & Fossum, 2002; Eriksen, 2004). 
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5.6.2. Centripetal and centrifugal forces 
The second conclusion of the analysis that has been conducted so far is that the unifying forces of 
the debate are primarily temporal, whereas the differentiation of the debate is spatially structured. 
When the temporal dimension of the debate is highlighted a powerful centripetal force may be 
observed to run through the discussions, a force that pulls the collective meaning formation in a 
constitutional direction. Although hesitation and opposition is voiced at every stage, the expectation 
that the reform process will result in a constitutional text becomes stronger and stronger as the 
debate unfolds.  
The operative force is the power of self-invocation that lies in the very concept of 
constitution. A constitutional text is a text that brings what it names into being, and this quality rubs 
off on the constitutional debate; when one discusses the possibility of constituting a political body, 
the discussion is partly constitutional itself. Whereas nothing arises out of silence, the mere 
engagement of the constitutional issue suggests the legitimacy of some form of European political 
community. Hence, even the starkest opposition to the creation of one coherent text for a unified 
polity implies the constitution of a European community of an alternative kind. Once the 
constitutional issue is voiced and validated a centripetal dynamic is set in motion: it moves the 
discussion on to establishment of the various constitutional possibilities that exist at the European 
level and implicates the eventual adoption of one of these.  
There is no necessity that the European constitutional text should be anything like the 
texts that establish the unified polities of the nation-states, but since the nation-states designate the 
horizon of previous constitutional experiences, the European constitutional process evolves through 
constant comparison with these nationally informed experiences. This, then, is a related, but slightly 
different centripetal force: no matter whether a particular utterance is for or against the idea of a 
European constitution, the meaning is articulated in terms that have been developed and defined in 
the context of the nation-state.  
However, the linkage between the European discussion and the nationally developed 
concepts also points to the centrifugal forces of the debate. When the spatial aspect of the debate is 
brought into focus, differences between the debate as it is understood and conducted in the distinct 
national settings emerge. Hence, the constitutional experiences of the nation-states may focus the 
debate on common concepts, but since the experiences of each nation-state are unique they are also 
responsible for the continued disparity of the debate. The various nation-states interpret the 
constitutional issues in different ways; distinct ideas about how the national constituencies are best 
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preserved and how their interests are best promoted have developed in each of the national contexts. 
These differences mean that the European constitutional debate varies from one national context to 
the other; more often than not the same concepts are interpreted differently in the various settings, 
and the different national debates also display a variety of specific concerns. These spatially 
established differences in priorities and understandings are the main centrifugal forces of the 
common European debate.  
 
5.6.3. Recursiveness and progress in the debate on the future of Europe 
The textual-intertextual analysis of the six moments and two turning points of the debate on the 
future of Europe shows that the infinity of particular situations in which the debate is articulated 
are, for all their disparity, the starting points for a broader and more stable process of meaning 
formation. The national contexts are the main loci of this common meaning formation and between 
them there are considerable differences, but they are also bound together by an abstract centripetal 
force of perpetual temporal development.  
In presenting their visions for the future of Europe the political leaders recognise 
common issues and they present their views using the same conceptual frameworks. Hereby, a 
diffuse agreement, a sense of partaking in a coherent process of European scope, emerges. At the 
specific instances that mark the turning points of the debate the unifying forces are intensified, 
whereby the possibility of common European decision-making arises. At these instances, however, 
the political leaders views are articulated in specific terms revealing differences that often remain 
unnoticed when general visions of Europe are being invoked.  
Thus, the main finding of the first round of analysis is a significant discrepancy 
between an abstractly perceived common mode of discussion and the variety of more specific 
concerns and expectations that make up actual speaker and audience positions. The tensions 
between a common sense of the abstract temporal developments of the debate and the diverse 
specific spaces of its articulation result in a dynamic that may best be conceptualised as a spiral. 
The debate progresses recursively, so to speak. It moves forward without leaving the already 
established contexts completely and intertextual references to previous interventions in the debate 
are one of its primary means of perpetuation. 
The distinction between the possibilities for positioning and acting in the 
institutionalised European settings of decision-making as opposed to the predominantly national 
contexts of public opinion formation is another major constitutive feature of the debate. The 
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national settings remain differentiated and subject to divergent specific expectations concerning 
what issues should be treated and how to treat them, yet these settings allow for the emergence of 
an abstract European collective identity. The European institutions offer the possibility of enacting 
the will of this European persona, but when the debate is crystallised around specific decisions 
national differences become visible and shatter the image of unity. In combination the constitutive 
tensions of the centrifugal (spatial)  centripetal (temporal) pair and the national opinion formation 
 European decision-making divide account for four general traits of the debate as illustrated in 
table 7. 
 National opinion formation European decision-making 
Centripetal force Abstract commonality 
concerning form and content of 
the European project and the 
debate about 
Institutional frame for collective 
decision brings national leaders 
into direct contact and dialogue 
Centrifugal force Specific differences concerning 
national interests and their 
preservation  
Intergovernmental procedures 
for decision-making encourages 
bargaining rather than 
deliberation 
Table 7: Constitutive features of the debate on the future of Europe 
In order to explain the findings of the first round of analysis further and to elaborate 
upon these preliminary conclusions the second round of analysis will deal with three sets of 
questions: 1) how do the political leaders establish the various persona positions that they make 
available in their speeches? That is, what rhetorical strategies are used in the constitution of the 
positions that the speeches offer? And how do they  the strategies and the personae  enable and 
restrict participation in the debate? What viewpoints are conceivable and how may they be argued? 
2) How do the Nice and Laeken Declarations create possibilities for change? And how does the 
creation of these texts become possible? In what ways do the declarations function as turning 
points? How do they both bind past and future together and redirect developments? 3) How does 
each nationally linked group of newspapers conceive of the relationship between the national and 
the European? And how does this conception play into the national understandings of the European 
debate?  
After having studied each of these three dimensions a fourth and conclusive move will 
seek to tie them together. Thereby, I shall attempt to answer the general question of what 
potentiality for common meaning formation there exists across the board of the particular fora in 
which the debate is carried out. It is this final analytical insight that I hold to have implications for 
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the proper conceptualisation of the European polity, and an evaluation of the constitutional theories 
that were presented earlier rounds off the second round of analysis to which I now turn. 
   153
  
 
6.  
Second round of analysis 
 
 
ith the completion of the first round of analysis I have established the general temporal 
developments of the debate and reached a preliminary understanding of the national and 
European positions that are available to and created by participants in the discussions. I now turn to 
a deeper inquiry into the time-space relations that are internal to the various interventions. This 
second round of analysis will be divided into four parts. First, I shall study the topoi  the rhetorical 
strategies  used in the six speeches in order to cast light on the places from which the speakers 
retrieve their arguments and to explain the spaces created in and through the utterances. I shall then 
turn to the declarations and study them as expressions of kairos, of the right moment in which 
action becomes possible. Third, I will bring the spatial and temporal aspects together in the study of 
how the press coverage of each national context forms patterns of time-space relationships, so-
called chronotopes.1 Finally, I shall bring the studies of speeches, declarations and newspaper 
reports together in the attempt to explain the general purposes and goals of the debate, its teloi.  
 
6.1. Constitutive dichotomies  the topoi of the speeches 
The purpose of the following investigation is to explain how the speakers present their proposals 
and what room for meaningful interaction they create. The issues of how the speakers identify 
themselves with the audiences existing beliefs and how they seek unity with the audiences through 
the invocation of common others are not abandoned. However, the focus is now on the third of the 
identificatory strategies that, according to Kenneth Burke, are available to the rhetor. That is, I 
move from the investigation of agency and personae to the study of the formal devices by which 
textual positions are established, and these formal devices of identification are examined through an 
analysis of the speakers use of topoi.  
                                                        
1 I use the three concepts as guiding tools for analysing the various utterances according to genre. I believe that each 
concept highlights the most important feature of the genre with which it is associated. However, I recognise that the 
concepts are not genre specific in any strict sense, but do in fact apply to all of the genres. The purpose of the linkage 
between concepts and genres is solely to focus the analysis, and since the overriding perspective is conceptual rather 
than generic I have on occasion drawn in other types of texts than the one primarily associated with each conceptual 
heading.  
W 
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The Greek term topos literally means place, and the spatial metaphor is part of the 
reason why the term is attractive to the present project with its special emphasis on spatio-
temporally bound processes of meaning formation. As will be explored in the following, the 
spatiality of the topoi can be interpreted in various ways. A topos can be understood as a place 
where one goes to find arguments, and it is the place from where one views the world. With the 
introduction of the concept of topos attention is directed to the internal spaces of the utterances; by 
what means is meaning created? But topos also points to the inherent relationship between the 
meaning created in the text and the broader background from which the speaker draws the various 
topoi he or she uses in articulating the message. What resources are available to the speaker and 
what possibilities for future communicative interaction are created? Explaining the interrelationship 
between the meaning that is articulated in and through the utterance and the constraints that make 
such articulation possible is a central rhetorical concern, and in this respect the study of how formal 
devices are used to create new meanings holds a particularly strong explanatory potential.  
In classical rhetoric the topoi  or topics as lists of topoi are often termed  were tools 
of invention and of argumentative analysis (Bloomer, 2001, p. 779). Aristotle designated two 
general strategies for creating arguments: either the argument can be based on specific viewpoints 
or eide, opinions about the subject matter at hand that are commonly accepted and may serve as the 
premise of the argument. Or one can create the concrete argument from a general mould, taking 
recourse to abstract patterns or argumentative forms that function independently of the specific 
subject and presenting the issue at hand in terms of one of these forms.2 Common to both categories 
is that they are ways for a speaker to move from generally accepted ideas or norms to some 
particular end (Bloomer, 2001, p. 779). Whereas both Aristotles and Ciceros Topicae  
regardless of Ciceros claim to the contrary, the two books are quite different from each other  deal 
exclusively with rational means of argumentation, later commonplace books broaden the scope. The 
commonplace book was a tool for storing examples of various argumentative and stylistic forms 
and for arranging them in a proper manner so as to have ready recourse to fixed formulas and fancy 
formulations to suit any occasion. Hereby, the topoi became connected not only to the first of the 
five canons of rhetoric, inventio, but also to dispositio and elocutio (Moss, 2001, p. 121).  
Modern interpreters of the concept are in variance as to how much it should be 
expanded. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca apply a quite narrow definition, understanding topoi  or 
                                                        
2 There are indications that Aristotle reserved the term topos for the general positions, but the issue remains unsettled, 
and now it is most common to regard both substantive premises and abstract argumentative patterns as topoi (Eide, 
1997, pp. 21-22). 
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loci as they say, preferring the Latin name  as premises of a general nature that can serve as the 
bases for values and hierarchies (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 84).3 Contrary to this 
view, Kenneth Burke, in his examination of the concept, includes both commonly held substantial 
attitudes and purely formal invitations to assent, and under the latter heading he places tropes and 
figures as well as schemes of argumentation (Burke, 1969, pp. 56-59). In the following I apply the 
notion of topoi in the extensive sense suggested by Burke, whereby the concept becomes a broad 
category including all the different persuasive appeals, devices, and strategies employed in an 
utterance.  
 The concept of topos has not only been broadened; the understanding of its 
epistemological functions and ontological status has also developed over time. In the heuristic sense 
that was dominant in the classical conception and in the practice of writing commonplace books, the 
topoi clearly refer to places in which argumentative and stylistic forms already exist and where one 
can go to look for them. But the use of topoi may also be understood as a particular way of 
reasoning, as suggested by Giambattista Vico who forwarded the topical method as an alternative to 
Cartesian criticism (Vico, 1990 [1708]). The introduction of this topical mode of thinking implies 
that the topoi are not only forms in which already perceived ideas may be clad, but are inherent to 
the process of perception as such. When this line of reasoning is followed through, there emerges a 
hermeneutical understanding of the topos as the perspective from which the speaker understands the 
world and articulates his or her understanding (Nothstine, 1988). Such a conception of topos as the 
speakers ontological place in the world implies that the rhetorical utterance is an articulation of the 
understanding, which this place facilitates. Or as William Nothstine puts it: rhetoric always 
involves the attempts of finite humans to come to terms with their condition and their finitude 
through language-use, to orient themselves to the world of tensions and discontinuities in which 
they always already find themselves (Nothstine, 1988, p. 158).  
I argue that topoi should not be understood as being either internal or external to the 
speaker; instead their double nature ought to be recognised. Topoi are communicative forms that at 
once constrain the speaker to a certain perspective and enable him or her to create new spaces of 
understanding. The selection of one out of the different available means of expression is a genuinely 
creative choice that facilitates the articulation of unique opinions and understandings. This view of  
                                                        
3 Whereas Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define the loci rather narrowly they do have a broad definition of 
argumentation in which rhetorical figures are included. The New Rhetorics inclusive definition of argumentative 
schemes corresponds to my equally inclusive definition of topoi, and I draw heavily upon Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tytecas comprehensive catalogue in the explication of the speakers rhetorical strategies.   
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topoi is in accordance with José Luis Ramírez conceptualisation; he uses the term topics to 
designate the sets of conventional forms  some universal, some specific to cultural or professional 
contexts  that are available to the speaker. A topic in Ramírez sense is not the particular topoi that 
are pronounced, but that which enables the speaker to create meaningful utterances in the first place 
(Ramírez, 1995, p. 266). Topoi are central to the speakers formation of meaning, to his or her 
constitution of the world, and the speakers topics, his or her horizon of understanding, are present 
in the topoi used in a concrete articulation.  
The textual study of topoi aims at understanding how a meaningful place is created in 
the merger of inventio and elocutio, that is, in and through the utterance.4 It is this textual creation 
of meaning that I shall now seek to explain. The present part of the analysis focuses on the six 
speeches comparing and contrasting their employment of topoi in order to discover the speakers 
topics. The study of the topoi employed by the six political leaders shows how they create the 
positions and possibilities that they ask their audiences to endorse. Thereby, the study may lead to a 
deeper understanding of the meaning formation of the European debate as such. The purpose of the 
analysis is both to gain further insight into the formal dimension of each speakers creation of 
meaning and to begin the assessment of the meaning formation that the speeches have in common. 
How are the visions and proposals presented and what possibilities of engagement do these 
presentations offer? How do the speakers conceive of the debate that they are contributing to? And 
what consequences do these conceptions have for the possibility of continuing the discussion?  
Naturally, each speech contains a wide range of different topoi. Some stylistic and 
argumentative features are only used once or a few times in one, some or all of the speeches. Other 
features are decisive to the creation of meaning in the individual speech, but are not found in any of 
the other utterances, or do not play an important role if they do occur. And some topoi are recurrent 
in and decisive to all of the speeches; it is around these that the following investigation evolves.  
Preliminary readings of the six speeches reveal that the most important and pervasive 
of the recurrent topoi are variations of a binary motive of opposition or strain. I have labelled  
                                                        
4 In the critical discourse analysis of Ruth Wodak and her co-authors topoi are also employed as analytical units. 
However, Wodak et al. view topoi as pertaining to a mezzo level between the particular articulation and the general 
strategies that make up discourses, and they analyse each of the three levels separately (Wodak et al., 1999, p. 34). 
While I can understand the procedural advantages of making such an analytical distinction, I do not believe the three 
levels exist separately in actual meaning formation. Rather, meaning formation is a result of the interaction between 
general norms and expectations and specific articulations, and I think this interaction is best explained by focusing 
exclusively on the topoi. In my opinion topoi point both to the speakers creative choices and to the constraints imposed 
by the subject and the context of the utterance, wherefore they are the analytical tools that hold the most potential for 
explaining meaning formation as it occurs in and through the utterance.  
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this group of topoi constitutive dichotomies, a general rhetorical strategy that I define as the 
establishment of antagonistic duality and subsequent suggestion of how that duality may be 
reconciled or overcome. The various specific instances of the general strategy have much in 
common with The New Rhetorics Procedures for Avoiding Incompatibility (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, § 47), but include the preceding acknowledgement or establishment of the 
incompatibilities that are subsequently removed or transformed. The constitutive dichotomies are 
means of simplifying, organising, and explaining complex phenomena. Furthermore, they are used 
to establish relationships  be they of agreement or opposition  between the various elements of an 
utterance, and it is this relational aspect that enables them to facilitate the creation of new meanings. 
I have divided the constitutive dichotomies of the six speeches into three subcategories according to 
their main purposes: some aim at justifying the need for reform, others set out the procedures of the 
debate, and the last group is used to advocate the speakers actual proposals. 
The division of the constitutive dichotomies into these three groups has some affinity 
with the classical rhetorical categorisation of central controversial issues. This categorical system, 
known as stasis, was primarily developed for the juridical genre. It was designed to assist 
rhetors in identifying the central issues in given controversies, and in finding the appropriate 
argumentative topics useful in addressing these issues (Hohmann, 2001, p. 741). The stasis system 
consists of four basic questions with corresponding argumentative strategies: first, it may be 
discussed whether an act was done and whether the defendant did it; this is the conjectural stasis. 
Second, the nature of the act in question could be disputed; strategies for such disputes are found 
under the definitive stasis. The third grouping, the qualitative stasis, suggests ways of contesting the 
evaluation of the act. Finally, there is the translative stasis in which it is argued that the case is 
being tried before the wrong court (Conley, 1990, pp. 32-33). The static categories of this theory 
can be transformed into a dynamic view of the process of argumentation; from this perspective the 
speaker takes the case through all of the argumentative stages rather than choosing one of them. In 
this dynamic conception the translative stasis is replaced by the advocative phase so that the 
resolution of the three other basic questions  is it the case? What is it? What value does it have?  
is followed by the consideration of what should be done about it (Brockriede & Ehninger, 1960, pp. 
52-53).  
The three general categories I have established are all present in all the speeches and 
should thus be understood as phases through which the argumentation runs rather than as isolated 
argumentative strategies. The third category is identical with the advocative phase whereas the two 
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others combine elements from the conjectural, definitive, and translative stages. The question of 
why reforms are needed is both a matter of justifying that this is actually the case and an issue of 
defining the reforms. And the issue of how the reforms should be debated resembles the translative 
stasis because it is a meta-reflection on matters of procedure, but the detailed definition of the 
debate takes the discussion beyond what would usually be included in this category. The qualitative 
stasis is implicitly present throughout the discussions in the guises of assessments of the present 
value of the European institutions, judgements of the appropriateness of the revision procedure, and 
appraisals of the proposed reforms.  
The three categories are meant to provide general understandings of the debate while 
remaining in close contact with the six speeches under investigation. Thereby, I wish to suggest that 
concrete argumentation may not fall neatly into the pre-set categories of the theories of 
argumentation and that one must always be attentive to the unique features of each rhetorical 
utterance, but this, of course, does not mean that classificatory schemes are without value. The 
relations between specific utterances and general patterns allow the speaker to create unique 
meanings, and by studying these relationships the critic may explain the speakers formation of 
meaning. The division of the constitutive dichotomies into three general groups is the result of my 
attempt to locate general patterns within the set of utterances under study. The division creates a 
starting point for exploring the relationship between general strategies and specific meanings, and 
thereby it presents a means of explaining how each speaker creates his meaning and of assessing the 
degree of commonality between the speakers meaning formation. The constitutive dichotomies of 
each of the three groups take various different forms. It is the purpose of the analysis to establish 
and explain these forms and to consider how auxiliary topoi partake in the concrete creation of 
meaning (see appendix 10 for a schematic overview of the strategies that will be presented and 
explained in the following).  
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6.1.1. Why are reforms needed? 
The speeches contain three predominant justifications for reform: enlargement, globalisation, and 
the disconnection between the EU and its citizens.  
 
The argument from enlargement 
The first three speeches  Fischers, Aznars, and Blairs  present the necessity of change in terms 
of enlargement. The speeches establish enlargement as an irrefutable historical demand through 
narratives that display the problems of division and the advantages of working together and through 
definitions of the candidate countries as natural members of the European unity. Enlargement is 
also presented as a process that will ensure stability and prosperity on the entire continent. The 
justification of enlargement is based on space in the geographical sense, on the topos of (re)uniting 
Europe, of making Europe whole. Furthermore, the understanding of geographical expansion as a 
positive development is connected to the historical narrative; the EUs expansion is presented as a 
natural consequence of its development in time. Through the spatio-temporally grounded 
argumentative strategies the necessity of enlargement is established as a common starting point. The 
ensuing shared understanding of enlargement is that it may be a challenge, but it is also an 
opportunity (Aznar, l. 18, Blair, ll. 49-50) and there is no alternative to it (Fischer, ll. 117-119).  
Having established the necessity of enlargement, the speakers are immediately faced 
with the problem that the enlargement process is undertaken at a time when the EU is also trying to 
expand its areas of activity and responsibility. This problem is articulated in spatial terms as the 
dilemma or double challenge of simultaneous deepening and widening (Aznar, l. 50, Fischer, l. 
314). Or, as Blair says, setting the terms for the EUs imminent collective actions and pointing to 
their inherent difficulty: there will be more of us in the future, trying to do more (Blair, ll. 190-
191). The different goals of enlarging the EU and endowing it with more responsibilities are 
seemingly incompatible, and the speakers must tackle this incompatibility in order to move the 
argument along. The tension between including more members and extending the political co-
operation is unfolded in Fischers speech: 
The institutions of the EU were made for six member states. They function with 
difficulty with 15. [] The danger is that an enlargement up to 27-30 members will 
overload the ability to absorb of the EU with its old institutions and mechanisms, and 
that it can come to severe crises. Yet this danger does not speak against the fastest 
possible enlargement, but even more for a decisive and appropriate institutional reform, 
whereby the capability to act is maintained even under the conditions of enlargement. 
Erosion or integration is thus the consequence of the irrefutable enlargement of the EU 
(Fischer, ll. 169-178).  
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In this passage Fischer overcomes the opposition between deepening and widening and instead 
establishes further integration in the shape of institutional reform as a prerequisite for successful 
enlargement. The dilemma of the coincidental realisation of two seemingly contradictory, but 
equally advantageous processes is, thus, replaced by an antithesis in which only one option is 
desirable.  
Fischer reaches his conclusion by recognising that the EUs current mode of spatio-
temporal development  increasing the number of members while maintaining the original 
institutional structure  has reached its limits. Thereby, the need for institutional reform is 
established, and through the antithesis of erosion or integration the tension between deepening and 
widening is resolved, making the two processes interdependent, rather than contradictory. Fischer 
pushes this point further than Aznar and Blair, who both display some hesitancy as to how far 
institutional integration should go.5 Yet all three speakers present the tension between deepening and 
widening as the reason why the EU is in need of fundamental reform. The common argument is that 
institutional and procedural reform is the only means of overcoming the incompatibility between the 
two equally desirable goals and thereby realising both at once. 
  
The argument from globalisation 
Whereas the first group of speeches labour to establish enlargement as a necessary event, the 
inevitability of enlargement is taken for granted in Jospins, Prodis, and Lykketofts interventions. 
In their speeches globalisation has become the basic exigence; it is now the unwieldy global 
developments and Europes need to assert itself on the world scene that figure as the basic reasons 
why reforms are needed. This is also a geographical argument, but now the issues of setting Europe 
off from the rest of the world and ensuring its effectiveness in the global context are at the centre of 
the reasoning.  
The argument is unfolded in several stages: first, the inevitability of globalisation and 
its critical importance is established. Lykketoft and Prodi perform these moves through analogy, 
thereby taking recourse to one of the most common strategies for ascribing new traits to existing 
phenomena. When used argumentatively, the purpose of analogy is to show the resemblance of 
structures: A is to B as C is to D. The relationship between C and D, the phoros, must be well 
known and generally recognised, and the purpose of the analogy is to transfer characteristics of this 
relationship to A and B, the theme, which have not previously been considered as being connected 
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in this way (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 372-373). Lykketoft makes the analogy thus: 
The only thing that is completely certain is that there is no secret path back to the closed nation-
states of decades past. Our globally mutual interdependence is just as impossible to turn away from, 
as it is for the egg to get back in the shell once it has been cracked into the hot pan (Lykketoft, ll. 
73-76). The analogy between the reality of globalisation and the egg frying on the pan may seem a 
bit far-fetched and it also has somewhat unfortunate connotations, but it does convey the message of 
irreversibility effectively.6 Prodi chooses a historical phoros, stating that there are times when 
history leaves people with a decisive choice. I am convinced that, for the Europeans, such a moment 
has arrived. Globalisation engenders an upheaval similar to that which the discovery of America 
caused five centuries ago: the world becomes smaller; the exchange of ideas and goods multiplies 
(Prodi, ll. 15-19). Here, it is not only the diffuse sense of being an important and unalterable event 
that is transferred; Prodi also specifies what elements of the discovery of America he wishes to pass 
over to the present situation. Furthermore, he indicates that the analogously established historical 
significance of the present circumstances necessitates decisive action thereby preparing the way for 
the second part of the argumentative chain.  
Jospin presupposes the magnitude of the processes of globalisation; he skips the first 
part of the argument and states the underlying dilemma directly: How to open it [Europe] to 
globalisation without diluting its identity? (Jospin, ll. 9-10). The second stage in the argument, 
then, is the presentation of globalisations contradictory nature, its potential benefits and inherent 
risks. Presenting globalisation as both an advantageous and a dangerous process opens the way for 
the third move of the argumentation, the establishment of the need for active involvement that is 
anticipated in Prodis analogous formation of the historical moment. Lykketoft argues for the active 
stance by setting up two alternatives of which only one is desirable: we are facing a new and 
exciting reality. A reality that one can choose to participate in and influence the content of. Or to be 
without influence on, but unable to liberate oneself from anyhow (ll. 44-46). The impossibility of 
disconnection from the reality of which Lykketoft speaks forms the basis of his argument; here the 
impossibility is presupposed, but it is unfolded and supported through the analogy. In a similar line 
of argument, Prodi explains what is needed to gain influence: In isolation our nation-states no 
longer have the critical mass for acting profitably. The people who will influence the course of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5 These considerations overlap with the theme of what reforms should be conducted, and they will be explored further 
under that heading. 
6 Note that Lykketoft accompanies the analogy with a metaphor of direction  the non-existence of a road back to the 
nation-states. This group of metaphors will be considered further in the following. 
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events will be those who have become aware of this change of scale. The others must resign 
themselves to being subjected (Prodi, ll. 20-22).  
In the fourth and final move of the elaborate argumentative chain that establishes 
globalisation as the root cause for the EUs need for reform it is asserted that the member states 
need to act collectively in order to assert active agency in the global reality is as of yet unfulfilled. 
Jospin takes the consequence of the choice between passivity in isolation or common European 
action. He demands a strong Europe that fully assumes its responsibility in the redefinition of 
the global order and which acquires the means of conveying its message of peace, solidarity, and 
pluralism (Jospin, ll. 120-121). Jospin and Prodi argue the EUs need for reform on the basis of the 
discrepancy between its potential to develop into a value-based world power (Jospin, ll. 150-151, 
Prodi, l. 40). Whereas the French Prime Minister and the Commission President advocate the 
constitution of a European collective actor, the Danish foreign minister takes the less integrationist 
view that the EU is the member states best platform for global action (ll. 247-248). In either case 
the constituting mechanism is the same, namely that of closing the gap between the capability of the 
Unions existing institutions and instruments and the tasks which the EU is expected to perform in 
the global reality. As Romano Prodi concludes: The danger that threatens us is that of consensus 
on the apparent status quo at a time when the world changes, at a time when the Union changes 
(Prodi, ll. 500-501).  
The argument presented by Jospin, Prodi, and Lykketoft is based on the relationship 
between the EU and the rest of the world and develops through variations of the general 
argumentative strategy that consists in aligning the premises and the conclusions through an 
implicit warrant of reciprocal relations (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1397a). The general argument runs as 
follows: if the EU is to act on the global stage, it must be given the means to do so. More 
specifically, the speakers seek to establish the political reforms they propose as the proper means 
for achieving the desired ends in the present circumstances. This position is grounded in the 
common assumption that symmetry is a prerequisite for successful action (Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969, p. 221). The three speakers base their claims on the same presupposed symmetries: 
first, they establish the EU as the only available political entity large enough to assert itself in a 
globalised world; thereby globalisation comes to be seen as an external force against which the 
members of the EU are united. Here, the implicit warrant stipulates that there must be a symmetrical 
relationship between the size of the scene in which an act is performed and the size of the actor 
performing the act. Second, the speakers use an argument about the necessary correspondence 
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between means and ends in order to conclude that the EU is in need of reform. The speakers assert 
that the EU is not at present able to perform its tasks on the world stage, and it is argued that this 
failure is due to a lack of the adequate means of action, wherefore the EUs institutional and 
procedural framework must be reformed.  
 
The argument from disconnection between the EU and the citizens 
The last reason why the EU is in need of reform is present in all six speeches: the disharmony 
between the way the EU is currently run and peoples expectations of it. While all the speeches 
recognise this disharmony as a major impulse towards reform  the reform process presenting the 
cure to the present problems  there are varying conceptualisations of it. Prodi sets up the argument 
in its basic form:  
Almost 90% of the European citizens assign ambitious priorities to the Union: 
maintaining peace and security as well as fighting unemployment, organised crime, and 
social exclusion. These same citizens, however, hardly concern themselves with the way 
the Union functions. This is the sign it is time to make Europe differently (Prodi, ll.47-
52).  
In a similar vein Aznar takes a pragmatic stance towards the peoples dissatisfaction: using the 
argument from symmetry he simply states that the EU must answer the citizens expectations in 
order to conserve their adhesion and suggests that his proposals create the necessary 
correspondence (Aznar, ll. 152-154 and l. 244). Unlike Prodi, Aznar does not explicitly recognise 
that a disconnection between the people and the Union has become a reality; instead he speaks of 
the conservation of adhesion and of the European politicians responsibility of not letting down the 
favourable disposition that the reforms will ensure (Aznar, l. 245). Since Aznar does not 
conceptualise a situation of crisis his call for reform is not very forceful, and accordingly he 
advocates minor adjustments, not fundamental change. 
At the outset of his speech, Fischer recognises that the process of integration is being 
called into question; the EUs achievements and remaining challenges stand in contrast to the 
growing scepticism. Fischer presents this mismatch as one of the main reasons why he is happy to 
have been given the opportunity to present his visions for Europe (Fischer, ll. 15-20). However, he 
does not really discuss the sceptical position. In the course of the speech several attempts to 
anticipate negative reactions are made, but only in order to ask the opponents to abstain from 
making shrill replies and to feel at ease with the ideas of the speech (Fischer, ll. 196-201 and ll. 
281-283). Although Fischer recognises the problem of the disenchanted populations this issue is not 
his main concern; instead his call for fundamental reform is primarily premised upon the need to 
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ensure the enlarged Unions capability of action. Fischer, therefore, advances his position without 
much attention to what the people think.7  
Jospin sets up the same contradiction between the EUs success and the growing 
disenchantment and incertitude, but contrary to Fischer he shows some understanding for the rising 
insecurity, acknowledging that it is true that the future of Europe raises legitimate questions 
(Jospin, l. 8). Jospin poses three such legitimate questions, all ridden with productive tensions. The 
first question sets up the relationship between Europe and the world that has already been presented, 
and the other two present different angles on the relationship between Europe and the nation, a 
constitutive dichotomy that will be presented under the heading of what reforms should be made. 
Jospins strategy for dealing with the disconnection between the individual citizen and the European 
project consists in alleviating other, more specific tensions, the implicit argument being that if the 
questions citizens pose are answered satisfactorily, the general incertitude will also be dissolved. 
 Like Jospin, Blair and Lykketoft connect the citizens concerns about the EU with the 
relationship between Europe and the nation-state, that is, with the issue of what reforms to make 
rather than with why reforms are needed. However, both speakers also set up the peoples priorities 
as a reason to begin the discussion of reforms in the first place. In this context, Blair presents an 
argument about the inevitability of Europe  an argument similar to that put forward by Prodi and 
Lykketoft in the context of globalisation:  
as Europe grows stronger and enlarges, there would be something truly bizarre and 
self-denying about standing apart from the key strategic alliance on our doorstep. None 
of this means criticisms of Europe are all invalid. [] But to conduct the case for 
reform in a way that leaves Britain marginalised and isolated [] is just plain foolish. 
[] being at the centre of influence in Europe is an indispensable part of influence, 
strength and power in the world. We can choose not to be there; but no-one should 
doubt the consequences of that choice (Blair, ll. 128-138).  
 
Here, Blair both argues for British participation in the reform process and seeks to set the terms for 
how the debate should be conducted, an issue to which I shall return. The argument is not so much 
about why reforms are needed, as it is about why Britain should participate actively in the reform 
process. Blair attempts to redefine valid criticisms of Europe as reasons to become involved in the 
process, rather than for standing apart from it. By advancing the claim that there are no alternatives 
to the EU, he seeks to create a dynamic of commitment, urging the citizens to seek solutions to their 
current dissatisfaction by engaging the system, not by withdrawing from it.  
                                                        
7 The actual proposals for reform are, as will be explained when I turn to the examination of the third subcategory, not 
inattentive to peoples sentiments, but these are not Fischers main motivation for seeking reform.  
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Lykketoft begins his treatment of the issue by setting up the contrast between the EUs 
potential and the peoples current support (Lykketoft, ll. 25-31). He then attempts to create a 
productive dynamic, equal to that set up by Blair, by presenting the strained relationship with 
Europe as being internal to each citizen, thereby avoiding the risk of locking the debate in polarised 
conflict between opposed groups. Says Lykketoft: 
The doubt about the EU is probably not an expression of a division of the nations into 
two populational groups in total disagreement. It is rather an expression of oppositional 
sentiments in the minds of most of us: We both have strong feelings tied to the nation 
and a sense of the utility of European co-operation (ll. 32-36).  
 
This reasoning allows Lykketoft to conclude that: bridges cannot be built to those who deny the 
realities of the European co-operation []. But bridges can and must be built between the national 
characteristics we want to maintain, and the European co-operation we cannot do without (ll. 51-
52). The argumentative strategies employed by Lykketoft in this passage include a shift in 
perspective and an establishment of correspondence in spite of controversy. The changed 
perspective, moving from external conflict between groups to a tension that is internal to each 
person regardless of his or her group affiliations, facilitates reconciliation. Since all involved 
individuals are now perceived as recognising both sides of the issue a common understanding of the 
need to find a compromise emerges.8 
 
Why reforms are needed   
The EUs need for reform and thereby the basic justification of the debate as such is established by 
positioning the EU in an intermediate position. This intermediacy is conceived spatially, as the 
occupation of a space between the individual nation-states and the entire world. It is also understood 
temporally; the EU is put in the middle of a developmental process that must be continued. 
Furthermore, a combined spatio-temporal transitory stance is created in which the EU is seen as 
being on the way to realising its finality. This combined argument has two dimensions: the EU is on 
its way to achieving its final geographical form through enlargement and it will achieve its ultimate 
institutional form through reformation. The basic argument, then, is that the reforms represent the 
means of moving the EU along towards its finality, and in addition it is proposed that the reforms 
may overcome the tensions of the EUs development. That is, through reform the strained 
relationship between the EU and its citizens can be alleviated, the incompatibilities between the 
                                                        
8 The question of what that compromise should look like belongs to the third group of dichotomies and will be 
discussed below. 
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Unions goals and its current capability of action can be overcome, and the risk that enlargement 
will put further strains on the relationship between means and ends can be avoided. The general 
purpose of the constitutive dichotomies that are used in speaking of the need for reform is to cast 
the reform process as a necessity for finishing the ongoing European project and for making the EU 
physically complete. 
 
6.1.2. How should reforms be debated? 
The issue of how the debate should be conducted is not as central to the speeches as are the two 
other main categories, but in dealing explicitly with the procedures and forms of the discussion it is 
of great concern to my investigation, and I have therefore included it here. In discussing this issue 
the speakers reflect directly upon the process in which they partake and seek to set the terms for 
further debate. Two main relationships constitute the speakers understanding of the debate: the 
relationship between short- and long-term debate, and the relationship between the discussion of the 
EUs purpose and its institutional makeup. These two relationships indicate what should be 
discussed and how the discussion should be conducted. A few other issues, namely who should 
participate in the debate and where it should be conducted, are also present, but these are addressed 
more implicitly than the other two dimensions. I shall explore the speakers treatment of these 
questions before turning to the investigation of the two more central issues. 
 
The who and where of the debate 
Blairs verdict on the foolishness of standing outside of the reform process, Fischers attempts to 
silence certain reactions to his speech, and Lykketofts statement about who he will not build 
bridges to all seek to exclude radically sceptical positions from the conversation. The three other 
speeches do not contain such direct markers of exclusion, but it is evident that all the interventions 
take a constructive tone that does not include considering secession of member states or rolling 
back the integration process. 
The speakers also touch upon the related issue of where the debate should be 
conducted. Here, two main distinctions are brought to bear namely the differentiation between 
national and European-wide fora for discussion and the division between popular and elite debates. 
The speakers ascribe varying degrees of importance to this issue: Aznar barely mentions it, but 
implies that the discussion is elitist and enjoins politicians and experts at the European level (Aznar, 
ll. 2-5 and ll. 244-245). The other speakers in one way or another express concern about the broader 
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public involvement in the discussion. Prodi casts the discussion on Europes future as the young 
peoples debate, and he understands the debate as aiming at granting the citizens a political role not 
only locally and nationally but also at the European level (Prodi, ll. 8-9 and ll. 373-375). Thus, 
Prodi appears to assume that a European-wide public debate with a genuine European focus can 
arise. Fischer also speaks into a European context, but he addresses a number of different audiences 
attempting to adapt his speech to some of the many national publics that he sees as the basic 
elements of the proposed European institutional unity (Fischer, ll. 241-249).  
Jospin continues this line of differentiating between distinct national publics and 
presents his intervention as the opening of the French debate on the future of the enlarged Union. 
Moreover, Jospin speaks of an elite European level of discussion represented by the heads of state 
and government, but also by other politicians who meet in permanent or temporary European 
institutions. He sees it as the politicians responsibility to invite the citizens to participate in 
discussions of the European issues at the level of the various national publics (Jospin, ll. 12-15). 
Blair and Lykketoft share the belief that a European-wide public does not exist and that people are 
primarily directed to their nations and the national political institutions (Blair, ll. 232-237, 
Lykketoft, ll. 633-635), but only Lykketoft takes the consequence of speaking directly to his 
national public. Although Blair seems to speak to both a united European political elite and to 
dispersed national publics, he does not explicitly make the distinction nor discuss how publics  
national or otherwise  can become involved in the debate on Europe, much less the European 
debate.     
The constitutive dichotomies that establish the who and where of the debate, thus, 
involve a dividing move in which sceptical positions are simply left out of the context of the debate. 
Also, the debate is divided spatially; it is seen to unfold in various national contexts where public 
debate may occur as well as at a general European level that primarily is a dialogue between 
political leaders. Prodi is the only speaker who attempts to overcome the dichotomy between the 
national public debates and the elitist European discussions, and he does so by assuming a European 
public rather than arguing its existence. The five other speakers simply accept the division of the 
debate as inevitable and base their various recommendations for the reform of the European polity 
on this fact.9  
 
                                                        
9 As will be seen in the discussion of the third group of dichotomies various proposals for reform may spring from the 
common recognition that a general European public does not presently exist. 
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Short- and long-term change 
Whereas the distinction between the discussion on goals and institutions, to which I shall turn 
shortly, is present in five of the speeches, most clearly in the three that belong to the second 
trajectory, the distinction between short- and long-term change only arises in the first two speeches. 
Fischer and Aznar divide their speeches into two sections, one dealing with the reforms to be 
decided at the Nice summit, and one going beyond the IGC that is to be concluded at Nice. Neither 
speaker argues for the need to continue the discussion in the longer term, but simply claims that the 
current reform process should be succeeded by further changes. The distinction between short- and 
long-term change, then, is not construed as a dichotomy at all. Rather, the two modes of discussion 
are presented as overlapping each other seamlessly, with long-term issues reaching their fruition as 
the short-term changes are decided and realised. The need for continuation of the debate that is 
already taken for granted in Fischers and Aznars speeches was officially recognised in the Nice 
Declaration. However, it seems that the debate had moved beyond the issues to be decided at Nice 
even before the summit had been held. At least Blair  delivering his message two months before 
the Nice summit  does not mention the upcoming negotiations at all, but instead focuses all his 
attention on the long-term discussion.10  
 Although the distinction between short- and long-term change is only directly 
articulated in Fischers and Aznars speeches, the understanding of European reform and the 
concurrent debate as a continuous process is common to all the speeches. This common 
understanding shows itself most clearly in the use of metaphors of construction and direction to 
describe ongoing and future events. These two groups of metaphoric expressions recur frequently in 
all six speeches and constitute the European project as an unfinished process, which must be 
continued, but can also be changed along the way.11 The speakers all refer to the construction of 
Europe, the Europe that is being built, the directions the project can take, the available courses of 
action, etc., etc., and thereby they establish a sense of Europes temporal and spatial emergence.  
The metaphors of construction and direction are so basic to the human understanding 
and expression of the world  they are metaphors we live by as Lakoff & Johnson (1980) say  
that they typically are not seen as bringing together different spheres, but rather as expressing 
                                                        
10 In more direct ways Jospin and Lykketoft foreshadow the decision to be reached in Laeken by declaring their support 
for the establishment of a convention (Jospin, ll. 329-331, Lykketoft, ll. 535-537). The speeches various hints at the 
future developments of the debate reinforce the feeling that the debate as a process progresses steadily, just as the EU 
moves gradually towards its final goal.  
11 Thereby, the metaphorical conception of the debate corresponds to and provides further support for the reasoning 
about the need for reform. 
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meaning directly. These metaphors have become dormant (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 
405), but still serve their original functions of making abstract social and political processes 
concrete and of lending impetus to these processes. They provide spatial and temporal frames for 
the subjects of which they speak. At the same time the metaphors are themselves so general and 
flexible that the speakers can endow them with very different specific meanings and thus shape 
them to match their own purposes. While the six utterances use the same types of metaphors, the 
envisioned European constructions and the recommended developmental directions are quite varied 
as will become clear from the study of the speakers actual proposals for reform.  
 
The EUs purpose and its institutional makeup 
The second relationship that is constitutive of the terms of debate is closely associated with the two 
groups of metaphors presented above, and arises through the tension between the metaphors 
procedural and substantial elements. The issue is whether the EU should primarily be understood as 
a content or a form, and thus whether the debate should focus on what the EU should be and do, or 
how it should do it. Or, as Prodi expresses the situation, there are two approaches in the debate: 
some privilege the foundations, others give priority to institutions (Prodi, ll. 488-489).  
Fischer is the only speaker who does not mention the issue of whether form or content 
should be prioritised in the debate; this is because he makes no distinction between the EUs 
substantial end and its institutional reformation. In Fischers speech the two elements merge 
through the understanding of integration as an institutional phenomenon that is revealed in his use 
of the antithesis of erosion or integration.  
The speakers who do take up the distinction between the two approaches all put the 
discussion of the EUs basic features and goals, the substantial aspects, before the consideration of 
the institutional and procedural dimensions. Jospin uses wordplay to express this choice, stating that 
Europe is first and foremost a political project, a content before being a container (Jospin, ll. 
18-19) wherefore Europes political sense should be established before the institutional architecture 
and procedural formulae can be decided (Jospin, ll. 213-215).  
Using directional metaphors Blair expresses a similar position: the trouble with the 
debate about Europes political future is that if we do not take care, we plunge into the thicket of 
institutional change without first asking the basic question of what direction Europe should take 
(Blair, ll. 165-168).12 Blair continues this line of reasoning and connects it with the basic exigence 
                                                        
12 In this passage the inscrutability of procedural discussions is also presented metaphorically  the thicket of 
institutional change is not a place that is easily traversed. 
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of closing the gap between Europe and the citizens. He states: the problems Europes citizens have 
with Europe arise when Europes priorities arent theirs. No amount of institutional change most of 
which passes them by completely will change that. Reforming Europe to give it direction and 
momentum around the peoples priorities will (Blair, ll. 269-273). And he concludes using 
reversed repetition, a stylistic feature known as antimetabole,13 to sharpen the point: The citizens 
of Europe must feel that they own Europe, not that Europe owns them (Blair, ll. 273-274). To 
Blair, only substantial discussions on the purposes and actions of the EU can ensure such popular 
ownership. This claim is supported through a double argument of asymmetry: problems arise when 
the EUs and its citizens priorities do not correspond and when institutional change and peoples 
comprehension do not correspond.     
Lykketofts attitude is quite similar to Blairs and it is based on the same argument 
from the lack of correspondence:  
Technically complicated debates about an EU-constitution or a catalogue of 
competences or the creation of a new second chamber in a decisional structure that is 
complicated already are not necessarily shortcuts to creating greater popular support for 
the project. On the contrary, they risk strengthening the mistrust and aversion and 
nourish myths about secret plans of a closer Union  unless we can explain the purpose 
of the changes in crystal-clear terms as a strengthening of the citizens influence on 
Europe (Lykketoft, ll. 616-621). 
 
Aznar expresses a parallel concern about the technicality of the central terms of the debate, and his 
is an argument based entirely on the undesirability of using ambiguous terms.14 Aznar uses the 
incompatibility of various rivalling definitions to argue that pragmatic agreement on actual contents 
is preferable to conceptual discussions:  
the two words, federalism and constitution, have a marked tendency towards 
polysemy, perhaps towards ambiguity. Both signify, for some, more transfer of 
sovereignty, more integration; and, for others, the opposite, that is, more 
decentralisation and reservation of competences to the states, regions, etc. before a 
centralism seated in Brussels. In both cases they generate both passionate adhesions and 
radical rejections. This is why I doubt their efficacy for the future of the European 
Union. It is preferable to reach understanding about the content instead of managing 
venerable words that cannot be verified in practice (Aznar, ll. 106-111).  
 
 
                                                        
13 In the binomial form Blair uses here the antimetabole resembles the chiasmus, the figure of presenting the two parts 
as an antithetical cross (Albeck, 1968, p. 169 and 186).  
14 The varied meanings of a word is a topos discussed by Aristotle; while Aristotle firmly supports defining each of a 
terms varied meanings clearly, he does not seem to think that the existence of multiple senses of single words is 
inherently problematic (Aristotle, Topica, book I, 107b). 
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The apparent general agreement on the necessity of keeping the debate focused on the 
substantial and goal-oriented side of the European construction rests somewhat uneasily with the 
various speakers own proposals for institutional and procedural changes. However, none of the 
speakers actually thinks that the formal level of discussion should be abandoned altogether. Rather, 
the common argument is that the EUs ends should guide its means and that this symmetry should 
also exist in the discussion. Prodi sums up the common position well by stating that the exercise in 
fact consists in synthesising the two approaches, deciding on common goals and then creating the 
means of achieving them (Prodi, ll. 490-510). It is in this direction, he concludes, that we should 
pursue the discussion until 2004 (Prodi, ll. 510-511). 
  
How reforms should be debated 
The designation of how the reforms should be debated is based on complementary pairs more than 
actual constitutive dichotomies. The short-term debate is to be supplemented by and continued in 
the long-term, and discussions of the EUs form are to be aligned with preceding deliberations on 
the purpose and content of the European project. The creation of Europe is seen to run its due 
course, and continued debate is understood as a central, constitutive element of that process. 
Through debate the blueprint is established and the route is laid out  to remain within the speakers 
preferred metaphorical framework of construction and direction.  
However, there is a recognised tension between those who wish to discuss the EUs 
developments in constructive terms, and those who wish to focus attention at the antagonistic level 
of support for or opposition to the EU. Here, the speakers do not attempt to resolve the tension, but 
simply opt in favour of the constructive mode of argumentation, thereby seeking to disallow the 
other option and setting the debates agenda at a level above the basic settlement of the EUs right 
of existence. Furthermore, it is widely recognised that discussions of the EUs contents and 
procedures are not necessarily in harmony with each other, but here potential incompatibilities are 
avoided by setting up the EUs purposes and ends as the guideline to which its procedures and 
means have to be adapted. That is, the issue of content takes precedence over the discussion of 
form, the exception to this rule being Fischers speech in which the two discussions are conceived 
as being at one.  
By presenting the debate as a process in which potential conflicts are resolved through 
the (chrono)logical arrangement of the involved issues tensions are smoothed, and the discussion is 
seen as progressing harmoniously and concurrently with the process of European integration as 
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such. However, the presentation of the debate as a unified process is inconsistent with the 
recognition that public discussion is actually conducted in many different contexts in which 
participants have varied priorities and concerns. There may be a coherent dialogue between 
European top politicians, but the politicians also have to refer to national audiences and take heed of 
the predominant expectations and demands of their national contexts. All speakers except Aznar 
recognise this situation and explicitly present the debate as taking place in diverse rooms with 
varied priorities and different participants. In actual conduct the debate remains dispersed over a 
great many specific contexts with divergent expectations and agendas, wherefore the process of 
debate in practice has far less chance of progressing smoothly than the temporal conceptualisations 
of it would indicate. However, none of the speakers addresses the inconsistency between the 
temporal coherence they invoke and the spatial differentiation they heed.  
 
6.1.3. What reforms should be made? 
The question of what reforms should be made is organised along two lines: the spectrum connecting 
the concepts of federalism and intergovernmentalism and that mediating between national and 
European sentiments. I shall begin with an examination of the national-European dichotomy since it 
forms the basis of the proposals that are expressed in conceptual terms. Although the speakers lean 
towards one or the other end of the scale in various degrees, the question to all of them is not how 
one end can be eradicated, but how a balance between the two poles can be struck.  
 
The national and the European 
Aznar and Prodi have the least developed accounts of the substantial relationship between Europe 
and the nation states. Prodi simply asserts: there exists in effect a European model, nuanced, 
diversified, but which really belongs to us. It is the result of an original historical equilibrium 
between prosperity and well-being on one side and the search for a solidary and open society on the 
other (Prodi, ll. 92-95). In his definition of the European model the president of the Commission 
employs another spectrum, that between liberal and social concerns, and he pronounces the 
equilibrium between these two objectives to be the hallmark of European unity and distinctness. 
Prodi focuses solely on establishing commonality between the members of the EU; he sets up the 
Union as the single collective actor that represents all the members equally  and equally well  and 
ignores the possibility that members may experience contradictions between the national and the 
European priorities.  
  6. Second round of analysis  
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The possible contradictions are taken up by the Spanish President of Government who 
warns against taking a solely national position. Being Spanish, Aznar says, I tell you that Europe 
is no springboard for strictly national projects, nor an insurance of stability for the weakest 
members, but a deeply rooted will of belonging (Aznar, ll. 37-38). The metaphor of the 
springboard is somewhat more original than the typical metaphors of direction, but its membership 
of that group is nevertheless evident; the expression deeply rooted will is an instance of another 
fundamental group of metaphors, namely the expressions of organic relation. Such metaphors  the 
metaphor of the root is the most commonly used, but references to trunks and branches as well as to 
human body parts are also typical of this group  are used to create natural relations between 
objects and concepts. The root metaphor is a special instance since it also belongs to the class of 
foundational metaphors, a group in which we also find metaphors of construction such as the 
fundament or the cornerstone. The present instance of the root metaphor creates both a natural and 
fundamental relationship between the EU and its member states, but even if it is deeply rooted, in 
Aznars conception belonging to Europe is still a willed act on the part of the members.  
Aznar also constitutes the specific Spanish relationship in terms of a deep belonging, 
but in this case he uses the strategy of shifting perspective: In reality, we did not enter Europe, 
because from here we had never left (Aznar, ll. 252-253). Moving beyond the concrete act of 
becoming an EU member, Aznar claims that Spain is an innately European country. And in 
conclusion he declares his loyalty to both the nation and Europe, using a metaphor of organic and 
foundational relation in order to emphasise the correspondence between the two dimensions: an 
active Spain in the heart of the European unity (Aznar, ll. 255-256). Again, it is noteworthy that 
Aznar presents the nation-state as the active entity even as European unity is declared.  
Aznars and Prodis conceptualisations are alike in presenting the national entities as 
being part of a common European whole and constituting the relationship between the Union and 
the member states as a harmonious one. However, in Aznars perspective the individual members 
remain the central actors of the united Europe, leaving little sense of an independently acting Union. 
To Prodi, on the contrary, the establishment of such a united European actor is the main aim of the 
intervention.   
Lykketoft and Blair are the two speakers who lean the most towards purely national 
definitions of collective identity. Both speakers see emotional attachment as a national matter and 
define Europe in primarily utilitarian terms (Blair, ll. 238-244, Lykketoft, ll. 35-36). However, Blair 
re-narrates the last fifty years of British history in order to be able to position Britain as a leading 
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partner at the centre of Europe (Blair, ll. 81-82 and ll. 158-159), and Lykketoft insists that there is 
no way back to the closed nation-states (Lykketoft, ll. 73-74). Moreover, both speakers recognise 
the existence of some sort of European community of values. Blair does so implicitly through the 
assertion that the EU underpinned peace and democracy in the reconstruction of post-war 
Western Europe (Blair, ll. 51-52), and through the use of the emotionally charged metaphor of 
belonging to the European family of nations (Blair, l. 17).  
Lykketoft is more direct in his assertion of what unites the EU members:  [the] EU 
has many common opinions, attitudes and values with which we will increasingly seek to influence 
the international community and which are in opposition to the opinions of the new American 
government (Lykketoft, ll. 227-230). By setting up a common other, Lykketoft is able to 
constitute Europe as a unity. This strategy is recurrent in several speeches: Aznar establishes a 
blurred image of the European alter ego in speaking of the enemies of democracy and freedom 
called nationalist exclusivity, ethnic tyranny and terrorism (Aznar, ll. 237-238). Jospin and Prodi 
are more specific in their presentations of Europe as an alternative to the US (Jospin, ll. 82-83, 166-
167, 181-181, and 195-196, Prodi, ll. 99-100, 139-142, and 261-262), but they do not establish the 
United States other-role as forcefully as does Lykketoft.15  
Lykketofts active establishment of European commonality does not lessen his 
commitment to the national identity, and in a concluding vision of the EU in 2010 he states firmly: 
we have not become less Danish because we co-operate better (Lykketoft, l. 692).16 As was seen 
earlier, Lykketoft understands the tensions between the national and the European levels of 
identification as being internal to all individuals, and his concluding denial of the notion that one 
identity should exclude the other continues this line of reasoning. Lykketoft sees identities  
individual and collective  as consisting of complex relationships between elements that may not be 
totally harmonious, but do not exclude each other.  
A similar acceptance of the coexistence of national and European features is present in 
Jospins assertion that: like so many other convinced Europeans, I want Europe, but I remain 
attached to my nation. Making Europe without undoing France  or any of the other European 
nations: this is my political choice (Jospin, ll. 216-218). However, Jospin places emphasis on the 
                                                        
15 Blair also seems to recognise the opposition between the US and the EU, but instead of exploiting it to enhance 
European commonality, he places Britain in an intermediate position: our strength with the United States is not just 
a British asset, it is potentially a European one. Britain can be the bridge between the EU and the US (Blair, ll. 124-
127). Events such as the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 and the war in Iraq mean that the presentation of the 
EU as an alternative to the US has become an immensely more delicate and consequential operation than it was at the 
moments of utterance of the six speeches.   
16 It is typical of Lykketofts intervention that he speaks of better not more co-operation.  
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European dimension, and in contradistinction to Lykketoft who sees the national and the European 
as distinct domains, Jospin does not separate France from Europe (Jospin, l. 216). In this vein he 
also states: I am French. I feel European17 (Jospin, l. 16). The conception of the duality as a unity 
is basic to Jospin whose understanding of the national-European relationship should thus be 
grouped with the positions forwarded by Prodi and Aznar.  
However, the position is unfolded in more detail in Jospins speech than in Prodis 
and Aznars interventions. Jospin begins with the presentation of a European model that is very 
similar to Prodis, stating that Europe is a work of the mind, a model of society, a world view 
(Jospin, ll. 20-21). Also, Europe is much more than a market. It is carrier of a social model, fruit 
of history, and it unfolds through the ever more intense bonds that today unite the European 
peoples. There exists a European art de vivre (Jospin, ll. 26-28). Europe is a civilisation 
(Jospin, l. 33), a community of values (Jospin, l. 36), and a community of destiny (Jospin, l. 53). 
Yet Jospins deeper investigation of the European unity leads to the conclusion that the 
justification of Europe is its difference (Jospin, ll. 32-33). Europe carries in itself an 
exceptional diversity of cultures (Jospin, l. 131), and its vocation is to bring this cultural diversity 
alive (Jospin, l. 122). Although he claims the unity of Europe and the nation-states, Jospins 
consideration of what the European unity means, leads to the assertion that it is constituted through 
diversity. The strategy of declaring unity in diversity consists in facing the apparent 
incompatibility boldly and insisting that it is in fact beneficial. The clash between endeavours of 
unification and of differentiation is avoided through the claim that overarching unifying structures 
can bring together disparate entities without hampering the unique features of each (Hellström, 
2002).18 In accordance with the argument of unity in diversity every reflection on the future of 
Europe must pay special attention to the role of the different nations that come together in the 
European entity (Jospin, ll. 214-215). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 Note the emotional charge of this expression that is so far from Lykketofts and Blairs preferred utilitarian mode of 
presenting their European attachment. 
18 This argumentative strategy is so fundamental to the EU that the Convention decided to propose it  in a slightly 
altered version: United in diversity  as the motto of the Union (article IV-1 of the Draft Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe).   
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The intergovernmental and the federal 
Although Fischer does not conceptualise the national and the European as separate entities in the 
same manner as do the other speakers, he does believe that the nations hold a special place within 
the European unity. Speaking as a convinced European and German parliamentarian (Fischer, ll. 
31-32) he advocates the establishment of a European federation, but immediately anticipates the 
objections such a proposal will provoke and concedes that the nation-states are realities that cannot 
be thought away (Fischer, ll. 223-224). The nation-Europe relationship is presented as follows: 
Europe will not emerge in an empty political room, and for that reason a further fact in our 
European reality is the different national political cultures and their democratic publics, also 
separated by language borders (Fischer, ll. 242-245). Fischer does not distinguish between this 
relationship and its institutional parallel, and he goes directly to the presentation of the institutional 
framework that in his opinion will match the double-sided national-European reality. He suggests 
that a European parliament must [] always be doubly representative: a Europe of nation-states 
and a Europe of citizens. This will only be possible when this European parliament actually brings 
the different national political elites and also the different national publics together (Fischer, ll. 
245-249).  
In Fischers articulation of the dichotomies the substantial and institutional issues 
merge. This is possible because his institutional conceptualisation lacks an intergovernmental side; 
in Fischers scheme both differing national and common European interests are represented in and 
served by European-level institutions. By proposing a fully-fledged federation Fischer seeks to 
accommodate the tension between national and European dimensions within a coherent 
supranational structure. And in an argument similar to that put forward by Lykketoft, although with 
much more radical implications, Fischer maintains that institutional integration will not lead to the 
loss of national identity: also in the European finality, [] we will still be British and German, 
French and Polish (Fischer, ll. 284-285).  
Fischers is the only one of the six speeches in which the federal ideal is adopted fully; 
the other five preserve the institutional duality between intergovernmental and federal features as 
well as the tension between substantial national and European issues. Blair argues for the mixture of 
the features in the following way:       
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There are two opposite models so far. One is Europe as a free trade area []. The other 
is the classic federalist model [] The difficulty with the first is that it nowhere near 
answers what our citizens expect from Europe, besides being wholly unrealistic 
politically. In a Europe with a single market and single currency, there will inevitably be 
a need for closer economic co-ordination. In negotiations over trade and global finance, 
Europe is stronger if it speaks with one voice. [] So a limited vision of Europe does 
not remotely answer the modern demands people place on Europe. The difficulty, 
however, with the view of Europe as a superstate, subsuming nations into a politics 
dominated by supranational institutions, is that it too fails the test of the people. [] 
The EU will remain a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the 
supranational. Such a Europe can, in its political and economic strength, be a 
superpower; a superpower, but not a superstate (Blair, ll. 197-248). 
 
The argumentative strategy that is explicitly employed here is also the backbone of many of the 
other considerations of alternatives that the speakers undertake. The strategy consists of two moves: 
first one sets up two extreme positions, and then a middle version is advocated. This strategy, then, 
might be termed the Goldilocks argument or, using Aristotelian vocabulary, the argument of the 
mean (Aristotle, Ethics, 1106a-b). Blair, in this particular articulation of the argument, uses 
wordplay (superpower/superstate) to enhance his conclusion and highlight the blend of features that 
makes his European porridge particularly appealing.  
The idea of the unique combination of institutional features recurs in Prodis speech, 
in which it is stated that: 
The genius of the founders consisted precisely in proposing an original institutional 
construction that is neither federal nor intergovernmental. It is because the European 
Economic Community has overcome the dilemma between a superstate and 
juxtaposed states that it has entered into history. It is by assembling instead of 
provoking confrontation that it [the Community method] is a solution for the future 
(Prodi, ll. 352-357).  
     
Prodi does not present his solution to the dilemma as elegantly as Blair does, but instead he bolsters 
the argument by reference to the authority of the Unions founders. And, elegant or not, Prodis 
claim is in a sense more forceful than Blairs; Prodi does not simply advocate a middle ground but 
in envisioning the EU as an original institutional construction seeks to overcome the dilemma 
altogether.  
Aznars solution to the problem represents a return to the balancing strategy. He 
supports the institutional mixture that combines the strengthening of the institutions that 
represent the Unions general interest [] and a better co-operation between the national 
governments and parliaments (Aznar, ll. 145-147). Here, the desirability of such a combination 
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is simply assumed, and the argument is thereby implicitly based on Aznars harmonious 
construction of the national-European relationship.   
 Jospin points directly to the constitutive tension of the European Union. There are 
nations, strong, vibrant, attached to their identities that found the wealth of our continent. And then 
there is the will to unite, to build together a unity that will make each one stronger (Jospin, ll. 231-
233). The institutional framework that productively unites the opposed forces is, according to 
Jospin, the federation of nation states; a combination of concepts that itself requires a redefinition of 
the term federation in order to hold together. In this context federation does not mean a 
European executive that only derives its legitimacy from the European parliament (Jospin, ll. 221-
222), but a progressive and controlled process of sharing or transferring competences to the 
level of the Union (Jospin, ll. 225-226). The expression federation of nation states, in Jospins 
view, captures the EUs uniqueness: Europe is an original political construction, in an 
indissociable fashion mixing a singular solid of two different elements: the federalist ideal and the 
reality of the European nation-states (Jospin, ll. 228-230). In a formulation that is almost identical 
with Prodis statement on the original institutional construction, Jospin seeks to position Europes 
political structure beyond the continuous reshuffling of national and European interests. Jospin 
expresses his argument about the desirable mixture of the two unviable extremes through a rather 
complex metaphor of chemical processes, but the purpose of creating a new unity is unmistakable.  
Lykketoft emphasises that the EU is the member states effective instrument for 
solving common problems  not some entity that is taking new, large steps to becoming a federal 
state. [] The EU will remain a completely special and historically new and unique phenomenon 
(Lykketoft, ll. 365-371). Thus, Lykketoft also conceives of the EU as more than a precarious 
balance between federal and intergovernmental elements, although his special European entity is 
decidedly less unified than is Jospins and Prodis. In his discussion of what name should be given 
to the unique co-operation, Lykketoft refers to Jospins preferred concept and states that in Danish 
we will call it a binding community of nation states, but probably mean more or less the same 
thing (Lykketoft, ll. 375-376). However, Lykketofts redefinition of the federation of nation states 
arguably moves the concept closer to the intergovernmental pole than what appears to be Jospins 
intention. The imprecision with which Lykketoft refers to the federation of nation states is part of 
his strategy and allows him to endow the concept with a much less integrationist meaning than what 
emerged from Jospins usage of it. Lykketoft advocates a primarily instrumental understanding of 
the EU that seems premised on the assumption that European statehood is the greater evil of the two 
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possible extremes. Therefore, the uniqueness he ascribes to Europe mainly consists of its political 
organisation not being that of a state.  
 
The reforms that should be made  
The speakers proposals for reforms are all centred around the dichotomy of the national and the 
European, and the tension takes two forms: identification of and with the national and the European 
dimensions and the political organisation of them. Here, all speakers perceive a purely European 
identity and polity as a nonentity, and all present the nation-states as constitutive parts of Europe. 
However, Europe and the EU are also viewed as unavoidable features of the individual nation-
states reality, wherefore tensions between the European and the national levels have to be resolved 
through compromise rather than by opting for one of the two sides (see figure 29). The speakers 
handle the extremes in various ways, and they use distinct strategies to advocate their preferred 
solutions. Some seek to move the resulting entity off the scale by claiming that the mix of national 
and European features creates something new and unique. Others simply seek to strike a balance 
between the national and the European, but the aim of overcoming the tensions between the two 
extremes is common to all. 
  Blair              Prodi   
  Lykketoft     Aznar  Jospin Fischer 
National                      European 
 
Intergovernmental   Federal 
Figure 29: The national/intergovernmental-European/federal scale and the speakers position19 
 
6.1.4. Meaning formation through constitutive dichotomies  
One of the main aims of all of the speeches is to position the debate on the future of Europe spatio-
temporally. Taking their cue from existing conditions of space and time the speakers create a here 
and now that facilitates common European debate while remaining sensitive to national differences, 
and they also seek to constitute a political entity that displays both national and European 
sensibilities. The formal features that I have analysed under the general heading of constitutive 
dichotomies are modes of meaning formation that are both operative at the common European and  
                                                        
19 The positioning of the speakers is an analytical abstraction; in practice most of the speakers are able to move up and 
down the scale according to their special purposes. The positioning of Blair and Prodi above the other four speakers is 
only intended to show the overlap between their positions and those of other speakers. 
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particular national levels. Thus, the constitutive dichotomies enable the speakers to create new 
opportunities for political discussion and action on the basis of the nationally constrained positions 
from which they speak.  
The speakers explain why there is a need for reform and thereby also justify the 
existence of the debate; they attempt to set up the procedures for discussion and to delimit the issues 
to be discussed. In all of these efforts the constitutive dichotomies are essential tools. One of the 
central features shared by all of the speakers is the attempt to position both the process of debating 
and the resulting European political entity in a middle position. As a regional entity the EU is the 
geographical link between the nation-state and the world order, but  it is claimed  reforms are 
needed if it is to fulfil that function effectively. Also, the EU is in the middle of an enlargement 
process, and again reforms are needed if that process is to be concluded effectively. The need for 
reform, then, is basically argued on the premise that the EU has come halfway and further changes 
are needed to bring the project to its conclusion and to realise its full potential. The debate is 
positioned between the poles of substantial and procedural discussion, the idea being that both the 
EUs ends and means must be considered and that the eventual reform must establish harmony 
between the two dimensions. Finally, the proposals for reform aim at balancing the national and 
European dimensions, wherefore they are situated between the extremes of intergovernmental and 
federal institutions and mechanisms.  
 The speakers advocate different solutions to the balancing exercise, and each utterance 
is a unique creation of meaning, but they all navigate the same conceptual space and use the same 
rhetorical strategies to establish their specific positions in the landscape. By placing himself within 
the debate on the future of Europe each speaker also sets his vision of the EU off from those 
presented by other participants in the debate. In so doing the speakers are constrained by existing 
expectations  some specifically national, others of general purport  as to the form and content of 
their utterances. One major strategy of identification is to adapt the utterance to the audiences prior 
relationship with the European project and with other social entities. Notably, it is argued that the 
EU does not do damage to the nation-states, which are conceived as the audiences primary point of 
reference, and the European unity is reinforced through reference to others that are common to all 
the nations of Europe. Furthermore, the speakers seek to live up to expectations as to what issues 
should be dealt with and how these should be discussed. In this regard there is a high degree of 
intertextuality between the six speeches as well as other contributions that belong to the specific 
sub-genre of political leaders presentations of their positions in the debate.  
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The speakers use the audiences prior feelings about the EU and the existing 
conventions concerning the form and content of their utterances creatively, thereby suggesting new 
meanings and changed relationships. For example, Lykketoft establishes a new relationship 
between sceptical and pro-European positions by suggesting that both of these are internal to all of 
us. Fischer endows the notion of federation with a new meaning, when claiming that political 
integration into a European federation does not erase national identity, Jospin also redefines the 
concept by combining it with the notion of nation-states. The argumentative and figurative topoi are 
the means by which the speakers seek to create new and alter old common meanings and positions. 
The various ways of negotiating incompatibilities and dissolving dilemmas all suggest the 
establishment of the EU as a new type of community  a third place.  
To all the speakers the EU is a unique social and political entity, neither state nor 
international association, neither nation nor collection of strangers. The ultimate aim of all the 
speeches is to substantiate this third place, to endow it with a meaning that goes beyond the 
enumeration of what it is not. In this regard the available and preferred topoi show their limitations: 
the rhetorical strategies prove well suited to opening up the new, intermediary space, but the room 
remains rather empty, mostly populated in the negative sense of all that it is not. The 
communicative constitution of the EU as a polity in its own right remains heavily dependent on the 
creation of conceptual relationships between the European polity and other political and social 
groupings that seem to be better defined and more stable.  
Yet the vagueness of the meaning formation concerning the European entity may also 
be regarded as a strength. The loose construction implies that the EU is in a transient state and 
thereby facilitates acceptance of proposed changes. Furthermore, the somewhat ambiguous images 
that emerge from the utterances allow for general agreements to arise even if differences of specific 
opinions remain. All the speakers use the strategy of keeping references to other positions so 
abstract as to allow surface resemblances to pass uncontested, whereby a productive if 
unsubstantiated sense of commonality emerges.  
Conducting the meaning formation at an abstract level facilitates the creation of 
consensus on the overall goals and the general directions of the European project and on the agenda 
and procedures of the debate about its future. On this basis it becomes possible to continue the 
discussion of specific points of disagreement, and the interlocutors may eventually move towards 
more substantial common understandings. The notion of the gradual build-up of consensus is 
supported by the speakers common conception of the temporal developments of both the debate 
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and the European project; the movement is one of continuous progress rather than abrupt leaps and 
radical change. Thus, the debate and the reforms are conceived as perpetuators of a smooth 
transition that gradually moves the EU towards the fulfilment of its ends.  
Finally, the constitutive dichotomies loose mediation between and blending of well-
known, opposed positions allow the speakers to address specific national concerns and to participate 
in the project of creating common European meaning simultaneously. The speakers usage of 
constitutive dichotomies to establish meanings that are common enough to facilitate a continued 
European dialogue and different enough to be adapted to the diverse expectations of nationally 
situated publics is a central feature of the debate on the future of Europe. This characteristic mode 
of meaning formation, the workings of which have been explained through the analysis of the 
speeches topoi, allows a general process of European debate to arise on the basis of diversified 
national positions. Moreover, the extensive use of constitutive dichotomies means divergences may 
persist in spite of the existence of the common process. National and European processes of 
meaning formation are interrelated, but neither subsumes the other; rather, they are mutually 
constitutive and recursive, they are established and altered in (re)productive tension with each other. 
 
6.2. Deciding the future  the kairoi of the declarations 
Having studied the topoi that the speakers employ in their attempts to create positions for 
themselves and their audiences that combine national and European elements meaningfully, I now 
turn to the investigation of the Nice and Laeken Declarations. The two declarations express the 
outcome of institutionalised moments of European decision-making and as such they mark the 
turning points of the debate. Furthermore, the declarations are the result of European processes of 
common opinion and will formation. These processes take place in a transnational forum in which 
politicians with decision-making powers interact directly, but the institutionalised processes of 
deciding are purely intergovernmental meaning that decisions are threatened by vetoes, and the final 
result tends to be a bargained compromise rather than a deliberated consensus. Being the result of 
these European negotiations the declarations point out the possibilities and limitations of creating 
common European meaning.  
At the moments of European decision-making the speeches abstractly postulated 
common meanings are tested as it becomes apparent what it is actually possible for the political 
leaders to agree upon and to decide collectively. The declarations are the results of decisive 
moments in which the leaders positions and proposals are concretised and take on binding force. 
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The declarations are conditioned by opinions and expectations that exist prior to their moment of 
creation, and they in turn set possibilities and limitations for continued debate and future 
agreements. In the following I shall study how the turning points of the debate become possible and 
how they facilitate further discussion. This means a shift from the focus on topoi as employed by 
the individual speakers, to an analysis of the kairoi in which the EU speaks as a collective actor.  
A kairos is not just a moment in time, but a right moment. In the classical Greek 
conception kairos is associated with the rhetorical utterance in both the sense that the rhetor must 
speak at the appropriate moment and in the sense of speaking the words that befit the moment 
(Sutton, 2001, p. 413). Kairos arises when the time has come for something, and it is a quality of 
properly adapted things (Andersen, 1997, p. 22). The utterance can thus be seen as a response to the 
various conditions of the speech situation, but the concept of kairos also has a creative dimension; 
there is a sense in which the right moment is only established when the utterance is made (Sipiora, 
2002, pp. 4-5).  
As a result of Lloyd F. Bitzers (1992) conceptualisation of the rhetorical situation and 
Richard E. Vatz (1973) direct contradiction of Bitzers claims, the responsive and the creative 
perspectives on the relationship between utterance and situation are today usually understood as 
being in stark opposition to each other. The concept of kairos, however, encompasses both the 
understanding of the situation as preceding and conditioning the utterance and the view that the 
moment only becomes meaningful in and through the utterance. The tension between these two 
understandings is not resolved in kairos, on the contrary the tension is understood as being 
productive  it is in the relationship between slavish propriety and solipsistic novelty that 
meaning is made (Miller, 2002, p. xiii). 
 The concept of kairos encompasses another tension, namely that between unity and 
plurality. This tension is not unrelated to the first one, but rather helps explicate the relationship 
between the situation-as-given and the situation-as-created. Even in the most compelling situations 
the speaker has a choice of how to respond; he or she must consider how situational aspects and 
textual features will function together and choose the rhetorical strategies that seem best suited to 
creating a coherent and meaningful communicative unit of text and context. The choice is both an 
ethical and an aesthetic one: given the circumstances, the speaker has to decide which course of 
action to advocate, and he or she must decide how the recommendations are expressed most 
appropriately (Kinneavy, 2002, pp. 61-62 and 64-65). Kairos emerges as a combination of these 
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two dimensions; it only becomes apparent what the appropriate answer to a situation is, when this 
answer is formulated in the right way (Sipiora, 2002, p. 5).   
The understanding of the utterance as both a response to and an articulation of kairos 
is central to Ramírez. He writes:  
In kairos the accidental, on the one hand, and the intentional and freely chosen, on the 
other, come together dialectically. Kairos thus has two faces: the circumstance or 
occurrence is the objectively given side, the ground for that which is to arise; the 
insight, ability to act, and practical wisdom is the subjective side, that which sows and 
causes the harvest []. Kairos is a merger of both these faces (Ramírez, 1995, p. 175, 
my translation). 
  
Moreover, Ramírez recognises the connection between the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of 
kairos; it is the combination of these two elements in the kairotic moment of the utterance that 
constitutes the meaningful rhetorical act (Ramírez, 1995, p. 222). The question of how given 
circumstances and choices of content and style merge in the utterances and create possibilities for 
further discussion is pivotal to the following analyses of the Nice and Laeken Declarations.  
The decisions upon the Nice Treatys Declaration on the future of the Union and the 
Laeken Declaration provide turning points of the debate on the EUs future. Being turning points, 
the declarations display the dual nature of kairos vividly; they both conform to a given moment and 
reform it  are conditioned and conditioning. The declarations are expressions of a moment in 
which decision is appropriate and through their articulation in and of that decisive moment they 
shape consecutive developments. The declarations are doubly situated, so to speak, and it is this 
duality that I seek to explore in the following. The investigation contains two dimensions: how does 
it become the right time for the declarations? And what sort of right time do the declarations create? 
But the two sides cannot really be separated as past and future conditions merge in the declarations 
unique presents; therefore, I shall seek to attend to both dimensions in conjunction. While focusing 
on the texts, the investigation also brings in the press coverage of the summits at which they were 
created, and the six speeches are mentioned as instantiations of the debate leading up to and 
connecting the two turning points. 
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6.2.1. The Nice Declaration 
Judging from the three speeches that preceded the Nice summit the need to continue the reform 
process after the conclusion of the Treaty of Nice was commonly recognised well before the content 
of the Treaty had been agreed upon. And as it became clear that the only possible result at Nice 
would be a complex compromise with the prime function of safeguarding national interests, a 
change of the revision procedures also seemed to be necessary. Only altering the mode of reform 
could support the claim that making another effort would be worthwhile. Before the Nice summit 
there may not have been consensus on granting the debate official status, but as the negotiations 
continued without resolution, the call for a deeper and wider debate offered an ever more appealing 
way out of the bind between lofty European ambitions and stark national positions.  
With the benefit of hindsight the situation was summed up neatly in a commentary 
published in Süddeutsche Zeitung on the opening day of the Laeken summit: A year ago, as the 
strongly delayed reform of the European Union failed at Nice, the 15 heads of state and government 
took their escape in the future. Fear not, they called out to the Europeans, for we will begin a 
post-Nice process (14/12/01A). Thus, the recognition that the Nice Treaty did not live up to the 
leaders ambitions and the citizens expectations provided the background for the Nice Declaration, 
and the process initiated in the declaration aimed at correcting the procedural deficiencies of earlier 
treaty revisions. 
 At Nice the emerging consensus on continuing the reform process and organising it 
differently was codified. The Declaration on the Future of the Union sets out the general 
procedural plan and agenda for the new round of reforms. The declaration establishes the overall 
time frame, agenda, and purpose of the ensuing debate, proclaiming that the reform process is to 
culminate in the convening of an IGC in 2004. The leaders were neither willing nor able to give up 
their control of the final decision on the revisions  changing that part of the procedure would 
demand a treaty revision in itself. Since existing rules stipulate that a new treaty can only be 
formally recognised by an IGC, the reference to such a conference is in fact the mark of officiality, 
the guarantee that the process will result in actual reforms.  
The Nice Declaration opens the new round of discussions and presents the novel idea 
that eventual decisions should be preceded by a deeper and wider debate, but it leaves open the 
questions of how the debate about the reforms should be created and conducted. The task of setting 
up appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process (Nice, ll. 17-18) is relegated to the 
Council meeting to be held at Laeken in December 2001.   
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6.2.2. The Laeken Declaration 
The writing of the Laeken Declaration was stipulated directly in the Nice Declaration, wherefore 
agreement on the Laeken text would be a sign that the process initiated at Nice was running its due 
course. The advent of the Laeken summit meant that the time had come to make good the promises 
of Nice. In the time-span between the Nice and Laeken summits the debate took on an interim 
nature: in this period discussions followed the agenda of the debate that was set in the Nice 
Declaration, but were also directed towards the pending institutionalisation of the debate, which the 
Laeken Declaration was to execute. This duality is most apparent in Jospins and Lykketofts 
speeches; here there are both references to the decisions taken at Nice and forecasts of the 
agreements to be reached at Laeken. In the first respect Jospin says: the heads of state and 
government, united last year in Nice, have decided to engage in a profound reflection on the future 
of the enlarged Union. [] It is in this framework that I inscribe my remarks today (Jospin, ll. 12-
14). Lykketoft focuses on the four points that the Nice Declaration puts on the agenda, structuring 
his discussion of institutional reforms around them (Lykketoft, ll. 521-523). In anticipation of the 
decisions to be made at Laeken, both Jospin and Lykketoft declare their support for letting a 
convention prepare proposals for reform before beginning the IGC (Jospin, ll. 328-332, Lykketoft, 
ll. 534-540). Lykketoft sees a convention as a possibility for creating broader popular discussion, 
and Jospin refers to the success of the Convention that prepared the Charter for Fundamental Rights 
as justification for using the method again.   
Jospins and Lykketofts unreserved endorsements of setting up a convention indicate 
that consensus on creating such an institution had been established prior to the Laeken summit. In 
accordance with this consensus, the Council did not consider whether a convention should be set 
up, but turned directly to the issue of which composition and mandate the Convention on the Future 
of Europe should be granted. In the three interim speeches there are no indications as to the 
Conventions composition, but it is clear that the agenda for discussion is conceived more broadly 
than stipulated by the Nice Declaration. Lykketoft is the only speaker who refers directly to the 
agenda decided at Nice, and all three speakers agree that a debate on the goals and purposes of the 
EU should precede the discussion of institutional and procedural reforms.  
The willingness to initiate a broad and fundamental debate proved to be a commonly 
held sentiment, as the press coverage of the Laeken summit clearly indicates. While it was readily 
agreed that the Convention should be given a broad mandate, the coverage of the Laeken summit 
reports prevailing disagreement as to how fundamental the reforms should be and what status the 
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final results of the Convention should be given. Should the EU be totally restructured or should its 
current modes of operation simply be adjusted? Should the Convention have any binding force or 
should it be a merely consultative organ? Also, there was disagreement on the Conventions 
composition up until the last minute.      
It is the general understanding of the press coverage that agreement on the Laeken 
Declaration was partially conditioned by the leaders perception that yet another failure to reach a 
common decision would demand a fatally high price in the form of loss of public credibility and 
support. Such considerations may have led the politicians to accept the composition and leadership 
of the Convention even if they did not consider it to be optimal, but the strategy of leaving some 
issues unresolved was also employed in order to ensure agreement. Thus, the Laeken Declaration 
states that the Conventions final document may comprise either different options, indicating the 
degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved (ll. 207-208). 
While the declaration presents the Conventions recommendations as a starting point for the 
following IGC, the press coverage points out that if the Convention reaches a strong consensus, its 
recommendations will become impossible to ignore. The declarations weak formulation satisfies 
those leaders who do not wish to grant the Convention any formal powers, but leaves open the 
possibility that the Convention may take on its own dynamic, thereby asserting itself and ensuring 
that its proposals will not be negligible.  
The open-endedness that allowed for agreement on the Laeken Declaration also 
reflects upon the agenda-setting function of the text. Through its many open questions and loose 
formulations about the most controversial issues, such as the possibility of creating a European 
constitution, the declaration strikes the general tone of the debate, but does not set any prior 
limitations on the possible outcome. Vague as it may be in pointing the debate onwards, the 
declaration does establish a firm base and general framework for the coming debate. In doing so, 
the text draws upon and sums up the experiences made and insights achieved in the debate so far. 
Thus, the first section of the Laeken Declaration reasserts the constitutive tensions between the 
EUs past achievements and future challenges, between the citizens expectations and the EUs 
current priorities, between the EUs potential for playing a leading role in a globalised world and its 
present capabilities. The debate arises out of these highly charged relationships and is directed to 
alleviating stress and realising potential.     
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6.2.3. Openness and closure in institutionalised kairotic moments  
The reflection and creation of kairos in the declarations is reminiscent of the use of constitutive 
dichotomies as means of constituting the space for further discussion in the speeches. Both 
declarations reflect that the debate in certain respects has reached its fruition, but the decisions 
taken deal with redirection, not closure, and the moments created in the texts are beginnings more 
than they are ends. Both declarations seek to create new possibilities for discussion in replacement 
of the phase that they conclude. The speeches and the declarations in a sense are related to each 
other as action and reaction: the speeches initiate discussions that it is the institutionalised role of 
the declarations to conclude. However, the declarations take recourse to intermediary decisions and 
abstract formulations in order to fulfil situational demands for decision-making without closing the 
discussion. The declarations, then, contribute to substantiating and populating the spaces of 
discussion that were opened by the speeches; they aim at facilitating the debate by establishing its 
agenda and procedures, not at closing it. 
The declarations represent institutionalised decisive moments, but the texts also create 
the possibility for further interventions in the debate. In their orientation towards the future the 
declarations set out guidelines for the continuation of the discussion, but they do so in the vague 
manner that is also the speakers strategy of choice. In this respect, the Nice Declaration seems 
clearer than the Laeken Declaration, but the former also recognises that many issues remain 
unresolved and explicitly piles the burden of resolution upon the latter. The Laeken Declaration 
takes on this task and is quite clear in its institutionalisation of the debate, but in its presentation of 
the issues to be discussed and the terms of discussion it employs the whole range of constitutive 
dichotomies and thereby avoids foreclosing any part of the discussion.  
Both declarations move the reform process onwards and create new openings without 
limiting the possible final results of the debate. The openness is, however, not just a reflection of the 
intent to invite a broad discussion, but also reflects the lack of substantial agreement among the 
decision-makers. The declarations are reflections of the degree of agreement that existed among the 
political leaders of Europe at the time of their creation. They demonstrate that the politicians can 
agree to continue the discussion, but that they have not reached any substantial consensus on the 
eventual outcome. Moreover, the open invitations extended by the declarations indicate that the 
broader debate, whether it is conducted in its general public or its institutionalised form, cannot 
have but an advisory function. The initiatives set up by the declarations do not themselves have the 
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power of closing the discussions; that privilege rests solely with the IGC and is thus bound up with 
the procedures of reform whose inadequacy the new initiatives are meant to soothe.   
 
6.3. What future for which Union?  The chronotopes of the press coverage 
The analysis of the kairoi of the declarations focuses exclusively on the European level of meaning 
formation, and the study of the topoi of the speeches also paid most attention to the modes of 
meaning formation that the speakers have in common. I shall now turn to the analysis of the debate 
in its various national guises as these emerge from the newspapers coverage of the speeches and 
the declarations. The aim of the present section is to establish national chronotopes20   the specific 
time-space relations that constitute the European debate within and between the national contexts 
(Nielsen, 2002, p. 68).  
The term chronotope was originally used by Mikhail Bakhtin as an expression of 
the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in 
literature (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 84). I shall apply the term somewhat more broadly than did Bakhtin: 
the chronotopic relationships I explore are not literary but belong to the realm of mediated public 
debate. Moreover, I use the chronotope as an expression of general tendencies in the mediation of 
the debate in question. This use is partially in line with Bakhtins connection of chronotopes with 
genres, but at the same time shifts the focus from a specific genre to the complex of utterances that 
constitute a debate. The questions that I seek to answer through the concept of the chronotope do 
not deal with concrete time-space relationships in individual utterances, but with the general 
possibilities and limitations that shape the utterances and in turn are shaped by them.  
The general tendencies I now seek to highlight and investigate are at the centre of 
many discourse analytical studies. Discourse analysts have given the tendencies various names, for 
instance discursive regularities (Foucault, 1972), discursive strings (Langer, 2000, pp. 133-
134), or some other term pointing to the commonalities and patterns that construct the field of 
discourse from within. I prefer the concept of the chronotope because of the greater sensibility to 
the debates flexibility and changeability that this concept holds. A debate can be seen as a 
                                                        
20 The continued dominance of national publics, upheld and reinforced by the exclusive national status of the media, by 
language barriers, and by the less tangible factors of political culture, makes it safe to assume that on the level of broad 
public debate the chronotopes are nationally divided. However, it is evident that a European chronotope already exists 
at the level of the European summits and their declarations. Furthermore, the political leaders utterances permeate 
national borders both in the choice of specific speech situations, in the use of common topoi, and in intertextual 
references.  
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relatively stable entity, but it is made up of individual utterances  specific positions in time and 
space  and is therefore constantly articulated anew and altered in the articulation.21  
The debate on the future of Europe constitutes a movement from a certain present 
position to a different future state. Contributions to the debate thus articulate positions of becoming, 
wherefore it is to be expected that the different conceptualisations of the debate are variations of the 
general theme of the chronotope of the threshold (Boutaiba, 2003, p. 33 and 61). Bakhtin 
understands the chronotope of the threshold in its actual physicality (standing in the doorway), but 
also points to its broader meaning of crisis and break (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 248). I have chosen to use 
the general concept of the chronotope and the special variation of the chronotope of the threshold in 
the broader, metaphorical sense. Instead of studying the actual locations in time and place of 
individual utterances, I focus on the possibilities and limitations that emerge in the various contexts 
in which the European debate is conducted. That is, I study the general conceptualisations of the 
debate that are constituted in and through the newspapers coverage, and I seek to answer the 
question of how the possibility for change  the chronotope of the threshold  is enacted and 
appraised in each of the national contexts. Having established each national chronotope, I shall 
investigate whether any possibilities and limitations for debate cut across the national contexts and 
thereby point to the emergence of a general European chronotope.22  
 
6.3.1. France: finally there is a European debate 
The French coverage focuses on the advent of the debate as such and conceptualises this debate at 
the European level. Thus, it is a recurring theme of the coverage that now at long last a discussion 
of European issues is being conducted at the corresponding European level. Fischers speech is 
taken as the starting point: it sets the general agenda and tone of the debate, and the coverage 
repeatedly refers back to this intervention to create the context for the reception of later utterances. 
The debate is consistently viewed as a positive phenomenon; one may, as is stated in reference to 
several of the politicians utterances, oppose the specific proposals, but the initiative is to be 
                                                        
21 Please recall that I regard the present study as being closely related to many of the projects conducted under the 
heading of discourse analysis, but that I consider the rhetorical perspective as an independent alternative to the various 
discourse analytical endeavours (see section 2.2.1.).  
22 Whereas the first round of analysis sought to present the developments of the debate at both national and European 
levels, I now seek to conceptualise each national coverage as a consistent attitude in space and time. This 
conceptualisation is somewhat artificial, as the national chronotopes are deeply involved in the general developments. 
However, I think it is possible to establish overall national perspectives from which the developments are conceived and 
into which they are incorporated. The establishment of the national chronotopes is based on the press coverage that was 
presented in the first round of analysis; for documentation of the general assessments made in the following I refer to 
these presentations.   
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applauded. The general purpose of the debate, defined as the creation of a new constitutional order 
for Europe, is also endorsed fully. The focus of discussion is whether that order is to be federal or 
intergovernmental, and more specifically it is considered how substantial policies and institutional 
structures are to be adapted to each other. In the French newspapers conceptualisation of the debate 
these two constitutive dichotomies are of the utmost importance.  
Throughout the coverage the various speakers proposals are compared and multiple 
reactions to each speech are recorded. But even if the scope of debate is principally European, the 
special positions of France and Germany and the importance of the relationship between these two 
countries are continuously highlighted. When Fischer makes his intervention, calls are heard for 
French responses, and by the time of Blairs speech concern about Frances lack of participation is a 
recurrent theme of the coverage.23  
The coverage of Jospins intervention focuses on the pressure that had been building 
on him personally to present his views, but also mentions that his speech alleviates a more general 
pressure on France to position itself in Europe. Jospins speech is thus perceived as a response to a 
demand emanating from both the French national public and the European policy-makers. This 
perception reveals a general tendency of the coverage, namely that of viewing the debate as 
genuinely European, but assuming that any truly European initiative is led by France, possibly in 
tandem with Germany. Although the schisms of this position are not totally ignored, it is 
presupposed that any European debate is also a French debate. This is true both in the procedural 
sense that France should take a leading role in generating and perpetuating the discussions and in 
the substantial sense that whatever reforms are finally passed should bear a significant French mark. 
The French chronotope positions France at the centre of Europe now and in the 
future.24 It is seen as being up to the French politicians to maintain this leading role through 
interventions into the ongoing European discussion. The terms of debate are constructive, and 
adequate interventions propose answers to the questions of what Europe should do and how it 
should do it. Although the general public may participate in these discussions, the European debate 
is primarily viewed as being a matter for politicians, and it is this level of debate that the coverage 
sees as being most important. The coverage positions the national public as demanding evidence 
that the French politicians are assuming their leading role, rather than seeking dialogue with the  
                                                        
23 Curiously, the fact that President Chirac had presented his views in a speech to the German Bundestag on the 27th of 
June 2000 is either only mentioned in passing or altogether ignored. 
24 These findings fit well with other authors conclusions on the French tendency to conceive of Europe as France writ 
large and as the heir of the French mission civilisatrice; see inter alia Risse (2002), Weiss (2002), and Wæver (2003). 
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politicians about the nations position in Europe. 
   
6.3.2. Denmark: will there ever be an EU-debate? 
Whereas the French coverage does not distinguish sharply between national and European scenes, 
contending that successful participation in the European debate is a prerequisite for national 
acceptance and denying the relevance of national exclusivity, the Danish newspapers insert clear 
lines of demarcation between national and European contexts. The European debate is mainly 
presented as something going on out there, as something Denmark (unfortunately) does not 
participate in actively. The national debate, on the contrary, is seen as a confrontation between 
sceptics and pro-Europeans at the base of which one may still find the question of whether or not 
Denmark should be a part of the EU at all. The difference between the national and supranational 
levels of debate is neatly contained in the terms designating the debate; the national EU-debate is 
about Denmarks relationship with the EU institutions, whereas the European debate is a broader 
and looser discussion about the future of the continent as such.25  
 The interventions of Fischer, Blair, Jospin, and Prodi26 and the reactions they spark 
are primarily reported upon from the outsiders position  they are registered but not discussed 
actively  and the European debate is set apart from the context of national Danish discussions. 
Nevertheless, utterances put forth in the European context may interfere with Danish developments 
as is reported in the case of Fischers speech. This speech is primarily conceived in the context of 
the national debate leading up to the referendum on participation in the EMU. The understanding of 
Fischers speech as initiating a new, important debate is absent from the Danish coverage. The 
reverse relationship, how Danish developments interfere with the European debate, is also noted; 
this is the case with the coverage of Blairs speech, in which the impact of the Danish referendum 
result on Blairs position is pondered. The coverage of Blairs speech is also aware of the 
connection between the national and European levels of debate in the sense that it is discussed 
whether the views advocated are in Denmarks interest or not. By the time of Blairs speech the 
Danish coverage recognises the existence of a European debate, the connection between the 
European and the Danish levels of debate is realised, and the lack of Danish participation in the  
                                                        
25 The distinction between the EU as a political entity and Europe as a larger, geographical unit is not found in the 
French debate; just as the French do not separate the national from the European levels of discussion, so the terms EU-
debate and European debate are used interchangeably.  
26 Aznars speech is not covered by the Danish newspapers. 
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general debate is lamented. Yet the focus of attention remains the national debate and its sorry state. 
 Lykketofts long-awaited intervention is primarily conceived and evaluated in the 
national context. It is seen as an attempt to reach out to the various national positions on the 
European issues and to create common ground. Also, the speech is seen as an attempt to enhance 
the national EU-debate. In this context the speech is evaluated as being successful, and the fact that 
it has not remedied the Danish passivity on the European scene does not affect the positive 
judgements. Lykketofts speech is perceived as creating some of the momentum and enthusiasm 
that is necessary for involving the national public and moving the EU-debate along.  
 The Danish coverage creates a two-tiered chronotope consisting of a broader 
European level at which Danish passivity is understandable if not desirable, and a national level at 
which efforts to engage the broad public in dialogue are called for. Thus, the Danish debate does 
not focus so much on the future of Europe in general as on the Danish attitude towards the EU, and 
membership/non-membership remains a major issue.27 Denmarks position within the EU and 
influence on the European-level debate is understood to be dependent on the attitude emerging from 
the national debate. The guiding question is not what kind of Europe should be created, but what 
kind of EU the Danish people can agree that it wants to participate in and whether such a Union is a 
realistic option. Thus, the relationship between the Danish public and the EU is perceived as being 
indirect; the Danes sentiments exclusively reach the European level through the national 
governments mediation. 
 
                                                        
27 These results correspond well with the conclusions reported in Hansen & Wæver (eds.) (2002). The Danish publics 
passivity on European matters is partly explainable through a consideration of the many Danish referenda on EU issues. 
The referenda give the people a chance to influence the Danish relationship with the EU directly, but have the side 
effect that the people rarely become involved if there is not a vote to be cast. Moreover, the continued existence of 
influential EU-sceptical forces conditions the debate towards consideration of Denmarks relationship with Europe and 
away from unobstructed participation in European affairs. The four Danish exceptions undoubtedly enhance this 
tendency. It should be noted that on one issue  enlargement  Denmark has been very active on the European scene. 
Several features may account for this attitude; the fact that Denmark held the EU-presidency at crucial moments in the 
enlargement process is probably among the most important, and the close relationship between Denmark and Baltic 
states is another frequently mentioned factor.  
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6.3.3. Spain: what debate? 
The Spanish coverage of the debate on the future of Europe has a marked tendency towards 
description of happenings rather than engagement with the events. The newspapers seem only 
slowly to realise the importance of the debate; none of the three first speeches receive much 
attention, and notably Aznars speech is not covered at any length.28 In the coverage of Fischers 
speech it is mentioned that the utterance contributes to reviving the European debate, but this is 
only one of a number of themes. During the coverage of Blairs speech a sense of the context of the 
European debate emerges more clearly. Here, Aznars speech is brought in showing that although 
the intervention did not receive much independent coverage it has not passed totally unnoticed. The 
reference to Aznars and other national leaders speeches in connection with Blairs speech shows 
that there is some awareness that a European debate has begun.  
The coverage of Jospins and Prodis speeches also presents the debate on Europes 
future as an important context for understanding the speeches, but it remains one of several issues to 
which the interventions are related. In the coverage of these two speeches criticism of the Spanish 
politicians for not having formed a coherent European policy emerges. However, the Spanish 
coverage itself continues to point in various directions and to present the European debate as one of 
several contexts in which the speakers interventions should be understood. Thereby, the coverage 
reflects and reinforces the dispersed Spanish engagement with the debate. 
 The Spanish chronotope is one of detached observation of the European developments 
as they unfold. Significantly, there is no national context to take account of and the implied national 
attitude is benevolently indifferent.29 The non-articulated Spanish public opinion that the coverage 
                                                        
28 It may be hypothesised that if Aznar had intervened in the debate later or if he had chosen a more spectacular location 
for his intervention, it might have received more attention, but significantly Aznar did neither. Thereby, the Spanish 
governments choices regarding participation in the debate and the national coverage of the debate seem to reinforce 
each other in conveying the impression of a somewhat detached and indifferent Spain. This position, of course, is quite 
contrary to the message Aznar seeks to convey through his speech. The tension between Aznars words and the general 
impression of Spains position gives rise to the suspicion that pragmatism and fatalism need not be contradictory 
attitudes.     
29 The publics passivity may seem to be at odds with Aznars call for an active Spain, but the active agent of his speech 
is actually the Spanish executive who is endowed with the ability to act for the people without having to consult it first. 
There is a similarity between the Danish and the Spanish chronotopes in that they both see the national governments as 
representing their peoples on the European scene. However, the Danish government has to receive a mandate from its 
constituency before acting; the public is involved in shaping the leaders attitude and actions. By contrast, the Spanish 
president of government endows his people with a purely receptive persona that is reproduced and reinforced by the 
Spanish newspapers coverage of European affairs. In Spain, the public is informed of what the leading politicians think 
and do; the people may appraise the politicians attitudes and actions post facto but does not constrain these in any 
significant way.    
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implicitly conveys is that whatever happens in Europe is probably okay, but there is no need to get 
too excited about it.30  
The Spanish position within Europe is created through comparisons with France, 
Germany and the UK. Here, Spain is seen as being closer to France and Germany than to Britain, 
and closer to France than to Germany.31 However, in later contributions concerns are voiced that no 
combination of the Spanish and the common European interests has been found, indicating that the 
Spanish governments position on Europe is not sufficiently well defined to allow for forceful 
interventions in Europe.  
There are signs that the features of the Spanish chronotope are changing towards the 
end of the period covered. Thus, it is reported that national initiatives and discussion fora are to be 
set up in conjunction with and run parallel to the Convention, and during the EU-presidency, which 
Spain was to hold in the first half of 2002, the country is required to take initiatives on the European 
scene. Thus, a more active stance may be emerging at both the national and the European level.32  
At the end of the time period on which I focus, however, the Spanish chronotope does 
not present the opportunity of instigating change, but instead encourages reporting on events as they 
occur and on changes as they are made. The Spanish coverage, for the most part, is detached from 
the European developments it records, and although Spanish concerns are mentioned from time to 
time, these concerns do not arise from or give rise to any national deliberations about the EU. The 
European debate is observed and described, and individual commentators participate in it, but the 
coverage shows no signs of any general public opinion formation on either the Spanish-European 
relationship or the European developments as such. 
    
                                                        
30 My findings match those of Antonio Menéndez-Alarcón closely; he reports that the Spanish peoples general 
acceptance of the European project has not led to a strong desire for further integration nor to any major reconfiguration 
of the Spanish national identity (Menéndez-Alarcón, 2000).  
31 These relationships have, of course, been altered considerably by recent developments in international relations. 
When Spain joined the UK as the ally of the United States in the war against terrorism, generally, and the campaign in 
Iraq, particularly, this also influenced its position within the European community and in the debate about its future. 
The new Spanish governments decision to change the foreign policy  most notably to withdraw all troops from Iraq  
may alter this position once again. 
32 In fact both the Spanish government and the Spanish people have become more actively involved in European affairs. 
However, events that are external to the debate on the future of Europe have taken these activities in directions that are 
quite different than what one may foresee from the Spanish press coverage of the first phases of the European debate.  
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6.3.4. England: a dangerous debate 
The main constitutive feature of the English chronotope is the national division between pro-
Europeans and Eurosceptics. Holders of the Euro-friendly position wish Britain to participate in the 
European debate and influence developments. Sceptics, on the contrary, fear the creation of a 
European superstate, see this federal construct as the underlying motive for all proposals for change, 
and suggest that if the UK cannot block European developments it should detach itself from them. 
There is a certain development during the course of the coverage: whereas Fischers speech is 
generally perceived as having a negative impact on both Britains relationship with Europe and on 
the national EU-debate, the invitations of discussion are generally welcomed by the time Jospin and 
Prodi make their interventions. However, the notions that interventions by other European leaders 
are uncomfortable to the pro-European British Labour government and play into the hand of the 
Eurosceptic Conservatives and that several issues of the debate present a threat to the British 
interests remain dominant throughout the coverage. 
 The English coverages evaluation of Blairs speech is a reversal of the Danish verdict 
on Lykketoft: Blair is deemed to have performed successfully on the European scene, but to be 
evading the hard task of engaging the national public. Thus, there is a conflict between the British 
governments quest for active participation in Europe and the underdeveloped national debate. 
There is a fear that Britain will be marginalised if it does not participate in the European debate, but 
at the same time there is a prevailing suspicion that the debate will lead to changes that cannot be 
accepted by the British public.33 The coverage places the British government in a dilemma: if it 
does not enter the European debate developments are likely to go against Britains wishes, but if it 
does participate in the debate it is likely to face domestic accusations of betraying national interests 
and selling out on sovereignty.34  
The obvious solution to this dilemma would be to raise national backing for the 
governments position in the European debate or to base the governments position on the publics 
opinion on European matters if such an opinion could be stated strongly. However, either solution is 
                                                        
33 I find it difficult to maintain the English/British distinction in this section. As mentioned earlier, the newspapers I 
have studied are all English, but they do not themselves distinguish the English and the broader British publics. Rather, 
they speak of these as if they were a unified whole. While this tendency to subsume all the British nations under the 
English position may say much of the internal political landscape in Britain I shall not pursue the issue further here. I 
will continue to speak of the English newspapers and the English coverage, but in so far as the presented positions are 
said to be British that is also the term I shall use.   
34 These results are in agreement with those presented by Anderson and Weymouth (1999) who emphasise the press 
role in creating and upholding the precarious position. My findings on the increasing acceptance of the European debate 
and Britains participation in it indicate that the general attitude may be on the move, but the generalisability of these 
findings is seriously hampered by the character of the newspapers that have been studied. 
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dependent on the existence of a constructive public debate that undertakes substantial discussions of 
European matters rather than simply rejecting or endorsing developments. In its later stages the 
coverage seems to be gravitating towards such a change in the mode of national opinion formation, 
but it has not emerged fully at the end of the studied period.  
 In the English chronotope the national and the European contexts remain separated. 
Although concern and reluctance continue to be voiced, the European debate receives more and 
more acceptance throughout the coverage. The lasting impression is that constructive British 
participation at the European level is necessary. Throughout the coverage the relationships between 
British, French, German and other significant actors are pondered with a view to how Britain can 
avoid isolation and place itself most favourably. However, the constructive attitude and active 
positioning of Britain in Europe does not pervade the national context. Here, debate on the EU 
remains a shouting match between those crying superstate and those advocating the view that 
European integration is beneficial and does not endanger the sovereignty of the member states. This 
situation leads to a differentiated perception of the governments stance on EU-matters  offensive 
in Europe, defensive at home. Such a stance reinforces the impression that EU-decisions are being 
passed behind the peoples back, thereby making it even more difficult to change the terms of 
national debate in a more productive direction. So far the position has held together in spite of its 
internal tensions, but it is doubtful whether British politicians can keep participating actively on the 
European scene if the national public remains suspicious and fearful of every European move. 
   
6.3.5. Germany: a genuinely European debate 
The German coverage consistently displays full endorsement of and enthusiasm for the European 
debate. With Fischers intervention a constitutional debate that breaks with unhealthy taboos is said 
to be launched, and the coverage of the unfolding discussion voices the hope that a European 
consensus on the (re-)constitution of the EU will emerge as a result of the process. It is regretted 
that the debate continues to be rather elitist, but the possibility that discussions will lead to the 
emergence of a European consciousness is not ruled out. 
 The German coverage takes support of the reform process for granted and 
concentrates on the content of the various interventions and the different reactions to them. Hence, 
the German coverage pays more attention to a wider range of reactions to the utterances and does so 
more thoroughly than any of the other national reports. There is a strong concern with investigating 
what differences remain between the involved national and European political actors and with 
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pointing to the possible emergence of agreements. Although the coverage includes the reactions of 
representatives of the European institutions  parliament and Commission  and of various national 
governments, German actors are given the most in-depth attention. Throughout the coverage both 
German government and opposition viewpoints are presented; while differences on specific issues 
are spelled out, all the German positions presented share the characteristic of welcoming whichever 
contribution to the debate is now being discussed and offering constructive propositions for the 
continuation of the debate. In presenting the various non-German interventions and reactions the 
coverage recurrently concerns itself with how the others relate to Germany. Whereas reactions to 
Fischers speech are said to be mostly positive, both Blairs and Jospins interventions are seen as 
rejections of German proposals. The persevering differences between the various national positions, 
it is agreed, suggest that an eventual common European vision will have to be a compromise 
between the different national perspectives and that such a compromise has yet to be struck.  
 The German chronotope has no strictly national level; in fact it seems bent on 
dissolving its own nationality.35 No national criticisms of the governments federal ambitions for 
Europe are voiced, and it is never questioned whether Germany should be involved with Europe in 
the first place. However, it is recognised that a German position exists at the supranational level of 
debate, and other countries objections to the German model are taken into account. There is an 
implicit acceptance that neither the process nor the final result of the European debate can be 
exclusively German. The point of European integration, as perceived in the German chronotope, is 
exactly the demise of such exclusively national positions. Even if the German chronotope contains 
the lure of thinking that the German understanding of Europe is the truly European one, the 
prevailing notion is that Germany cannot, after-all, create Europe alone. The basic constitutive 
element of the German chronotope is the hope for a genuinely European dialogue to emerge and for 
Europe to be re-constituted through this dialogue. The participants in such dialogue would ideally 
be all Europes citizens, but it is recognised that active involvement may in reality be restricted to 
political elites.  
With the decision to create the Convention the potential for establishing a 
supranational chronotope of common European debate grows. This decision may, therefore, be seen 
as a decisive step towards the realisation of the German ambitions, but the question remains what 
                                                        
35 The ultimate goal of the reform process, and thereby of the discussion, is conceived as the containment of Germany 
within a European legal structure. The self-conscious German effacement (we do not want a German Europe, but a 
European Germany, as Thomas Mann said) and the recourse to legalism (constitutional patriotism, 
Verfassungspatriotismus, is a decidedly German notion) have also been noted in other studies; see inter alia Risse 
(2002), Weiss (2002), and Wæver (2003).  
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pre-existing transnational commonalities the members of the Convention had to build on. Having 
explored the separate chronotopes that constitute the differing national takes on the European 
debate I shall now investigate whether the coverage as a whole displays similarities that may form 
the basis of a common European conceptualisation of the debate. 
 
6.3.6. Unity in diversity  an emergent European chronotope? 
Most of the national chronotopes recognise two levels of debate, a distinct national level and a 
common European one. The national debates are constructed with varying degrees of exclusivity: in 
the English and Danish cases foreign interventions are typically seen as disturbing intrusions, the 
French and German chronotopes seek a merger of national and European debate, and in Spain the 
connection between the national and the European communicative space is rarely made at all. The 
national and the European discussions are related differently and the national arenas also take on 
various shapes, but the common European domain shares decisive features in each of the national 
mediations of it.  
The common European features of the press coverage are in some respects closely 
connected to the consensus reached among the leading politicians. As politicians agree on the 
agenda and procedure of the European debate, newspapers faithfully report this agreement. In the 
coverage of the speeches there is also a common understanding of what should be discussed and 
how the discussion should be conducted. It is repeatedly stressed that although a given speakers 
viewpoints remain controversial, he has asked the right questions. In some national arenas agreeing 
to the European agenda is troublesome, but nevertheless agreement is reached whereby the common 
debate is at least made possible. 
 The presentation of a common agenda is followed by converging understandings of 
the issues to be discussed, and the coverage also displays a high degree of agreement on the main 
positions in the debate. The fault lines and alliances between the discussants are drawn up 
consistently, thereby continuing the constitution of a genuinely European debate. However, this 
agreement on where and how to disagree actually also contains an indication of the limits of the 
common European stance since the available positions are all nationally bound. The national 
anchorage of any actors perspective on Europe recurs in even the most pro-European utterances as 
when Jospin says he is French and feels European, or when Fischer positions himself as a staunch 
European and a German parliamentarian. The press coverage reproduces and enhances the national 
ties, and consistently presents them as the main cause for the debating parties diverging opinions.  
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The continued national grounding of the discussants positions is taken to its extreme 
in the newspapers common conception of the summit negotiations as processes of bargaining 
rather than of deliberation. The leaders are presented as going to the summits with fixed stances, 
with a set of priorities of which the lower may be altered or given up in return for concessions on 
the higher. As there exists no conception of how decisions may be reached other than through 
bargaining the European debate does not seem to hold much potential for genuinely common 
opinion and will formation. Views and propositions may be exchanged, but when the moment of 
decision arrives, the politicians striking the deals as well as the journalists reporting on the events 
revert to the pattern of give-and-take between previously cemented national positions. The genuine 
transcendence of national views may be advocated in non-binding situations, but European 
decision-making remains a question of balancing primarily national interests.  
There does appear to be a common conception of European debate, but this 
conception consistently gives priority to national positions. The possibility for change, the chance 
of actually forming a common European attitude, is blocked because agency continues to be 
nationally bound. There may be a European debate, but there is no conception of a common 
outcome other than that which emerges from compromises between the national agents; the 
common features of European debate are procedural rather than substantial. The procedural norms 
on which agreements exist are such that the various agents may interact and debate the different 
positions reasonably. However, there is no common conception of how remaining substantial 
differences are to be overcome. Participants are expected to listen and perhaps to adapt, but not to 
change their own prior positions, and there exist no shared means of creating a common European 
agency.  
 
6.3.7. Becoming European, nationally speaking  
By pointing to the limitations of the European chronotope I do not mean to suggest that total 
substantial agreement should be the normative goal of the debate on the future of Europe. However, 
the participants must accept the possibility of learning and changing if the debate is to be truly 
constitutive. Without such recognition the common chronotope provides nationally bound actors 
with chances for presenting their views and being acknowledged on a European scene, but only 
limited possibilities for reaching common decisions and taking collective actions arise. For the time 
being the spatio-temporality that is characteristic of debate at the European level remains the most 
abstractly defined of the chronotopes I have studied; if offers the least specific opportunities for 
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communicative interaction and for collective identification. The spatio-temporal conditions of 
becoming by which the future of Europe is constituted in the debate as it is conducted at the level of 
the EU-institutions can most adequately be described as an open field. At the European level of 
debate there is a wide range of opportunities for interaction and it is not specified how these 
opportunities are to be realised; in this sense the field is a more adequate metaphor for this specific 
spatio-temporality than the Bakhtinian notion of the threshold.  
 In a similar manner the conditions of becoming that are characteristic of the five 
national chronotopes may also be represented more precisely by means of other metaphors than the 
threshold. Thus, the Spanish spatio-temporality is like a weather vane, turning undecidedly with the 
flow of events. That is, in a certain sense the Spanish room for discussion is constantly subject to 
changes imposed by others, but in another and possibly deeper respect it stoutly remains the same. 
The Danish and the English conditions of becoming resemble those of the boxing ring; a rather 
strictly defined space in which each new intervention constitutes yet another round of battle 
between ritually aligned adversaries of equal weight. Finally, the French and the German 
chronotopes may be likened to windows of opportunity; here moments in space and time that do 
provide substantial opportunities for collective movement towards a common future are constituted. 
However, the French and German chronotopes remain unclear as to what actions should be taken 
and how they should be performed, wherefore the narrow and swift passage across a threshold does 
not convey it properly, and the less specific possibilities that are invoked by the window of 
opportunity are more adequate.  
The metaphorical presentations of the chronotopes point to the dominant conceptions 
of the debate on the future of Europe in each of the national contexts, and they highlight the 
similarities between the Danish and the English as well as the French and the German chronotopes. 
These general metaphorical characterisation of the chronotopes may be supplemented with an 
establishment of the modes of meaning formation that are predominant within each chronotope; that 
is, with a categorisation of the chronotopes according to how the EU is typically constituted within 
them. To create an overview of these forms, one may study whether the EUs emergence is 
primarily conceived in spatial or in temporal terms, and one may establish how much stress is put 
on either of the diverging issues of the form and the content of the Union.36 Making this  
                                                        
36 This categorisation of the predominant themes of each of the six chronotopes is deeply indebted to Gilbert Weiss 
study of French and German conceptualisations of Europe (Weiss, 2002). I have embarked from Weiss conclusions 
and merely added the remaining four categories. Like Weiss, I must emphasise that the following are generalisations 
and that all four strategies for conceiving the EU are found in all contexts, only not to equal degrees. 
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categorisation demands drawing more upon the speakers constitution of Europe than on the press 
coverage since the speakers conceptualisations of the time-space and content-form relationships 
are more explicit and elaborate than are those of the newspapers. The establishment of the 
categories leads to a different grouping of the six chronotopes than did the metaphorical 
characterisation of their respective conceptions of the debate (see table 8).  
 
              Time (abstract)             Space (concrete) 
 
Content (concrete) 
 
 
      France 
                                 Spain 
 
         England & Denmark 
 
Form (abstract) 
 
                  Europe 
 
 
           Germany 
Table 8: Dominant ways of constituting the EU  
The two distinctions of space-time and content-form are both instantiations of the 
more general concrete-abstract partition, space and content being the more specific terms and time 
and form belonging to a more abstract level of conceptualisation. When arranging the chronotopes 
according to these categories it becomes apparent that although the French and the German 
understandings of the possibilities of change are quite similar, these meanings are constituted in 
different ways. The German understanding of the future of Europe and the debate about it tends to 
focus on the concrete issue of European spatial unification and the abstract issue of institutional 
(re)form. The French conceptualisation rests upon the abstract idea of a common future and the 
concrete notion of the contents of European co-operation. Contrary to the French and German 
chronotopes the common meaning of the Danish and English chronotopes is also created in similar 
ways; in both national contexts the concrete features of space and content are privileged over time 
and form. Since the Spanish chronotope seems to change its direction for every new event, it is 
extremely hard to locate in a fixed matrix, but when one focuses on the indications of Aznars 
speech it seems fair to place Spain in the same category as France, but tending strongly towards a 
middle position. Finally, the European chronotope  the conceptualisation of the EU at the 
supranational level  is purely abstract with an emphasis on the realisation of the true European 
vision that is relegated to the future and is to be realised by institutional means.  
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6.4. Had we but world enough, and time  the teloi of the debate 
The analysis of the chronotopes of the debate contains the first general pronouncements on the 
debate as such; it establishes regularities and conventions that are unique to each national setting 
and explores similarities and differences across the board. The analysis of the teloi of the debate, to 
which I now turn, seeks to explain the general tendencies by combining the insights of the three 
preceding analytical sections and by bringing in the theoretical reflections on the relationship 
between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion formation in the European setting.  
Telos is normally understood as the end of an action in an instrumental sense or as the 
final goal in a utopian sense (Ono & Sloop, 1992, p. 53). In Ramírez conception of praxis, 
however, telos is the realisation of phronesis in the very performance of the act. In the humanistic 
theory of action the teleological or purposive moment does not lie outside of the act. The telos of an 
act is not a consequence of what is done, but is contained in the performance of the action, and the 
explanation and evaluation of the act must focus on how it is carried out (Ramírez, 1995, p. 120). 
When the act is a rhetorical one, the telos is realised in the speakers adequate (phronetic) 
combination of substantial (proposals and recommendations), formal (topoi), and situational 
(kairoi) elements. In an abstract sense, the rhetorical telos is the creation of meaning as such, but the 
telos always takes the specific form of being the meaningful expression of something. Each 
utterance has a concrete telos that is enacted in the very articulation of it.  
 Understanding telos as the enactment of the particular meaning of an utterance may 
seem to imply an isolated view of the utterance. Indeed, each and every individual expression does 
carry its own telos, but no telos can be separated from the situation in which the utterance is made 
or from the broader context that delimits and enables its articulation. As constitutive elements of the 
utterance, kairoi and topoi point to the existence of intertextual teloi  purposes realised by a group 
of related texts collectively. The debate on the future of Europe is such a collection of texts, united 
in the collective action of reforming the institutional and procedural underpinnings of the EU and 
endowing it with a new foundational treaty.  
Reform, however, is not a telos in itself; instead, it is a way of enhancing the 
legitimacy of the EU. The changes suggested by the various participants in the reform process all 
aim at making the EU more legitimate in one way or another. The argument is that if the advocated 
changes are made, then the EU will become more effective, more accountable, more transparent, 
more democratic, more acceptable  more legitimate. The purpose of the debate, then, can be stated 
as the agreement on reforms that will augment the EUs legitimacy when enacted, but the debate is 
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in itself a legitimatory process. Legitimacy can be understood as a function of common opinions 
and collective identities created through public debate, and the enactment of this constitutive 
relationship is the telos of the debate as such. Throughout the preceding analyses of the selected 
moments and turning points of the debate I have been exploring various dimensions of the 
relationship between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion. I now turn to the task of bringing the 
pieces together in the explanation of how the telos of the debate is enacted. 
 
6.4.1. Legitimating the EU in and through public discussion 
The Nice and Laeken Declarations contain the explicit statements of the telos of the debate  the 
aim is to make reforms that increase legitimacy and to do so legitimately. Moreover, the 
declarations officially create the agendas and procedures of the debate; they designate what will be 
considered relevant and proper contributions as well as how, where, and by whom such 
contributions can be made. Being declaratory performatives the declarations primarily perform the 
task of establishing the legal basis for the ensuing debate. This establishment is in turn reliant on the 
need for debate that was justified in the preceding interventions, and these earlier developments are 
referred to in both declarations. The Nice Declaration keeps such reference to a minimum, merely 
stating that the Nice Treaty has opened the way for enlargement and that it is now time to begin a 
deeper and wider debate. The Laeken Declaration is more elaborate; it reproduces many of the 
constitutive dichotomies of the foregoing utterances, notably the tensions between the EUs past 
accomplishments and its future challenges and between the citizens demands and the EUs 
capacities. Although the declarations do contain some references to the EUs current level of 
legitimacy and the possibility of enhancing it, their primary telos is to justify the debate  not the 
Union  and to inaugurate it by identifying the central participants and the adequate modes of 
discussion. The underlying argument is that if the debate is conducted properly, it will enable 
agreement on reforms that will in turn boost the EUs legitimacy, but this argument can only be 
enacted in the actual debate, not in the declarations that instate it. 
 The speeches also seek to legitimate the process of the debate and to identify its 
proper arenas and procedures, but these functions are secondary to the primary telos of creating a 
harmonious relationship between the audiences identities and the EU. The speeches mean to 
legitimate the EU directly by raising public support for the European project and to promote the 
speakers particular version of that project. In order to realise their purpose the speakers use two 
interwoven strategies; they create a position of collective identity from which their image of the 
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reformed EU may be endorsed, and they establish an image of the EU that is desirable to all those 
who accept the offered identity. That is, the speakers use strategies of legitimation through 
identification and of identification through legitimation. They seek to move existing collective 
identities towards endorsement of the EU, and to adapt the EU to the perceived preferences and 
expectations of these collectivities.  
In performing this dual telos some speakers touch directly upon the relationship 
between legitimacy, identity, and public opinion formation. Blair and Lykketoft do so most 
explicitly in their common endorsement of the no demos thesis. They argue that the EU should 
remain intergovernmentally organised because the lack of a European people and of European-level 
public discussions entails that the EU can only be legitimated indirectly through the national 
governments mediation between the European level and the national publics. Fischer also 
recognises the dispersed state of the European debate and the exclusiveness of national publics, but 
he feels the situation can be remedied and suggests setting up European institutions that both 
represent the citizens as individuals and as members of nationally defined collectivities. Fischer, in 
agreement with Habermas retort to the no demos thesis, alleges that common political institutions 
may found a unity of culturally dispersed peoples.  
The three remaining speakers do not pose an explicit argument about the relationship 
between the three concepts, but even so their utterances are in themselves enactments of the 
relationship. Jospin and Prodi both constitute multilevel identities in which individuals are 
presented as holding national and European affiliations, they advocate institutional changes that are 
adapted to this duality, and, implicitly, their conception of the debate also contains the diverging 
national and the common European levels. The identity Aznar offers to his audience also holds both 
national and European features, but his lacking sense of public participation in the discussions leads 
to a singular staging of the debate at the political level as a dialogue between national leaders with 
common European inclinations. Aznar thinks a European attitude can be expressed in 
intergovernmental institutions and that such expression will ensure the support of the people. The 
Spanish leader is the only one of the six speakers who does not include public participation as a 
legitimating factor in its own right. Nevertheless, he remains faithful to the aim of raising support 
for the EU, but claims that such enhanced support can spring solely from the citizens recognition 
that the leaders actions are beneficial. Aznar conceives of results as being more important than 
participation and, hence, privileges the output dimension of legitimacy.    
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Central to the speeches common telos of creating public endorsement of the 
European project as they present it, is the constitution of positive relationships between national 
identities and the European polity. The speakers all seek to accomplish this task by creating an 
intermediate space  a position that is neither solely national, nor eradicates nationality. 
Furthermore, they all use the same strategies of identification in which the tensions between 
national and European affiliations are presented as productive dynamics, not inhibitory bonds. In 
seeking to resolve the apparent incompatibilities between the national and the European levels the 
speakers rely heavily on constitutive dichotomies. Although the speakers employ the same range of 
strategies to realise the same general goals, the positions that they advocate as the common ground 
on which the reformed EU should be erected are quite distinct from each other and the proposals for 
reform vary accordingly. These differences are in concordance with the variations in the speakers 
constraints. The specific contexts in which the utterances are made, the speakers diverging 
perceptions of the audiences expectations, and their own disparate evaluations of what would be a 
positive development all contribute to marking each utterance off as a unique expression of 
meaning. However, each speech aims at establishing a collective identity position that balances 
national and European concerns, and to suggest institutional and procedural changes reflecting this 
balance. The speeches do not enact the EU reforms as such, but seek to raise public opinion in 
favour of the positions they suggest, thereby generating support for their preferred vision of the 
future Europe.  
 The press coverage of the two declarations and the six speeches represents the link 
between the political level of debate and the broader spheres of public opinion formation. The 
media constitute the main point of contact between the politicians and the citizens, and they are 
necessary for involving the people in the reform process. However, the media are not noiseless 
channels of communication. The institutionalised methods of production, self-perceived functions, 
and rules of access constitute the media not only as facilitators of dialogue, but also as actors who 
participate in deciding what the dialogue should be about, how it should be conducted, and who 
should participate in it. The main telos of the newspaper coverage may be one of public opinion 
formation through mediation, but in performing this act the newspapers cannot avoid serving 
functions of identification and legitimation as well. First, the newspapers, through their choices of 
which events to report, identify the matters that qualify for public discussion. Second, they identify 
the available stances of the debate by choosing which reactions to the events should be recorded. 
Third, the selections of what issues and arguments to pursue and what quotes to print influence how 
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the debate is conducted. And by making these choices, the newspapers constitute and legitimate a 
certain version of the debate, silencing other versions or at least rendering their access to the public 
space extremely difficult.  
The analysis of the chronotopes showed that there are important differences between 
the national medias conceptions of what the debate is about, how it should be conducted, and who 
should participate in it. However, there is also an emergent European-wide acceptance of the need 
for reforms and of the debate as the proper means of reformation. And more specifically, the 
newspapers do present more or less the same image of the European debate as it is conducted at the 
political level. What is significantly different from country to country is how the transnational 
political dialogue is connected to the broader realms of public discussion. Some chronotopes see the 
public debate as being European even when conducted within national boundaries, whereas others 
presume that the national arenas not only delimit the spaces of public discussion but also set out 
peoples horizon of solidarity and engagement.  
The newspapers seek to promote public opinion formation, but they also 
accommodate their coverage to the expectations and demands of their readerships. Therefore, the 
identity positions and entailing visions of what constitutes a legitimate European Union, which the 
newspapers offer to their readers, vary from country to country. However, all the newspapers do 
confirm the national-European and the intergovenmental-federal spectra as the two dimensions 
along which collective identity and political legitimacy should be sought. As studies of the so-called 
agenda setting function of the media have amply shown (Hjarvard, 1995, p. 48), the news does not 
determine what public opinion should be, but contributes greatly to the settlement of what issues 
should be addressed and how one should address them. In this regard, the coverage perceives and 
reproduces a European-wide general scheme of discussion, but the general commonalities are 
enacted differently in each of the national contexts.   
 The three types of contributions to the debate included in this study lay their main 
emphasis on one or another of the three related teloi  legitimation, identification, and public 
opinion formation. However, they all contribute to the overall telos of creating a constitutive 
relationship between these elements, of presenting the EU as a legitimate polity with which citizens 
may identify and in which they can participate. All the contributions also have a common 
conception of how the constitutive relationship should be conceived in the case of the EU; it should 
be a point of mediation between differentiated national interests and common European concerns. It 
is to the evaluation of this overall constitution of meaning that I now turn. The evaluation is 
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conducted on the terms of the debate; the various interventions are seen as contributions to a 
collective action of establishing middle ground, and it is the possibilities for engagement and 
identification offered  not the audiences actual reactions  that are scrutinised. The question to be 
answered here is what potential for further communicative interaction the debate creates. The 
question of whether this potential is realised can only be answered through investigations that attend 
to the audiences reception of the offered positions. The answering of that question, therefore, goes 
beyond the purely textual scope of this study and is left open for investigations conducted in the 
mode of reception analysis. 
 
6.4.2. Evaluation of the constitution of meaning 
The general characteristic of the terms of articulation that delimit and enable every specific 
intervention into the debate is that they are both too open and too closed. Statements about Europes 
future are locked between conceptions of nation-states co-operating intergovernmentally, on the one 
hand, and of a federally organised Europe, on the other, wherefore the creation of the EU as a 
genuinely different third place is effectively disallowed. In this sense there is an uncreative 
foreclosure of the discussion: if the EU is to be more than an international co-operation it must take 
on federal features, and if the nation-states are to be protected the institutional structure of the EU 
must remain intergovernmental. However, the ground between the two predetermined points of 
reference is so vast and so undetermined that it is difficult to say anything about what the EU 
actually is. Thus, the two contradictory tendencies of closure and openness actually feed on each 
other. It is easier to begin a statement on the EU by describing what it is not  it is neither a state 
nor an international organisation  and in choosing this easy solution it becomes increasingly 
difficult to say what the EU is  something different altogether. The sense in which the EU can be 
described positively is a very broad one. It can be presented as a promoter of values and principles 
shared by all the member states (the French solution), as a preserver of each members particular 
identity (the Danish and British versions), as a common legal framework (the German option), or as 
a political scene (the Spanish model).37  
Identifications of and with the EU are restricted by the alternatives that constitute the 
debate, but it seems that without these alternatives neither the debate nor the European project as 
such could have begun. Without the two well-established extremes of national unity and 
                                                        
37 The national conceptions of the EU do, of course, contain elements of all four predominant descriptions. What I spell 
out here are the general tendencies. The degree to which interventions in the various national debates are aware of and 
able to employ each others preferred conceptions indicates how developed the common European debate actually is. 
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international co-operation and their derivative models for European integration, the notion of the 
European project as constituting a third kind of polity could not have emerged at all. The 
constitutive dichotomies provide the creative force by which new meaningful conceptualisations of 
the EU may emerge, but they also set limitations on how this new political entity may be thought. 
Seeing the constitution of Europe as a matter of balancing already existing models and positions 
allows the EU to emerge as an independent polity. In the long run, however, it may present serious 
limitations to the development of that polity  just as it already restricts the range of proposals that 
can be forwarded in the discussion of the future developments. In time the dichotomies may prove 
to be unduly restrictive in their constitution of the EU in relations of opposition. Such binary 
relations are adequate tools for initiating a process of reconsideration, but could restrain the 
possibility of establishing and detailing alternatives once the process has begun  as again may be 
illustrated by the limited range of proposals that emerge within the broadly defined agenda of the 
debate.  
Here, once again, the restraining tension of simultaneous openness and closure is at 
play. The constitutive dichotomies present the participants with very few alternative enactments of 
the broad theme of European constitution, and thus give them few means of moving beyond the 
rough description of the initial scene. The rhetorical strategy of the constitutive dichotomies is a 
very general one, but it does not provide the interlocutors with means of moving beyond it. The 
seemingly open texture of the guiding conceptualisations explains the limited range of possible 
meaning formation; had the debate been more closely defined  in terms of a larger number of more 
specific rhetorical strategies  more possibilities of different articulations might have emerged.   
The dilemma of simultaneous closure and openness is also apparent in the differences 
between the contexts in which the debate is carried out. The politicians messages  declarations as 
well as speeches  are both too broadly and too narrowly contextualised. As addresses to the 
European people they offer rather weak possibilities of identification since they do not endow the 
supposedly common European position with much substance. And as specific contributions to the 
ongoing discussions between the leaders of Europe, with their high presupposition of common 
knowledge and narrow intertextuality, they offer little chance of public participation. The solution 
to this dilemma that most of the speakers choose is to address nationally defined audiences  
whether they be of the speakers own nationality or pertaining to other current or coming member 
states  and seek to inscribe these audiences into the European project. As a consequence of the 
national addresses the understanding of the EU as something common yet different is reinforced. 
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The EU is offered to the national audiences as a project they should support and participate in both 
because it has the same values and goals as they do, and because it is not identical with the existing 
statal formations.         
The ambivalent condition of being simultaneously our and other that the citizens 
are offered as the defining feature of their relationship with the EU is both a blessing and a curse. 
The European structure, as it is forwarded in the debate, offers the potential of overcoming the 
perceived problems of the states incapacity for dealing with global challenges and of the states 
inability or unwillingness to include individuals whose identities deviate from the national norm. As 
it is presented in the debate, the EU offers better protection and more benefits than the states, and it 
promises to set the individual free of snaring national ties. However, the citizens are also disallowed 
deep identification with the European project, and their active participation in the debate about it is 
severely hampered. As long as the European collective identity is not substantiated in its own right, 
it offers no actual alternative to the national affiliations. And as long as the debate at the European 
level is conducted in either too broad or too narrow contexts, the discussion that citizens may 
readily participate in is limited to the question of how their nation-state should relate to the EUs 
institutions.  
The politicians who participate in European decision-making share an institutionalised 
space of debate and negotiation, and each nationally elected politician has a room for interaction 
with the electorate. As is to be expected in a representative democracy, the citizens are not directly 
present in the European political institutions, nor do they  and this is more surprising and 
problematic for a polity as developed as the EU aspires to be  have a corresponding common 
public sphere of interaction. European will formation is strictly elitist and public opinion formation 
about European matters remains diversified.  
Elitism needs not be detrimental to democratic legitimacy if a strong public sphere 
monitors the elites opinions and actions, and such a public sphere does not have to be unitary. Even 
the most coherent of national public spheres is a network of different media and various specific 
arenas, the question is how tightly interwoven the network is and how conscious the various nodal 
points are of being related. It is a basic insight of the theory of deliberative democracy that if the 
political elite is to derive its legitimacy from a public sphere, the alleged participants in that sphere 
must at least be aware of being part of it. The members of a public need not communicate directly 
or be informed by the same media, but they must be conscious of each other and of the relationships 
between their respective positions.  
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In the case of the EU this demand for awareness is only partially fulfilled: each 
national public sphere recognises its connection with the European level, but not necessarily with 
the other national spheres. Information and opinions are usually exchanged within the national 
arenas or between the national and the European levels. Direct exchanges between national arenas 
are less frequent and usually confined to intergovernmental negotiations. When views emanating 
from other national contexts are made available to a national public they are usually presented as 
positions with which one may compare the viewpoints forwarded in ones own national context, not 
as invitations to dialogic engagement let alone identification. The network of the European public 
sphere is not very well developed; it evolves around the EU-institutions and is mainly enacted in the 
already established national fora for public debate.  
The different national spheres are not closely connected and at the supranational level 
the communicative network is only slightly interwoven. Transnational spheres of dialogue on 
specialised topics  political standing, professional training, spare-time activities, etc.  have not 
(yet) become so strong that they receive much attention within or are able to attract attention from 
the national dialogues. There are opportunities for European-wide opinion formation, but only in 
narrowly defined political and specialised settings do the communicative networks that constitute 
these opportunities become more than loosely coupled, and generally speaking the citizens remain 
detached from all the contexts and situations in which European meaning making unfolds. As long 
as the national discussions do not convey a stronger sense of belonging to the same European 
debate European-wide decisions can hardly claim to be publicly controlled let alone grounded.   
Even though the political leaders have access to institutionalised European settings of 
dialogue, their communicative interaction is also constrained by the general terms of discussion. At 
the political level the problem is that when abstract pronouncements on the national-European and 
intergovernmental-federal relationships are substantiated general agreements are replaced by 
specific differences. When the discussions turn detailed it is revealed that the politicians actually 
mean very different things by their common references to general concepts. Here, the distinction 
between the EUs overall purpose and its institutional instruments is also at work; the leaders 
readily agree on the common goals, but disagree on how to achieve them. When the interlocutors 
seek to conclude the reform process and turn from general invocations to detailed negotiations, 
particular differences that remain hidden within the general statements emerge and actual closure 
becomes impossible.  
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The difficulty of reaching consensus on the reforms that everyone agrees are 
necessary suggests a difference between deciding a new treaty and realising the purpose of the 
debate. The telos of the debate is not realised in the agreement that eventually results from the 
bargaining process to which the leaders have to resort in the face of their continued substantial 
divergences. Rather, the purpose of the debate is realised in its continuation; only through perpetual 
discussions of what the EU is and what it should be does a common conception of Europe come 
into being. The process of European becoming will be continued for as long as discussions on the 
future of Europe are carried on, and gradually a common understanding of the EU that is both 
denser and more inclusive may emerge. The process is one of perpetual creation, and there is no 
definite constitutive moment, no instance in which the EU comes to be and the debate can be 
brought to an end. As evidenced by the events surrounding the agreement on the two declarations, 
whenever the discussion reaches its institutionally stipulated turning points, its moments of 
decision, the common creation of meaning has to be abandoned and instrumental means of 
bargaining that leave everyone partially satisfied must be taken into use.38 Only in an imagined 
space of infinite communicative interaction does the image of a finally constituted Europe make 
sense, and in order to uphold that vision the European process of constitution through self-reflection 
must be continued.  
 
6.4.3. What is becoming?  The European debate theoretically speaking 
This project in its entirety has been guided by the basic assumption that meanings cannot be 
understood independently of the time and space in which they are articulated, and that, conversely, 
meanings may alter our understanding of the time and space in which they are articulated. The 
presupposition of the mutually constitutive relationship between texts and their contexts has, on the 
one hand, led to the discovery of an abstract European temporality in which the continuation of 
debate leads to the recursive constitution of the EU as an independent polity. On the other hand, a 
number of national contexts that divide the debate into spatially distinct sections have been 
identified. It is now time to apply the analytical findings to the various theoretical conceptions of 
the European constitutional order with the purpose of determining which theory is most appropriate 
for the European polity. It is time to answer Wagner and Frieses (2002) call for a theorisation of 
the EU that is sensitive to the European politys specific being in space and time.  
                                                        
38 The failure to agree on the new Treaty at the meeting of December 2003 can be explained by the leaders 
unwillingness, in that instance, to bargain.  
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Even if transnational spaces for debate and modes of discussion are emerging, the 
telos of the debate on the future of Europe continues to be enacted, and to be enacted differently, 
within the various contexts of the debate. Difference is a main constitutive element not only of the 
debate but also of the European polity as such. Any politico-legal conception of the EU that aspires 
to rise above a status of marginal relevance must take into account and account for the multiple 
multiplicity of the Union. The EU must be conceived as a multilevel, multifunctional, 
multirepresentational polity. Even so, the conception must not lose its sense of coherence and 
commonality  no mean feat for a single model, which is exactly why I shall suggest that the 
available theories only approach adequacy in combination. In the following I discuss the strengths 
and weaknesses of the various theoretical positions in relation to the analytical findings. And I 
outline the conceptual combination that I believe holds the greatest potential for explaining the EU 
in its present state and the strongest normative force for directing the European political project 
towards its future.     
The European debate certainly represents and recreates the reality of a multilevel 
polity; the debate occurs in a variety of different contexts, has many layers, and passes through a 
number of filters. The multiplicity of the debate cannot be described simply in terms of concentric 
circles moving from the specific locale in which a particular utterance is delivered to the general 
European context of the debate as such. Although there is a certain tendency towards such a 
movement, the intertextuality of utterances, the interrelations between different contexts and the 
appearance of speakers in situational contexts that are not their own complicate the image of 
neatly ordered circles of increasing generality and thinness. The interdependence of the 
contributions to the debate across the various specific settings, to which each contribution is 
necessarily tied, constitutes the discussion as a rich and complexly interwoven process. The 
European debate can be likened to an unfinished patchwork made up of differently patterned and 
shaped pieces and with considerable holes where pieces do not fit or have not yet been meshed. 
 The process of debating the future of Europe displays affinities with the generally 
accepted theoretical understanding that the EU is a multilevel polity. The understanding of Europe 
emerging from the communicative interaction that is the thread and needle of the European 
patchwork also corresponds to various elements of the different theoretical explanations. In the 
debate, however, features that are not theoretically harmonious are present simultaneously, 
wherefore no single theory is consistent with and explanatory of the Europe that is constituted in the 
debate. Most obviously, neither the no demos thesis nor the theory of constitutional patriotism 
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adequately capture the European development, although both theoretical standpoints have their 
advocates among the participants in the debate. A common European polity cannot emerge on a 
purely legal basis, nor does cultural diversity make it impossible. In this sense Joseph Weilers 
assessment of the European telos as the continued and conscious subjection to the will of the other 
comes closest to the Europe of the debate. At present the EU and the debate about its future does 
not overcome the differences between us and them, but makes it possible for us to recognise 
each other and to collaborate in pursuing common goals. 
 The European telos of achieving and upholding unity in diversity places the EU and 
the debate about it in a precarious position between theories of modernity and explanatory models 
informed by postmodernism. The EU is an enlightenment project in the Habermasian sense of 
relying on and promoting communicative rationality, of being a reasonable community, but it is 
also, as Deirdre Curtin points out, an inherently postmodern project whose potential is only realised 
if it remains other than itself. The Habermasian ideal of creating community on a purely legal basis 
has proven its limitations, but if the European collective identity is substantiated it loses its 
liberating potential. The EU must be kept in a state of productive tension in which its constitutive 
dichotomies are neither dialectically resolved nor deconstructed. Only as a constantly contested 
alternative to existing realities does the European postnational constellation emerge.  
If the EUs constitutive strains were resolved the common European project that 
would then emerge could probably in the long run raise public support to much higher levels than is 
currently feasible. Embarking from a written constitution of a purely federal nature the EU could 
begin a process of nation building in the traditional sense, and it might end up beating the nation-
states in their own popularity contest. But the EU is not meant to be popular; it is meant to be right. 
As a project continuously in its making it can play a crucial civilising role through the constant 
reminder that we are the other. This is how the EU should be constituted, but also what limits its 
constitution. 
 It may be recognised as a democratic weakness that there is no unitary discussion, no 
single European public sphere, and the desire to endow the citizens with a stronger European 
agency, a better ability to participate in European debates, is certainly a laudable one. Nevertheless, 
the benefits of the EU would be lost if potentials for common discussion and enhanced agency were 
to be realised at the expense of the Unions present diversity. If the EU were constituted  in legal 
and communicative terms  as a coherent and uncontested polity it would forfeit its unique 
liberating potential; removing the EUs current limitations would also alter its possibilities.  
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The continued division between the fora of discussion, the perpetual variations in the 
issues discussed, and the different meanings given to the terms of discussion do inhibit the Unions 
development in a certain sense, but it would be much more problematic if the EU were not 
discussed at all. Ultimately, the EU finds its legitimation in its contestation, understood both as the 
challenge the EU poses to our ingrown understandings of political formations and collective 
identities and as the citizens and politicians questioning of the alternatives Europe has to offer. 
The constitution of Europe is a thoroughly reflexive process; it is grounded in its constant 
commentary upon itself, and it is in this dynamic and strained process, not in any state of blissful 
being, that the uniquely European telos is realised. The specific round of debate that has been the 
subject of this study may find its end in the ratification of the EUs constitutional treaty. The 
constitution of Europe, however, is only achieved through continued communicative interaction in 
and among the EUs many distinct publics with their prevailing differences and emerging 
similarities.    
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7.  
Conclusion 
 
 
 text is the result of a complex process; it arises out of a dialogue with the myriad of other 
texts that precedes it, and on its pages a dialogue is conducted between the writer and his or 
her anticipated audience. A text is a physical product, but a peculiarly dynamic and interactive one 
that loses its purpose and meaning if it is not read and commented upon. If the discussion a text 
invites is discontinued, that text suffers the destiny of yesterdays newspaper  fit for nothing but 
wrapping fish. Some texts have an ability to maintain relevance across space and time, to fascinate 
generation after generation of readers and to remain central to discussions about the subjects with 
which they deal. Other texts are fleeting, meant to be read once and immediately replaced by other 
interventions. Two patterns of textual dialogue emerge from these extreme cases: one of circularity 
or recursiveness, the other of linearity or perpetual progression.  
The recursive dialogue, on the one hand, is structured around issues with lasting 
relevance whose main problems and possible solutions are embedded in central texts around which 
other texts evolve, on which they comment, and to which they repeatedly return for inspiration. The 
progressive dialogue, on the other hand, moves from one utterance to the other without looking 
back, stringing each statement together to form a dynamic process the aim of which is less 
important than the movement as such. The recursive dialogue is characterised by spatiality; it is 
conducted in a well-known context and directed towards the examination of issues whose resolution 
may be the professed goal of each utterance, but whose lasting relevance actually ensures the 
continuation of the dialogue. The progressive dialogue is primarily temporal; it develops through 
time by means of a gradual solution of problems that simultaneously spurs new issues to be dealt 
with; each statement is both an answer to earlier utterances and an invitation to further responses.  
The debate on the future of Europe displays both recursive and progressive features. 
In its connection to specific contexts  primarily nationally defined, but with emerging cross-cutting 
and transnational variants  the debate is recursive. In its movement from the emergence and 
recognition of the debate as a special version and independent round of the European reform 
process to the institutionalisation of the debate and the eventual agreement on a constitutional treaty 
the debate is progressive. The most striking feature of the debate, however, is the interdependence 
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between the two modes of dialogue: temporal progression can only be articulated in a recursive 
setting, and the spatial dialogue is only continued and maintained if it is provided with temporal 
impetus. In the following I shall explore this spatio-temporal interdependence further, thereby 
summing up the results of the preceding investigation and pointing out its contribution to the 
understanding of both the political process and the theoretical conceptualisation of debating the 
future of Europe. 
 
7.1. The constitutive process of European debate 
The constitutional debate exists in and as a combination of national and European fora. At the 
European level politicians meet in face-to-face discussions of the reforms and aim at the eventual 
agreement on a refoundation of the institutional and procedural framework of the EU. Genuine 
European debate only exists in an area of restricted participation, in the strong, but narrow public 
sphere of political incumbents. The newspapers mediate between the narrow European level of 
political will formation and decision-making and the broader publics of their nationally defined 
readerships. In the process of mediation, the European issues are adapted to the various expectations 
and concerns that are dominant in the different national contexts. Although the press coverage as a 
whole displays general agreement on the main issues and positions of the debate there are also 
significant differences between each of the national versions of the debate. The weaker and broader 
publics of opinion formation vary from each national setting so that there are differences as to what 
issues receive public attention and how public opinions about these issues are formed.  
The English and Danish contexts are significantly shaped by the presence of strong 
Eurosceptic actors, and the debate in these countries concentrates on the relationship between the 
nation and the EU understood as an institutional co-operation which one may choose to join or opt 
out of. In Germany and France the EU is conceived as a project in which participation is both 
desirable and inevitable  Europe is understood as a community of destiny and the question is how 
this community should be institutionally organised. Thus, the German and the French debates go 
beyond the more restricted discussions of the countries particular relationship with the EU to 
discuss the organisation of the EU as such. The debate in the Spanish context is somewhat 
ambiguous; although the Spanish press presents the common European concerns as well as the 
positions of other nations there is neither an active discussion of the European issues nor a contested 
enactment of the Spanish relationship with Europe.   
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 One of the common features of the debate in all its contexts is the development of a 
concern for constitutional issues that gradually evolves into an expectation that the debate should 
result in the settlement of these issues and that such settlement should take the shape of a 
constitutional text. While the national contexts provide the spatial settings in which the broader 
public debate is enacted, whereby centrifugal dispersion of the debate is maintained, the temporal 
dimension of progressive dialogue generates centripetal forces of European scope. Meeting in their 
narrow political fora the heads of state and government are able to initiate the debate and thus to set 
the centripetal forces in motion. Although the relevance of the debate is generally accepted, a 
common debate does not arise across the various national publics. In all its versions the debate is 
directed towards the same abstractly defined goals, but it remains too differentiated and fragmented 
to enable the emergence of a common European public opinion about how these goals should be 
realised. Thus, the common will to discuss European matters does not lead to a common European 
discussion, and at the time of decision no substantial public opinion has arisen. Since the 
constitutive processes of public discussion remain nationally dispersed, no common European 
constitutional moment arises. Even though the leaders eventually reached a compromise to which 
they could all agree, one of the main lessons of the process should be that the idea of constituting 
the EU once and for all is not consistent with the purpose of the European political project. The EU 
may, as Jospin says, be a content before it is a container, but it is also a process before it is a 
product.1  
 
7.2. The rhetorical study of European debate 
The rhetorical study of the debate on the future of Europe shows that any conception of the 
relationship between legitimacy, identity and public opinion that does not highlight their dynamic 
interdependence provides an inadequate account of European developments. Furthermore, if one 
supposes that the legitimation of Europe through a public constitutional debate is a once-off process 
the conduction of which will yield a stable and constantly legitimate product, then one is grossly 
mistaken. The EU remains, and should remain, united in diversity, but this tension is only 
productive as long as it is enacted. If the discussion on the relationship between the EUs different 
constitutive elements were to ebb out, the difference would either be replaced by unreflected 
                                                        
1 This distinction is not just a matter of splitting hairs: a process is dynamic whereas a container is static. The EU 
emerges, realises its content in both the senses of discovering and fulfilling, in and through the continuous constitutive 
discussion of what it is and what it should be. The establishment and reform of the EU as a product, the institutional 
container, is the instrumental aim of this generative debate. 
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agreements or harden into uncompromising oppositions. Neither of these opposite alternatives 
would allow the fulfilment of the EUs unique potential as a collective actor with the legitimacy of 
a state, but without the identity of a nation. 
 As regards the theorisation of the legitimacy-identity-public opinion relationship in 
the European context, the rhetorical perspective lends support to the notion that the EU is indeed a 
unique and independent polity, but also highlights the EUs being on the threshold, its perpetual 
state of becoming. The most important theoretical lesson to be drawn from the present study is that 
the EU should not be conceptualised as a static entity; rather, both the Union itself and theories 
about it find their strength in being dynamic and in being able to explain and further the dynamics. 
The recommendations for a European constitution that can be derived from this theoretical 
understanding stipulate that the constitutional text should also be seen as a dynamic entity. The 
constitution should provide a framework for sustained and continuous communicative interaction 
between a plurality of actors in multiple contexts. The European polity should be seen as arising in 
and out of the continuous debate; only if the constitutional text continues to be discussed  if it 
becomes the centre of a recursive dialogue  can it be said to constitute the EU.  
 The constitutional text should be seen as marking a new beginning  a turning point  
not a termination of the discussion. What is distinctive about the ensuing phase in the discussion is 
that the constitution may provide a common European centre of attention. While discussions 
continue to be carried out in the primarily national contexts, they now have a common textual 
reference that could cause the discussions to enter a path of gradual conversion. As Habermas 
argues, the constitution could provide the basis for the establishment of a European public, but only 
if it succeeds in becoming a common point of reference for the various communicative contexts in 
which the opinions of the European public will continue to be articulated. If the constitution obtains 
such pivotal status there would be a common text as well as a common temporality to provide 
centripetal impetus in each of the national debates. That would not mean the end of the centrifugal 
forces that distinguish the contexts from each other; however, it would mean a stronger recognition 
of common concerns as well as points of disagreement and possibly a better understanding of the 
various positions.  
Viewed from the theoretical position that I advocate the constitutional text will not, 
nor should it, espouse a uniform European debate, nor will it lead to the substantiation of a 
collective European identity. Instead, it is predicted and advocated that the mutual awareness across 
contexts will rise and that a better understanding of similarities will also lead to a stronger 
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acceptance of differences. By recognising their shared norms and common concerns Europeans of 
all nationalities may become able to engage each other in communicative interaction, and they may 
do so with genuine respect for each others unique identities rather than with a desire to become 
substantially the same. The national contexts would remain the nodal points of European 
discussions, but their boundaries would become increasingly fluid and their interiors would be criss-
crossed by the articulation of so many diverse interests that the identification and expression of one 
consistent national position would become decreasingly relevant. Thus, the full potential of 
Europes diverse cultural richness as well as its common political values would be released.   
 On a more general theoretical note, I believe this study has shown the worth of the 
constitutionist perspective as an alternative to constructionism. While it is valid to speak of 
constructions when explaining the instrumental use of language to create speaker and audience 
positions, choosing the label constructionism as the defining term for ones approach as such may 
lead to a singular focus on strategic issues. Constitutionism, on the contrary, can be accused of 
having a singular focus on generative aspects. However, the constitutionist recognises that 
constitutive features are enacted by means of constructive strategies. Thus, both instrumental and 
generative elements and the relations between them are included in the constitutionist study. When 
investigating collective processes of meaning formation such as the debate on the future of Europe 
constitutionism is a more adequate starting point than constructionism. The constitutionist 
perspective allows the critic to take the full analytical consequence and release the total explanatory 
potential of such ideas as the recursiveness of social norms and creative acts and the mutual 
interdependence of general expectations and individual actions.  
The interrelationship between the individual and the general, between possibilities and 
limitations, is an important starting point for constructionists and constitutionists alike, but the 
constructionists tend to lose the point amidst discussions of structural power or strategic resistance. 
Constructionists conceive the actor as being either too constrained or too free and fail to see the 
dynamic relationships between limits and possibilities that enable action as such. Constitutionists 
know that both elements are equally important and focus the investigation on how particular 
meanings are articulated in the field of tensions between them.   
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7.3. Outlook 
Just as the European debate is both a recursive and a progressive dialogue so the present 
investigation of it aspires to contribute to discussions carried out in both dialogic modes. I hope to 
have contributed to the recursive theoretical discussion of the role of rhetoric as an academic 
discipline. Thus, I have sought to establish the benefits of uniting rhetoric and the legal and social 
sciences in interdisciplinary endeavours, and more particularly I have aspired to demonstrate the 
relevance of combining rhetorical studies in the interpretive mode with legal and social scientific 
theories of society formation. Rising again to a general level, I have argued that studies of meaning 
formation have a greater explanatory potential if their overall perspective is conceived as 
constitutionist rather than constructionist; I hope my analytical findings have substantiated this 
claim. My theoretical suggestions regarding the constitutionist-constructionist distinction and the 
interdisciplinary relationship between rhetoric and other academic fields are neither exhaustive nor 
conclusive, and I am looking forward to continuing the dialogue on these recursively relevant 
matters. 
As regards the subject matter of the project, the EU and the public debate about its 
future development, I hope to have contributed to the progressive dialogue that is carried on in both 
academic, political, and broader public circles. The study of meaning formation in the particular 
situations of the six speeches and two declarations, in the five national contexts, and at the general 
European level aims at explaining how the EU is being conceived and debated at present. The study 
explores the various defining spatio-temporal features of the debate showing that the main 
constraint  simultaneously enabling and restricting  of European meaning formation lies in the 
concrete spatial variations of the debate combined with the abstract temporal commonality. Thus, 
there is a vague idea of a common European goal, but the common vision is only embodied 
nationally, and the concrete national manifestations are diverse. However, one cannot substantiate 
the European collective idea and identity at the supranational level for both practical reasons  the 
lack of a European public sphere  and because of normative concerns. If the European peoples 
were to become genuinely united, the EU would lose its normative appeal as the only political 
entity that is able to promote unity and diversity simultaneously.  
The investigation of the debate on the future of Europe has pointed out the unique 
potential of the EU and has hopefully laid the ground for continuing the debate in such a mode that 
the potential may be released. I am looking forward to participating both in the political and the 
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academic debates about the future of Europe as these debates progress beyond the current 
discussions of the character of the European constitutional text, but remain as constitutive as ever.  
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Dansk resumé 
 
 
anglen på en fælles europæisk offentlighed er et af de karakteristika, der oftest nævnes som 
begrænsende omstændighed for den europæiske integration. Uden et fælles offentligt rum, 
hvor synspunkter kan udveksles og en offentlig mening samt en bredere fornemmelse af fællesskab 
 af kollektiv europæisk identitet  kan opstå, kan den Europæiske Union (EU) ikke styrke sin 
demokratiske legitimitet, og unionen må derfor fortsætte med at legitimere sig gennem de nationale 
demokratier, lyder argumentet. I de senere år har den europæiske udvikling imidlertid i stigende 
grad bevæget sig fra mellemstatsligt til overstatsligt samarbejde, og i den anledning er en række 
initiativer, der dels søger at sikre det formelle, legale grundlag for et sådant overstatsligt 
samarbejde, dels søger at involvere medlemslandenes befolkninger mere aktivt og direkte, blevet 
iværksat. Disse initiativer kan samles under betegnelsen debatten om Europas fremtid, der i denne 
afhandling står for totaliteten af nationale og overnationale meningsdannelsesprocesser rettet mod 
reformeringen af EUs eksisterende traktatmæssige grundlag. Den igangværende reformproces kan 
siges for alvor at have taget form og retning i løbet af 2000 og at have nået et foreløbigt klimaks 
med stats- og regeringsledernes vedtagelse af en europæisk forfatningstraktat i juni 2004. Processen 
vil finde sin endelige afslutning, når traktaten enten er blevet ratificeret i alle medlemslandene, hvad 
enten denne godkendelse sker glat eller traktaten forkastes i et eller flere lande og må igennem 
yderligere bearbejdning, eller den er blevet forkastet, fordi det har vist sig umuligt at opnå alle 
medlemslandenes tilslutning til den. 
 Denne afhandling fokuserer på debatten om Europas fremtids tidligste stadier fra 
debatten blev lanceret og officielt anerkendt som en ny reformrunde i 2000 til den i december 2001 
blev institutionaliseret med beslutningen om at nedsætte det såkaldte europæiske konvent. 
Afhandlingen analyserer udvalgte tekster, der dels dækker den udvalgte periode, dels repræsenterer 
forskellige nationale og overnationale dimensioner af debatten. Det overnationale aspekt udtrykkes 
primært i to erklæringer udstedt af det europæiske råd, det vil sige alle EUs medlemslandes stats- 
og regeringschefer i enhed; en tale holdt af præsidenten for den europæiske kommission, Romano 
Prodi, udgør en yderligere overnational dimension. Fem nationale kontekster  Danmark, England, 
Frankrig, Spanien og Tyskland  inddrages, og disse kontekster studeres dels gennem taler afholdt 
af ledende politikere, dels gennem den nationale pressedækning af de i alt seks taler og de to 
erklæringer. Undersøgelsen foregår således at taler og erklæringer opfattes som initiativer på hvilke 
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pressedækningen responderer, og det overordnede formål er at udfinde blivende nationale særpræg 
og fremkommende europæiske ligheder.  
 Projektets grundlæggende perspektiv er retorisk: meningsdannelse af en hver slags  
det være sig politisk mening som den, der studeres, og akademisk mening som den, der søges 
produceret  opfattes som en retorisk proces. Det vil sige at meningsdannelse er en kommunikativ 
handling, der både muliggøres og begrænses af den kontekst hvori den indgår. Mening opstår i et 
gensidigt konstituerende samspil mellem den overordnede helhed og den konkrete artikulation, 
mellem de forventninger kommunikationen er underlagt og den kreativitet kommunikatøren lægger 
for dagen. Meningsdannelsen i det udvalgte tekstlige materiale  erklæringer, taler, avisartikler - 
analyseres ud fra denne grundlæggende opfattelse, og der benyttes konkrete retoriske 
analyseredskaber. Afhandlingen har dog også et vigtigt tværfagligt element: 
samfundsvidenskabelige teoridannelser om legitimitet, identitet og offentlig mening informerer 
både forståelsen af den europæiske integrationsproces som sådan og analysen af den aktuelle 
europæiske debat. Spørgsmålet er dels hvordan legitimitet, identitet og offentlig mening benyttes i 
debatten, altså hvordan allerede fastsatte betydninger af begreberne inddrages i den tekstuelle 
meningsdannelse, dels hvordan legitimering, identifikation og offentlig meningsdannelse skabes i 
debatten. Endelig vurderes det hvilke(n) teoretisk forståelse af de tre begreber og deres indbyrdes 
relationer i den europæiske kontekst, der bedst reflekterer og forklarer den sociale virkelighed 
debatten konstituerer. 
 De analytiske hovedpointer er, at debatten om Europas fremtid er kendetegnet ved en 
samlende tidslig kraft og en spredende rumlig dimension. Debatten er karakteriseret ved en rekursiv 
fremdrift, således at meningsdannelsen gennem periodevis gentagelse af visse temaer og retoriske 
strategier bevæger sig i retning af den endelige vedtagelse af den nye grundtraktat. Disse gentagne 
temaer og deres formulering er fælles for både de overnationale ytringer og for tekster, der udgår fra 
de fem nationale kontekster, og jeg betegner dem konstitutive dikotomier. En konstitutiv dikotomi 
er et modsætningsforhold, i den europæiske debats tilfælde kan dette som oftest føres tilbage til en 
kontrast mellem nationalt tilhørsforhold og europæisk integration, hvis spænding søger overført til 
og udløst i skabelsen af det reformerede EU.  
Udover disse fælles temaer, der både inkluderer begrundelser for nødvendigheden af 
reform og debat, fastsættelse af hvad og hvordan der skal reformeres og debatteres, og egentlige 
forslag til reform, er der unikke forhold ved hver ytrings konkrete udsigelsessituation, og der er 
specifikke karakteristika ved hver af de nationale kontekster   både hvad angår det der debatteres 
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og måden der debatteres på. Således er man i den engelske og den danske kontekst konstant optaget 
af at italesætte EU og debatten om Europas fremtid som et konkret rum med et bestemt indhold, 
mens man i Frankrig og Spanien ser det europæiske projekt og reformprocessen som en abstrakt 
tidslig proces med et bestemt indhold. I Tyskland er man primært optaget af unionens institutionelle 
form og ligeledes af debattens formelle rammer, og man indskriver disse i konkrete geografiske og 
fysiske rum. Rent overnationale artikulationer er typisk både abstrakte i deres opfattelse af EU som 
en tidslig proces og i deres fokus på unionens og debattens form. 
Den endelige vurdering af den europæiske meningsdannelse, der konstitueres i og med 
debatten om Europas fremtid, peger på at EU er en konstant tilblivende størrelse. Den Europæiske 
offentlige debat i alle dens forskellige fremtoninger er en genuint konstituerende proces, men den er 
ikke karakteriseret ved et konstitutionelt øjeblik, hvor det europæiske folk kan siges at være gået 
sammen om at etablere det europæiske politiske system en gang for alle. EU finder sin legitimitet 
og den europæiske kollektive identitet fremkommer i den kontinuerlige og vidt forgrenede 
offentlige meningsdannelsesproces. Debattens målsætning, der i øvrigt også er EUs nye motto, er 
enighed i forskellighed, en konstitutiv dikotomi, der kun bevarer sin skabende kraft gennem 
konstant artikulation. 
Afhandlingen bidrager til den empiriske forståelse af en fremkommende europæisk 
offentlighed, der realiseres i løse koblinger mellem situationelt bundne artikulationer. Afhandlingen 
viser at genuin europæisk meningsdannelse endnu kun er en svag afskygning af de meninger, der 
artikuleres på nationalt niveau. Jeg konkluderer at en mere ensartet europæisk meningsdannelse 
ikke er en nødvendig forudsætning for borgernes fremtidige identifikation med og legitimering af 
EU, men at de forskellige kommunikative rum må bindes sammen i et tættere netværk, hvor man 
indenfor hver kontekst er opmærksom på de omgivende meningsdannelsesprocesser, og der i højere 
grad sker en udveksling af informationer og holdninger mellem de forskellige kontekster.  
Teoretisk bidrager afhandlingen til dannelsen af en tværfaglig platform fra hvilken 
meningsdannelse som sådan kan undersøges og forklares. Projektet viser at det retoriske perspektiv 
på meningsdannelse og samfundsvidenskabelige begrebsdannelser med fordel kan kombineres; i det 
konkrete tilfælde danner den retorisk-samfundsvidenskabelige syntese grundlag for udforskningen 
af europæiske meningsdannelsesprocesser. Mere overordnet argumenteres der i og med 
afhandlingen for en konstitutionel tilgang til den sociale virkelighed; det er i sammenhængen 
mellem del og helhed, artikulation og kontekst, det værende og det kommende, at mening bliver til.   
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Fast auf den Tag vor 50 Jahren stellte Robert Schuman seine Vision einer "Europäischen 
Föderation" zur Bewahrung des Friedens vor. Hiermit begann eine völlig neue Ära in der 
europäischen Geschichte. Die europäische Integration war die Antwort auf Jahrhunderte eines 
prekären Gleichgewichts der Mächte auf diesem Kontinent, das immer wieder in verheerende 
Hegemonialkriege umschlug, die in den beiden Weltkriegen zwischen 1914 und 1945 
kulminierten. Der Kern des Europagedankens nach 1945 war und ist deshalb die Absage an 
das Prinzip der balance of power, des europäischen Gleichgewichtssystems und des 
Hegemonialstrebens einzelner Staaten, wie es nach dem Westfälischen Frieden von 1648 
entstanden war, durch eine enge Verflechtung ihrer vitalen Interessen und die Übertragung 
nationalstaatlicher Souveränitätsrechte an supranationale europäische Institutionen. 10 
Ein halbes Jahrhundert später ist Europa, der europäische Einigungsprozess für alle beteiligten 
Staaten und Völker die wohl wichtigste politische Herausforderung, da sein Erfolg oder 
Scheitern oder auch nur die Stagnation dieses Einigungsprozesses für die Zukunft von uns 
allen, vor allem aber für die Zukunft der jungen Generation von überragender Bedeutung sein 
wird. Und eben dieser europäische Einigungsprozess ist gegenwärtig bei vielen Menschen ins 
Gerede gekommen, gilt als eine bürokratische Veranstaltung einer seelen- und gesichtslosen 
Eurokratie in Brüssel und bestenfalls als langweilig, schlimmstenfalls aber als gefährlich. 
Ich möchte mich gerade deshalb für die Gelegenheit bedanken, heute dazu öffentlich einige 
grundsätzlichere und konzeptionelle Überlegungen über die zukünftige Gestalt Europas 
entwickeln zu können. Gestatten Sie mir deshalb auch, für die Dauer dieser Rede, die beim 20 
öffentlichen Nachdenken bisweilen beengende Rolle des deutschen Außenministers und 
Mitglieds der Bundesregierung hinter mir zu lassen, auch wenn ich weiß, dass dies nicht 
wirklich geht. Aber ich möchte heute eben nicht über die operativen Herausforderungen der 
Europapolitik in den nächsten Monaten zu Ihnen sprechen, nicht also über die laufende 
Regierungskonferenz, die Osterweiterung der EU und alle anderen wichtigen Fragen, die wir 
heute und morgen zu lösen haben, sondern vielmehr über die möglichen strategischen 
Perspektiven der europäischen Integration weit über das nächste Jahrzehnt und über die 
Regierungskonferenz hinaus. 
Es geht also, wohlgemerkt, nicht um die Position der Bundesregierung, sondern um einen 
Beitrag zu einer öffentlich längst begonnen Diskussion um die "Finalität", um die "Vollendung" 30 
der europäischen Integration, und dies will ich eben als überzeugter Europäer und deutscher 
Parlamentarier tun. Um so mehr freue ich mich deshalb, dass beim letzten informellen 
Außenministertreffen der EU auf den Azoren, dank der Initiative der portugiesischen 
Präsidentschaft, exakt zu diesem Thema der Finalität der europäischen Integration eine lange, 
ausführliche und überaus produktive Diskussion stattgefunden hat, die sicher Konsequenzen 
zeitigen wird. 
Man kann es gegenwärtig fast mit den Händen greifen, dass zehn Jahre nach dem Ende des 
Kalten Krieges und mitten im Beginn des Zeitalters der Globalisierung die europäischen 
Probleme und Herausforderungen sich zu einem Knoten geschürzt haben, der innerhalb der 
bestehenden Vorgaben nur noch sehr schwer aufzulösen sein wird: Die Einführung der 40 
gemeinsamen Währung, die beginnende Osterweiterung der EU, die Krise der letzten 
EU-Kommission, die geringe Akzeptanz von europäischem Parlament und europäischen 
Wahlen, die Kriege auf dem Balkan und die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und 
Außenpolitik definieren nicht nur das Erreichte, sondern bestimmen auch die zu bewältigenden 
Herausforderungen. 
Quo vadis Europa? fragt uns daher ein weiteres Mal die Geschichte unseres Kontinents. Und 
die Antwort der Europäer kann aus vielerlei Gründen, wenn sie es gut mit sich und ihren 
Kindern meinen, nur lauten: Vorwärts bis zur Vollendung der europäischen Integration. Für 
einen Rückschritt oder auch nur einen Stillstand und ein Verharren beim Erreichten würde 
Europa, würden alle an der EU beteiligten Mitgliedstaaten und auch alle diejenigen, die Mitglied 50 
werden wollen, würden vor allem also unsere Menschen, einen fatal hohen Preis zu entrichten 
haben. Und dies gilt ganz besonders für Deutschland und die Deutschen. 
Was vor uns liegt, wird alles andere als einfach werden und unsere ganze Kraft erfordern, denn 
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wir werden in der nächsten Dekade die Ost- und Südosterweiterung der EU zu wesentlichen 
Teilen zuwege bringen müssen, die letztlich zu einer faktischen Verdoppelung der 
Mitgliederzahl führen wird. Und gleichzeitig, um diese historische Herausforderung bewältigen 
und die neuen Mitgliedstaaten integrieren zu können, ohne dabei die Handlungsfähigkeit der 
EU substantiell infrage zu stellen, müssen wir den letzten Baustein in das Gebäude der 
europäischen Integration einfügen, nämlich die politische Integration. 
Die Notwendigkeit, diese beiden Prozesse parallel zu organisieren, ist die wohl größte 60 
Herausforderung, vor der die Union seit ihrer Gründung jemals gestanden hat. Aber keine 
Generation kann sich ihre historischen Herausforderungen aussuchen, und so ist es auch 
diesmal. Nichts Geringeres als das Ende des Kalten Krieges und der erzwungenen Teilung 
Europas stellt die EU und damit auch uns vor diese Aufgabe, und deshalb bedarf es auch 
heute einer ähnlich visionären Kraft und pragmatischen Durchsetzungsfähigkeit, wie sie Jean 
Monnet und Robert Schuman nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs bewiesen haben. Und 
wie damals, nach dem Ende dieses letzten großen europäischen Krieges, der wie fast immer 
auch ein deutsch-französischer Krieg gewesen war, wird es bei diesem letzen Bauabschnitt der 
Europäischen Union, nämlich ihrer Osterweiterung und der Vollendung der politischen 
Integration, ganz entscheidend auf Frankreich und Deutschland ankommen. 70 
Meine Damen und Herren, 
zwei historische Entscheidungen haben das Schicksal Europas zur Mitte des letzten 
Jahrhunderts grundsätzlich zum Besseren gewendet: Erstens, die Entscheidung der USA, in 
Europa zu bleiben. Und zweitens, das Setzen von Frankreich und Deutschland auf das Prinzip 
der Integration, beginnend mit der wirtschaftlichen Verflechtung. 
Mit der Idee der europäischen Integration und mit ihrer Umsetzung entstand nicht nur eine 
völlig neue Ordnung in Europa, genauer: in Westeuropa, sondern die europäische Geschichte 
kehrte sich in ihrem Verlauf fundamental um. Vergleichen Sie einmal die europäische 
Geschichte der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts mit dessen zweiten fünf Jahrzehnten, und 
Sie werden sofort verstehen, was ich meine. Gerade die deutsche Perspektive ist dabei 80 
besonders lehrreich, denn sie macht klar, was unser Land der Idee der europäischen 
Integration und ihrer Umsetzung tatsächlich zu verdanken hat! 
Dieses fast revolutionär zu nennende neue Prinzip des europäischen Staatensystems ging von 
Frankreich und seinen großen Staatsmännern Robert Schuman und Jean Monnet aus. Seine 
schrittweise Verwirklichung von der Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und 
Stahl bis zur Schaffung des Binnenmarkts und der gemeinsamen Währung beruhte in allen 
Stadien seiner Entwicklung zentral auf der deutsch-französischen Interessenallianz. Diese war 
allerdings niemals exklusiv, sondern für andere europäische Staaten immer offen, und so sollte 
es bis zum Erreichen der Finalität auch bleiben. 
Die europäische Integration hat sich als phänomenal erfolgreich erwiesen. Das Ganze hatte 90 
nur einen entscheidenden Mangel, der durch die Geschichte erzwungen war. Es war nicht das 
ganze Europa, sondern ausschließlich dessen freier Teil im Westen. Die Teilung Europas ging 
fünf Jahrzehnte mitten durch Deutschland und Berlin hindurch, und östlich von Mauer und 
Stacheldraht wartete ein unverzichtbarer Teil Europas, ohne den die europäische 
Integrationsidee niemals vollendet werden konnte, auf seine Chance zur Teilnahme am 
europäischen Einigungsprozess. Diese kam dann mit dem Ende der europäischen und 
deutschen Teilung 1989/90. 
Robert Schuman hat dies bereits 1963 mit äußerster Klarheit gesehen: "Wir müssen das 
geeinte Europa nicht nur im Interesse der freien Völker errichten, sondern auch, um die Völker 
Osteuropas in diese Gemeinschaft aufnehmen zu können, wenn sie, von den Zwängen, unter 100 
denen sie leiden, befreit, um ihren Beitritt und unsere moralische Unterstützung nachsuchen 
werden. Wir schulden ihnen das Vorbild des einigen, brüderlichen Europa. Jeder Schritt, den 
wir auf diesem Wege zurücklegen, wird für sie eine neue Chance darstellen. Sie brauchen 
unsere Hilfe bei der Umstellung, die sie zu bewerkstelligen haben. Unsere Pflicht ist es, bereit 
zu sein." 
Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Sowjetimperiums musste sich die EU nach Osten öffnen, 
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sonst hätte sich die Idee der europäischen Integration selbst ausgehöhlt und letztlich zerstört. 
Warum? Ein Blick nach dem ehemaligen Jugoslawien zeigt uns die Konsequenzen, auch wenn 
sie nicht immer und überall zu ähnlich extremen Entwicklungen geführt hätten. Eine auf 
Westeuropa beschränkte EU hätte es dauerhaft mit einem gespaltenen Staatensystem in 110 
Europa zu tun gehabt: in Westeuropa die Integration, in Osteuropa das alte 
Gleichgewichtssystem mit seiner anhaltend nationalen Orientierung, Koalitionszwängen, 
klassischer Interessenpolitik und der permanenten Gefahr nationalistischer Ideologien und 
Konfrontationen. Ein gespaltenes europäisches Staatensystem ohne überwölbende Ordnung 
würde Europa dauerhaft zu einem Kontinent der Unsicherheit machen, und auf mittlere Sicht 
würden sich diese traditionellen Konfliktlinien von Osteuropa auch wieder in die EU hinein 
übertragen. Gerade Deutschland wäre dabei der große Verlierer. Auch die geopolitischen 
Realitäten ließen nach 1989 keine ernsthafte Alternative zur Osterweiterung der europäischen 
Institutionen zu, und dies gilt erst recht im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. 
Die EU hat als Antwort auf diesen wahrhaft historischen Einschnitt konsequent einen 120 
tiefgreifenden Umgestaltungsprozess eingeleitet: 
- In Maastricht wurde von den drei wesentlichen Souveränitäten des modernen Nationalstaats 
 Währung, innere und äußere Sicherheit  erstmals ein Kernbereich ausschließlich in die 
Verantwortung einer europäischen Institution übertragen. Die Einführung des Euro bedeutete 
nicht nur die Krönung der wirtschaftlichen Integration, sie war zugleich ein zutiefst politischer 
Akt, denn die Währung ist nicht nur eine ökonomische Größe, sondern sie symbolisiert auch 
die Macht des Souveräns, der sie garantiert. Aus der Vergemeinschaftung von Wirtschaft und 
Währung gegenüber den noch fehlenden politischen und demokratischen Strukturen ist ein 
Spannungsfeld entstanden, das in der EU zu inneren Krisen führen kann, wenn wir nicht die 
Defizite im Bereich der politischen Integration produktiv aufheben und so den Prozess der 130 
Integration vollenden. 
- Der Europäische Rat in Tampere markierte den Einstieg in ein neues weitreichendes 
Integrationsprojekt, den Aufbau eines gemeinsamen Raums des Rechts und der inneren 
Sicherheit. Damit rückt das Europa der Bürger in greifbare Nähe. Die Bedeutung dieses neuen 
Integrationsprojekts geht aber noch darüber hinaus: Gemeinsames Recht kann eine große 
integrative Kraft entfalten. 
- Die europäischen Staaten haben, gerade unter dem Eindruck des Kosovokrieges, weitere 
Schritte zur Stärkung ihrer gemeinsamen außenpolitischen Handlungsfähigkeit ergriffen und 
sich in Köln und Helsinki auf ein neues Ziel verständigt: die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen 
Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Die Union hat damit  nach dem Euro  den nächsten 140 
Schritt getan. Denn wie sollte man auf Dauer begründen, dass Staaten, die sich durch die 
Währungsunion unauflösbar und in ihrer ökonomisch-politischen Existenz miteinander 
verbinden, sich nicht auch gemeinsam äußeren Bedrohungen stellen und ihre Sicherheit 
gemeinsam gewährleisten? 
- Ebenfalls in Helsinki wurde ein konkreter Plan für die Erweiterung der EU vereinbart. Nach 
diesen Beschlüssen dürften die äußeren Grenzen der künftigen EU mehr oder weniger 
vorgezeichnet sein. Es ist absehbar, dass die Europäische Union am Ende des 
Erweiterungsprozesses 27, 30 oder noch mehr Mitglieder zählen wird, beinahe so viel wie die 
KSZE bei ihrer Gründung. 
Wir stehen damit in Europa gegenwärtig vor der enorm schwierigen Aufgabe, zwei 150 
Großprojekte parallel zu organisieren: 
1. Die schnellstmögliche Erweiterung. Diese wirft schwierige Anpassungsprobleme für 
Beitrittsländer wie für die EU selbst auf. Sie löst zudem bei unseren Bürgern Sorgen und 
Ängste aus: Geraten ihre Arbeitsplätze in Gefahr? Wird durch die Erweiterung Europa noch 
undurchsichtiger und unverstehbarer für die Bürger? So ernsthaft wir uns mit solchen Fragen 
auseinandersetzen müssen, wir dürfen darüber nie die historische Dimension der 
Osterweiterung aus den Augen verlieren. Denn diese ist eine einmalige Chance, unseren über 
Jahrhunderte kriegsgeschüttelten Kontinent in Frieden, Sicherheit, Demokratie und Wohlstand 
zu vereinen. 
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Die Erweiterung liegt gerade für Deutschland im obersten nationalen Interesse. Die in 160 
Deutschlands Dimension und Mittellage objektiv angelegten Risiken und Versuchungen werden 
durch die Erweiterung bei gleichzeitiger Vertiefung der EU dauerhaft überwunden werden 
können. Hinzu kommt: die Erweiterung  siehe die Süderweiterung der EU  ist ein 
gesamteuropäisches Wachstumsprogramm. Gerade die deutsche Wirtschaft wird von der 
Erweiterung einen hohen Gewinn für Unternehmen und Beschäftigung davontragen. 
Deutschland muss daher weiter Anwalt einer zügigen Osterweiterung bleiben. Zugleich muss 
die Erweiterung sorgfältig und nach Maßgabe des Beschlusses von Helsinki vollzogen werden. 
2. Die Handlungsfähigkeit Europas. Die Institutionen der EU wurden für 6 Mitgliedstaaten 
geschaffen. Sie funktionieren mit Mühe noch zu 15. So wichtig der erste Reformschritt mit 
seiner verstärkten Mehrheitsentscheidung bei der vor uns liegenden Regierungskonferenz 170 
auch für den Beginn der Erweiterung ist, so wird er langfristig für die Erweiterung insgesamt 
allein nicht ausreichen. Die Gefahr besteht dann, dass eine Erweiterung auf 27  30 Mitglieder 
die Absorptionsfähigkeit der EU mit ihren alten Institutionen und Mechanismen überfordern 
wird, und dass es zu schweren Krisen kommen kann. Aber diese Gefahr spricht, wohlgemerkt, 
nicht gegen die schnellstmögliche Erweiterung, sondern vielmehr für eine entschlossene und 
angemessene Reform der Institutionen, damit die Handlungsfähigkeit auch unter den 
Bedingungen der Erweiterung erhalten bleibt. Erosion oder Integration lautet deshalb die 
Konsequenz aus der unabweisbaren Erweiterung der EU. 
Meine Damen und Herren, 
die Bewältigung dieser zwei Aufgaben steht im Zentrum der aktuellen Regierungskonferenz. 180 
Die EU hat sich verpflichtet, bis zum 1.1. 2003 aufnahmefähig zu sein. Nach dem Abschluss 
der Agenda 2000 geht es nun darum, die institutionellen Voraussetzungen für die nächste 
Erweiterungsrunde herzustellen. Die Lösung der drei Kernfragen  Zusammensetzung der 
Kommission, Stimmgewichtung im Rat und ganz besonders der Ausweitung von 
Mehrheitsentscheidungen  ist unverzichtbar für eine reibungslose Fortsetzung des 
Erweiterungsprozesses. Ihr kommt deshalb jetzt als nächster zu lösender praktischer Schritt 
unbedingte Priorität zu. 
So zentral die Regierungskonferenz für die Zukunft der EU als nächster Schritt auch immer ist, 
so müssen wir angesichts der Lage Europas gleichwohl schon heute damit beginnen, uns über 
den Prozess der Erweiterung hinaus Gedanken zu machen, wie eine künftige "große" EU 190 
einmal funktionieren kann, wie sie deshalb aussehen und funktionieren müsste. Und das will 
ich jetzt tun. 
Gestatten Sie mir deshalb, meine Damen und Herren, dass ich jetzt "den Außenminister" 
definitiv weit hinter mir lasse, um einige Überlegungen sowohl über das Wesen der 
sogenannten "Finalität Europas" anzustellen als auch darüber, auf welchem Weg wir uns 
diesem Ziel annähern und es schließlich erreichen können. Und auch allen Euroskeptikern 
diesseits und jenseits des Kanals sei empfohlen, jetzt nicht gleich wieder die dicksten 
Schlagzeilen zu produzieren, denn erstens handelt es sich um eine persönliche Zukunftsvision 
von der Lösung der europäischen Probleme. Und zweitens reden wir hier über einen 
langfristigen Zeitraum, weit jenseits der laufenden Regierungskonferenz. Niemand muss sich 200 
also vor diesen Thesen fürchten. 
Die Erweiterung wird eine grundlegende Reform der europäischen Institutionen unverzichtbar 
machen. Wie stellt man sich eigentlich einen Europäischen Rat mit dreißig Staats- und 
Regierungschefs vor? Dreißig Präsidentschaften? Wie lange werden Ratssitzungen dann 
eigentlich dauern? Tage oder gar Wochen? Wie soll man in dem heutigen Institutionengefüge 
der EU zu Dreißig Interessen ausgleichen, Beschlüsse fassen und dann noch handeln? Wie 
will man verhindern, dass die EU damit endgültig intransparent, die Kompromisse immer 
unfasslicher und merkwürdiger werden, und die Akzeptanz der EU bei den Unionsbürgern 
schließlich weit unter den Gefrierpunkt sinken wird? 
Fragen über Fragen, auf die es allerdings eine ganz einfache Antwort gibt: den Übergang vom 210 
Staatenverbund der Union hin zur vollen Parlamentarisierung in einer Europäischen 
Föderation, die Robert Schuman bereits vor 50 Jahren gefordert hat. Und d.h. nichts 
  Appendix 1: Joschka Fischers speech 
 5
geringeres als ein europäisches Parlament und eine ebensolche Regierung, die tatsächlich die 
gesetzgebende und die exekutive Gewalt innerhalb der Föderation ausüben. Diese Föderation 
wird sich auf einen Verfassungsvertrag zu gründen haben. 
Mir ist wohl bewusst, welche Prozedur- und Substanzprobleme es bis zur Erreichung dieses 
Ziels zu überwinden gilt. Es ist aber für mich völlig klar, dass Europa seine ihm gemäße Rolle 
im wirtschaftlichen und politischen globalen Wettbewerb nur dann wird spielen können, wenn 
wir mutig vorangehen. Mit den Ängsten und Rezepten des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts können 
die Probleme des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht gelöst werden. 220 
Freilich erhebt sich gegen diese einfache Lösung sofort der Vorwurf der nicht vorhandenen 
Machbarkeit. Europa a sei kein neuer Kontinent, sondern voll mit unterschiedlichen Völkern, 
Kulturen, Sprachen und Geschichten. Die Nationalstaaten seien nicht wegzudenkende 
Realitäten, und je mehr die Globalisierung und Europäisierung bürgerferne Superstrukturen 
und anonyme Akteure schaffen, umso mehr werden die Menschen an ihren Sicherheit und 
Geborgenheit vermittelnden Nationalstaaten festhalten. 
Nun, alle diese Einwände teile ich, denn sie sind richtig. Deshalb wäre es ein nicht wieder gut 
zu machender Konstruktionsfehler, wenn man die Vollendung der politischen Integration gegen 
die vorhandenen nationalen Institutionen und Traditionen und nicht unter deren Einbeziehung 
versuchen würde. Ein solches Unternehmen müsste unter den historisch-kulturellen 230 
Bedingungen Europas scheitern. Nur wenn die europäische Integration die Nationalstaaten in 
eine solche Föderation mitnimmt, wenn deren Institutionen nicht entwertet oder gar 
verschwinden werden, wird ein solches Projekt trotz aller gewaltigen Schwierigkeiten machbar 
sein. Anders gesagt: die bisherige Vorstellung eines europäischen Bundesstaates, der als 
neuer Souverän die alten Nationalstaaten und ihre Demokratien ablöst, erweist sich als ein 
synthetisches Konstrukt jenseits der gewachsenen europäischen Realitäten. Die Vollendung 
der europäischen Integration lässt sich erfolgreich nur denken, wenn dies auf der Grundlage 
einer Souveränitätsteilung von Europa und Nationalstaat geschieht. Genau dieses Faktum aber 
steckt hinter dem Begriff der "Subsidiarität", der gegenwärtig allenthalben diskutiert und von 
kaum jemandem verstanden wird. 240 
Was hat man sich nun unter dem Begriff der "Souveränitätsteilung" vorzustellen? Wie gesagt, 
Europa wird nicht in einem leeren politischen Raum entstehen, und ein weiteres Faktum 
unserer europäischen Realität sind deshalb die unterschiedlichen politischen Nationalkulturen 
und deren demokratische Öffentlichkeiten, getrennt zudem noch durch die allfälligen 
Sprachgrenzen. Ein europäisches Parlament muss deswegen immer ein Doppeltes 
repräsentieren: ein Europa der Nationalstaaten und ein Europa der Bürger. Dies wird sich nur 
machen lassen, wenn dieses europäische Parlament die unterschiedlichen nationalen 
politischen Eliten und dann auch die unterschiedlichen nationalen Öffentlichkeiten tatsächlich 
zusammenführt. 
Dies lässt sich meines Erachtens erreichen, wenn dieses europäische Parlament über zwei 250 
Kammern verfügt, wobei eine Kammer durch gewählte Abgeordnete besetzt wird, die zugleich 
Mitglieder der Nationalparlamente sind. So wird es keinen Gegensatz zwischen nationalen 
Parlamenten und europäischem Parlament, zwischen Nationalstaat und Europa geben. Bei der 
zweiten Kammer wird man sich zwischen einem Senatsmodell mit direktgewählten Senatoren 
der Mitgliedsstaaten oder einer Staatenkammer analog unseres Bundesrates zu entscheiden 
haben. In den USA wählen alle Staaten zwei Senatoren, in unserem Bundesrat hingegen gibt 
es eine unterschiedliche Stimmenzahl. 
Ebenso stellen sich für die europäische Exekutive, die europäische Regierung, zwei Optionen. 
Entweder entscheidet man sich für die Fortentwicklung des Europäischen Rats zu einer 
europäischen Regierung, d.h. die europäische Regierung wird aus den nationalen Regierungen 260 
heraus gebildet, oder man geht, ausgehend von der heutigen Kommissionsstruktur, zur 
Direktwahl eines Präsidenten mit weitgehenden exekutiven Befugnissen über. Man kann sich 
hier aber auch verschiedene Zwischenformen dazu denken. 
Nun wird es den Einwand geben, dass Europa ja bereits heute viel zu kompliziert und für die 
Unionsbürger viel zu undurchschaubar geworden sei, und nun wolle man es noch komplizierter 
The Constitution of Meaning 
 6
machen. Aber genau das Gegenteil wird hier intendiert. Die Souveränitätsteilung von 
Föderation und Nationalstaaten setzt einen Verfassungsvertrag voraus, der festlegt, was 
europäisch und was weiterhin national geregelt werden soll. Die Vielzahl von Regelungen auf 
EU-Ebene sind mit das Ergebnis der induktiven Vergemeinschaftung nach der Methode 
Monnet und Ausdruck zwischenstaatlicher Kompromisse im heutigen Staatenverbund EU. Die 270 
klare Zuständigkeitsregelung zwischen Föderation und Nationalstaaten in einem europäischen 
Verfassungsvertrag sollte die Kernsouveränitäten und nur das unbedingt notwendig europäisch 
zu Regelnde der Föderation übertragen, der Rest aber bliebe nationalstaatliche 
Regelungskompetenz. Dies wäre eine schlanke und zugleich handlungsfähige Europäische 
Föderation, voll souverän und doch auf selbstbewussten Nationalstaaten als Glieder dieser 
Föderation beruhend. Zudem wäre dies auch eine Föderation, die von den Bürgern 
durchschaut und verstanden würde, weil sie ihr Demokratiedefizit überwunden hätte. 
Dies alles wird aber nicht die Abschaffung des Nationalstaates bedeuten. Denn auch für das 
finale Föderationssubjekt wird der Nationalstaat mit seinen kulturellen und demokratischen 
Traditionen unersetzlich sein, um eine von den Menschen in vollem Umfang akzeptierte 280 
Bürger- und Staatenunion zu legitimieren. Dies sage ich gerade mit Blick auf unsere Freunde in 
Großbritannien, denn ich weiß, dass der Begriff "Föderation" für viele Briten ein Reizwort ist. 
Aber mir fällt bis heute kein anderer Begriff ein. Es soll hier niemand gereizt werden. 
Auch in der europäischen Finalität werden wir also noch Briten und Deutsche, Franzosen und 
Polen sein. Die Nationalstaaten werden fortexistieren und auf europäischer Ebene eine 
wesentlich stärkere Rolle behalten als dies die Bundesländer in Deutschland tun. Und das 
Prinzip der Subsidiarität wird in einer solchen Föderation künftig Verfassungsrang haben. 
Diese drei Reformen: die Lösung des Demokratieproblems sowie das Erfordernis einer 
grundlegenden Neuordnung der Kompetenzen sowohl horizontal, d.h. zwischen den 
europäischen Institutionen, als auch vertikal, also zwischen Europa, Nationalstaat und 290 
Regionen, wird nur durch eine konstitutionelle Neugründung Europas gelingen können, also 
durch die Realisierung des Projekts einer europäischen Verfassung, deren Kern die 
Verankerung der Grund-, Menschen- und Bürgerrechte, einer gleichgewichtigen 
Gewaltenteilung zwischen den europäischen Institutionen und einer präzisen Abgrenzung 
zwischen der europäischen und der nationalstaatlichen Ebene sein muss. Die Hauptachse 
einer solchen europäischen Verfassung wird dabei das Verhältnis zwischen Föderation und 
Nationalstaat bilden. Damit ich nicht missverstanden werde: Dies hat mit Renationalisierung 
überhaupt nichts zu tun, im Gegenteil. 
Meine Damen und Herren, 
die Frage, die sich nun immer drängender stellt, ist folgende: wird sich diese Vision einer 300 
Föderation nach der bisherigen Methode der Integration realisieren lassen oder muss diese 
Methode selbst, das zentrale Element des bisherigen Einigungsprozesses, in Frage gestellt 
werden? 
Bis in der Vergangenheit dominierte im wesentlichen die "Methode Monnet" mit ihrem 
Vergemeinschaftungsansatz in europäischen Institutionen und Politiken den europäischen 
Einigungsprozess. Diese schrittweise Integration ohne Blaupause für den Endzustand war in 
den 50er Jahren für die wirtschaftliche Integration einer kleinen Ländergruppe konzipiert 
worden. So erfolgreich dieser Ansatz dort war, für die politische Integration und die 
Demokratisierung Europas hat er sich als nur bedingt geeignet erwiesen. Dort, wo ein 
Voranschreiten aller EU-Mitglieder nicht möglich war, gingen deshalb Teilgruppen in 310 
wechselnden Formationen voraus, wie in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion oder bei 
Schengen. 
Liegt also in einer solchen Differenzierung, einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit in Teilbereichen, 
die Antwort auf die doppelte Herausforderung von Erweiterung und Vertiefung? Gerade in einer 
erweiterten und zwangsläufig auch heterogeneren Union wird eine weitere Differenzierung 
unverzichtbar werden. Sie zu erleichtern, ist deshalb auch ein zentrales Ziel der 
Regierungskonferenz. 
Allerdings wird eine immer stärkere Differenzierung auch neue Probleme aufwerfen: einen 
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Verlust von europäischer Identität, an innerer Kohärenz sowie die Gefahr einer inneren Erosion 
der EU, wenn nämlich neben die Klammer der Integration immer größere Bereiche 320 
intergouvernementaler Zusammenarbeit treten sollten. Schon heute ist eine wohl innerhalb 
ihrer eigenen Logik nicht mehr zu lösende Krise der "Methode Monnet" nicht mehr zu 
übersehen. 
Jacques Delors sowie Helmut Schmidt und Valéry Giscard d´Estaing haben deshalb in jüngster 
Zeit versucht, auf dieses Dilemma neue Antworten zu finden. Nach den Vorstellungen von 
Delors soll eine "Föderation der Nationalstaaten", bestehend aus den 6 Gründungsländern der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, einen "Vertrag im Vertrag" schließen, mit dem Ziel einer 
tiefgreifenden Reform der europäischen Institutionen. In eine ähnliche Richtung gehen die 
Überlegungen von Schmidt und Giscard, die allerdings anstatt der 6 Gründungsmitglieder von 
den Euro-11 Staaten als Zentrum ausgehen. Bereits 1994 hatten Karl Lamers und Wolfgang 330 
Schäuble die Schaffung eines "Kerneuropa" vorgeschlagen, das allerdings einen 
entscheidenden Geburtsfehler hatte, nämlich die Vorstellung eines exklusiven "Kerns", der 
noch dazu das Gründungsland Italien ausschloss, anstatt eines für alle offenen 
Integrationsmagneten. 
Wenn angesichts der unabweisbaren Herausforderung der Osterweiterung die Alternative für 
die EU tatsächlich Erosion oder Integration heißt und wenn das Verharren in einem 
Staatenverbund Stillstand mit all seinen negativen Folgen bedeuten würde, dann wird, 
getrieben durch den Druck der Verhältnisse und der von ihnen ausgelösten Krisen, die EU 
innerhalb der nächsten Dekade irgendwann vor der Alternative stehen: Springt eine Mehrheit 
der Mitgliedstaaten in die volle Integration und einigt sich auf einen europäischen 340 
Verfassungsvertrag zur Gründung einer Europäischen Föderation? Oder, wenn dies nicht 
geschieht, wird eine kleinere Gruppe von Mitgliedstaaten als Avantgarde diesen Weg 
vorausgehen, d.h. ein Gravitationszentrum aus einigen Staaten bilden, die aus tiefer 
europäischer Überzeugung heraus bereit und in der Lage sind, mit der politischen Integration 
voranzuschreiten? Die Fragen würden dann nur noch heißen: Wann wird der richtige Zeitpunkt 
sein? Wer wird teilnehmen? Und wird sich dieses Gravitationszentrum innerhalb oder 
außerhalb der Verträge herausbilden? Eines jedenfalls ist dabei sicher: ohne engste 
deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit wird auch künftig kein europäisches Projekt gelingen. 
Angesichts dieser Lage könnte man sich also weit über das nächste Jahrzehnt hinaus die 
weitere Entwicklung Europas in zwei oder drei Stufen vorstellen: 350 
Zunächst dem Ausbau verstärkter Zusammenarbeit zwischen denjenigen Staaten, die enger 
als andere kooperieren wollen, wie dies bereits auch in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion 
und bei Schengen der Fall ist. Auf vielen Gebieten können wir hiermit vorankommen: bei der 
Weiterentwicklung der Euro-11 zu einer wirtschaftspolitischen Union, beim Umweltschutz, der 
Verbrechensbekämpfung, der Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Einwanderungs- und Asylpolitik 
und natürlich auch in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Sehr wichtig dabei ist, dass verstärkte 
Zusammenarbeit nicht als eine Abkehr von der Integration verstanden werden darf. 
Ein möglicher Zwischenschritt hin zur Vollendung der politischen Union könnte dann später die 
Bildung eines Gravitationszentrums sein. Eine solche Staatengruppe würde einen neuen 
europäischen Grundvertrag schließen, den Nukleus einer Verfassung der Föderation. Und auf 360 
der Basis dieses Grundvertrages würde sie sich eigene Institutionen geben, eine Regierung, 
die innerhalb der EU in möglichst vielen Fragen für die Mitglieder der Gruppe mit einer Stimme 
sprechen sollte, ein starkes Parlament, einen direkt gewählten Präsidenten. Ein solches 
Gravitationszentrum müsste die Avantgarde, die Lokomotive für die Vollendung der politischen 
Integration sein und bereits alle Elemente der späteren Föderation umfassen. 
Mir sind nun die institutionellen Probleme im Hinblick auf die jetzige EU durchaus bewusst, die 
ein solches Gravitationszentrum mit sich bringen würde. Deshalb würde es entscheidend 
darauf ankommen, sicherzustellen, dass das in der EU Erreichte nicht gefährdet, diese nicht 
gespalten und das die EU zusammenhaltende Band weder politisch noch rechtlich beschädigt 
werden darf. Es müssten Mechanismen entwickelt werden, die eine Mitarbeit des 370 
Gravitationszentrums in der größeren EU ohne Reibungsverluste erlauben. 
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Die Frage, welche Staaten sich an einem solchen Projekt beteiligen, die EU-Gründungs-, die 
Euro11-Mitglieder oder noch eine andere Gruppe, lässt sich heute unmöglich beantworten. Bei 
jeder Überlegung über die Option Gravitationszentrum muss eines klar sein: diese Avantgarde 
darf niemals exklusiv, sondern muss für alle Mitgliedstaaten und Beitrittskandidaten der EU 
offen sein, wenn diese zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt teilnehmen wollen. Für alle diejenigen, 
die teilnehmen wollen, aber dazu die Bedingungen nicht haben, muss es 
Heranführungsmöglichkeiten geben. Transparenz und eine Mitwirkungsoption für alle 
EU-Mitglieder und kandidaten wären wesentliche Faktoren für die Akzeptanz und 
Realisierbarkeit des Projekts. Und dies muss gerade auch gegenüber den Beitrittsländern 380 
gelten. Denn es wäre historisch absurd und zutiefst töricht, wenn Europa just zu dem Zeitpunkt, 
wo es endlich wieder vereint wird, erneut gespalten würde. 
Ein solcher Gravitationskern muss also ein aktives Erweiterungsinteresse haben und er muss 
Attraktivität für die anderen Mitglieder ausstrahlen. Folgt man dem Grundsatz von Hans 
Dietrich Genscher, dass kein Mitgliedstaat gezwungen werden kann, weiter zu gehen, als er es 
kann oder wünscht, aber dass derjenige, der nicht weitergehen möchte, auch nicht die 
Möglichkeit hat, die anderen daran zu hindern, dann wird sich die Gravitation innerhalb der 
Verträge herausbilden, ansonsten außerhalb. 
Der letzte Schritt wäre dann die Vollendung der Integration in einer Europäischen Föderation. 
Damit wir uns nicht missverstehen: von der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit führt kein 390 
Automatismus dorthin, egal ob als Gravitationszentrum oder gleich als Mehrheit der 
Unionsmitglieder. Die verstärkte Zusammenarbeit wird zunächst vor allem nichts anderes als 
eine verstärkte Intergouvermentalisierung angesichts des Drucks der Fakten und der 
Schwäche der Methode Monnet bedeuten. Der Schritt von der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit hin 
zu einem Verfassungsvertrag  und genau dies wird die Voraussetzung der vollen Integration 
sein  bedarf dagegen eines bewussten politischen Neugründungsaktes Europas. 
Dies, meine Damen und Herren, ist meine persönliche Zukunftsvision: Von der verstärkten 
Zusammenarbeit hin zu einem europäischen Verfassungsvertrag und die Vollendung von 
Robert Schumans großer Idee einer Europäischen Föderation. Dies könnte der Weg sein!
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Señor Director, señoras y señores 
Pensar en serio en el futuro de la Unión Europea y ofrecer criterios y propuestas nítidas constituye un doble ejercicio muy 
estimulante. Doy las gracias al Instituto Francés de Relaciones Internacionales por la oportunidad de hacerlo hoy ante  
ustedes. La última de las voces que se han escuchado al respecto ha sido la del actual Presidente del Consejo Europeo,  
Jacques Chirac, Presidente de la República Francesa. 
Con gusto les adelanto que tienen en mí a un decidido amigo de que las instituciones de la Unión progresen en su  
integración de un modo más rápido y decidido que en sus cuarenta años de existencia. También estoy persuadido de que  
nuestro porvenir compartido ha de mirar más que nunca por las reformas económicas tendentes a la liberalización de  
mercados y a la privatización del sector público; reformas que supongan más competitividad y, por lo tanto, mayores  
oportunidades de prosperidad en un mundo global. 10 
Me considero partidario claro de un profundo proceso de integración y estoy dispuesto a compartir nuevas y mayores 
responsabilidades. 
Creo que es oportuno presentar la orientación de España en este debate, y no es mera coincidencia que yo lo haga en el  
país que ahora mismo ostenta la Presidencia de la Unión y que tanto ha tenido que ver en su nacimiento y desarrollo. 
La ampliación ha sido, sin duda, lo que ha desencadenado estas inquietudes sobre nuestro futuro. La ampliación  
rejuvenece el anhelo de unidad europea, pone a prueba la solidaridad entre los pueblos de una misma civilización y el  
deseo de compartir nuestra prosperidad con ellos. Sin ampliación, Europa estará desprovista de la necesaria dimensión  
continental para actuar en la época de la globalización. Para mí, la ampliación es más una oportunidad que un problema. 
En consecuencia, mi Gobierno pretende que la ampliación se haga realidad lo antes posible. No podría desear otra cosa  
para España, que ha conocido una larga transición económica y una feliz transición política. Esta ampliación, no hay duda,  20 
exige esfuerzos a los Estados miembros y a los candidatos. Nosotros estamos dispuestos. Era justo que la negociación se  
abriese cuanto antes; pero también lo es que no se cierre precipitadamente. Lo importante es que sea un proceso bien  
ordenado. 
En este sentido, el quid de esta quinta ampliación no está en marcar fechas y plazos rápidamente desmentidos por el  
curso de los hechos. Es preferible que todos los participantes respeten las reglas de toda ampliación: los candidatos,  
porque tengan a punto su transformación de sus economías en economías de mercado y sus Estados, en Estados de  
Derecho; y nosotros, preparando las instituciones comunes para acoger a un gran número de candidatos. Es el único  
modo que conozco de no poner en peligro la legitimación social en toda Europa de nuestra Unión. 
Dicho esto, no obstante, creo que el 2003 puede ser el año que dé paso a los vecinos más avanzados, y con esa  
perspectiva creo que debemos todos, Estados miembros actuales y candidatos, hacer los esfuerzos necesarios para estar 30 
en condiciones de dar ese primer paso hacia la reunificación del continente. 
Por ello, resulta imprescindible aclarar cómo ha de funcionar la Unión en sus condiciones actuales cuando se duplique  
el número de sus miembros. 
Pero, al tiempo que la extensión geográfica, la profundización de nuestra unidad, poniendo en común nuestra moneda  
hoy, o de nuestra defensa mañana, exigen que seamos conscientes de la responsabilidad y del compromiso que esto  
implica. 
Como español, les digo que la idea europea no es un trampolín para proyectos estrictamente nacionales, ni un seguro de 
estabilidad para los miembros más débiles, sino una voluntad inveterada de pertenencia. 
Europa es, para mí, una comunidad atravesada por múltiples trayectorias históricas e intereses confrontados. El gobierno  
y la administración de la idea europea representan un proceso simultáneo que consiste en apostar por el futuro,  40 
consolidando el acervo laboriosamente conseguido. 
En concreto, debemos evitar la tentación de recurrir a modelos políticos que no cuentan con la aceptación espontánea y  
pacífica de los ciudadanos de nuestros respectivos países. Es preciso, igualmente, que evitemos el colapso en el  
funcionamiento diario de las instituciones comunes. Yo pienso que es posible articular una respuesta en dos fases ante la  
nueva situación: una, inmediata, en el marco de la Conferencia Intergubernamental, y otra, a más largo plazo, que en mi  
opinión debería culminarse en la segunda mitad de esta década. 
Por lo que respecta al corto plazo, quiero insistir sobre el hecho de que estoy dispuesto a contribuir activamente al éxito  
de Niza y, aunque no quiero entrar en el detalle de las negociaciones de la Conferencia Intergubernamental, no puedo, sin 
embargo, dejar de recordar los principios que conforman la posición española. En ese contexto, me detendré algo más en  
la cuestión en la que algunos cifran todas sus esperanzas para resolver el dilema profundización-ampliación, y a la que  50 
conciben como nexo o enlace entre las reformas a corto y a largo plazo: las cooperaciones reforzadas. 
El objetivo de la Conferencia Intergubernamental de Niza es dotar de una mayor eficacia y de una mayor  
representatividad a las instituciones de la Unión ampliada. Para ello es necesario ahora y lo será más en el futuro contar  
con una Comisión fuerte con capacidad de iniciativa que le permita continuar desempeñando sin trabas su misión  
equilibradora y de guardiana de los Tratados y que continúe siendo el pulmón de la Unión. Creo que se equivocan quienes  
plantean propuestas en orden al debilitamiento de la Comisión. 
Estoy convencido de que la reorganización de la Comisión será fácil y rápida si se acepta el principio de que la renuncia a  
un Comisario sea compensada con una adecuada ponderación de votos en el Consejo. En todo caso, en mi opinión, está  
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fuera de toda lógica política una Comisión en la que no estén presentes los grandes Estados de la Unión. 
El Consejo debe ser capaz de actuar de forma eficaz, y ello es especialmente importante porque, a mi juicio, la fuerza  60 
de la Unión reposa, sobre todo, en su capacidad de tomar decisiones acertadas que faciliten la vida cotidiana de sus  
ciudadanos, y que amplíe sus horizontes culturales, sus oportunidades materiales, etcétera. 
La mayoría cualificada facilita la adopción de esas decisiones y debe, por tanto, ser ampliada. Ahora bien, cualquier  
extensión de la mayoría cualificada exige previamente que las decisiones sean representativas. Ello supone que se  
reequilibre el peso respectivo de cada Estado miembro en el Consejo. Si la Unión continúa ignorando por más tiempo el  
peso real de cada Estado, no sólo renuncia a ser una instancia de gobierno verdaderamente democrática, sino que el  
proceso de adopción de decisiones será difícilmente viable. Es preciso adecuar los equilibrios institucionales a la realidad. 
En ese contexto, España aspira a que le sea reconocido un peso acorde con su importancia demográfica y que  
se restablezcan los equilibrios que se han ido deteriorando con sucesivas ampliaciones. 
A pesar de todo, la mayoría cualificada no permitirá, sin duda, siempre acordar entre veintisiete Estados el ritmo y la  70 
profundidad de la Unión. Para superar estas divergencias y permitir que la Unión avance, incluso cuando no todos sus  
miembros lo deseen o no estén en condiciones de hacerlo en la misma medida, en Amsterdam se pactaron normas que  
rigen actualmente las cooperaciones reforzadas. En una Unión cada vez más vasta y plural conviene contar con  
instrumentos que se atengan a la diferente situación social y económica de algunos Estados y la diferente magnitud del  
esfuerzo necesario para alcanzar objetivos comunes. 
El problema se plantea en la llamada "Europa a la carta", en la que cada Estado elige aquellos ámbitos en los que quiere  
participar y aquellos objetivos que desea compartir. Es aquí donde aparecen los peligros de disgregación y de erosión del  
acervo de la Unión. Por ello, hemos hecho sonar la señal de alarma. Tenemos que garantizar el tronco común y evitar el  
nacimiento de varias Europas. 
Yo propongo que las cooperaciones reforzadas se apliquen a los ámbitos en los que la construcción europea está menos 80 
desarrollada y en los que, de momento, las posiciones de los Estados miembros no permiten avanzar al unísono. Me estoy 
refiriendo a la cooperación en asuntos de Justicia e Interior y a algunos sectores de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad  
Común, ámbitos en los que ya hemos hecho distintas propuestas en el seno de la Conferencia Intergubernamental. 
Ahora bien, también tenemos la obligación de velar por que ni el Mercado Interior ni las políticas comunes queden  
afectadas negativamente. Eso no convendría a la unidad europea. Me congratulo de que esta preocupación fuera hecha  
suya por el Consejo Europeo de Feira, que recordó que las cooperaciones reforzadas debían, en todo caso, respetar las 
necesidades de coherencia y de solidaridad en una Unión ampliada. 
Considero igualmente positivo el criterio que se observa en los últimos documentos de la Presidencia francesa sobre esta  
cuestión en el marco de la CIG. En efecto, se insiste en la necesidad de entender las cooperaciones reforzadas como un  
factor de integración y no de segregación. Es, sin duda, esta filosofía la que inspira la idea expresada por el Presidente  90 
Chirac, quien concibe la cooperación reforzada como un instrumento mediante el cual un grupo de países pioneros  
avanzan en la construcción de una Europa más unida, señalando el camino a otros y animándoles así a emprenderlo a su  
lado. 
Por utilizar términos de la biología, se podría decir que los Estados miembros que lancen una cooperación reforzada serían 
precursores cuya combinación y esfuerzo común desembocaría en una realidad más elaborada y más amplia. En ese  
sentido, España desea ser uno de los precursores de esa nueva vía. 
Pero no podemos convertir a la Unión Europea en un rompecabezas. Es fácil imaginar que, si proliferan y multiplican  
distintos núcleos, los integrantes en cada ocasión también varíen. Es evidente que no puede forzarse a nadie a participar,  
pero tampoco se debe practicar una especie de sutil exclusión. Debe ser el valor añadido obtenido por la participación el  
que incite a los diferentes Estados miembros a integrarse. Este riesgo de fragmentación es el que ha llevado a algunas  100 
voces a desarrollar, en el marco de una reflexión a más largo plazo, la idea de un centro de gravedad que agrupe a  
aquellos Estados miembros con una visión compartida de principio federalista, encarnada en una Constitución que  
definiría las reglas jurídicas fundamentales de esa Federación. 
Esto me lleva a reflexionar sobre la configuración de la Unión Europea a largo plazo. Creo que esta reflexión debe iniciarse  
después de Niza, pero sin fijarnos calendarios estrictos y sin aprioris nominalistas. 
A ese respecto, las dos palabras, federalismo y Constitución, tienen una marcada tendencia a la polisemia, quizás al  
equívoco. Ambas significan, para unos, una mayor transferencia de soberanía, una mayor integración; y, para otros, lo  
contrario, es decir, mayor descentralización y reserva de competencias para los Estados, las regiones, etcétera, ante un  
centralismo con sede en Bruselas. En ambos casos generan tanto adhesiones apasionadas como rechazos radicales. Es  
por ello por lo que dudo de su eficacia para definir el futuro de la Unión Europea. Es preferible entendernos sobre los  110 
contenidos más que manejar venerables palabras sin verificación práctica. 
Es loable delimitar las competencias de los distintos niveles de gobierno y administración, asignando a cada uno las que  
pueden desarrollar más apropiadamente. Yo entro en ese debate con una mentalidad abierta, pero creo que hay dos  
límites que cualquier discurso federal no puede ignorar alegremente: los Estados europeos son muy celosos de su  
identidad nacional e internacional, y las modificaciones en la esfera de competencias de la Unión deben seguir  
supeditadas al acuerdo de todos. 
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Otro tanto ocurre en lo que se refiere a la utilización del término "Constitución". No hay que quedarse en el aspecto  
formal, sino más bien fijarse en su aspecto material. Nada impide que un texto que sea formalmente un Tratado tenga un  
contenido constitucional. Yo creo que ésa es una buena vía por recorrer, donde todavía queda mucho trecho por mejorar  
y donde las ideas de simplificación y de consolidación de los Tratados actuales pueden encontrar su acomodo. 120 
En cuanto al contenido de ese pacto constitucional, quisiera destacar dos aspectos: el primero de ellos, la Carta de  
Derechos Fundamentales. Yo soy partidario de que forme parte de ese Tratado, para lo cual sería preciso alcanzar un  
consenso suficiente sobre un texto que recoja los derechos personales derivados de la dignidad individual de cada ser  
humano, y de dar mayor amplitud a los valores en los que se asienta la integración europea. 
En segundo lugar, está la cuestión de la definición de los ámbitos en los que queremos trabajar juntos. Esto es lo que  
pretenden los que son favorables al establecimiento de un catálogo que delimite las respectivas competencias de la Unión  
Europea, de sus Estados miembros, de sus regiones, etcétera. Esta opción, basada en el principio de la subsidiariedad,  
aspira a que la Unión sólo se ocupe de un número reducido de cuestiones y deje las demás a otras esferas de poder más  
próximas a los ciudadanos. 
La preocupación por la subsidiariedad es genuinamente europea, pero no puede servir de pretexto a un nacionalismo  130 
renovado, con el efecto no querido de una repatriación de competencias de la Unión hacia los Estados miembros y que  
éstos últimos, o sus regiones, las ejerzan sin control en cuanto al pleno respeto a las reglas y a los principios jurídicos de  
la Unión. 
Como español, creo que, más que en la división geométrica de competencias, hay que profundizar en la noción del  
ejercicio compartido de las competencias. No debe fomentarse la creación de compartimentos estancos, sino favorecer la  
puesta en común de esfuerzos a diferentes niveles en pro de un objetivo común. Queremos una subsidiariedad que  
fomente empeños comunes, no que desagregue. 
Será conveniente que la Unión resista a tendencias uniformizadoras. Saber organizar la diferencia: ésta es la clave para  
construir una Europa de alcance continental. 
Por su parte, los Estados miembros deben estar dispuestos a acomodar sus intereses nacionales, ellos mismos resultado  140 
de conjuntar intereses inferiores, al interés común de la Unión. Es cierto que este proceso de acomodo recíproco supone  
renuncias por parte de los Estados miembros; pero esto no debe interpretarse como una pérdida o una cesión sin más,  
sino como la asunción en común de lo que antes se ejercía unilateralmente e incluso, y por qué no reconocerlo, que se  
tienen perdidos o recluidos algunos poderes en la historia europea reciente. 
Esta acomodación recíproca de intereses deberá hacerse en el marco de un entramado institucional que combine el  
fortalecimiento de las instituciones que representan el interés general de la Unión, como la Comisión, el Tribunal de  
Justicia y el Parlamento Europeo, y una mejor cooperación con los Gobiernos y Parlamentos nacionales, con el fin de  
garantizar un equilibrio entre las diferentes instancias en las que se manifiesta la legitimidad democrática en las naciones  
europeas. 
Ahora bien, el debate sobre la nueva arquitectura institucional de la Unión no debe perder de vista que su principal  150 
objetivo es dar una respuesta eficaz a los problemas de los ciudadanos europeos. 
Para responder a las expectativas de sus ciudadanos y conservar así su adhesión, la Unión Europea debe contribuir a  
lograr una Europa reforzada al servicio de quienes la viven, una Europa competitiva y dinámica que preserve su cohesión  
social y una Europa abierta al mundo. 
Para lograr una Europa reforzada al servicio de sus ciudadanos, yo propongo que se haga realidad un Espacio de Libertad, 
Seguridad y Justicia en el que los europeos vean garantizados sus derechos en un marco jurídico común y en el que  
puedan circular libremente. Éste es el objetivo del Consejo extraordinario en la finlandesa ciudad de Tampere. 
De estas libertades cotidianas y civiles no debemos excluir a los nacionales que sean ciudadanos de otros Estados  
distintos y se encuentran legalmente en el territorio de la Unión. Debemos abordar, quizá ya en las próximas citas en  
Biarritz o en Niza, una política común de inmigración, asilo y refugio que pueda contribuir no sólo a resolver situaciones 160 
humanitarias o de necesidad económica, sino también a hacer frente a los evidentes problemas demográficos que  
la población europea va a experimentar en el nuevo siglo. 
Naturalmente, debemos prever que este nuevo espacio común para los ciudadanos europeos facilitará la actividad de  
quienes cometen delitos. Por eso, la cooperación policial y judicial es otro corolario de la Unión que está forjándose  
durante estos últimos años y que debemos potenciar para luchar, en particular, contra el terrorismo, el narcotráfico y  
otras formas de crimen organizado. 
Siempre con el mismo deseo de dar una respuesta a las inquietudes de nuestros países, con la intención de acelerar la  
unidad europea en los primeros años del siglo XXI, hemos ofrecido desde marzo de este año una estrategia de reformas 
económicas y liberalizaciones a escala europea y en el horizonte del año 2010; un programa que estimule la participación  
de nuestros ciudadanos y favorezca su espíritu de iniciativa en la próxima década 170 
En síntesis, la oferta aprobada en Lisboa desea acertar en tres vertientes decisivas para el nivel de vida y de empleo de  
nuestro continente, en dura competencia con otras pujantes regiones económicas del planeta. Francamente, debo  
reconocerles que no sé si hemos entrado en una "Nueva Economía", con reglas de comportamiento diferentes de la  
clásica. Dejemos que el tiempo responda a esta cuestión. El tiempo nos permitirá hacer la distinción entre cuánto hay de  
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realmente nuevo en la presente fase de expansión o cuánto resulte simplemente de la aplicación de principios de buena  
política económica. 
Sabemos que en Europa el desarrollo de las nuevas tecnologías no se ha visto frenado por la falta de excelencia técnica o 
científica, pues de ésta hay sobradas pruebas, sino por la regulación excesiva, el dirigismo y la fragmentación de los  
mercados nacionales. Eso es lo que hemos querido combatir en Lisboa mediante un ambicioso programa de liberalización  
a medio plazo de nuestros mercados, que ahora debemos llevar a la práctica. 180 
En segundo lugar, la cuestión de la modernización y la sostenibilidad del modelo social europeo es inaplazable. Las cotas  
de bienestar y cohesión alcanzadas desde el pacto social fundado tras la Segunda Guerra forman parte de nuestra  
herencia. Esto es cierto, es indiscutible; pero la deuda moral hacia las nuevas generaciones nos empuja a movernos y no  
dilapidar esta herencia. El "statu quo" no es suficiente. En tanto que responsables de administrar esta herencia, nada peor  
que consentir un miedo paralizante ante cualquier cambio que modifique parcialmente el modelo hasta ahora vigente. 
No tendría sentido repetir mecánicamente el proceso de convergencia de Maastricht, ni plantear una mera armonización  
de regímenes. Por el contrario, sí creo que existe un valor añadido fundamental en el trabajo en común. 
Finalmente, llegamos al tercer componente del proceso: la apertura económica. Sería un error pensar que, gracias el  
euro, podemos prescindir del resto del mundo. La realidad ya se encarga de demostrarlo día a día. Cerrarnos y aislarnos  
sería un error y un absurdo desde el punto de vista económico y desde el punto de vista político. 190 
Una Europa dinámica, competitiva y segura de sí misma tiene todo que ganar en un orden comercial multilateral sólido y  
abierto. Seattle debe enseñarnos algunas lecciones: hay que reflexionar sobre lo que no hemos sabido hacer o quizá  
sobre lo que no hemos sido capaces de explicar bien. Pero no debe, en ningún caso, servir de excusa para quienes  
pretenden debilitar el orden multilateral, que constituye, en definitiva, la clave de la prosperidad económica internacional,  
muy en particular en los países menos desarrollados. 
Por lo tanto, yo soy partidario de fortalecer plenamente la cohesión de la zona euro. El euro debe hacer más visible en el  
mundo la dimensión y vitalidad de la economía europea. Europa debe aprovechar este mayor peso en el mundo para  
asumir un papel de liderazgo en la economía internacional y los países del euro deben aparecer como un frente unido en 
los foros económicos internacionales. 
La actual crisis del petróleo nos da la oportunidad de mostrar esa unidad. Hasta ahora, cada Gobierno ha tomado sus  200 
decisiones en función de sus prioridades y esto es comprensible ya que nadie sabe mejor que cada país el orden de sus 
preferencias nacionales; pero hay que reconocer que el conjunto de los países europeos no ha estado a la altura de las 
circunstancias. 
Estamos ante una situación que afecta a nuestro ritmo de crecimiento económico y a un cierto vacío de iniciativa europea  
ante un problema del que están pendientes todos los países del mundo. En este compás de espera, hemos conocido la  
proposición de Estados Unidos de sacar al mercado sus reservas estratégicas y yo creo que en Europa debemos pensar 
seriamente en la posibilidad de tomar una medida semejante. 
En adelante, lo más inteligente y realista es pensar que tendremos que hacer frente a imprevistos en el camino de la  
Unión, imprevistos que no figuraban en el llamémosle "programa oficial". Lo decisivo es tener la voluntad de resolver en  
común las dificultades y hacerlo al máximo nivel, mejor entre los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno y la Presidencia de la  210 
Comisión sin delegar nuestras responsabilidades. Es el método para garantizar la rapidez de respuesta y nos asegura que  
será ejecutada por todas las instancias de gobierno a escala europea. 
Lo menos acertado frente a la actual circunstancia, dominada por el riesgo de un fuerte impacto petrolífero en la  
economía mundial, sería desentenderse de la necesidad evidente de proseguir la vía de la coordinación económica entre  
los miembros de la Unión. El entendimiento en el seno de la Unión es la ayuda más adecuada que podemos aportar a  
nuestro plan de unidad monetaria. El euro representa la más decisiva apuesta por la unidad que Europa ha anunciado a la 
comunidad internacional. Los demás pilares de integración necesitan de una Europa en muy buena forma, competitiva a  
nivel mundial y generadora de prosperidad entre sus respectivas opiniones públicas. 
Señoras y señores, 
En mi opinión, no valen las fórmulas del pasado. Más costes y más rigideces no nos van a permitir conseguir el  220 
crecimiento del empleo. La Europa del empleo requiere una economía más flexible y competitiva, basada, en mi opinión,  
en el equilibrio presupuestario, la liberalización económica y la reforma laboral. 
Ahora mismo, en un momento de dificultad, el pensar y deliberar sólo en términos institucionales supone conformarse  
seguramente, permítanme la expresión, con una cierta "política de salón". Aspiraciones e ideales tan valiosas como la  
unión política y la corresponsabilidad en la defensa del continente; escenarios fabulosos como una multitud de ciudadanos 
atravesando libremente los distintos países del mosaico europeo, hoy tienen su mejor compañero de viaje en trabajar 
constantemente a favor del euro. Créanme cuando les digo que siento una sana ilusión materialista al defender el valor de  
la moneda común. Seamos "activamente proeuro" en esta situación que exige nuestra atención, pero que todavía está  
bien lejos de degenerar en una crisis o en un "shock" petrolífero. La economía europea depende de un factor intangible: la  
voluntad y del sentido del compromiso que deseemos poner en el proyecto monetario. 230 
Es muy ilustrativo recordar que, viviendo en Shangai antes de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Jean Monnet tuviese  
conocimiento de que el primer emperador de la dinastía Qin había unificado China al uniformar pesos y medidas. Ustedes  
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lo saben igual que yo. 
Por nuestra parte, el fortalecimiento de la voz de Europa en el mundo exige también una Europa más activa en la  
proyección y defensa de sus valores en las relaciones internacionales. Debemos reforzar la política exterior y de seguridad  
común para convertirla en herramienta coherente y eficaz, para permitirnos defender mejor en el mundo abierto del  
futuro nuestros valores e intereses frente a los enemigos de la democracia y de la libertad, que se llaman la exclusión  
nacionalista, la tiranía étnica y el terrorismo. 
En esa lucha, Europa debe contar con las organizaciones y aliados que de un lado y otro del Atlántico comparten esos  
intereses y esos valores. De esa manera, aportaremos nuestra contribución a lograr un mundo en paz y más próspero. En  240 
efecto, la lucha contra la pobreza no es eficaz si no va acompañada de la extensión de las libertades, del respeto a los  
derechos humanos y del apoyo a Gobiernos responsables democráticamente ante sus ciudadanos. Quiero decirles que he 
efectuado una propuesta a la Conferencia Intergubernamental para una cooperación reforzada a este respecto. 
Con ello, estoy seguro de que podemos generar la estima y la adhesión de nuestros ciudadanos, y nos corresponde a  
nosotros, los políticos europeos, no defraudar esta nueva predisposición favorable. 
Señor Director, señoras y señores, 
La España del año 2000 es una nación antigua, sin complejos y dispuesta a merecer su lugar en un mundo globalizado.  
Es extremadamente creativa porque la democracia genera la pluralidad y la apertura de un modo natural. Mi país es,  
naturalmente, abierto y plural. La Constitución de 1978 significó la liberación de un potencial desusado que guardábamos  
en nuestro interior; pero qué lejos estaríamos de esta imagen de España sin el acicate de la integración europea durante  250 
estos últimos años, que nos atrae siempre como el primer día del ingreso en la Comunidad. 
España se incorporó con entusiasmo a este proceso que fundara, entre otros, Francia. En realidad, no entrábamos en  
Europa porque de aquí nunca habíamos salido. España es de los pocos países en el continente que ha deseado y  
demostrado durante siglos que era europeo al entrar en contacto con otras civilizaciones. 
Con estas palabras hoy, ante un auditorio de una competencia probada, he pretendido ser fiel a ambas dimensiones: una  
España activa en el corazón de la unidad europea. 
Muchas gracias. 
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A few weeks ago, you celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the 
extraordinary revolution that gave birth to a movement called Solidarity. 
Poland grew to be the icebreaker for the end of communism in all of 
Europe and for the end of the Cold War. 
As we speak, another revolution is taking place. What the people of 
Poland begun, the people of Serbia will finish - opening up for the first 
time in history the prospect of a European continent united in freedom and 
democracy. 
Milosevic has done enough damage, for one man, in one country. 
Three wars. Tens of thousands dead. Millions displaced. Acts of barbarism 10 
not seen in Europe since the Second World War. Their effect felt 
throughout Europe. 
We, and you, part of the NATO Alliance that stood up for our values 
against him in Kosovo last year, know what he is capable of. The sooner he 
is gone, the better for Serbia, the better for the whole of Europe. 
Then we must stand ready, when the will of the people is finally 
done, to hold out the hand of partnership to a democratic Serbia, and 
welcome her into the European family of nations. 
Poland led the wave of revolution in Europe. Since then, Poland has 
been critical to the great transition from communism to democracy, 20 
together with your dynamic Central European partners. I am delighted that 
the Czech and Slovak Prime Ministers, and the Hungarian Foreign Minister 
are also with us today. 
Britain and Poland have marched shoulder-to-shoulder at decisive 
moments in Europes history. Last month in a moving ceremony, we unveiled 
in London a statue of General Sikorski, a fitting monument to a great 
patriot. 
Britain went to war in 1939 because Hitler invaded Poland. Robbed 
of their own homeland, the Polish people gave themselves selflessly in the 
liberation of Western Europe, only to see the iron curtain come down on 30 
Poland. 
Winston Churchill said of the pilots who so valiantly and against 
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such odds defended the last bastion of resistance in Europe against 
Hitlers air armadas that never had so many owed so much to so few. 
And of those few, the Polish pilots are remembered and revered for 
their courage, their skill, their idealism. They laid down their lives not 
in defence of their own country, but in defence of an ideal, in defence of 
a free Europe. 
As the Allied forces struggled to roll back 
fascism, Polish servicemen marched, fought and died for that same ideal, 40 
shoulder-to-shoulder with their British comrades; in the Battle of the 
Atlantic; at Tobruk and Monte Cassino; in Normandy; the unsung heroes of 
the Special Operations Executive and the most spectacular intelligence 
coup of the Second World War, Enigma. 
Few countries have contributed more to the fall of fascism and 
Soviet dictatorship in Europe. Now we want you in the European Union. 
ENLARGEMENT 
The European Union is on the brink of one of the most important 
decisions in its history. Enlargement to the East may be the EUs greatest 
challenge, but I also believe it is its greatest opportunity. 50 
Nobody who considers how the European Union has underpinned peace 
and democracy in the reconstruction of post-war Western Europe can doubt 
the benefits that enlargement will bring post-Cold War Europe and the 
Balkans. 
Nobody who considers the role that open markets have played in 
generating wealth and prosperity in the European Union can doubt the 
benefits of creating a market of half a billion consumers. 
People can always find good reasons for delay. People concerned 
about what these momentous changes will mean for the EU, and for them. 
Farmers worried about the implications for the CAP. Popular but misplaced 60 
fears that freedom of movement means massive shifts of population. 
But let me be frank. Without enlargement, Western Europe will 
always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass 
migration on its borders. Without enlargement, the political consensus 
  Appendix 3: Tony Blairs speech 
 3
 
behind economic and political reform in the weaker transition countries 
may splinter. 
Should that happen, we would all lose. That is why supporting 
enlargement in principle but delaying in practice is no longer good 
enough. 
So I am determined there should be a breakthrough on enlargement 70 
under the Swedish Presidency. I will be urging Europes political leaders 
to commit themselves to a specific framework leading to an early end of 
the negotiations and accession. I want to see new member states 
participating in the European Parliamentary elections in 2004 and having a 
seat at the table at the next IGC. 
My message to you is this: there are no guaranteed places. Reform 
is the only entry ticket. But we want Poland, and as many others as are 
ready, in the EU as soon as possible. 
BRITAIN IN EUROPE 
Britain will always be a staunch ally of all those European 80 
democracies applying to join the European Union. A staunch ally, wielding 
its influence at the centre of Europe. 
It was not always like that. The blunt truth is that British policy 
towards the rest of Europe over half a century has been marked by gross 
misjudgements, mistaking what we wanted to be the case with what was the 
case; hesitation, alienation, incomprehension, with the occasional burst 
of enlightened brilliance which only served to underline the frustration 
of our partners with what was the norm. The origins of this are not 
complex but simple. Post-war Britain saw the issue entirely naturally as 
how France and Germany were kept from going back to war with each other. 90 
Britain's initial role was that of a benign, avuncular friend encouraging 
the two old enemies to work together. Then with gathering speed, and 
commensurate British alarm, Europe started not just to work together but 
to begin the institutional cooperation that is today the European Union. 
At each stage, Britain thought it won't possibly happen and held back. And 
at each stage it did happen and we were faced with the choice: catching up 
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or staying out. 
This was complicated by the fact that for all the other key 
players, there were compelling reasons for being in: reasons of history, 
reasons of proximity, reasons of democracy. For Britain, the victor in 100 
WWII, the main ally of the United States, a proud and independent-minded 
island race (though with much European blood flowing in our veins) the 
reasons were there, but somehow always less than absolutely compelling. 
And for the rest of Europe, the reasons for Britain being in seemed 
less compelling too. Reading over the summer Jean Lacouture's biography of 
de Gaulle, I could see clearly why our French friends hesitated over 
Britain. There is a perception in Britain that it was because de Gaulle 
was anti-British. Nothing could be more misguided. He was an admirer of 
Britain and grateful for our support in WWII. But he had painstakingly 
given France back her dignity and self-esteem. He mistrusted American 110 
intentions and saw Britain as both a Trojan Horse for the United States 
and a brake on the necessary strengthening of Europe. So, even though, 
ironically, he was closer to Britain in his conception of what Europe 
should be than to virtually anyone else, he blocked Britain. There is 
something very poignant about the accounts of his meetings in 1963 with 
Macmillan, a sometimes underestimated British Prime Minister, who saw only 
a little late the danger for Britain in isolation from Europe. 
All this is history, but its effects live on. Now, the 
circumstances of today mean it is time to overcome the legacy of Britains 
past. Two things have changed. From Europe's perspective, Britain as a key 120 
partner in Europe is now a definite plus not a minus. Britain has a 
powerful economy, an obvious role in defence and foreign policy and there 
is genuine respect for Britain's political institutions and stability. 
Also, in a world moving closer together, with new powers emerging, our 
strength with the United States is not just a British asset, it is 
potentially a European one. Britain can be the bridge between the EU and 
the US. 
And for Britain, as Europe grows stronger and enlarges, there would 
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be something truly bizarre and self-denying about standing apart from the 
key strategic alliance on our doorstep. None of this means criticisms of 130 
Europe are all invalid. They aren't, as I shall say later. But to conduct 
the case for reform in a way that leaves Britain marginalised and isolated 
(and that, despite the efforts of John Major, was the reality we inherited 
three years ago), is just plain foolish. 
For Britain, as for those countries queuing up to join the European 
Union, being at the centre of influence in Europe is an indispensable part 
of influence, strength and power in the world. We can choose not to be 
there; but no-one should doubt the consequences of that choice and it is 
wildly unrealistic to pretend those consequences are not serious. In 
particular, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind, that our strength 140 
with the US is enhanced by our strength with the rest of Europe and vice 
versa. 
I have said the political case for Britain being part of the single 
currency is strong. I don't say political or constitutional issues aren't 
important. They are. But to my mind, they aren't an insuperable barrier. 
What does have to be overcome is the economic issue. It is an economic 
union. Joining prematurely simply on political grounds, without the 
economic conditions being right, would be a mistake. Hence our position: 
in principle in favour; in practice, the economic tests must be met. We 
cannot and will not take risks with Britain's economic strength. The 150 
principle is real, the tests are real. 
A word about Denmark. The Danish referendum was an important vote 
for the Danish people, but the rest of us should draw the correct 
conclusions. It will have no impact on the political support for 
enlargement as some fear. Nor will it affect the British Governments 
position on the Euro. Each country must make up its own mind on the Euro, 
in its own way. 
But my point is this: Britain's future is and will be as a leading 
partner in Europe. Today I turn to the issue of Europe's political future. 
A LARGER, STRONGER, DEMOCRATIC EUROPE 160 
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What sort of European Union will Poland join? 
The Polish historian Joachim Lelewel famously asked Polska tak, ale 
jaka? Poland, yes, but what sort of Poland? Today I want to ask: Europe, 
yes, but what sort of Europe? 
The trouble with the debate about Europes political future is that 
if we do not take care, we plunge into the thicket of institutional 
change, without first asking the basic question of what direction Europe 
should take. 
To those who say the need for change in Europes institutions is 
driven by the impression Europe is slowing down, I must say I find that 170 
bizarre. Monetary union is currently the most ambitious economic 
enterprise in the world. We have just begun to fashion a common defence 
policy. And we are now set to reunify Europe and expand it with up to 13 
new members and in the longer term more. We are hardly short of 
challenges. 
Neither do I see any profit in pitting the European institutions 
against intergovernmental co-operation. We need a strong Commission able 
to act independently, with its power of initiative: first because that 
protects smaller states; and also because it allows Europe to overcome 
purely sectional interests. All governments from time to time, Britain 180 
included, find the Commissions power inconvenient but, for example, the 
single market could never be completed without it. The European Parliament 
is a vital part of the checks and balances of the EU. The Commission and 
the Council have different but complementary roles. 
The need for institutional change does not derive either from a 
fear that Europe is immobile or that it is time to upset the delicate 
balance between Commission and governments; it derives from a more 
fundamental question. 
The most important challenge for Europe is to wake up to the new 
reality: Europe is widening and deepening simultaneously. There will be 190 
more of us in the future, trying to do more. 
The issue is: not 
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whether we do this, but how we reform this new Europe so that it both 
delivers real benefits to the people of Europe, addressing the priorities 
they want addressed; and does so in a way that has their consent and 
support. 
There are two opposite models so far proposed. One is Europe as a 
free trade area, like NAFTA in North America. This is the model beloved by 
British Conservatives. 
The other is the classic federalist model, in which Europe elects 200 
its Commission President and the European Parliament becomes the true 
legislative European body and Europes principal democratic check. 
The difficulty with the first is that it nowhere near answers what 
our citizens expect from Europe, besides being wholly unrealistic 
politically. In a Europe with a single market and single currency, there 
will inevitably be a need for closer economic co-ordination. In 
negotiations over world trade and global finance, Europe is stronger if it 
speaks with one voice. 
In areas like the environment and organised crime, in policing our 
borders, Europe needs to work together. In foreign and security policy, 210 
though nations will guard jealously their own national interests, there 
are times when it will be of clear benefit to all that Europe acts and 
speaks together. What people want from Europe is more than just free 
trade. They want: prosperity, security and strength. 
In a world with the power of the USA; with new alliances to be made 
with the neighbours of Europe like Russia; developing nations with vast 
populations like India and China; Japan, not just an economic power but a 
country that will rightly increase its political might too; with the world 
increasingly forming powerful regional blocs ASEAN, Mercosur; Europes 
citizens need Europe to be strong and united. They need it to be a power 220 
in the world. Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about 
peace. It is about projecting collective power. That is one very clear 
reason, quite apart from the economic reasons, why the central European 
nations want to join. 
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So a limited vision of Europe does not remotely answer the modern 
demands people place on Europe. 
The difficulty, however, with the view of Europe as a superstate, 
subsuming nations into a politics dominated by supranational institutions, 
is that it too fails the test of the people. 
There are issues of democratic accountability in Europe the 230 
so-called democratic deficit. But we can spend hours on end, trying to 
devise a perfect form of European democracy and get nowhere. The truth is, 
the primary sources of democratic accountability in Europe are the 
directly elected and representative institutions of the nations of Europe 
national parliaments and governments. 
That is not to say Europe will not in future generations develop 
its own strong demos or polity, but it hasnt yet. 
And let no-one be in any doubt: nations like Poland, who struggled 
so hard to achieve statehood, whose citizens shed their blood in that 
cause, are not going to give it up lightly. We should celebrate our 240 
diverse cultures and identities, our distinctive attributes as nations. 
Europe is a Europe of free, independent sovereign nations who 
choose to pool that sovereignty in pursuit of their own interests and the 
common good, achieving more together than we can achieve alone. The EU 
will remain a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the 
supranational. 
Such a Europe can, in its economic and political strength, be a 
superpower; a superpower, but not a superstate. 
We should not therefore begin with an abstract discussion of 
institutional change. We begin with the practical question, what should 250 
Europe do? What do the people of Europe want and expect it to do? Then we 
focus Europe and its institutions around the answer. 
How we complete the single market. 
How we drive through 
necessary economic reform. 
How we phase out the wasteful and 
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inefficient aspects of the CAP. 
How we restore full employment. 
How we get a more coherent foreign policy. 
How we develop the 260 
military capability we require without which common defence policy is a 
chimera. 
How we fight organised crime, immigration racketeering, the 
drugs trade. 
How we protect an environment that knows no borders. 
And of course, how we stop Europe focussing on things that it 
doesnt need to do, the interfering part of Europe that antagonises even 
Europes most ardent supporters. 
The problem Europes citizens have with Europe arises when Europes 
priorities arent theirs. No amount of institutional change most of which 270 
passes them by completely will change that. 
Reforming Europe to give it direction and momentum around the 
peoples priorities will. The citizens of Europe must feel that they own 
Europe, not that Europe owns them. 
So let me turn to the changes I believe are part of delivering that 
direction. 
PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL REFORM 
First, we owe it to our citizens to let them know clearly what 
policies and laws are being enacted in their name. The European Council, 
bringing together all the Heads of Government, is the final court of 280 
appeal from other Councils of Ministers unable to reconcile national 
differences. 
That is a vital role. But the European Council should above all be 
the body which sets the agenda of the Union. Indeed, formally in the 
Treaty of Rome, that is the task given to it. We now have European Council 
meetings every three months. And in truth they do, for example, in areas 
like the Luxembourg summit on jobs, the Lisbon summit on economic reform, 
the Peortschach summit on defence, develop the future political direction 
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of Europe. I would like to propose that we do this in a far more organised 
and structured way. 290 
Just as governments go before their electorates and set out their 
agenda for the coming years, so must the European Council do the same. We 
need to do it in all the crucial fields of European action: economic, 
foreign policy, defence, and the fight against cross-border crime. I am 
proposing today an annual agenda for Europe, set by the European Council. 
The President of the Commission is a member of the European 
Council, and would play his full part in drawing up the agenda. He would 
then bring a proposal for Heads of Government to debate, modify and 
endorse. It would be a clear legislative, as well as political, programme 
setting the workload of individual Councils. The Commission's independence 300 
as guardians of the treaty would be unchanged. And the Commission would 
still bring forward additional proposals where its role as guardian of 
those treaties so required. But we would have clear political direction, a 
programme and a timetable by which all the institutions would be guided. 
We should be open too to reforming the way individual Councils 
work, perhaps through team presidencies that give the leadership of the 
Council greater continuity and weight; greater use of elected chairs of 
Councils and their working groups; and ensuring that the Secretary-General 
of the Council, Javier Solana, can play his full role in the development 
of foreign and defence policy. For example, when Europe is more than 25 310 
members, can we seriously believe that a country will hold the Presidency 
only every 12 or 13 years? But two or three countries together, with a mix 
of large and small states, might make greater sense. In future we may also 
need a better way of overseeing and monitoring the Unions programme than 
the three monthly European Councils. 
Second, there is an important debate about a Constitution for 
Europe. In practice I suspect that, given the sheer diversity and 
complexity of the EU, its constitution, like the British constitution, 
will continue to be found in a number of different treaties, laws and 
precedents. It is perhaps easier for the British than for others to 320 
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recognise that a constitutional debate must not necessarily end with a 
single, legally binding document called a Constitution for an entity as 
dynamic as the EU. 
What I think is both desirable and realistic is to draw up a 
statement of the principles according to which we should decide what is 
best done at the European level and what should be done at the national 
level, a kind of charter of competences. This would allow countries too, 
to define clearly what is then done at a regional level. This Statement of 
Principles would be a political, not a legal document. It could therefore 
be much simpler and more accessible to Europes citizens. 330 
I also believe that the time has now come to involve 
representatives of national parliaments more on such matters, by creating 
a second chamber of the European Parliament. 
A second chamber's most important function would be to review the 
EU's work, in the light of this agreed Statement of Principles. It would 
not get involved in the day-to-day negotiation of legislation - that is 
properly the role of the existing European Parliament. Rather, its task 
would be to help implement the agreed statement of principles; so that we 
do what we need to do at a European level but also so that we devolve 
power downwards. Whereas a formal Constitution would logically require 340 
judicial review by a European constitutional court, this would be 
political review by a body of democratically elected politicians. It would 
be dynamic rather than static, allowing for change in the application of 
these principles without elaborate legal revisions every time. 
Such a second chamber could also, I believe, help provide 
democratic oversight at a European level of the common foreign and 
security policy. 
Efficient decision making, even with these changes, will be harder 
in an enlarged European Union. In the long run, I do not believe that a 
Commission of up to 30 members will be workable. The present 350 
intergovernmental conference must and will address the size of the 
Commission. More radical reform is not possible this time round in view of 
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the worries of some states. I simply give my view that, in the end, we 
shall have to revisit this issue and streamline considerably. Reweighting 
votes in the Council has also become a democratic imperative which this 
current intergovernmental conference must resolve. 
Efficient decision making in an enlarged Union will also mean more 
enhanced cooperation. I have no problem with greater flexibility or groups 
of member states going forward together. But that must not lead to a hard 
core; a Europe in which some Member States create their own set of shared 360 
policies and institutions from which others are in practice excluded. Such 
groups must at every stage be open to others who wish to join. 
I agree with Guy Verhofstadt that enhanced cooperation is an 
instrument to strengthen the Union from within, not an instrument of 
exclusion. That is why enhanced cooperation must not be used to undermine 
the single market or other common policies. The safeguards must be 
stringent ones. The present treaties provide them. Any changes must be 
equally stringent in avoiding a multi-tier Europe; the creation of 
different sets of rules; damage to the rights of those not able to 
participate; or erosion of the powers of the Commission as guardians of 370 
the treaties. The European Parliament should play a part in ensuring that 
these conditions are met, both at the time an enhanced co-operation is 
decided upon and during the course of its implementation. 
Within a coherent framework agreed by the European Council, there 
is clearly much greater scope for using enhanced cooperation in the two 
biggest growth areas of European action: the development of a foreign and 
security policy and the cross border fight against crime. In the fight 
against international crime it should be in the interest of all Member 
States if particular groups of countries carry forward work in particular 
areas. That, after all, is what was done through the Schengen Agreement. 380 
The difference now is that we must, from the beginning, operate within the 
framework of the European treaties, not outside it. Italy and Germany have 
suggested joint police operations at the Unions external borders. That 
kind of cooperation between groups of countries seeking to achieve goals 
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agreed by all, and in the interests of all, will become common place. 
CONCLUSION 
We need to get the political foundations of the European Union 
right. These foundations are rooted in the democratic nation state. 
Efficiency and democracy go together. Poland knows that. Your people have 
decided that the European Union is the most effective route to deliver 390 
what they want: prosperity, security and strength. We are building a 
Europe of equal partners served by institutions which need to be 
independent but responsive and accountable. We want a Europe where there 
are national differences, not national barriers, where we hold many of our 
policies in common, but keep our distinct, separate identities. 
The European Union is the worlds biggest single economic and 
political partnership of democratic states. That represents a huge 
opportunity for Europe and the peoples of Europe. And as a Union of 
democracies, it has the capacity to sustain peace in our continent, to 
deliver unprecedented prosperity and to be a powerful force for democratic 400 
values in the rest of the world. 
Our task, with the help of the new democracies about to join the 
EU, is to shape a responsive European Union - in touch with the people, 
transparent and easier to understand, strengthened by its nations and 
regions - a European Union whose vision of peace is matched by its vision 
of prosperity. 
A civilised continent united in defeating brutality and violence. A 
prosperous continent united in extending opportunities to all. A continent 
joined together in is belief in social justice. 
A superpower, but not a superstate. 410 
An economic powerhouse through the completion of the world's 
biggest single market, the extension of competition, an adaptable and well 
educated workforce, the support for businesses large and small. 
A civilised continent through common defence, the strength of our 
values, the pursuit of social justice, the rich diversity of our cultures. 
The countries represented here today have suffered more than most 
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in the cause of freedom. I want you, as soon as possible, to share in the 
European Unions success, and to join as equal partners, as, amid the new 
reality I have outlined, a new Europe is built.
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1. Important reforms have been decided in Nice. The Conference welcomes the successful 
conclusion of the Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States and commits the Member States to pursue the early and successful ratification of 
the Treaty of Nice. 
2. It agrees that the conclusion of the Conference of Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States opens the way for enlargement of the European Union and 
underlines that, with ratification of the Nice Treaty, the European Union will have 
completed the institutional changes necessary for the accession of new Member States. 
3. Having opened the way to enlargement, the Conference calls for a deeper and wider 
debate about the future development of the European Union. In 2001, the Swedish and 10 
Belgian Presidencies, in cooperation with the Commission and involving the European 
Parliament, will encourage wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties; 
representatives of national Parliaments and all those reflecting public opinion; political, 
economic and university circles, representatives of civil society, etc. The candidate 
States will be associated with this process in ways to be defined. 
4. Following a report to Göteborg in June 2001, the European Council, at its meeting at 
Laeken/Brussels in December 2001, will agree on a declaration containing appropriate 
initiatives for the continuation of this process. 
5. The process should address, inter alia, the following questions: 
•  how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of competencies between 20 
the European Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity; 
•  the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed 
in Nice, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council in Cologne; 
•  a simplification of the Treaties with a view to making them clearer and better 
understood without changing their meaning; 
•  the role of national Parliaments in the European architecture. 
6. Addressing the above-mentioned issues, the Conference recognises the need to improve 
and to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its 
institutions, to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States. 
7. After these preparatory steps, the Conference agrees that a new Conference of the 30 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States will be convened in 2004, to 
treat the above-mentioned items in view of the related Treaty changes. 
8. The Conference of Member States shall not constitute any form of obstacle or precondition 
to the enlargement process. Moreover, those candidate States which have 
concluded accession negotiations with the Union shall be invited to participate in the 
Conference. Those candidate States which have not concluded their accession 
negotiations shall be invited as observers. 
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Mesdames, Messieurs, 
En cinquante ans, lEurope sest faite. Elle vit en paix, la démocratie règne, notre mode de vie séduit. 
LUnion européenne a encore progressé récemment. La croissance a repris. Le chômage reflue. Dans moins de huit mois, 
leuro sera une réalité concrète pour 300 millions de citoyens européens. La défense européenne se met en place.  
LUnion réaffirme sa dimension sociale. Elle se donne des instruments pour protéger la santé et  
lenvironnement. Le Gouvernement français est fier davoir contribué à ces évolutions. 
Pourtant un certain désenchantement et des incertitudes se font jour, au sein des peuples comme chez certains 
responsables politiques. Et il est vrai que lavenir de lEurope soulève des questions légitimes. LEurope ne risque-t-elle  
pas de se défaire si elle sélargit jusquaux frontières de son continent ? Comment louvrir à la mondialisation sans  
diluer son identité ? Pour réformer ses institutions, doit-elle estomper le rôle des Nations ? Comment faire pour que les 10 
citoyens de lUnion sapproprient lEurope ? 
Attentifs à ces interrogations, les Chefs dEtat et de Gouvernement, réunis lan passé à Nice, ont décidé dengager une 
réflexion en profondeur sur lavenir de lUnion élargie. Les citoyens européens sont invités à y participer. Nous avons  
décidé douvrir ce débat en France. Cest dans ce cadre que jinscris mon propos daujourdhui. Il est la contribution du 
responsable politique que je suis à cette réflexion. 
Je suis Français. Je me sens Européen. Je veux une Europe qui affirme son identité, qui réponde mieux au désir de  
ses peuples, qui se fasse exemplaire dans le monde. 
Cest pourquoi le débat ne doit pas porter uniquement sur la question des institutions et de leur réforme. LEurope est 
dabord un projet politique, un " contenu " avant dêtre un " contenant ". LEurope nest pas faite seulement de  
règlements, de directives ou de contentieux. Elle est dabord une uvre de lesprit, un modèle de société, une vision  20 
du monde. Lidée européenne inscrite dans la réalité : voilà ce qui compte pour moi. LEurope que jaime, celle que je  
veux avec tant dautres accomplir, a un projet de société (I), une vision du monde (II), une architecture politique (III). 
I. LEurope doit affirmer un projet de société 
Jusquà une période récente, lessentiel des efforts de lEurope sest concentré sur la mise en place de lUnion  
économique et monétaire. Nous en avons tiré de réels bénéfices. Mais il nous faut maintenant élargir la perspective,  
sous peine de réduire lEurope à un marché et de la diluer dans la mondialisation. Car lEurope est bien plus quun  
marché. Elle est porteuse dun modèle de société, fruit de lHistoire et qui se déploie au travers de liens toujours plus 
intenses qui unissent aujourdhui les peuples européens. Il existe un " art de vivre " à l'européenne, une façon propre  
dagir, de défendre les libertés, de lutter contre les inégalités et les discriminations, de penser et d'organiser les  
relations de travail, d'accéder à l'instruction et aux soins, d'aménager le temps. Chacun de nos pays a ses traditions  30 
et ses règles mais celles-ci composent un univers commun. 
Ce modèle de société original, nous devons désormais linscrire dans les traités et le faire vivre dans nos politiques.  
La justification de lEurope, cest sa différence. Rappelons-nous que lEurope est une civilisation, cest-à-dire tout à la fois  
un territoire, une histoire partagée, une économie unifiée, une société humaine et des cultures diverses qui dessinent 
ensemble une culture. 
1. Cette civilisation repose sur une communauté de valeurs. 
Au premier rang de celles-ci, il y a la démocratie et les droits de lhomme. Les " Pères fondateurs " ont voulu et  
construit lEurope politique pour délivrer notre continent des impérialismes solitaires ainsi que des totalitarismes  
meurtriers qui lont ensanglanté au XXème siècle. Grâce à eux, lEurope est désormais une terre de paix. Les ennemis  
dhier se sont réconciliés. La désunion a laissé place à la recherche dune unité renforcée. LEurope est lespace de la 40 
planète où lEtat de droit est le mieux accompli. Elle est le seul ensemble politique au sein duquel la peine de mort  
nexiste plus. Elle est cette terre où le respect de la personne humaine est poussé à son plus haut point. Elle a  
vocation à porter plus loin ce message. 
LEurope refuse de dissocier la prospérité économique du progrès social. Cest ainsi quelle a pu se relever des  
guerres qui lont ravagée. Malgré les inégalités qui subsistent, elle connaît aujourdhui un très haut niveau de  
développement économique. Des droits sociaux ont été conquis : le droit à la protection sociale, les droits syndicaux, le  
droit à une éducation gratuite. 
Cest pour proclamer ces valeurs que nous avons doté lUnion dune Charte des droits fondamentaux. Quil sagisse de 
dignité et dintégrité de la personne humaine, de libertés ou de solidarité, dégalité, de citoyenneté ou de justice, ou  
encore de droits nouveaux tels ceux qui sattachent à la préservation de notre patrimoine naturel, lensemble des  50 
principes qui fondent la civilisation européenne sont ainsi consacrés. Cette Charte mérite dêtre considérée comme la  
clé de voûte de la construction européenne. Je souhaite quelle fasse partie intégrante du pacte qui unit les nations  
dEurope et qui fonde, entre les Européens, une communauté de destin. 
2. Cette communauté de destin doit mieux inspirer nos politiques communes. 
LEurope a besoin de plus de solidarité économique. La monnaie unique nous apporte désormais une précieuse  
stabilité. Depuis deux ans, leuro a joué son rôle de " bouclier " commun contre les crises financières internationales et  
les dévaluations compétitives. Pour équilibrer lédifice de lUnion, il nous faut maintenant nous doter dun  
gouvernement économique de la zone euro. La coordination des politiques économiques doit être considérablement  
The Constitution of Meaning 
 2
accrue. Je propose que tout Etat membre consulte en amont ses partenaires et tienne compte de leur recommandation 
avant de prendre une décision ayant des conséquences globales sur la zone. Créons un fonds daction conjoncturelle, 60 
auquel chaque Etat serait éligible, qui permettrait de soutenir tout pays membre frappé par les turbulences  
économiques mondiales. Il faut sattaquer enfin aux comportements qui attentent à lintérêt général européen. La lutte  
contre le " dumping fiscal " est une priorité immédiate : il nest pas acceptable que certains Etats membres usent dune 
concurrence fiscale déloyale pour attirer les investissements internationaux et les délocalisations des sièges sociaux  
de groupes européens. A terme, une harmonisation globale de la fiscalité des entreprises est nécessaire. 
Cette cohérence économique doit être au service de la solidarité sociale. Les citoyens lappellent de leurs vux.  
LEurope ne saurait être une simple zone de libre-échange. Depuis quatre ans, le Gouvernement français sest battu  
pour réorienter la construction européenne au profit de la croissance et de lemploi. Des progrès importants ont été  
réalisés avec l'adoption de l'agenda social européen. Ces objectifs doivent se traduire par des résultats concrets, pour  
toutes les catégories de travailleurs. Les conditions de travail des salariés doivent être harmonisées vers le haut.  70 
Faisons reculer la précarité et combattons les discriminations. Créons les conditions dun dialogue social avec les  
syndicats à léchelle européenne. Un véritable droit social européen fixant des normes communes ambitieuses doit  
être édifié, notamment en matière dinformation et de participation des salariés dans la vie des entreprises, de droit des 
licenciements, de lutte contre le travail précaire et de politique salariale. Notre perspective doit être celle dun traité  
social européen. 
De même, les Européens ont besoin, pour garantir légalité des citoyens, leur solidarité et lintérêt général, de services 
publics forts et efficaces. Je suis favorable à une directive européenne qui définirait un cadre juridique permettant de 
consolider, sous la responsabilité des États, le rôle des services publics en Europe. 
Au service de lemploi, lEurope doit avoir une ambition industrielle forte. Lintégration européenne permet des  
réussites majeures : hier, Ariane et Airbus ; aujourdhui, EADS dans le domaine de laéronautique civile ou, dans la  80 
sphère militaire, le projet de gros avion de transport. Ces partenariats sont importants pour nos industries : ils leur  
offrent les moyens nécessaires à leurs investissements, ils leur confèrent une taille critique sur le marché mondial, ils 
permettent déviter une domination exclusive des Etats-Unis dans des secteurs décisifs. 
Dans le même esprit, lEurope doit saffirmer comme le continent de la science et de linnovation. Le savoir est un  
élément de la conscience européenne. Mais léclatement de la recherche européenne en autant defforts nationaux  
trop peu coordonnés réduit aujourdhui son efficacité. Il est urgent de constituer un véritable espace européen de la 
recherche, dans des domaines aussi essentiels que la santé ou lenvironnement, comme lEurope a su le faire en  
matière spatiale, avec lAgence spatiale européenne. 
3. Lunité de lEurope appelle des droits et protections renforcés pour tous les Européens. 
Nous devons édifier un espace de droit commun, dont la Charte sera la référence. La Cour européenne de justice  90 
devrait pouvoir être saisie, dans certaines conditions, directement par les citoyens. Il nous faut harmoniser les  
différentes règles nationales de fond et de procédure. Dans limmédiat, une reconnaissance mutuelle effective des  
décisions de justice et la création dune instance arbitrale pour trancher les conflits de droits nationaux constitueraient  
des avancées importantes ; je pense en particulier à la douloureuse question des divorces de couples binationaux. 
Lun des droits fondamentaux du citoyen est la sécurité. LEurope doit aider à la garantir. 
Je pense dabord à la lutte contre la criminalité. Parce que le crime organisé ne connaît pas de frontières on le voit 
particulièrement avec le blanchiment dargent, le trafic de drogue et toutes les formes contemporaines de traite des  
êtres humains, il faut le combattre au niveau de lEurope. Plusieurs de nos partenaires ont proposé la création dune  
police européenne intégrée. Pour ma part, jy souscris. Je propose la création dune police criminelle opérationnelle,  
dont Europol serait le noyau. Confions aussi à une police spécifique la mission dassurer la protection des frontières 100 
extérieures de lUnion et de ses aéroports internationaux. 
La sécurité des Européens passe aussi par la mise en place dun véritable espace judiciaire européen qui, sappuyant  
sur une coopération renforcée entre magistrats et sur la poursuite de lharmonisation du droit pénal des Etats  
membres, pourrait conduire à terme à la création dun parquet européen. Celui-ci serait chargé de coordonner les  
poursuites et laction publique au niveau européen et faciliterait, notamment, lexécution des commissions rogatoires  
sur tout le territoire de lUnion. 
La sécurité sanitaire est une autre exigence. Les récentes crises, en particulier celle de la " vache folle ", ont montré  
les menaces que fait courir aux consommateurs le productivisme à outrance. Nous devons collectivement en tirer une  
leçon urgente : le citoyen est aussi un consommateur dont il faut renforcer la protection. Dotons lUnion dun statut du 
consommateur européen, fondé sur le principe de précaution, la transparence dans linformation et la traçabilité des  110 
produits " de la fourche à la fourchette ". Je propose, en outre, dans le domaine de la santé humaine, la création dun  
réseau de surveillance et dalerte sanitaires permettant une réaction immédiate des autorités publiques face au 
déclenchement dune crise. 
Mesdames, Messieurs, 
Dans un monde désormais globalisé, notre Europe ne saurait se contenter dêtre un îlot de prospérité relative et de  
stabilité. Ce repli égoïste serait une illusion et un reniement. LEurope porte un modèle, mais un modèle ouvert au  
monde, notamment à la Méditerranée et à ses rives. Elle a vocation à orienter la mondialisation dans le sens du droit et  
de la justice. 
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II. LEurope doit peser sur le cours du monde 
Je veux une Europe forte, qui assume pleinement sa responsabilité dans la redéfinition de lordre mondial et qui se  120 
donne les moyens de porter son message de paix, de solidarité et de pluralisme. 
1. Au nom de ce pluralisme, lEurope doit faire vivre la diversité culturelle. 
La diversité des cultures est un des éléments les plus précieux du patrimoine de lhumanité. Or celle-ci est aujourdhui 
menacée. La loi du marché pousse à luniformité des modes de consommation et à la concentration des industries 
culturelles. Bien entendu, certaines formes dexpression je pense en particulier au cinéma ont acquis une dimension 
industrielle. Mais il faut nous préserver, collectivement, de la menace de luniformité et de lenvahissement de produits 
culturels émanant dune source unique. Cest là un enjeu de civilisation fondamental. Cest là un combat pour les  
cultures européennes, bien sûr, mais aussi pour toutes les cultures. Un combat porté par lEurope à lOCDE quand  
elle dénonce lAccord multilatéral sur linvestissement et au sein de lOrganisation mondiale du commerce lorsquelle 
défend la spécificité de la création et des uvres culturelles. Elle doit poursuivre en ce sens. 130 
LEurope est consciente de cet enjeu parce quelle porte en elle-même une exceptionnelle diversité de cultures. Ces 
cultures, dans toutes leurs composantes religieuses, philosophiques, littéraires, musicales ou plastiques et dans  
toutes leurs expressions, nous en sommes les héritiers. Elles forment notre patrimoine commun. Cest pourquoi pour  
nous, Européens, la culture nest pas une marchandise. Elle est dabord une part de notre identité. 
Pour faire vivre cette identité, lEurope doit permettre à tous de partager ce patrimoine. Favorisons mieux encore la  
mobilité des étudiants, des artistes et des chercheurs. Dici dix ans, tous les jeunes Européens devraient pouvoir  
accomplir une partie de leur scolarité dans un autre pays de lUnion que le leur. Faisons de lenseignement dau moins  
deux langues européennes, dès le plus jeune âge, une règle. Tout doit être fait notamment à lEcole pour que nos  
enfants prennent conscience que leur héritage national sinscrit dans une richesse plus vaste encore, celle de lEurope. 
Parce que la culture est vivante, il appartient à lEurope de favoriser la création. La culture doit bénéficier dune  140 
politique commune, conçue spécifiquement et non dominée par les règles de la concurrence et du marché intérieur.  
Dans cet esprit, je propose la mise en place, au niveau européen, de mécanismes de soutien à la création 
cinématographique, audiovisuelle et informatique et celle de studios européens. Au moment où se multiplient dans  
tous nos pays les bouquets numériques, lEurope devrait disposer dune chaîne de télévision qui lui soit propre, sur le 
modèle réussi dArte. 
A mes yeux, lengagement de lEurope pour la diversité culturelle est exemplaire de notre vision dune société  
internationale ouverte et solidaire. 
2. Animée par cette conception, lEurope a vocation à défendre la paix et la démocratie dans le monde. 
Face aux tentations de lunilatéralisme cest-à-dire de la loi du plus fort ou des visions trop simples, lEurope doit être  
un facteur déquilibre dans les relations internationales. Elle ne veut pas être une puissance dominante mais elle peut  150 
mettre sa puissance au service de valeurs. 
LEurope est capable de faire entendre sa voix grâce à une politique étrangère commune. Approfondissons nos  
" stratégies communes " dans les zones du monde où nos intérêts sont en jeu. Renforçons le rôle du Haut représentant  
pour la PESC. Veillons à la cohérence de nos diplomaties nationales avec la définition dune politique qui nous soit 
commune. Travaillons au rayonnement, à travers le monde, dune Europe présente et active. Lunification de la 
représentation externe de la zone euro à travers une présidence élue de leurogroupe y contribuera. Mettons-là en  
place à brève échéance. Par ailleurs, la fusion des réseaux consulaires européens à létranger permettrait à des  
" maisons de lEurope " d'être au service de tous les Européens expatriés à travers le monde. Ces maisons  
conforteraient chez eux le sentiment de la citoyenneté européenne. 
Pour assurer sa sécurité, mais aussi pour contribuer au maintien de la paix dans le monde, lEurope a besoin dune  160 
défense commune. Ses fondations ont été jetées. Grâce aux récentes décisions, prises sous la Présidence française  
de lUnion, lEurope est en passe de se doter dune force de réaction rapide encadrée par des institutions politiques et 
militaires permanentes. LUnion demande une doctrine globale dintervention et demploi de cette force. La priorité va 
aujourdhui au renforcement dune politique de prévention des conflits, qui est la mieux à même dassurer une sécurité 
durable. Dans le même temps, lEurope doit définir, en fonction de ses intérêts propres et dans le respect de ses  
alliances, une stratégie de défense à long terme. Cela suppose en particulier quelle adopte une position cohérente  
face à linitiative controversée des Etats-Unis de créer un bouclier antimissile. 
Au-delà des questions diplomatiques et de sécurité, léconomie et le commerce doivent être organisées de façon plus  
juste et plus efficace. 
3. LEurope doit aider à construire la régulation dont le monde a besoin. 170 
Pour empêcher que les intérêts privés étouffent lintérêt général, que la recherche du profit à court terme ignore la  
justice sociale et dégrade lenvironnement, il faut définir des " règles du jeu ". LUnion européenne peut tenir un rôle de 
premier plan dans la définition de cette régulation et se mettre au service de trois priorités. 
Il faut donner un cadre stable à léconomie mondiale. Les récentes crises économiques et financières ont démontré  
que des règles, publiques et privées, sont indispensables au bon fonctionnement de léconomie de marché. Depuis  
trois ans, pour tirer les leçons de ces crises, d'importants progrès ont été accomplis. Mais beaucoup reste à faire, et  
dabord en matière de régulation financière internationale. Renforçons le rôle des institutions de Bretton-Woods dans la 
gestion et la prévention des crises. Assurons mieux leur transparence et leur responsabilité politique. Premier  
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actionnaire de ces institutions, lUnion européenne doit y faire entendre sa voix. Réfléchissons, pour les pays de la  
zone euro, à une représentation coordonnée, voire unique, dans ces institutions. Luttons contre la criminalité financière  180 
et la concurrence fiscale déloyale ; les hésitations de la nouvelle administration américaine ne sauraient remettre  
en cause les travaux du Groupe daction financière international et de lOCDE. LEurope continuera daffirmer ses  
positions en faveur de la réforme de larchitecture financière internationale. 
Nous voulons un commerce équitable. L'Europe s'est battue pour la création de lOMC parce que cette organisation  
traite les conflits commerciaux par des procédures objectives, en nous préservant de l'unilatéralisme. Cette régulation  
va dans lintérêt même de lessor du commerce international. LEurope devra plaider, à lOMC, pour une politique 
commerciale posant des limites claires. La libéralisation du commerce na pas à porter atteinte aux services publics, à  
la diversité culturelle, au progrès social ou à la sécurité alimentaire. Il faut que lEurope accentue son effort de  
solidarité envers les pays en développement pour faire reculer la pauvreté. Le Sud a besoin de lEurope. Celle-ci se  
battra pour aider ces pays à trouver toute leur place dans les échanges mondiaux. Elle contribuera à alléger le poids  190 
de la dette, premier obstacle à leur développement. 
Il nest de développement que durable. La planète est menacée. Notre responsabilité devant les générations futures  
est engagée. LEurope, vieille terre industrielle, espace de population très dense, modestement dotée en matières 
premières, ayant tiré les leçons des chocs pétroliers, sait que la Terre nest pas un stock inépuisable de ressources 
naturelles. Cest pourquoi elle est à la tête du combat pour le développement durable, au moment où les Etats-Unis  
semblent éluder leurs responsabilités. Il lui revient de montrer lexemple : le développement durable est désormais un 
objectif prioritaire de la construction communautaire. Près de dix ans après lacte fondateur de Rio, il faut aller au-delà.  
Fer de lance de la création dune autorité mondiale de lEnvironnement que mon gouvernement a proposée, lEurope  
devrait porter une politique ambitieuse de recherche et de promotion de technologies respectueuses de  
lenvironnement. 200 
Mesdames, Messieurs, 
LEurope a besoin dinstitutions dignes de son projet de société et de sa vision du monde. Cest là où la réflexion 
institutionnelle trouve sa pleine justification. 
III. LEurope politique exige des réformes profondes 
Un débat est engagé sur lavenir de lUnion. Le terme de cette réflexion a été fixé à 2004. Nous savons aussi que les 
conséquences à tirer de cette réflexion devront lêtre à lunanimité. Le consensus sera donc nécessaire entre les  
Quinze. Nous devons bien sûr prendre en compte les préoccupations des pays candidats. La plupart dentre eux  
bénéficient des institutions démocratiques et vivent leur indépendance depuis une décennie seulement. Il est  
indispensable de les associer à notre réflexion. 
Des contributions intéressantes ont déjà été apportés à ce débat. Des " modèles " institutionnels ont été proposés. En 210 
Allemagne, par exemple, le SPD a suggéré pour lEurope une construction fortement inspirée par le système politique  
de son pays. Dautres propositions ont été faites ou viendront. Au terme du processus, il faudra chercher la ligne dun 
compromis acceptable par tous. Cest pourquoi lon ne peut avancer des architectures institutionnelles ou proposer des 
formules sans avoir réfléchi, au préalable, au sens politique que lon veut donner à lEurope. On ne peut en particulier  
faire léconomie dune réflexion sur la place des Nations au sein de lensemble européen. 
Japporterai la mienne dans cet esprit. Je ne sépare pas la France de lEurope. Comme tant dautres Européens  
convaincus, je désire lEurope mais je reste attaché à ma Nation. Faire lEurope sans défaire la France ni aucune des 
autres nations européennes : tel est mon choix politique. 
1. Ainsi, je fais mienne la belle idée de " fédération dEtats-nations ". 
" Fédération " : voilà un mot qui présente les apparences de la simplicité et les attraits de la cohérence, mais qui recèle en 220 
réalité une diversité de sens. Pour certains, ce terme signifie un exécutif européen qui tirerait sa légitimité du seul  
Parlement européen. Cet exécutif aurait le monopole de la diplomatie et de la défense. Dans ce nouvel ensemble, les  
Etats actuels auraient le statut des Länder allemands ou des Etats fédérés américains. La France, comme dailleurs  
dautres nations européennes, ne saurait accepter un tel statut ni cette conception de la " fédération ". 
Si, en revanche, on entend par " fédération " une démarche progressive et maîtrisée de partage ou de transfert de 
compétences au niveau de lUnion, alors on se réfère à la " fédération d'Etats-nations ", selon la formule forgée par  
Jacques DELORS. Cest là une notion à laquelle je souscris pleinement. Dun point de vue juridique, elle peut sembler 
ambiguë. Mais je la juge politiquement pertinente, car lEurope est une construction politique originale, mêlant de façon 
indissociable en un précipité singulier deux éléments différents : lidéal fédératif et la réalité des Etats-nations  
européens. 230 
Cest pourquoi la notion de " fédération dEtats-nations " traduit avec justesse la tension constitutive de l'Union  
européenne. Il y a les nations, fortes, vivantes, attachées à leur identité, qui font la richesse de notre continent. Et puis  
il y a aussi la volonté dunir, de bâtir un ensemble qui rendra chacun plus fort. Il y a dun côté lhistoire, marquée par les 
rivalités et les égoïsmes nationaux, et de lautre le projet, tourné vers lharmonie et lalliance. Des éléments fédératifs  
très forts existent déjà : la primauté du droit européen, sanctionnée par la Cour de Justice, une Commission  
indépendante, un Parlement européen élu au suffrage universel, le marché et la monnaie uniques. Mais la coopération  
inter-gouvernementale occupe encore une place importante et restera indispensable. 
Si nous voulons aller vers une telle fédération, il nous faut clarifier les compétences respectives de lUnion et des Etats.  
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Il faut le faire selon le principe de la subsidiarité. Cela doit être loccasion de simplifier des traités qui sont devenus 
indéchiffrables au fil des négociations successives et au gré de l'empilement des politiques communes. 240 
Cette clarification ne doit pas remettre en cause des compétences partagées. Celles-ci favorisent les synergies entre  
laction des Etats et celle de lUnion. Il en est ainsi, par exemple, pour la formation, l'éducation et la culture. Ces  
domaines sont et resteront de la compétence principale des Etats ; mais ils font aussi lobjet, pour le bien de tous, de 
politiques communes ou de programmes communautaires quil faudra développer encore dans lavenir. 
A fortiori, nous devons refuser la renationalisation de politiques jusquà présent définies et conduites au niveau de  
l'Union. Il y aurait un paradoxe à suggérer des pas en avant vers une plus forte intégration européenne tout en  
commençant par opérer des replis nationaux. Je pense en particulier aux fonds structurels. Quant à la politique  
agricole commune, elle doit rester au niveau européen mais être réorientée. Tout en préservant la compétitivité de  
notre agriculture, il faut aider les agriculteurs à produire mieux pour répondre aux attentes de qualité et de sécurité 
alimentaires. La politique agricole commune doit encourager un développement plus équilibré de lespace rural,  250 
préservant la diversité des terroirs et des pratiques agricoles. 
Il conviendra en revanche de mieux assurer dans certains domaines la répartition " verticale " des compétences : le  
cadre général, fait de principes ou dobjectifs, serait alors défini au plan européen tandis que la mise en uvre  
politique et technique serait assurée par les Etats ou les régions, selon les formes constitutionnelles et les institutions 
administratives de chaque Etat membre. Ainsi évitera-t-on la multiplication des normes de détail jugées souvent à juste  
titre je pense par exemple à la chasse comme excessivement tatillonnes. 
Une " fédération dEtats-nations " implique que les parlements nationaux soient mieux associés à la construction 
européenne. Renforçons les pratiques actuelles, trop timides, de concertation entre le Parlement européen et les  
parlements nationaux. Confions à un organe commun Conférence permanente des Parlements ou " Congrès " un  
vrai rôle politique. Réuni en sessions périodiques, il contrôlerait le respect de la subsidiarité par les instances 260 
communautaires et débattrait chaque année de " létat de l'Union ". Ce " Congrès " pourrait jouer un rôle dans  
lévolution des règles de l'Union. A lexception des normes de nature " constitutionnelle ", pour lesquelles les  
procédures actuelles de ratification resteraient en vigueur, les modifications apportées dans les traités aux règles  
techniques relatives aux politiques communes pourraient suivre, grâce à ce " Congrès ", des procédures simplifiées.  
Cette formule remplacerait avantageusement, dans l'Europe de demain, la trentaine dautorisations de ratification  
nationale qui aurait été sinon nécessaire. Nous pourrions ainsi faire évoluer nos politiques communes avec plus de 
souplesse. 
Dans la perspective de lélargissement, les coopérations renforcées seront indispensables. Lélargissement de  
lEurope est une nécessité historique ; mais cest aussi un défi. Avec l'adhésion de nouveaux membres, lEurope devra 
apprendre à maîtriser sa diversité. LEurope à deux vitesses est une perspective inacceptable. Mais la paralysie 270 
institutionnelle est une menace quil nous faut conjurer. Ceux qui souhaitent aller de lavant devront pouvoir le faire.  
Cest pourquoi le mécanisme des coopérations renforcées a été judicieusement assoupli à Nice. Il pourrait évidemment 
trouver à sappliquer en matière de coordination économique, autour de leuro, mais aussi dans des domaines tels que  
la santé ou larmement. Ces coopérations permettront à un groupe d'Etats de renouveler la force d'entraînement qui a 
toujours été indispensable à la construction européenne. 
Notre Union tirera aussi sa force de la vitalité de sa vie démocratique. 
2. LEurope doit constituer, pour ses citoyens, un véritable espace politique. 
Un espace où vive un débat et où se rencontrent de véritables partis européens, comme lest déjà le Parti des  
socialistes européens. Un espace où les peuples dEurope pourraient ainsi, en élisant leurs représentants, exprimer  
des choix politiques clairs. Un espace où les responsabilités de ceux qui décident seraient mieux marquées. 280 
LEurope est devenue un horizon familier à nos concitoyens, mais ceux-ci ressentent le besoin profond de mieux  
sapproprier lEurope. Ils veulent en tracer le dessin. Pour eux, lélection au Parlement européen devra saffirmer  
comme le temps fort de la vie démocratique européenne. Je souhaite une réforme profonde du mode délection actuel. 
Recherchons un mode de scrutin combinant, dans chaque Etat membre, la proportionnelle et un système de grandes 
circonscriptions régionales. Ceci permettrait de rapprocher lélu de lélecteur. 
Entre deux élections, cette vie démocratique ne doit pas sassoupir. Dans cet esprit, je propose trois pistes. Dabord, la 
consultation directe de la société civile, grâce à des forums de dialogue. Appuyons-nous sur la richesse du monde  
associatif en France et en Europe. Appuyons-nous sur les nouvelles technologies de la communication, à limage du  
projet délection en ligne du premier Conseil étudiant européen. Ensuite, lorganisation régulière, au sein des Etats 
membres, de consultations sur un sujet politique important, clairement identifié et de nature européenne. Cette  290 
consultation se ferait à travers les parlements nationaux ou des forums ad hoc. Enfin, le renforcement du rôle du  
médiateur européen, dont lexistence reste ignorée par limmense majorité des citoyens européens. Son rôle serait  
accru grâce à linstauration de correspondants nationaux et locaux. Le médiateur serait alors en mesure de remplir 
pleinement sa mission de résolution amiable des conflits entre les citoyens et les institutions européennes. 
Celles-ci ont à lévidence besoin dêtre réformées. 
3. Les institutions européennes doivent gagner en cohérence et en efficacité. 
Le système institutionnel européen est construit autour du triangle de la Commission, du Conseil et du Parlement  
européen. Cet équilibre reste essentiel. Des évolutions sont néanmoins nécessaires. 
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Il faut mieux garantir lintérêt général européen. Cest là le rôle de la Commission européenne. Son autorité et sa  
légitimité politiques sont donc à renforcer. A cette fin, je propose la désignation dun Président de la Commission issu  300 
de la formation politique européenne victorieuse aux élections européennes. 
Le Parlement européen, expression de la volonté des peuples, exercerait ainsi plus nettement son rôle dinstitution  
devant laquelle la Commission est politiquement responsable et par laquelle elle peut même être censurée. En  
contrepartie, la responsabilité de lAssemblée de Strasbourg devrait être mieux définie. Je propose dinstituer, pour le 
Conseil européen, un droit de dissoudre le Parlement, sur proposition de la Commission ou des Etats membres. Cela 
pourrait jouer en cas de crise politique ou pour lever un blocage institutionnel. Un équilibre de ce type, on le sait,  
caractérise la plupart des grandes démocraties représentatives. 
Comme la Commission, le Conseil a besoin dêtre renforcé parce quil ne joue plus suffisamment son rôle. Le futur  
traité devrait consacrer pleinement le Conseil européen rassemblant les Chefs dEtat et de Gouvernement ainsi que le 
Président de la Commission. Ce Conseil devrait avoir la responsabilité dapprouver un véritable programme de  310 
" législature " pluriannuel, à partir d'une proposition de la Commission et du Parlement européen. Il devrait se réunir de  
façon plus fréquente par exemple tous les deux mois et consacrer ses travaux, sans à-côtés protocolaires, aux  
débats d'orientation et aux grandes décisions de l'Union. 
Par ailleurs, le moment est venu de réfléchir à la mise en place dun Conseil permanent des ministres. Ses membres,  
sortes de Vice-Premiers ministres, coordonneraient les questions européennes dans leur propre gouvernement  
national. Une telle formation pourrait assurer les fonctions dimpulsion, de préparation et de coordination du travail  
européen en amont du Conseil européen. En liaison avec le Parlement européen, elle assumerait mieux son rôle de  
co-législateur dans lélaboration des " lois " européennes. Sagissant de cette dernière fonction, la règle des  
délibérations devrait être systématiquement celle de la majorité qualifiée. 
Telles sont les orientations et les réformes qui pourraient fonder, selon moi, l'architecture institutionnelle de l'Europe de 320 
demain. 
Ces voies dessinent la perspective, à laquelle je suis favorable, d'une Constitution européenne. Celle-ci déterminerait 
l'organisation et le fonctionnement des institutions européennes. Bien entendu, il ne suffirait pas de baptiser  
" Constitution " un nouveau traité. Un tel texte n'aurait de sens que s'il était l'aboutissement de réformes profondes et  
non le produit d'une simple réécriture des traités actuels. Il importe en même temps que cette démarche  
constitutionnelle exprime un acte politique fondamental : l'affirmation d'un projet commun, l'expression d'une ambition 
collective. Cette démarche serait dabord, bien entendu, conduite par les gouvernements ; mais elle devrait aussi être 
laffaire des citoyens. La Charte des droits fondamentaux serait au cur de cette Constitution. A limage de la méthode 
retenue avec succès pour élaborer la Charte, la préparation de cette Constitution pourrait être confiée au niveau  
européen à une Convention réunissant des représentants des différents acteurs de l'Union : États, parlements  330 
nationaux, Parlement européen, société civile. Les décisions finales reviendraient aux États et seraient ratifiées par les 
peuples. 
Mesdames, Messieurs, 
Parce que je ne suis pas un Européen tiède, je ne veux pas dune Europe fade. 
LEurope que jaimerais construire est une Europe forte, consciente de son identité politique, respectueuse des  
peuples qui la composent, assumant ses responsabilités dans le monde, prête à supporter la charge de sa défense, 
déterminée à préserver son modèle équilibré de développement économique et social, décidée à définir en toute 
indépendance et à défendre avec opiniâtreté ses intérêts diplomatiques, industriels et commerciaux, attachée 
passionnément à sa diversité culturelle. Lédification de lEurope exige de nous le meilleur : lambition et limagination  
dans la perspective, lhumilité et la ténacité dans leffort. 340 
Jai la volonté de répondre, avec dautres, à lappel de lEurope. 
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Monsieur le Directeur, 
Mesdames et Messieurs 
Permettez-moi tout d'abord de vous remercier pour votre invitation. Je suis 
heureux de m'exprimer dans un établissement dont la réputation est ancienne 
mais qui a résolument choisi de s'ouvrir aux réalités européennes. 
Vous êtes jeunes. Vous avez grandi après la chute du mur de Berlin. Vous 
n'êtes pas prisonniers des schémas de la guerre froide: l'Union élargie est votre 
horizon naturel. La discussion sur l'avenir de l'Union européenne est avant tout 
votre débat. 
Dans la patrie de Jean Monnet et de Robert Schuman, dans ce pays qui 10 
possède une conception ambitieuse du rôle de l'Union européenne dans le 
monde, je voudrais m'écarter du détail des considérations institutionnelles. Je 
ne souhaite pas vous parler de la Commission d'aujourd'hui, mais de l'Europe 
de demain. 
Il est des moments où l'Histoire laisse aux peuples un choix décisif. Je suis 
convaincu que, pour les Européens, ce moment est venu. La mondialisation 
engendre un bouleversement similaire à celui que causa, voici cinq siècles, la 
découverte de l'Amérique : le monde se rétrécit ; les échanges d'idées et de 
biens se multiplient. 
Isolément, nos Etats Nations n'ont plus la masse critique pour agir utilement. 20 
Les peuples qui pèseront sur le cours des choses seront ceux qui auront pris 
conscience de ce changement d'échelle. Les autres devront se résigner à subir. 
Face à ce bouleversement, les Européens disposent d'au moins trois sérieux 
atouts. 
Le premier est notre poids économique et commercial : du marché commun au 
marché unique, du marché unique à l'Euro, nos réalisations sont tangibles. 
Face aux défis que nous avions à affronter, nous avons su, peu à peu, élaborer 
des réponses appropriées, originales. En regard du cloisonnement économique 
qui prévalait en Europe jusqu'à peu et du carcan de régulations qui entravaient 
les entreprises et les marchés financiers, les progrès de nos économies sont 30 
impressionnants. 
Notre deuxième atout est l'élargissement qui fera de notre Union une 
puissance à l'échelle du continent. Avec l'élargissement, c'est la réunification 
de l'Europe qui se réalise, c'est l'émergence d'un pôle majeur de la vie 
internationale. Cet ensemble aura pour lui la force. Il aura aussi pour lui, et 
c'est ce qui fait sa différence, un sens aigu des responsabilités car il a été forgé 
par l'Histoire. Avec l'élargissement, cinquante ans de division idéologique 
s'achèvent. C'est aussi la victoire définitive de la démocratie sur le 
totalitarisme, fondée sur la défaite du nazisme et du fascisme et sur la chute du 
mur de Berlin. L'Union élargie sera puissante, elle ne sera jamais dominatrice. 40 
Enfin, et c'est à mes yeux le plus important, l'Union européenne possède 
comme troisième atout un capital intellectuel irremplaçable grâce à la diversité 
de ses cultures, grâce au niveau d'instruction de ses populations et à 
l'ancienneté de ses traditions démocratiques nationales . 
Grâce à ces atouts, nous ne devons pas craindre la mondialisation ; mais au 
contraire nous pouvons en tirer le meilleur. 
Près de 90 % des citoyens européens assignent à l'Union des priorités 
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ambitieuses : le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité ainsi que la lutte contre le 
chômage, contre le crime organisé et l'exclusion sociale. 
Ces mêmes citoyens ne se sentent pourtant guère concernés par la manière 50 
dont l'Union fonctionne. C'est le signe qu'il est temps de faire l'Europe 
autrement. 
A dessein, les Fondateurs avaient contourné les questions politiques trop 
brûlantes. Le rapprochement incombait aux industriels et aux marchands, 
conformément à la tradition historique de l'Europe où les négociants ont 
souvent été des précurseurs. 
Tout leur génie avait consisté à traduire une ambition politique extrêmement 
élevée, présente dès l'origine, en une série de décisions plus concrètes, 
quasiment techniques. Cette sorte de « détour » a permis l'action. Le 
rapprochement a pu s'opérer pas à pas. De l'affrontement, nous sommes passés 60 
à la volonté de coopérer dans le domaine économique, puis à l'intégration. 
Après les ajustement successifs (Acte Unique, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice), 
ma conviction est que cette méthode, qui correspondait aux contraintes et aux 
objectifs du passé, atteint aujourd'hui ses limites. Il faut la moderniser, car 
dans l'Union européenne, les temps « pré-politiques » sont révolus : derrière 
les marchands, ce sont les peuples qui aspirent à bâtir l'Union ; c'est la société 
toute entière qui se sent concernée. 
Aujourd'hui, les conditions internationales et internes pour une véritable 
politisation du processus de construction européenne sont réunies : l'heure est 
venue de prendre en main notre avenir et de le façonner. L'heure est venue de 70 
bâtir l'Europe politique. 
En redéfinissant le « projet européen », en faisant apparaître nos objectifs au 
grand jour, nous pouvons faire en sorte que les Européens s'approprient 
l'Europe. 
Je ne veux pas encore débattre sur la forme ultime que doit prendre l'Union ; je 
souhaite tenter d'esquisser pour quels projets elle doit exister et ce que nous 
voulons faire ensemble. De ce point de vue, je partage l'opinion exprimée hier 
par le Premier Ministre français Lionel Jospin : « l'Europe est d'abord un 
projet politique » 
Avant toute autre négociation institutionnelle, nous devons en premier lieu 80 
définir quels sont nos objectifs. Cette clarification préalable nous permettra de 
nous doter ensuite des instruments d'action à la hauteur de nos ambitions. 
Enfin, il nous appartient de consolider la démocratie commune. 
J'aborderai successivement ces trois points, en espérant quevous ne 
considérerez pas comme une provocation de faire, à Sciences-Po, une 
intervention en trois parties. 
1. Définir des objectifs communs 
Pour plus de clarté, je voudrais distinguer entre les objectifs internes à l'Union 
et les objectifs que celle-ci devrait avoir vis-à-vis de l'extérieur. 
Des objectifs internes 90 
C'est dans leur propre réussite que les Européens doivent trouver le sens de 
leur avenir : il existe en effet un « modèle européen », nuancé, diversifié mais 
qui nous appartient en propre. Il est le résultat d'un équilibre historique 
original entre la prospérité et le bien-être d'un côté, la recherche d'une société 
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solidaire et ouverte de l'autre. 
Prospérité, solidarité, sont bien nos principaux objectifs internes. Et il faut que 
nous soyons prospères pour pouvoir être solidaires. 
Notre prospérité actuelle ne serait pas ce qu'elle est sans le marché unique et 
l'Euro : ils ont fait de nous une puissance commerciale de premier rang, de 
taille à rivaliser avec l'économie des Etats-Unis. Ils ont permis à nos 100 
entreprises de se développer dans un environnement sûr, sans entraves aux 
échanges, ni risques de change. La compétitivité des entreprises s'est accrue, 
l'inflation est maîtrisée. Ce résultat me rend optimiste : il y a quelques années 
lorsque j'étais Président du Conseil italien- une telle perspective, avec douze 
Etats, passait pour irréaliste 
Avec l'élargissement, le futur grand marché intégré comptera sur l'apport de 
500 millions de personnes. Cette expansion interviendra dans un contexte de 
rapide évolution technologique. Je n'ai aucun doute que le résultat en soit 
bénéfique pour tous. 
Bien entendu, cet élargissement pose lui aussi dans de nouvelles perspectives, 110 
la question des solidarités. 
Le moment vient vite où nous devrons débattre de la politique agricole 
commune de demain, et de la politique structurelle après l'élargissement. 
Quel doit être le rôle d'agriculteurs dans la société du XXIème siècle ? 
Comment assurer la compétitivité et le respect des exigences des 
consommateurs ? Restons-nous d'accord pour aider les régions en retard ? 
Selon quels critères ? Comment assurer la redistribution dans un ensemble 
aussi vaste, sans administration décentralisée ? 
Seule une stratégie conçue au niveau européen peut assurer les synergies et les 
équilibres nécessaires aux politiques communes de demain. L'exigence d'une 120 
approche politique globale n'est pas contradictoire avec de nouvelles formes 
de gestion, plus proches du terrain, plus « horizontales » et qui impliquent 
encore plus directement les collectivités régionales et locales. 
Enfin, nous devons penser à ce que signifie aujourd'hui le « E » d'UEM 
(Union « économique» et monétaire) : les politiques budgétaires nationales 
sont encore trop souvent conçues sur base des intérêts nationaux, alors même 
que l'Euro nous place en position de partager les risques. Des questions se 
posent : tous les Etats prennent-ils les mesures qui assurent durablement la 
convergence ? Comment privilégier le plein-emploi sans détériorer les autres 
indicateurs ? 130 
Tout ceci est important car, sans une poursuite continue de la convergence et 
de l'intégration, le grand marché se désagrégera, et l'Euro ne pourra jouer le 
rôle mondial pour lequel nous l'avons créé. 
Le second volet, incontournable pour préserver le « modèle européen », est de 
maintenir autant que possible la cohésion de nos sociétés. 
Si nous tenons à un modèle social solidaire, « fraternel » comme dit la devise 
de votre République, nous devons également poursuivre l'intégration : seule la 
constitution d'une Union politique d'une taille suffisante nous permettra de le 
défendre à l'échelle mondiale. Il faut en effet être conscient que, dans la 
plupart des économies développées, aux Etats-Unis et au Japon notamment, 140 
mais aussi dans la majeure partie des pays européens, les inégalités de revenu 
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se creusent. 
Mesdames et Messieurs, nos sociétés ne peuvent pas, sans dommage, voir 
certains s'enrichir rapidement et d'autres rester au bord du chemin. Pour des 
motifs éthiques comme pour des raisons économiques, nous devons combattre 
les inégalités qui déchirent nos sociétés. 
Sans rêver d'une société parfaitement égalitaire, je tenais à mettre en garde 
contre le danger de voir les différences se creuser encore. Nos sociétés ne le 
supporteraient pas. Je crois que, même si le niveau moyen de revenu est 
aujourd'hui supérieur à ce qu'il était par le passé, nous ne sommes pas loin du 150 
point de rupture. 
Ensemble, nous pouvons bâtir une « nouvelle économie à l'européenne » dans 
laquelle l'innovation, la compétitivité, la liberté d'entreprendre sont des valeurs 
positives mais où l'homme demeure la suprême référence. Il ne s'agit pas, bien 
sûr, d'harmoniser toutes les règles sociales au niveau européen mais d'intégrer, 
dans nos préoccupations économiques, comme nous avons commencé de le 
faire, des objectifs sociaux : l'emploi, la lutte contre l'exclusion et la pauvreté. 
Bien des questions restent ouvertes à ce stade : jusqu'où doit aller la flexibilité 
du marché du travail? Où commence la précarité ? Comment éviter que des 
millions d'enfants grandissent dans des foyers dont les revenus sont en dessous 160 
du seuil de pauvreté ? Enfin, comment intégrer les millions d'immigrés que la 
société européenne a attirés à l'intérieur de ses frontières ? 
Actuellement, comme vous le savez, en matière sociale, les pouvoirs dévolus à 
l'Union européenne sont limités. 
Mais ce n'est pas une raison pour escamoter la discussion sur le type de société 
que nous voulons et sur les instruments absolument indispensables pour la 
bâtir. Une telle question n'est pas de celles qu'on traite par défaut. Le grand 
débat qui s'ouvre doit l'aborder par priorité. Là encore, pour être à la hauteur 
des attentes sociales de ses citoyens, l'Union a besoin de faire des choix 
généreux, et de s'y tenir ; en un mot, elle a besoin d'être gouvernée. 170 
De même, nous ne pouvons laisser de côté l'environnement : nous devons nous 
battre ensemble pour mettre en uvre, dans l'Union, une économie fondée sur 
le développement durable. Ce concept paraît abstrait à certains. Mais pour 
vous les jeunes, il ne l'est pas : c'est l'expression de la solidarité entre les 
générations. 
Dans 15 jours au Sommet de Göteborg, il sera l'objet de l'attention principale 
des Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement. 
Du reste, dans quels domaines plus que dans ceux de l'environnement, de 
l'économie et du social pouvons-nous apprécier le sens de notre Union, et sa 
valeur ajoutée ? Les événements récents (ESB, fièvre aphteuse) ont montré les 180 
conséquences catastrophiques de politiques à courte vue et étroitement 
nationales, beaucoup plus coûteuses en réalité que la prévention et l'action 
concertée à l'échelle européenne. 
L'Union a besoin d'être gouvernée, c'est à dire que les décisions 
communautaires soient prises en réfléchissant aux implications de long terme, 
en dépassant les échéances immédiates et les contraintes politiques du 
moment. 
Enfin, l'Union doit promouvoir une plus grande cohésion sociale qui suppose 
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de lutter contre les trafics, le crime organisé, et tous les fléaux qui échappent à 
l'action d'un seul Etat. 190 
Toutes ces questions, tous ces objectifs internes à l'Union que j'ai bien 
conscience d'avoir abordés de manière un peu rapide, Mesdames et Messieurs, 
sont éminemment politiques. Ils appellent une méthode de travail politique, et 
des réponses conçues avec la pleine participation des citoyens et de leurs 
représentants. 
Des objectifs externes 
Après avoir esquissé ce que pourraient être les principaux objectifs internes de 
l'Union élargie, j'en viens maintenant à nos objectifs externes. 
Etre une puissance en devenir, une « puissance potentielle » si j'ose dire, voici 
le paradoxe qui caractérise la situation de l'Europe dans le monde aujourd'hui. 200 
Nous ne devons pas nous en contenter : l'Union de demain, l'Union qui ira de 
la Méditerranée au pôle Nord, de l'Atlantique à la grande plaine d'Europe 
orientale, cette Europe là devra parvenir à parler d'une seule voix sur la scène 
mondiale. A cette condition, et seulement à cette condition, nous pourrons être 
entendus, nous pourrons agir de manière efficace. 
C'est absolument essentiel car l'Union a un rôle à jouer dans la « gouvernance 
» mondiale : dans les relations entre Etats européens, l'état de droit a remplacé 
le jeu brutal de la puissance. Après bien des guerres sanglantes, les Européens 
ont proclamé leur « droit à la paix ». C'est pourquoi, nous pouvons jouer un 
rôle tout particulier : en parachevant l'intégration, nous apportons au monde 210 
l'exemple réussi d'une méthode pour la Paix. 
Dans l'Union, le poids respectif des Etats n'est pas le seul critère, les alliances 
ne sont pas de mise. En un mot, les rapports de force sont atténués. C'est un 
acquis considérable qui pourrait faciliter la mise en place, à l'échelle 
universelle, des règles du jeu que la mondialisation exige. Nous avons aussi su 
développer les procédures de vote, caractéristiques des processus 
démocratiques, là où bien des organisations internationales piétinent à cause 
de la nécessité de l'unanimité. 
Sans agressivité envers personne, sans arrogance, nous devons être fiers de 
notre uvre et, dans notre intérêt commun, travailler à la préserver. 220 
Le premier objectif externe de l'Union devra donc être d'assurer la sécurité des 
Européens, de leur donner la stabilité politique à laquelle ils aspirent. 
Grâce notamment à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne qui sont à l'origine de la 
déclaration de Saint-Malo, l'Union a tiré des leçons des guerres balkaniques de 
la dernière décennie. Elle met en place, dans des délais très brefs, une 
politique européenne de sécurité et de défense et décide de la rendre 
opérationnelle, d'ici 2003, une force de réaction rapide de 60.000 soldats. 
Ces engagements doivent encore se concrétiser, ce qui exige une 
réorganisation en profondeur des forces armées de nos pays et des choix 
budgétaires. 230 
Enfin, pour exercer un réel leadership dans le domaine de la sécurité, l'Union 
ne devra pas, durablement, escamoter certaines questions passées sous silence 
: pour quelle cause serions-nous prêts à mourir ensemble ? Jusqu'où peut-on, 
par des montages technocratiques, « exporter de la stabilité » quand faut-il 
engager des vies humaines ? Un ensemble dépourvu d'unité politique peut-il, 
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sur le long terme, agir principalement par la distribution de crédits ? L'Union 
est-elle dotée des moyens financiers et technologiques d'assurer sa sécurité ? 
Voici bien des questions pour un vrai débat politique, au sens le plus noble du 
terme. 
Elle devra aussi, et peut-être surtout, surmonter la fragmentation et la 240 
complexité de ses instruments de politique extérieure. 
Ici je veux être clair : l'Union européenne, heureusement, a une politique 
commerciale respectée, parce que forte et intégrée. Mais une politique 
commerciale ne suffit pas à faire des relations extérieures ; une politique 
commerciale ne suffit pas à exister sur la scène mondiale. 
Or la politique extérieure de l'Union continue de balbutier. Elle n'est pas 
encore adulte, éclatée entre les diplomaties nationales, le Conseil des 
Ministres, le Haut Représentant créé par le traité d'Amsterdam, et la 
Commission. 
C'est à mon sens le domaine principal où l'Union politique peut progresser 250 
rapidement. A défaut, elle passe à côté d'une formidable valeur ajoutée. 
Enfin, et ceci est aussi un objectif externe : il y a urgence à défendre notre 
environnement, qu'il s'agisse de la préservation de la biodiversité, du 
développement d'une agriculture durable ou du réchauffement de la planète. 
Sur ce dernier point, sachez que ma détermination est entière : l'Union 
européenne se battra pour sauver l'accord de Kyoto. Il en va de notre 
leadership. Il en va de notre sens des responsabilités. 
Malgré quelques incertitudes, la majorité des scientifiques s'accordent à 
reconnaître l'urgence d'une action. Il n'est pas acceptable que les pays 
industrialisés, producteurs massifs de CO2, se dérobent à leurs devoirs. 260 
Comme je l'ai déjà écrit dans la presse française, nous sommes prêts à discuter 
avec les Etats-Unis de leurs éventuelles difficultés mais nous ne renierons pas 
cet accord. En l'état actuel des choses, le protocole de Kyoto qui est le fruit 
d'années de négociations, est la meilleure option possible. 
Ainsi, la matière ne manque pas pour des réflexions de fond. Toutes les 
interrogations de fond, toute tentative d'assigner à l'Union des objectifs à la 
hauteur du défi de la mondialisation, aboutissent à un seul diagnostic : l'Union 
a besoin de plus de cohérence et dans de nombreux domaines clés, de plus 
d'intégration. 
Un saut qualitatif est nécessaire. 270 
2. Nous devons doter l'Union des instruments de nos ambitions 
Mesdames et Messieurs, il ne suffit pas de vouloir une Europe forte, une « 
Europe puissance ». Encore faut-il lui accorder les moyens de mener sa 
politique, y compris des moyens institutionnels et financiers. Encore faut-il 
changer notre méthode de négociation, le débat politique ayant une vertu en 
soi. 
Des moyens renforcés 
La situation actuelle est assez critique : après des décennies de progrès et de 
succès, l'Union peut rester au milieu du gué. Faute d'impulsion nouvelle, faute 
d'un sursaut des Etats membres et des institutions communautaires, 280 
l'élargissement pourrait n'apporter qu'une unification continentale 
superficielle. 
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Là où les citoyens cherchent une société plus juste, ils ne trouveraient qu'une 
zone de libre échange. Je ne souhaite pas voir l'Union se transformer en un 
groupement d'Etats incapable d'agir et de développer un véritable projet 
politique. 
Contrairement à certains, je ne verrais pas un avenir brillant dans la 
multiplication de structures dites légères, des « secrétariats » ou des « comités 
de pilotage », qui ne seraient surtout pas ce serait voulu des autorités 
politiques. 290 
La démocratie en souffrirait parce que les décisions de ce type d'instances 
informelles ne seraient ni transparentes, ni soumises au Parlement européen, ni 
susceptibles de recours devant la Cour de justice. 
Les procédures communautaires offrent aux citoyens, quoiqu'en disent ses 
détracteurs, un grand nombre de garanties. A cet égard, l'apport décisif de la 
Cour de justice ne sera jamais assez souligné. Et je crois que c'est un trésor 
réel du traité de Nice, de l'avoir renforcée. 
Au bout du compte, je conclus prudemment que la structure actuelle de 
l'Union, qui abrite à la fois le pilier communautaire et des cercles 
intergouvernementaux, est probablement dépassée. 300 
J'en donne encore trois exemples : 
•  Tout d'abord, la gestion de l'Union économique et monétaire n'est ni 
efficace, ni cohérente : dans le domaine monétaire, la Banque Centrale 
Européenne est indépendante mais elle n'a pas aujourd'hui 
d'interlocuteur stable qui représente une vision d'ensemble des 
orientations économiques de l'Union et de ses membres. Les dernières 
grandes orientations de politique économique vont dans la bonne 
direction, mais il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour disposer d'un vrai 
« gouvernement économique ». Seule la Commission, sur mandat du 
Conseil, peut être l'interlocuteur de la Banque centrale : c'est elle en 310 
effet qui incarne l'intérêt général communautaire, c'est en son sein que 
peut s'effectuer efficacement l'évaluation globale de la politique 
économique de l'Union. Toute autre solution, conçue pour règler le 
problème de la représentation externe de l'Euro, ne répondrait pas aux 
besoins. 
•  En politique étrangère, le Premier Ministre hier, a exprimé un très 
grand nombre de vérités desquelles je me sens proche. Je voudrais 
rester dans sa logique avec mon deuxième exemple : en politique 
étrangère comme ailleurs, il est illusoire d'attendre des résultats d'un 
système intergouvernemental. 320 
La cohérence et la globalité ne sera atteinte, là comme ailleurs, que par la 
conjonction des deux branches de l'exécutif : le Conseil qui décide, et la 
Commission qui exécute. C'est pourquoi je continue de penser que le Haut 
Représentant, qui fait d'ailleurs un travail remarquable, serait beaucoup plus 
efficace encore s'il était également membre de la Commission européenne. 
Tout cela serait de l'exécution sous contrôle permanent du Conseil des 
Ministres. Mais plus simple, plus cohérent, plus efficace. 
o Dernier exemple : l'Europe de la justice et des affaires 
intérieures. Des domaines aussi sensibles pour les libertés 
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publiques que le droit pénal ou la coopération entre les forces 330 
de l'ordre, échappent au contrôle du Parlement et de la Cour 
parce qu'ils sont traités dans des cercles intergouvernementaux. 
Est-ce là l'Europe que nous voulons durablement? 
Je ressens souvent comme injuste que soit reproché à l'Union son caractère 
non démocratique, alors même que, pour certaines des politiques soumises à 
ces critiques, les règles communautaires ne s'appliquent pas ! 
D'une manière beaucoup plus générale, nous devons mener à terme le 
processus qui conduit à remplacer le consensus par le vote, procédure normale 
dans un espace démocratique. 
Il s'agit de tendre vers un système de décision qui repose sur le vote, système 340 
efficace et compréhensible par tous. Et de ce point de vue, je ne puis que 
répéter combien le résultat du Conseil européen de Nice, en matière 
d'extension du vote à la majorité qualifiée, me laisse perplexe. 
Mais il s'agit plus encore d'acquérir tout à fait une culture majoritaire, dans 
laquelle les décisions reflètent la volonté du plus grand nombre, mais 
s'imposent à tous. Trop souvent, nous cherchons le consensus même quand 
celui-ci n'existe pas, ce qui entraîne la paralysie. Pour surmonter les réticences 
de quelquesuns, il n'y a qu'une solution : voter. 
Tout ce qui a été construit de durable en Europe l'a été par la coopération 
harmonieuse des Etats et des institutions supranationales autour d'une méthode 350 
: la méthode communautaire. 
Le génie des fondateurs a justement consisté à proposer une construction 
institutionnelle originale qui ne soit ni fédérale, ni intergouvernementale. C'est 
bien parce que la Communauté économique européenne a surmonté ce 
dilemme entre « super Etat » et « Etats juxtaposés » qu'elle est entrée dans 
l'histoire. C'est en ce qu'elle rassemble, au lieu d'aiguiser la confrontation, 
qu'elle est une solution d'avenir. 
A la fois comme ancien président du Conseil italien et comme Président de la 
Commission, voilà ma conception, exigeante, du débat sur l'avenir de 
l'Europe. 360 
Une nouvelle méthode communautaire, fondée sur le débat 
Le débat est ouvert de façon large, partout en Europe : il a la vertu de 
permettre les explications, de démythifier ce qui est compliqué ou mal perçu. 
Le débat éclaire les tendances profondes. Ainsi en est-il de la rédaction de la 
Charte des Droits Fondamentaux, proclamée à Nice. Elle est le signe que 
l'Union a franchi une étape irréversible. D'une Union des marchés nous 
sommes passés, définitivement, par sa proclamation, à une Union des droits et 
des libertés. Ces droits et ces libertés forment le socle fondamental de l'Union. 
Ils lui confèrent une légitimité indispensable et lancent un processus 
constitutionnel européen nouveau. 370 
Le débat semble parfois se polariser : ainsi en est-il actuellement de la 
question de la répartition des compétences entre l'Union et les Etats. C'est une 
question centrale, car un enjeu du débat sur l'avenir de l'Europe est d'offrir aux 
citoyens une Europe dans laquelle ils se sentent à l'aise, c'est à dire où ils 
jouent un rôle politique à la fois au niveau local, national et européen. 
L'enracinement local est nécessaire dans un monde ouvert, globalisé, qui peut 
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faire peur. Les Nations sont et demeureront un cadre essentiel, en raison de 
notre Histoire et de nos cultures. Mais sans le niveau européen, nous sommes 
condamnés au mieux à subir des normes venues d'ailleurs, à subir un monde 
conçu en d'autres lieux. 380 
C'est pourquoi le besoin se fait sentir de mieux comprendre la répartition des 
responsabilités en Europe. Toutefois, la réponse, à mon sens, ne doit pas 
seulement être cherchée en termes de compétences abstraites, dans des 
cloisonnements étanches ou définitifs. 
Nous devons moins encourager les cloisonnements, quels qu'ils soient, que 
permettre aux différents niveaux de décider de façon complémentaire. 
Il faut répondre à l'aspiration générale des populations d'être gouvernées au 
plus près toutes les fois où c'est possible, et efficacement, ce qui implique, 
dans certains, cas des décisions à l'échelon central européen plutôt que local 
ou national. 390 
C'est ce que résume le concept de « subsidiarité » bien compris. L'Union n'a 
pas à s'occuper de tout : elle doit se recentrer sur des tâches stratégiques, 
donner des orientations, jouer son rôle global. 
Je suis bien conscient qu'un exercice de répartition des compétences entre le 
niveau national et le niveau européen, comporte un risque : celui de n'être 
qu'une répétition, par d'autres moyens, des débats et des désaccords sur la 
substance même du projet européen. 
Pour certains, il s'agira surtout de « re-nationaliser » des compétences 
transférées ou, à l'inverse, d'en « communautariser » de nouvelles, selon des 
critères tirés de la sensibilité de l'opinion sur tel ou tel sujet, ou des finances 400 
publiques. 
Pour ma part, j'entrerai dans ce débat sans arrière-pensée, en pensant au fond, 
et en cherchant au cas par cas, de quelle manière nous pouvons le mieux 
atteindre nos objectifs : par des compétences séparées ou partagées. Même si 
cela peut paraître compliqué, nous devons raisonner par fonction et laisser au 
système de la souplesse. 
Je prendrai un exemple pour illustrer ce propos : celui de l'éducation. 
Il est clair que la responsabilité première doit rester aux Etats ou aux régions. 
Mais le niveau européen a certainement une valeur ajoutée à apporter, 
notamment : 410 
•  en facilitant les échanges, la reconnaissance mutuelle des diplômes et 
l'adoption des grilles harmonisées d'évaluation des compétences 
acquises ; 
•  en permettant de confronter les expériences sur des sujets tels que la 
lutte contre l'échec scolaire, la formation continue, la violence à l'école, 
etc 
•  en offrant des bourses et en encourageant la constitution de centres de 
recherche performants. 
Pour conclure sur la subsidiarité, il me paraît essentiel que le contrôle de celleci 
incombe à la Cour de justice, organe indépendant dont la vocation est 420 
d'arbitrer les conflits, à l'instar des cours constitutionnelles de nos Etats. 
Confier ce contrôle à une « deuxième chambre » ou « chambre des Nations », 
constituerait un recul du droit dans l'Union européenne, un pas vers l'arbitraire 
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de la conjoncture politique. 
Ceci m'amène à mon troisième et dernier point. 
3. Consolider la démocratie commune 
La démocratie européenne n'échappera pas aux grandes questions du droit 
constitutionnel telles qu'elles ont été forgées, peu à peu, pour les Etats Nations 
, notamment celles qui ont trait à la séparation des pouvoirs entre exécutif, 
législatif et judiciaire, si vous me permettez d'employer une expression 430 
anglaise, aux « checks and balances » ou encore à celle du consentement à 
l'impôt. 
Toutes ces questions sont ouvertes. Nous devrons y apporter des réponses 
aussi exigeantes que nos traditions démocratiques nationales. Pour moi, 
comme pour l'ensemble du collège des commissaires qui compte une grande 
majorité d'élus, d'anciens ministres, c'est absolument essentiel. 
Si les questions sont celles du droit constitutionnel classique, les réponses 
devront néanmoins être originales. Plaquer sur la réalité communautaire des 
solutions nationales est une tentation, mais probablement pas toute la solution. 
Parmi les défis spécifiques que l'UE doit relever, l'un des plus difficiles est 440 
celui de la légitimation démocratique de ses décisions. Chacun en ressent le 
besoin, mais rien n'est plus subjectif. 
En réalité, je m'étonne toujours de l'idée tenace que les institutions 
européennes souffrent d'un déficit de « légitimation » ; car après tout 
•  le Conseil est composé de membres des gouvernements nationaux ; 
•  la Commission est nommée par les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement et 
approuvée par le Parlement européen ; elle peut être censurée par le 
Parlement. 
•  la plupart des textes européens sont débattus, soit dans les Parlements 
nationaux, soit l'enceinte parlementaire européenne, soit dans les deux. 450 
Mais telle est la perception. Le citoyen veut avoir la garantie qu'il ne cède pas 
des compétences à des institutions moins fiables que celles qu'il connaît au 
niveau national. 
Sans doute nos institutions sont-elles trop compliquées. D'où ce paradoxe : là 
où les pouvoirs communautaires sont précis (concurrence, commerce 
extérieur), même s'ils sont étendus, l'autorité suit. Là où ils sont peu clairs ou 
complexes, l'autorité communautaire peine à s'affirmer. 
La question de la transparence au niveau communautaire s'entrecroise 
d'ailleurs avec une question encore plus complexe, que je pourrais résumer 
ainsi : comment peut-on gérer les politiques communautaires avec la 460 
participation des citoyens, dans une organisation beaucoup plus décentralisée 
qu'actuellement ? 
Je crois en effet qu'il est très difficile d'améliorer le fonctionnement des 
institutions européennes sans en même temps procéder, dans le cadre des 
règles existantes, à une révision approfondie des mécanismes de participation 
des entités nationales et infra-nationales, d'interactions et de gestion 
décentralisée des politiques communes. C'est tout l'enjeu d'un livre blanc sur la 
« gouvernance », que la Commission rendra public en juillet. 
L'autre aspect essentiel de l'édification d'une démocratie est celui du 
consentement à l'impôt. Pour moi, toute réflexion d'envergure sur l'avenir de 470 
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l'UE doit comporter à son ordre du jour la réforme de son financement. 
La question des ressources européennes doit faire partie intégrante du débat 
sur la subsidiarité : chaque échelon de décision doit pouvoir compter sur des 
ressources identifiées, proportionnées aux missions qui lui ont été confiées. 
Dans la perspective de l'élargissement, la création d'un impôt européen (à 
définir) remplaçant le système actuel de contributions nationales, source 
permanente de conflits entre Etats, serait sans doute une solution opportune, 
d'ailleurs souvent évoquée. Des solutions existent, les difficultés étant moins 
techniques que politiques : la concentration des marchés financiers et 
industriels permet d'en imaginer d'autres. 480 
Nous devrions aussi ouvrir un débat sur le niveau du budget européen. Celuici 
donne lieu à des critiques assez peu objectives, voire irrationnelles, laissant 
entendre que l'UE coûte cher. Pourtant, qui a les ordres de grandeur en tête ? 
Qui sait que nous ne consacrons pas même à l'Union européenne 1,27 % de 
notre richesse, Politique agricole et Fonds structurels inclus ?.L'ordre de 
grandeur actuel serait plutôt de 1,09 %. 
Dans le débat qui a débuté et qui doit durer jusqu'en 2004, je discerne deux 
approches : certains privilégient le fond, d'autres donnent la priorité aux 
institutions. 
Je ne vois pas de contradiction entre ces deux manière d'aborder la discussion. 490 
Je partage le souci des uns et des autres. 
Comme je l'ai dit au début de mon propos, c'est en dévoilant ses objectifs, c'est 
en révélant qu'elle est un projet politique que l'Union pourra se construire. 
Nous devons donc commencer par débattre entre nous de ce que nous voulons 
faire ensemble, comme Lionel Jospin nous y a invités hier. Sans projet 
commun, sans politiques communes, il n'y aura pas d'Europe forte. 
Mais ensuite, une fois que nous aurons défini la substance, nous devrons 
rapidement tirer les conséquences de nos ambitions : sans institutions fortes et 
respectées, sans moyens financiers, il n'y aura pas non plus « d'Europe 
puissance ». Le danger qui nous guette est celui du consensus sur un statu quo 500 
apparent alors même que le monde change, alors même que l'Union change. 
C'est pourquoi le Chancelier Schröder va dans la bonne direction lorsqu'il 
propose une clarification des rôles respectifs de la Commission et du Conseil 
des ministres. 
Nous ne devons jamais oublier non plus que sans clarification des rôles des 
différentes institutions, ni implication active, dans la construction européenne, 
des échelons nationaux et infra nationaux, il n'y aura pas de démocratie. Sans 
citoyens qui se sentent politiquement concernés aux trois niveaux local, 
national et européen, il n'y aura pas de large adhésion des populations. 
C'est à la synthèse entre ces deux approches que j'entends travailler. C'est en 510 
ce sens que nous devons poursuivre la discussion pour 2004, et que je souhaite 
maintenant répondre à vos questions. 
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Regeringen fremlægger i dag synspunkter om Europas fremtid og den videre  
udvikling af dansk europapolitik. 
Jeg er glad for denne lejlighed til at sætte disse synspunkter ind i en bredere  
historisk og international ramme: 
Uanset hvor gode holdninger, vi har i Danmark, så vil vi aldrig alene ændre  
verdens gang. Dét har vi kun en chance for i samarbejde med andre. 
Derfor er det Danmarks interesse, at der udvikles et langt stærkere og mere  
forpligtende internationalt fællesskab. 
Den Europæiske Union er det mest forpligtende fællesskab, vi er med i. 
EU-samarbejdet er vævet så tæt, at det er gjort umuligt mellem os indbyrdes at  10 
gentage den nære, blodige fortid. Ved at eksportere varer og ideer til hinanden i  
stedet for krige og kriser har landene i fællesskab opnået en vældig økonomisk  
og social fremgang. 
Danmarks medlemskab af EU er den helt afgørende forudsætning for, at vi kan 
varetage vores interesser og præge verden med vore holdninger. 
Derfor skal dansk udenrigspolitik have til formål at styrke EU, så vi sammen med 
vore EU-partnere med langt større kraft kan præge hele den globale udvikling. 
Vores egne sidste 50 år med fred, frihed og velstand, risikerer kun at blive en 
parentes mellem nogle af verdenshistoriens katastrofer, hvis ikke denne opgave 
lykkes for os: 20 
For vi har i den moderne verden et uafviseligt skæbnefællesskab med andre  
lande og verdensdele. Deres ufred, ufrihed og fattigdom bliver også vores  
problem, når sult og had udløser krige og folkevandringer, og giver grobund for 
stærke mænd med nemme, populistiske løsninger. 
EU har udviklet sig til det eneste mulige samlingssted, når Europas lande fra nord 
til syd, fra øst til vest i fællesskab skal møde globaliseringens udfordringer. Og  
det er ikke mindst gennem udvidelsen af EU, at vi kan bidrage til sikkerhed og 
velstand på vores eget kontinent. 
Alligevel er den folkelige opbakning til EU langt fra en given sag. Det er 
demonstreret ved to danske folkeafstemninger de sidste 10 år og i Irland for et  30 
par måneder siden. 
Tvivlen om EU er næppe udtryk for, at nationerne står splittet i to helt uenige 
befolkningsgrupper. Den er snarere udtryk for modstridende stemninger inde i 
hovedet på de fleste af os: 
Vi har både de stærke følelser knyttet til nationen og en sansning af nytten i det 
europæiske samarbejde. 
Mange af os gik for 30 år siden imod dansk medlemsskab af Det Europæiske 
Fællesskab, fordi vi frygtede, at synspunkter, der var fjendtlige over for vores 
ønsker om velfærd og afspænding, skulle blive toneangivende . 
Men vi har oplevet en udvikling, der blev anderledes positiv. Vi ser et  40 
samarbejde, hvor fælles værdier om menneskeret og social retfærdighed står  
langt stærkere, end vi turde tro for 30 år siden - og hvor gamle diktaturer har  
fundet - eller er ved at finde - deres plads i fællesskabet som nye demokratier. 
Vi står med en ny og spændende virkelighed. En virkelighed, som man kan  
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vælge at være med i og påvirke indholdet i. Eller være uden for indflydelse på, 
men alligevel ude af stand til at frigøre sig fra. 
Der tales om at bygge bro i dansk europapolitik. 
Der kan ikke bygges bro til dem, der fornægter realiteterne om det europæiske 
samarbejde, og som lever politisk af at nære fordomme og frygt for fremtiden,  
det fremmede og de fremmede. 50 
Men der kan og skal bygges bro mellem det nationale særpræg, vi vil fastholde,  
og dét europæiske samarbejde, vi ikke kan undvære. 
Min tale i dag er et forsøg på denne form for brobyggeri. 
Udgangspunktet må være kampen for en bedre verden. Hvilke problemer ønsker 
befolkningen vi skal løse? Herfra må vi identificere de kerneområder, hvor et 
forpligtende fællesskab er nødvendigt for løsningen. Ændringer i traktaten og 
reformer af EUs institutioner kan være forudsætninger for løsningen. Men de kan 
aldrig været målet i sig selv. Slet ikke i forsøget på at sparke en folkelig debat i 
gang. 
Jeg vil gennem min beskrivelse bl.a. forsøge at give en vision for Europa i 2010. 60 
Ikke som en simpel fremskrivning. Heller ikke som et fantasifuldt hjernespind. 
Derimod som en realistisk vision, der tager højde både for uomgængelige 
udfordringer og for uafviselige synspunkter fra vore samarbejdspartnere. 
Rå markedskræfter eller internationalt samfund? 
Globalisering er kodeordet for den vældige forandring i økonomi, teknologi, 
jobmuligheder og levevilkår, der foregår, og som med stor hast spreder sine 
virkninger til alle hjørner af kloden. Gamle job forsvinder og nye frembringes i 
meget højt tempo. Hele industrier flyttes rundt mellem lande og verdensdele. 
Verden som helhed bliver uden al tvivl rigere af udviklingen. Globaliseringen 
betyder vækst i produktion, handel og produktivitet. Også mange fattige lande  70 
får del i denne fremgang. 
Globalisering er ikke defineret ved et bestemt indhold og et bestemt resultat. 
Det eneste, der er helt sikkert, er, at der findes ikke nogen hemmelig sti tilbage  
til de lukkede nationalstater fra årtier tilbage. Vores globalt gensidige  
afhængighed er lige så umulig at vende sig væk fra, som det er for ægget at 
komme tilbage i skallen, når det først er slået ud på den varme pande. 
Men globaliseringen stiller både til det enkelte menneske og til det enkelte land 
større krav om viden og omstillingsevne. Derfor risikerer socialt og 
uddannelsesmæssigt svage at blive hægtet af. 
Det kræver både nationalt og globalt et stærkt samfund til at modvirke  80 
tendensen til endnu større ulighed i og mellem landene. 
Men dén verden, der lige nu udfolder sig for vore øjne, er politisk ustruktureret  
og økonomisk dereguleret. 
En alt for stor del af verden hærges af ekstrem fattigdom, sult, sygdom, 
underudvikling og undertrykkelse. 
I mange u-lande og tidligere sovjetrepublikker forhindrer traditioner og uduelige  
og korrupte systemer mobilisering af enorme menneskelige ressourcer, mens 
uklare retstilstande blokerer for investering udefra. 
Markedskræfternes frie løb på tværs af grænserne har mange andre  
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konsekvenser end altid at udløse en fri konkurrence til uomtvistelig gavn for 90 
forbrugere og borgere. 
Det internationale erhvervsliv samles i disse år i firmaer, der i mange tilfælde er 
større og stærkere end middelstore nationalstater. I mange udviklingslande og 
tidligere sovjetrepublikker opleves sådanne firmaer let som nye kolonimagter,  
der rykker ind. 
Et ganske lille antal selskaber sidder på det meste af verdenshandlen. Derfor har 
de multinationale giganter ofte en monopollignende position på væsentlige dele  
af verdensmarkedet. Mange oplever f.eks., at national kultur trues af  
amerikansk-domineret underholdningsindustri. 
De internationale kapitalmarkeder kendetegnes af umådeholden spekulation,  100 
hvor enorme værdier skabes og destrueres, og hvor formuer flyttes voldsomt og 
vilkårligt rundt over grænserne med dramatiske konsekvenser for millioner af 
mennesker. 
Globaliseringen er også skatteparadiser, hvor dem med de hurtige gevinster kan 
slappe af uden at bidrage til et fællesskab. Der er voldsom og 
grænseoverskridende økonomisk kriminalitet. Mafiaer organiserer storstilet 
smugling af mennesker, der drives på vandring af elendigheden i deres  
hjemlande. 
Dét er alle disse fænomener, der hos mange mennesker efterlader et billede af 
globalisering lig med rå markedskræfter, der skaber ulighed, ustabilitet og  110 
konflikt. 
Verdens uorden er kendetegnet ved mangel på tilstrækkeligt stærke globale 
organisationer og aftaler - og ved eksistensen af kun én supermagt, der aktuelt 
regeres af meget stærk tro på markedskræfterne og de nationale egeninteresser. 
Det er EU, der har det bedste udgangspunkt for at modvirke verdens uorden. 
EU er i dag det eneste nogenlunde effektivt organiserede regionale samarbejde i 
verden. 
I de fleste europæiske lande har vi oplevet det anderledes positivt, at der var en 
balance mellem samfund og marked. Vi har set kvaliteten i, at stat, lov og 
civilsamfund var en stærk ramme, der kunne afbalancere pengemagten. 120 
Derfor har vi opbygget etEU, der forsøger at anvende disse erfaringer regionalt. 
EU-kommissionens vetomod fusion mellem General Electric og Honeywell var et 
slagkraftigt eksempelpå, at EU også globalt kan gå op mod skabelsen af endnu  
en dominerende multinational gigant. 
De vigtigste politiske opgaver i første del af det 21. århundrede er netop at 
opbygge denne balance mellem samfundsregulering og markedskræfter også 
internationalt. At vi forpligter hinanden. Og at vi opbygger en international orden 
uden dominans fra noget enkelt land eller nogen enkelt region. 
International solidaritet - global deal 
Under den danske regerings formandskab i den vestlige verdens økonomiske 130 
samarbejdsorganisation (OECD) i dette forår fik vi opbakning til at formulere  
nogle retningslinier for en global deal  en global pagt, der forpligter. 
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Global deal er summen afalt det, som skal blive resultatet af en ny runde 
iverdenshandelsforhandlingerne (WTO) og af verdenstopmødet om bæredygtig 
udvikling iJohannesburg i september 2002 - 10 årefter Rio-mødet: 
Udviklingsbistanden må løftes og de fattigste u-lande må have afskrevet gæld.  
Alle rige lande må forpligte sig til at opfylde FNs krav om en u-landsindsats på 
mindst 0,7 pct. af nationalindkomsten. Hvis kravet bliver opfyldt vil den globale 
udviklingsbistand bliver tredoblet . 
Øget u-landsbistand måkobles til en langt stærkere indsats mod de globale 140 
miljøproblemer. 
Udvikling kræver sundhed. En fælles indsats  især gennem FN  skal rette 
effektive angreb på morderiske epidemier som aids, malaria og tuberkulose. Det 
handler både om massiv indsats for at forebygge smitte, for at opbygge et 
fungerende sundhedsvæsen og sikre, at de multinationale selskaber leverer 
livsvigtig medicin til priser, som ludfattige stater og mennesker kan betale. 
Udvikling kræver også bedre betingelser for overførsel af teknologi fra den rige 
verden. 
Men udvikling kræver  allervigtigst - at u-landene ikke mødes af told og 
importbegrænsninger på vore markeder - og at de ikke afskæres ved snedige 150 
definitioner af såkaldte anti-dumping-regler. 
En ny runde i WTO skal netop være en udviklingsrunde med fokus på de fattige 
landes adgang og reelle muligheder for at komme ind på de rige landes  
markeder på for dem vigtige områder. 
De rige lande må uden modydelser åbne for de fattigste lande. EU er gået i 
spidsen ved Everything-but-arms-initiativet i foråret 2001, der efter nogle år  
giver verdens 48 fattigste lande fuldstændig fri markedsadgang for alle andre 
produkter end våben. 
Øget markedsadgang for u-landene vil kræve massive opgør med velerhvervede 
interesser. Det vil forudsætte omvæltninger i EUs landbrugsstøtteordninger og 160 
USA's lokale begunstigelser af landmændene. Det skal vi i de rige lande være 
villige til at acceptere, samtidig med at vi giver u-landene praktisk hjælp til at lære 
og udnytte de internationale handelsregler bedst muligt. 
Men samtidig skal viinsistere på sammenhæng mellem frihandel og international 
orden i form afforpligtende globale miljøaftaler og respekt for fundamentale 
socialerettigheder - jfr. aftalerne i den internationale arbejdsorganisation ILO. 
Detskal vi ikke gøre for ad bagvejen at beskytte vore egne industrier, men for 
atsikre, at den globale udvikling bliver miljømæssigt og socialt bæredygtig. 
Global deal har også et sikkerhedspolitisk perspektiv. Ufred opstår ikke mindst  
af armod . Men fred kommer ikke automatisk i kølvandet på økonomisk og social 170 
fremgang. Derfor må internationalt økonomisk samarbejde gå hånd i hånd med 
aftaler om bilæggelse af konflikter, nedrustning osv. 
International orden og EUs fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik 
International orden kræver stærke globale organisationer og aftaler. 
Derfor er der brug for en styrkelse af De Forenede Nationers rolle. Det handler  
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om større autoritet til Generalsekretæren og til Sikkerhedsrådet. Det sidste 
forudsætter en reform, hvor Rådets permanente medlemskreds kommer til at 
afspejle den moderne verdens realiteter - og ikke situationen i 1945. 
Det ville være ønskeligt med større økonomi og slagkraft i FNs  
særorganisationer og bedre samordning mellem FN-systemet, Verdensbanken og 180 
Den internationale Valutafond og Verdenshandelsorganisationen (WTO). 
Men en stærkere international orden kræver stærke regioner, fordi det er  
umuligt at bringe 200 lande i verden ind i et mere forpligtende samarbejde uden 
stærk regional samordning. 
I denne sammenhæng er EUs fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik en positiv og 
vigtig faktor. 
Repræsenteret ved Solana som Ministerrådets Høje Repræsentant plus  
EU-formandskabet og udenrigskommissær Patten  er EU i færd med engagere 
sig mere aktivt i løsningen af konflikter verden over: 
Et EU, der optræder anderledes enigt end i starten af 1990erne, har meget  190 
aktivt forsøgt at inddæmme Balkans nyeste etniske konflikt i Makedonien . I nært 
samspil med USA er EU i færd at spille en mere samlet og selvstændig rolle i 
forsøgene på at bremse den tragiske og vanvittige konflikt i Mellemøsten . EU har 
formuleret en samlet strategi for konfliktløsning på det hærgede afrikanske 
kontinent . Endelig har EU taget et selvstændigt intiativ for at genoplive 
solskinspolitikken mellem de to Korea -stater og på ny få USA engageret i 
processen. 
EUs fælles militære og civile krisestyringsstyrke er ved at blive opstillet, og kan 
rykke ud fra 2003 med deltagelse fra europæiske NATO-lande og ansøgerlande. 
Den militære kapacitet udvikles i tæt samarbejde med NATO og med støtte fra 200 
USA. FNs generalsekretær forudser, at EUs krisestyringsstyrke kan udvikle sig  
til at være FNs hidtil stærkeste arm , når det gælder hurtig og massiv indsats for  
at standse eller forebygge konflikter rundt om i verden. 
Desværre betyder det danske forsvarsforbehold, at vore soldater ikke kan  
deltage i sådanne militære aktioner under EUs ledelse. Konsekvenserne af det 
danske forbehold bliver anderledes og mere negative end oprindeligt forudset: Vi 
kan blive afskåret fra at deltage i fredsbevarende aktioner af samme art som  
dem, hvor vi i fem årtier har været i front under FNs eller NATOs ledelse. 
Men EUs fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik vil i de kommende år blive  
udfoldet med en palet af fælles politiske, økonomiske og militære virkemidler,  210 
hvor Danmark kan være med men ikke til at skabe fred. 
Den fælles politik er ikke mindst i de små EU-landes interesse, fordi den kan 
dæmpe de stores behov for eller tilbøjelighed til at spille soloroller på den 
internationale scene. Det vil langsigtet være en logisk konsekvens af EUs 
stærkere globale rolle at få en fælles EU-repræsentation i FNs sikkerhedsråd og 
G7/G8-kredsen, en styrket position i Verdensbanken og Valutafonden, og fælles 
repræsentation i andre internationale forhandlingsfora. 
EU - USA - partnerskab og modspil 
Forholdet til USA - verdens eneste nuværende supermagt og en økonomisk  
styrke af samme størrelse som EU  er naturligvis af meget stor vigtighed. 220 
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Det er åbenbart, at der eksisterer et stærkt, men modsætningsfyldt partnerskab. 
USAs lederskab i NATO har i årtier været den fundamentale sikkerhedsgaranti  
for Europa. Vi ønsker at fastholde det amerikanske engagement i Europa gennem 
partnerskab i et NATO, der udstrækkes til de øvrige nye demokratier i  
Østeuropa. Vi ønsker et nært samarbejde mellem EU og USA om krisestyring og 
konfliktforebyggelse. 
Samtidig er det åbenbart, at EU har mange fælles synspunkter, holdninger og 
værdier, som vi i stigende grad vil søge at præge det internationale samfund  
med, og som er i modsætning til synspunkterne hos den nye amerikanske 
regering. 230 
Der er meget langt en fælles europæisk tilgang til at regulere markedskræfter og 
skabe velfærd for at hjælpe de svage på markedet. Og vi er modstandere af 
dødsstraf og mener ikke, at private borgere skal have lov at gå med håndvåben. 
Der er en stærk fælles europæisk prioritering af aftaler, der kan løse de 
fundamentale globale miljøproblemer eller bidrager til nedrustning og  
afspænding: 
Kyoto-protokollen om indsats for klimaopvarmende drivhusgasser er et klart 
eksempel på konflikt mellem et EU, der kæmper for et internationalt forpligtende 
aftalesystem, og et USA, der afviser aftaler, der kolliderer med landets snævre 
nationale, økonomiske interesser. 240 
Men der er også stærke holdninger i Europa om, at ABM-traktaten ikke ensidigt 
bør opsiges for at starte udviklingen af et omstridt missilskjold. 
Europa vil gerne sikre aftalerne om f.eks. forbud mod landminer, om den 
internationale straffedomstol, om protokollen til håndhævelse af forbudet mod 
biologiske våben - og vi vil gerne have en stærkere kontrol med udbredelsen af 
lette våben. 
EU er reelt vores slagkraftige, progressive platform i kamp for global  
menneskelig udvikling. 
Det blev illustreret, da det i sidste måned lykkedes EU at formidle et globalt 
kompromis mellem 179 lande, der fastholder det fundamentale i  250 
Kyoto-protokollen - men uden USA. 
EU har en helt central opgave i at holde en dialog i gang med USA, forsøge at få 
amerikanerne med i forpligtende internationale aftaler og modvirke ny 
isolationisme i USA. 
USA og EU har stærke fælles interesser i at sikre en positiv udvikling i 
verdensøkonomien  derunder vor indbyrdes samhandel. Det er ønskeligt at få  
en forhandlingsløsning på indbyrdes konflikter mellem EU og USA, der kan  
placere os på samme side i de globale forhandlinger om handelsliberalisering. 
Hvis ikke det er muligt at få tilstrækkelig amerikansk forståelse for en global  
deal til fordel for u-landene, så må EU igen på egen hånd sætte sig i spidsen. 260 
EUs partnerskab med andre regioner 
EUs samarbejde med andre regioner vil udfolde sig i ringe - efter geografisk 
nærhed og interessefællesskab: 
Samarbejdet  ikke mindst med de nære naboer i øst og syd - må have fredelig 
konfliktløsning, opgør med autoritære og korrupte samfundsstrukturer, og  
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respekt for menneskerettighederne som en meget afgørende del af den fælles 
dagsorden. 
Det vil være af helt central betydning for EU at udvikle et tæt samarbejde med 
Rusland og Ukraine - og med Tyrkiet i dén årrække, hvor landet er kandidat til 
medlemskab. 270 
Det skal være et partnerskab, der effektivt understøtter økonomisk, social og 
demokratisk udvikling af disse store og vigtige nabolande til Den Europæiske 
Union . 
For det er kun en stakket frist for stabiliteten i Europa, hvis udvidelsen med de  
12+ blot flytter fattigdomsgrænsen i Europa nogle hundrede kilometer østpå,  
men til gengæld uddyber den dramatisk. 
På samme måde vil stabilitets- og associeringsaftaler med landene langs 
Middelhavets syd- og østkyst være afgørende for at bringe Nordafrika og 
Mellemøsten ind i positiv udvikling. 
Men EU har en central rolle i hele verdenssamfundet. 280 
Det gælder i forholdet til økonomiske magter som Japan, Canada, Kina  
og Indien. 
Kina og Japan indgår sammen med Sydkorea og de vigtigste lande i Sydøstasien  
i ASEM-samarbejdet med EU, hvor der i september 2002 skal afholdes topmøde i 
København under det danske formandskab for EU. 
ASEM-samarbejdet rummer muligheder for en helt ny og stærkere  
europæisk-asiatisk dialog om handel, udveksling, forskning, kultur, global 
sikkerhed og bekæmpelse af kriminalitet over grænserne. 
Desuden har EU en åbenbar og central rolle i at understøtte udviklingen af andre 
regionale samarbejdsorganisationer, så de kan spille bedre sammen med EU om 290 
udviklingen af en ny global orden. 
ASEAN-samarbejdet i Sydøstasien, Mercosur i Sydamerika og SADC i det sydlige 
Afrika er gode eksempler på sådanne regionale organisationer. 
Udvidelsen  ophævelsen af Europas deling 
En europæisk union af mere end dobbelt så mange lande som i dag er den 
smukkeste indsats for nabosolidaritet og den bedste investering i langsigtet 
tryghed og sikkerhed for vore egne børn og børnebørn, som denne generation af 
vesteuropæere kan gøre. 
EUs mål må være at udvide sin medlemskreds så meget som fællesskabet kan 
bære, uden at grundlaget udhules og samarbejdet udvandes og svækkes. 300 
EUs udvidelse med de nye demokratier i Central- og Østeuropa er vores  
vigtigste historiske opgave ved starten af det 21. århundrede. De positive 
perspektiver for fred, demokrati og velstand i de tidligere kommunistiske 
diktaturstater kan ikke overvurderes. 
Jeg ser med glæde frem til, at vi om få år måske sidder dobbelt så mange lande 
om bordet i EUs ministerråd: Vel vidende, at det bliver en vældig udfordring at  
få tyskere, briter, danskere, portugisere, estere, polakker og ungarere og alle de 
andre til at enes om fælles mindstekrav til f.eks. miljø, arbejdsforhold og 
selskabsskat. 
Perspektivet for medlemskab omfatter ikke kun dé 12 kandidatlande, der er i  310 
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gang med forhandlinger - og hvoraf forhåbentlig op til 10 kan blive fulde 
medlemmer indenfor de næste 3 år. 
Det vil styrke de nordiske synspunkter og værdier i EU, hvis også Norge og  
Island kommer med. Derfor skal de være meget velkomne, hvis de beslutter sig  
for medlemskab. 
Schweiz ville ligeledes være et naturligt medlem, men er måske ikke uden videre 
med på et ønskeligt fælles europæisk opgør med internationale skattely. 
Perspektivet er imidlertid også, at EUs stabilitets- og associeringsaftaler 
udstrækkes til alle landene på det vestlige Balkan og bidrager til fred, stabilitet, 
interetnisk samarbejde, demokrati og økonomisk udvikling, så også disse lande 320 
kan få et perspektiv om inden for de næste par årtier at søge fuldt medlemskab. 
Lige nu ser vi omsider demokratiske, reformvenlige regeringer i Kroatien,  
Serbien og Albanien. De må støttes og opmuntres i opgøret med den nære fortid. 
Medlemskabet af EU er i sidste ende den eneste realistiske garanti, der kan  
stilles op for social og demokratisk stabilitet i Europas nye demokratier. En 
samfundsudvikling, der bæres frem af perspektivet om at medlemskabet i den 
europæiske union er den bedste forsikring mod nye etniske konflikter og 
ukontrollerede flygtningestrømme i Europa. 
Økonomisk er EUs udvidelsesproces et plus-plus spil. Det er ikke et spørgsmål 
om, at vi skal give og andre skal have. Nej, på samme måde som dengang  330 
fattige lande som Irland, Grækenland, Spanien og Portugal blev medlemmer, så  
vi fællesskabet trække de nye medlemslandes levevilkår opad mod de gamles 
levestandard, og samtidig skabe ny dynamik hos os, fordi vi får nye, mere 
købedygtige kunder til vore produkter. 
Derfor er det vigtigt, at både de nuværende medlemslande og ansøgerlande gør 
sig umage med at finde de kompromiser og skræddersyede overgangsordninger, 
der kan sikre en hurtig og stor udvidelsesomgang. 
Tempoet i udvidelsesprocessen må holdes, så skuffelse og tvivl ikke når at få den 
folkelige opbakning til udvidelsen til at smuldre både i de kommende og de gamle 
medlemslande. 340 
Det er uden videre klart, at Polens hurtige optagelse er af helt central både 
symbolsk og realpolitisk betydning. Polen var det første offer for Anden 
Verdenskrig. Den lemlæstede nation blev efter sejren på ny berøvet friheden.  
Men det var også Polen, der gik i spidsen i de opgør, der førte til det 
kommunistiske diktaturs sammenbrud i Østeuropa. Samtidig er Polen det 
befolkningsmæssigt og økonomisk vigtigste ansøgerland. 
Men det er også vigtigt, at såfremt nogle af de mindre ansøgerlande  f.eks. i 
Baltikum - er endnu tidligere parat, at de så også optages først - som en klar 
markering af vores vilje til at leve op til løftet om at optage ansøgerlandene, så 
snart de opfylder betingelserne og er rede. 350 
Beslutningskraft og nærhed i et udvidet EU 
EU er i sin kerne et meget tæt samarbejde mellem demokratisk valgte  
regeringer, hvor der er præcise spilleregler for forhandling og kompromis. 
Spillereglerne er til entydig fordel for de små nationer. De er et stort fremskridt  
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fra dengang, hvor det var de skiftende alliancer mellem de store lande, der 
dirigerede hele den europæiske koncert. 
Reglerne betyder, at vi små lande har indflydelse på vores verdensdel, som er 
større end vi nogensinde før har haft, og større, end antallet af vore indbyggere 
egentlig skulle berettige til. 
De små landes fordel vedEU-samarbejdets karakter er endnu tydeligere, hvis de 360 
formår at samarbejdeindbyrdes. Derfor vil fremtidens udvidede EU også blive 
præget af stærkeresamspil mellem de mange små lande. For Danmark vil 
koordineringen med denordiske og baltiske lande være lige for. Er vi enige, har vi 
en størrestemmevægt end Tyskland . 
EU er medlemsstaternes effektive instrument til at løses fælles problemer - ikke  
en størrelse, der tager nye store skridt hen mod at blive en forbundsstat. 
Det er præcis denne tankegang, der præger Nice-traktaten. Den vil uden tvivl  
også gennemsyre kommende traktater: Dét udvidede og reformerede EU, der vil 
blive skabt de næste ti år, vil ikke have overbevisende fælles træk med 
forbundsstater som USA eller med gamle europæiske nationalstater. 370 
EU vil forblive et helt særligt og historisk set nyt og enestående fænomen. 
Forsøgene på at finde ordet for samarbejdets karakter vil fortsat give anledning til 
en meget følelsesladet debat og mange misforståelser i Danmark. 
Den franske statsminister Jospin siger, at Unionen er en føderation af 
nationalstater. På dansk vil vi kalde det et forpligtende fællesskab af 
nationalstater, men nok mene nogenlunde det samme. 
Det er åbenbart, at det største problem i et EU med dobbelt så mange  
medlemmer er at sikre, at beslutninger kan træffes tilstrækkelig effektivt på dé 
områder, som ingen nationalstat kan løse alene. 
Det vil kræve, at færre beslutninger tages i enstemmighed og flere med 380 
kvalificeret flertal. 
Dette er en vanskelig og politisk følsom diskussion, hvor hver enkelt  
medlemsland må vise mod. 
Den danske regering vil være konstruktiv. Vi kan umiddelbart se behov for flere 
flertalsafgørelser, når det gælder miljøområdet og minimumsregler på 
skatteområdet. 
Vejen frem til at indføre flertalsafgørelser på vitale fællesområder findes nok  
lettest ved operere med flere minimumsregler og kombinere beslutningen med  
en skarpere afgrænsning af, hvor EU overhovedet skal blande sig. 
Alternativet til større beslutningskraft via flere flertalsafgørelser er på sigt, at 390 
reglerne om forstærket samarbejde, hvor en gruppe af lande på egen hånd går 
videre - med andre ord et Europa i flere hastigheder. Det er ikke i det lille lands 
interesse, at samarbejdet på den måde udvikler sig i flere forskellige rum, hvor vi 
ikke er med alle vegne, men alligevel påvirkes af beslutningerne dé steder, hvor  
vi ikke er med. 
Der er behov for at styrke nærhedsprincippet . Altså at forhindre, at EU  
unødigt og utilsigtet bevæger sig ind på nye områder og laver detaljeret  
regulering for medlemslandene, der ikke er påkrævet for at løse fælles  
problemer. 
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Nogle ønsker, at vi i den næste traktat skal indskrive et katalog, der klart deler 400 
kompetencerne på de enkelte politikområder op mellem EU og nationalstaterne. 
Jeg tror bestemt, at vi kan gøre kompetencefordelingen klarere. Vi kan justere  
og tydeliggøre, hvor vi vil bevare eller genoprette national kompetence. Vi skal 
indrette de fælles institutioner, så vore hensigter bedre håndhæves. 
Men jeg tror ikke, at vi kan skrive et endegyldigt kompentencekatalog, uden at  
give uønsket stivhed i samarbejdet og stadige behov for traktatændringer. Det er 
mere en politisk end en juridisk mekanisme, vi skal stræbe efter. En klarere 
retningsgivning om afgrænsningen mellem fællesskab og nærhed mellem union  
og nation. 
Opgaver og grænser for EU 410 
Et forpligtende samarbejde er afgørende for vores og de andres velfærd. 
I det følgende vil jeg give et bud på samarbejdets kerneområder og på, hvor jeg 
mener, at samarbejdet skal være knap så forpligtende 
Jeg har argumenteret for, at jeg finder det allervigtigst, at EU kommer til spille  
en langt større rolle globalt  når det gælder sikkerhed, menneskerettigheder, 
økonomi, handel, udvikling og miljø. 
Lad mig uddybende nævne en række politikområder, som er centrale for 
samarbejdet: 
Der vil i det udvidede EU være stort behov for samordning af den økonomiske 
politik , så alle medlemslandene kan bidrage til stabil valuta, sunde offentlige 420 
finanser, konkurrenceevne, beskæftigelse, ligestilling og social 
sammenhængskraft. Det er forudsætningen for at velfærdssamfundet kan 
fastholdes og udvikles. 
Det store flertal af EU-lande vil her have den fælles valuta som ankerplads, hvor 
der i Euro-gruppen og Den europæiske Centralbank fastlægges en kurs mod 
inflation og valutaspekulation, som bliver retningsgivende for hele EU - også de 
lande, der er uden for euroen. 
EU skal være bundet sammen af stærke fælles regler og ambitioner på miljø og 
arbejdsmiljø. Miljøproblemerne er i deres natur grænseoverskridende og kan ikke 
løses alene med nok så store flertal i de nationale parlamenter. Høje mindstekrav 430 
til arbejdsmiljøet skal forhindre, at vi i EU konkurrerer mod hinanden på 
sundhedstruende arbejdsvilkår. 
EUs fælles forbrugerpolitik skal effektiviseres med højt beskyttelsesniveau og 
anvendelse af forsigtighedsprincippet. EU skal have alle nødvendige magtmidler  
til afrunde og håndhæve det indre marked, sikre effektiv konkurrence , nedbryde 
monopoler og karteller. Statsstøtte må afvikles, når den ikke varetager 
veldefinerede politiske mål om f.eks. miljø og forbrugerbeskyttelse. 
Der er brug for fælles EU-regler for at undgå unfair skattekonkurrence , der 
undergraver velfærdssamfundenes finansiering. Skattely skal bekæmpes. Der  
skal arbejdes for, at der ikke bare er fælles regler for beskatningsgrundlag og 440 
mindstesatser for momsen, men også for renteskat, selskabsskat og 
konkurrencepåvirkende miljøafgifter. 
EU skal i de kommende år udvikle en fælles flygtninge- og indvandrerpolitik og  
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en effektiv fælles håndhævelse ved at bekæmpe menneskesmuglere, illegal 
indvandring, asylsvindel og have fælles krav til hjemtagning af afviste 
indvandrere/asylansøgere. På civilrettens område er der også brug for 
regelharmonisering for at lette virksomhedernes brug af det indre marked og 
familiernes stilling ved flytning over grænserne. 
Det er Danmarks interesse at være omfattet af fælles regler på disse områder. 
Derfor må der energisk arbejdes på, at vi i praksis kan deltage i  450 
politikudviklingen - også selv om vi på grund af forbeholdet på de retlige og indre 
anliggender formelt er uden for indflydelse på de fælles EU-beslutninger. 
EUs fælles linie skal selvfølgelig også indeholde forstærket indsats for at 
forebygge flygtningestrømme og for at hjælpe og udvikle i nærområderne. Ingen 
fælles flygtninge- og indvandrerpolitik vil få langsigtet succes, medmindre den er 
en del af ny international orden, hvor levevilkårene i de fattige lande afgørende 
forbedres. 
EU skal være rammen om et effektivt europæisk samarbejde om bekæmpelse af 
grænseoverskridende kriminalitet  ikke mindst økonomisk kriminalitet og 
miljøkriminalitet. Det er en opgave, som intet land i dag kan klare alene. Og de 460 
eksisterende traktatbestemmelser giver os her et godt grundlag for at udvikle 
samarbejdet. 
Et smertensbarn i rækken af fælles politikområder er EUs landbrugspolitik 
De nuværende ordninger er de sidste store monumenter over gammeldags og 
kostbar planøkonomi i Europa 12 år efter Murens Fald. 
Vi i Danmark ønsker, at EU fortsat skal have en fælles landbrugs- og fiskeripolitik - 
men med en anden indretning. 
En reform af landbrugspolitikken er påtrængende nødvendig af tre grunde: For  
det første må EU levere indrømmelser i en global deal med u-landene, så de  
kan få langt bedre konkurrencevilkår og markedsadgang for deres 470 
fødevareproduktion. For det andet vil en ændret landbrugspolitik i et EU med 
mange ny medlemslande være nødvendig for at begrænse budgetbelastningen  
og bureaukratiet. For det tredje vil der være krav om omlægning af 
landbrugsproduktionen, der opfylder befolkningernes berettigede forventning og 
krav til kvalitet, miljø, fødevaresikkerhed og dyrevelfærd. Der er brug for en 
konsekvent og klar fælles indsats med fokus på sikre og sunde fødevarer. 
De første retningsgivende skridt hen mod en markedsorienteret og mere grøn 
landbrugspolitik bør om muligt tages inden afslutningen af første runde af 
udvidelsesforhandlingerne for at skabe større klarhed for både de nuværende og 
de kommende medlemslande. 480 
Landbrugsreformen skal betyde gradvis afvikling af kvoter og 
produktionsafhængige tilskud og derved afgørende forenkling. Der kan så i en 
overgangsperiode overvejes produktionsuafhængighed og aftrappet personstøtte 
til de enkelte landbrug. 
Det er klart, at reformen af landbrugs- og fødevarepolitikken i EU vil være 
smertefuld og politisk vanskelig. Der er en sammenhæng mellem denne reform  
og fremtidens regionalpolitik i fællesskabet: 
Midlerne i de såkaldte strukturfonde til regional udvikling skal i et udvidet EU  
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mest gå til de nye, fattigere medlemslande i øst  for at bidrage til at løfte deres 
velstand opad mod niveauet i det gamle EU. Men der vil også være fattige egne  490 
i nogle af de nuværende medlemslande, der fortsat har brug for støtte. En del af  
dé midler, der spares ved en konsekvent landbrugsreform, kan anvendes til en 
indsats for alternativ udvikling af landdistrikterne, der kan forhindre massiv 
affolkning  også i de gamle EU-lande. 
Det er ikke kun landbrugs- og fiskeripolitikken, der skal reformes. For at  
finansiere udvidelsen skal der saneres og effektiviseres i den store skov af andre 
tilskudsordninger . EU-støtteordninger må koncentreres om projekter, som ingen 
nation og intet firma løfter af sig selv, men som kan bidrage til det samlede 
Europas langsigtede udvikling og konkurrencekraft. 
Så er der en række områder, hvor vi ønsker et samarbejde, der ikke har samme 500 
forpligtende karakter som på de allerede nævnte områder: 
EU skal ikke have nye beføjelser med hensyn til uddannelses- og 
beskæftigelsespolitik. Her skal vi først og fremmest have en fornuftig dialog og 
lære af hinandens erfaringer  dvs. bruge den såkaldte åbne  
koordinationsmetode, der blev fastlagt i Lissabon i marts 2000. På den måde kan 
vi sætte fokus på de svage punkter i hinandens systemer og derved tilføre den 
politiske proces ny dynamik i de enkelte lande. På den måde kan vi  uden at 
overdrage beføjelser  i fællesskab bidrage til, at vi hver især udvikler vores 
velfærdsstater bedst muligt. 
Indretning og finansiering af sundhedsvæsen, ældreomsorg og børnepasning skal 510 
ligeledes forblive under den nationale kompetence. Disse områder afspejler i 
særlig grad forskelle mellem landene i valg af velfærdsmodel og fordelingspolitik, 
men også bagved liggende forskelle i erhvervs- og familiemønster. 
Heller ikke kultur- og fritidslovgivningen skal være et fællesskabsanliggende   
men et område for gensidig inspiration. 
Det beskrevne billedepeger ikke i retning af omfattende ændringer i den juridiske 
kompetencefordeling mellem union og nationalstat. Men det angiver en klar 
prioritering af, hvor det er Danmarks interesse at udvikling og uddybning af det 
europæiske samarbejde sker i de kommende år. 
Reform af traktat og institutioner 520 
På topmødet i Nice i december sidste år lagde stats- og regeringscheferne op til  
at diskutere i hvert fald fire hovedtemaer op til næste regeringskonference og 
traktatrevision i 2004. 
Udover det alleredediskuterede behov for klarere arbejdsdeling mellem nationer  
og union var temaerne: 
- menneskerettighedscharterets stilling i forhold til traktaten 
- behovet for en enklere traktat 
- en stærkere rolle for de nationale parlamenter i EUs beslutningsproces. 
Med dette udgangspunkt - og med de udfordringer, som udvidelsen stiller os 
overfor  vil der blive foreslået og være behov for væsentlige traktatændringer i 530 
2004. 
Det er nu, vi fra dansk side bør give et første bud på ændringerne, så vore 
synspunkter kan være med til præge den videre proces: 
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Diskussionen om EUs fremtid vil gå i gang med fuld styrke under det belgiske 
formandsskab her i efteråret. Det er en god idé at nedsætte et såkaldt konvent  
en forsamling med deltagelse af personligheder fra Europa-Parlament, nationale 
parlamenter, regeringer, arbejdsmarkedsparter m.fl.  til at diskutere reformer.  
Det sikrer større folkelig deltagelse i debatten  og bør følges op med et folkeligt 
debatforum om konventet i Danmark. En konference mellem regeringernes 
repræsentanter skal derefter konkludere, hvilke traktatændringer, der skal 540 
besluttes. 
Vi skal undervejs være konstruktive og åbne over for valg af nye modeller for 
samarbejdet. 
Men lad mig sammenfatte nogle bud på, hvilken retning, den danske regering 
mener, arbejdet skal have: 
Ministerrådet er og skal også i fremtiden være det mest centrale  
EU-beslutningsforum. Det er den eneste logiske konsekvens af min holdning om, 
atunionen skal forblive et nært og forpligtende samarbejde mellem  
medlemsstater. 
Jeg har nævnt behovet for flere flertalsafgørelser i ministerrådet, når vi bliver 550 
mange flere medlemmer. Jeg mener også, at større åbenhed om Rådets arbejde 
er en helt central opgave for borgernes mulighed for indflydelse. 
Det er ikke enudfordring, der løses ved at oprette nye ministerråd - f.eks. et råd 
afeuropaministre. Det vil være uklart ogforskelligt, hvad sådanne ministres 
beføjelser er i de enkelte lande. Derforvil de i praksis have svært ved både at  
finde en rolle i forhold tiludenrigsministrenes løbende arbejde i det generelle råd  
og afgørende at aflastestats- og regeringscheferne fra at lægge de overordnede 
retningslinier forUnionen. 
Det er langt mere relevant at præcisere den centrale placering for stats- og 
regeringschefernes Europæiske Råd. Opgaven er på én og samme tid at 560 
afdramatisere topmøderne og at styrke deres funktion. En mulighed er, at Det 
Europæiske Råd holder sine møder oftere, men i et kortere og mere 
forretningspræget format. Møderne kunne f.eks. være fast i Bruxelles hver anden 
måned. 
Samtidig må formandsskabsfunktionen nyvurderes, når EU efterhånden får 25-30 
medlemslande. Måske skal formandsskabet i fremtiden varetages af en gruppe af 
lande i stedet for af et nyt land hvert halve år. 
Jeg mener, at Charteret for menneskerettigheder skal indarbejdes i EU-traktaten, 
fordi dets indhold er nogetoverordnet og bærende i vort videre samarbejde. 
Charteret er mere detaljeret i formuleringen af menneskerettighederne end den 570 
danske grundlov fra 1953. Det er naturligvis på intet punkt i konflikt med vores 
danske forfatning, men Charteret er mere moderne og vidtgående i sin  
formulering af de fundamentale menneskerettigheder. 
Indskrivning af Charteret i Traktaten i en eller anden form vil understrege, at EU  
er andet og mere end praktisk, økonomisk samarbejde og fælles varetagelse af 
udenrigspolitiske interesser. Det vil være i linie med en stadig bredere folkelig 
opbakning til at gøre internationalt samarbejde mere forpligtende, når det  
gælder at traktatfæste og håndhæve nogle fundamentale rettigheder om  
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individets beskyttelse og frihed. Det er en udvikling, der de sidste par år har  
fundet udtryk i interventionen i Kosovo og oprettelsen af den internationale 580 
straffedomstol. 
Der skal ske forenkling både af EU's traktat, regler og producerer. 
En fuldstændig omskrivning af traktaterne er en uhyre kompliceret sag, fordi det  
vil åbne for utrolig mange spørgsmål om, hvorvidt forenklingen af teksten også 
tilsigter reelle ændringer i retstilstanden. Men jeg håber, at vi kan gennemføre  
en egentlig opdeling af traktaten i de mere grundlæggende bestemmelser på den 
ene side og de mere tekniske på den anden. 
Vi skal sigte efter en enklere og mere folkelig sammenfatning af samarbejdets 
formål  inklusive indarbejdelsen af charteret  i en grundtraktat . Her skal 
beskrives, at EU er et samarbejde om dét, vi ikke kan løse hver for sig, at 590 
arbejdsdelingen skal bygges på nærhedsprincippet med styrkelse af de nationale 
parlamenters rolle, og balancen mellem institutionerne i øvrigt fastholdes i 
hovedsagen som nu. 
Kommissionen har allerede en central og vigtig rolle som initiativtager til nye 
retsakter. Det er Kommissionens opgave at sikre, at forslagene hænger sammen 
og tager hensyn til alles - også de små medlemslandes - rimelige interesser. Den 
bør prioritere at forbedre Unionens administrative apparat og kompetence, blive 
bedre til at planlægge og udføre de fælles projekter, gøre op med svindel og 
sanere i tilskud. 
Kommissionen har netop fremlagt en god rapport om governance  600 
regeringsførelse i EU-systemet. Det understreger, at Kommissionen kan og skal 
skabe større folkelig opbakning til det europæiske projekt gennem åbenhed   
både om sit eget arbejde og om forhandlinger med andre i internationale fora, - 
tidlig høring af lande, regioner og folkelige organisationer om initiativer - og ved  
at forberede direktiver, der giver de enkelte nationer større spillerum i den 
praktiske udførelse. 
Både Kommission og Ministerråd skal tænke mere smidigt, end vi har været vant 
til. F.eks. havde det vel ikke været utænkeligt at sikre en fælles holdning til 
beskyttelse mod børnearbejde i Unionen med større indlagt fleksibilitet for de 
enkelte lande i den praktiske udførelse. I så fald kunne vi måske have undgået et 610 
skænderi om børns udbringning af danske aviser? 
Styrkelse af de nationale parlamenters rolle er nødvendig. 
EU skal fungere effektivt og demokratisk, og på en måde, hvor alle interesserede 
kan følge med i beslutningsprocessen. Det er en uhyre væsentlig diskussion, som 
vi i Danmark skal være med til at præge. 
Teknisk komplicerede debatter om en EU-forfatning, et kompetencekatalog eller 
oprettelse af et nyt 2. kammer i en forvejen kompliceret beslutningsstruktur er  
ikke nødvendigvis genveje til at skabe større folkelig opbakning bag projektet. De 
risikerer tværtimod at styrke mistro og modvilje og nære myter om hemmelige 
planer om stærkere unionsudvikling - medmindre vi kan forklare formålet med 620 
ændringerne lysende klart som en styrkelse af borgernes indflydelse på Europa. 
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Det er ikke den danske regerings opfattelse, at der kræves grundlæggende 
ændringer i den institutionelle ramme med Ministerråd, Kommission, Domstol, 
Europa-Parlament og Revisionsret. 
Europa-Parlamentet har ikke i folkenes øjne fået en vældig legitimitet, selvom  
der i sin tid blev indført direkte valg. 
I det længere perspektiv kan man overveje kommissær Pattens idé om valg af de 
enkelte landes repræsentanter til Europa-Parlamentet på de nationale valgdage. 
Det vil sikre større samklang mellem de valgte i de enkelte lande og i Bruxelles - 
og langt højere valgdeltagelse til parlamentsvalget. Patten taler også for at 630 
europaparlamentarikere skal have møderet  men ikke stemmeret!- i de nationale 
parlamenter. 
Men der vil ikke i overskuelig fremtid blive skabt en fælles europæisk  
offentlighed. Følelserne og tilknytningen vil fortsat først og fremmest være til 
nationen. 
Med andre ord: Der eksisterer en langt større demokratisk legitimitet hos de 
nationale parlamenter. Derfor er der ikke anledning til at give  
Europa-Parlamentet væsentlige nye beføjelser. Ved den først kommende 
traktatændring er det vigtigste tværtimod at finde formlen for de nationale 
parlamenters stærkere deltagelse i EU-udviklingen. 640 
Det handler både om arbejdsformen i de enkelte parlamenter og om at  
give dem en rolle i fællesskab i EU-arkitekturen. 
Europaudvalget i det danske folketing har allerede en helt central placering i den 
nationale beslutningsgang forud for ministerrådsmøderne. De EU-beslutninger, 
Danmark bliver en del af i forlængelse af mandaterne fra Europaudvalg til 
regeringen, har samme vidtgående betydning for borgernes hverdag som megen 
national lovgivning, og det er derfor af stor vigtighed, at der er størst mulig 
åbenhed om processen. Det er ikke rimeligt, at det kan påstås, at danske 
interesseorganisationer er mere inddraget i EUs egen lovgivningsproces end i  
den danske beslutningsproces i EU-sager. 650 
For at sikre større åbenhed og parlamentarisk medvirken er det tillige meget 
vigtigt, at Folketingets øvrige udvalg løbende drøfter de europapolitiske  
spørgsmål. 
Det vil være naturligt, at de nationale parlamenter får forelagt alle vigtige  
retsakter med ret til at udtale sig. 
Forudsætningen for, at de nationale parlamenter kan udøve deres  
retmæssigerolle i den demokratiske proces er, at Kommission og 
Ministerrrådtilrettelægger deres arbejdsprocesser med størst mulig åbenhed. 
Premierminister Blair og præsident Havel har foreslået oprettelse af et 
traktatfæstet 2. kammeraf nationale parlamentarikere som garant for stærkere 660 
folkelig kontrol og respekt for nærhedsprincippet i kompetencefordelingen. 
Det mest nærliggende er at udvikle det eksisterende samarbejde mellem de 
nationale parlamenters europaudvalg (COSAC) til Nationernes Råd med lige 
mange repræsentanter for hvert EU-land. Det skal næppe være en forsamling,  
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der tager selvstændige initiativer i EUs lovproces. Den skal derimod have 
beføjelse til at påse, at nærhedsprincippet respekteres. Jeg synes, man skal 
overveje at give Rådet ret til at udsætte en retsakt, der ikke anses for at  
respektere princippet - i hvert fald indtil den pågældende retsakt har været 
behandlet i Det Europæiske Råd. 
De nationale parlamenters rolle i at skabe folkelig interesse og engagement har 670 
ikke kun noget med deres formelle deltagelse i beslutningerne at gøre. Nye råd, 
nævn, kamre eller arbejdsgange gør det ikke alene. Det handler i høj grad om 
parlamentarikernes egen indsats i debatten om den europæiske og globale 
dagsorden. Og det handler om deres dialog med de folkelige organisationer om 
denne dagsorden. Folk skal mærke, at EU faktisk har en formidabel evne til løse 
vigtige problemer, hvis løsning ikke ligger inden for nationalstatens rækkevidde. 
Det vil også skabe større forståelse og velvilje for EU-projektet, hvis nationale 
beslutningstagere lader være med at bruge EU som prügelknabe for dét, de ikke 
selv kan komme til at udrette, og i stedet forklarer, at kompromisser er lige så 
vigtige og nyttige i internationalt som i nationalt politisk arbejde. 680 
For at slutte omtrent, hvor jeg begyndte på denne tour dhorizon: Hvad er da 
essensen i dét, jeg håber og tror om EU 2010 ? 
Ved at forpligte os i et stærkt europæisk samarbejde har vi bidraget til en bedre 
verden. 
EU spiller sin naturlige rolle som verdenssamfundets progressive kraft i kampen  
for en globalt bæredygtig udvikling. EU spiller i samarbejde med FN og NATO en 
afgørende rolle for international konfliktløsning, afspænding og nedrustning. 
Den største del af EUs udvidelse mod øst er gennemført. Den historiske deling af 
Europa er overvundet. 
EU-samarbejdet er blevet organiseret mere åbent - og mere effektivt. Mennesker 690 
synes, at EU beskæftiger sig med de væsentlige udfordringer. 
Vi ikke er blevet mindre danske, fordi vi samarbejder bedre. Vor samfundsmodel 
har vist styrke og livskraft og er en inspiration for andre europæere. 
Derfor har vi fået langt større engagement og opbakning om det europæiske 
projekt. 
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I. EUROPE AT A CROSSROADS  
For centuries, peoples and states have taken up arms and waged war to win control of the European continent. The 
debilitating effects of two bloody wars and the weakening of Europe's position in the world brought a growing realisation  
that only peace and concerted action could make the dream of a strong, unified Europe come true. In order to banish  
once and for all the demons of the past, a start was made with a coal and steel community. Other economic activities,  
such as agriculture, were subsequently added in. A genuine single market was eventually established for goods,  
persons, services and capital, and a single currency was added in 1999. On 1 January 2002 the euro is to become a  
day-to-day reality for 300 million European citizens. 
The European Union has thus gradually come into being. In the beginning, it was more of an economic and technical 
collaboration. Twenty years ago, with the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the Community's democratic 10 
legitimacy, which until then had lain with the Council alone, was considerably strengthened. Over the last ten years, 
construction of a political union has begun and cooperation been established on social policy, employment, asylum, 
immigration, police, justice, foreign policy and a common security and defence policy. 
The European Union is a success story. For over half a century now, Europe has been at peace. Along with North  
America and Japan, the Union forms one of the three most prosperous parts of the world. As a result of mutual  
solidarity and fair distribution of the benefits of economic development, moreover, the standard of living in the Union's  
weaker regions has increased enormously and they have made good much of the disadvantage they were at. 
Fifty years on, however, the Union stands at a crossroads, a defining moment in its existence. The unification of Europe  
is near. The Union is about to expand to bring in more than ten new Member States, predominantly Central and  
Eastern European, thereby finally closing one of the darkest chapters in European history: the Second World War and  20 
the ensuing artificial division of Europe. At long last, Europe is on its way to becoming one big family, without  
bloodshed, a real transformation clearly calling for a different approach from fifty years ago, when six countries first  
took the lead. 
The democratic challenge facing Europe 
At the same time, the Union faces twin challenges, one within and the other beyond its borders. 
Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. Citizens undoubtedly support the  
Union's broad aims, but they do not always see a connection between those goals and the Union's everyday action.  
They want the European institutions to be less unwieldy and rigid and, above all, more efficient and open. Many also  
eel that the Union should involve itself more with their particular concerns, instead of intervening, in every detail, in  
matters by their nature better left to Member States' and regions' elected representatives. This is even perceived by  30 
some as a threat to their identity. More importantly, however, they feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight  
and they want better democratic scrutiny. 
Europe's new role in a globalised world 
Beyond its borders, in turn, the European Union is confronted with a fast-changing, globalised world. Following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, it looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable world order, free from  
conflict, founded upon human rights. Just a few years later, however, there is no such certainty. The eleventh of  
September has brought a rude awakening. The opposing forces have not gone away: religious fanaticism, ethnic  
nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still  
provide a constant seedbed for them. 
What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in  40 
a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many 
countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French 
Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for  
others' languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights. The  
Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for  
the rule of law. 
Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to  
shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing  
battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's  
heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not  50 
just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other  
words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development. 
The expectations of Europe's citizens 
The image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches citizens' wishes. There have been  
frequent public calls for a greater EU role in justice and security, action against cross-border crime, control of migration  
flows and reception of asylum seekers and refugees from far-flung war zones. Citizens also want results in the fields of 
employment and combating poverty and social exclusion, as well as in the field of economic and social cohesion. They  
want a common approach on environmental pollution, climate change and food safety, in short, all transnational issues  
which they instinctively sense can only be tackled by working together. Just as they also want to see Europe more  
involved in foreign affairs, security and defence, in other words, greater and better coordinated action to deal with  60 
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trouble spots in and around Europe and in the rest of the world. 
At the same time, citizens also feel that the Union is behaving too bureaucratically in numerous other areas. In  
coordinating the economic, financial and fiscal environment, the basic issue should continue to be proper operation of  
the internal market and the single currency, without this jeopardising Member States' individuality. National and regional 
differences frequently stem from history or tradition. They can be enriching. In other words, what citizens understand by 
"good governance" is opening up fresh opportunities, not imposing further red tape. What they expect is more results,  
better responses to practical issues and not a European superstate or European institutions inveigling their way into  
every nook and cranny of life. 
In short, citizens are calling for a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach, developing a  
Europe which points the way ahead for the world. An approach that provides concrete results in terms of more jobs,  70 
better quality of life, less crime, decent education and better health care. There can be no doubt that this will require  
Europe to undergo renewal and reform. 
    II. CHALLENGES AND REFORMS IN A RENEWED UNION 
The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. It also has to resolve three basic 
challenges: how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions,  
how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a  
stabilising factor and a model in the new, multipolar world. In order to address them a number of specific questions  
need to be put. 
A better division and definition of competence in the European Union 
Citizens often hold expectations of the European Union that are not always fulfilled. And vice versa - they sometimes  80 
have the impression that the Union takes on too much in areas where its involvement is not always essential. Thus the 
important thing is to clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between the Union and the Member States  
in the light of the new challenges facing the Union. This can lead both to restoring tasks to the Member States and to 
assigning new missions to the Union, or to the extension of existing powers, while constantly bearing in mind the  
equality of the Member States and their mutual solidarity. 
A first series of questions that needs to be put concerns how the division of competence can be made more  
transparent. Can we thus make a clearer distinction between three types of competence: the exclusive competence of  
the Union, the competence of the Member States and the shared competence of the Union and the Member States? At  
what level is competence exercised in the most efficient way? How is the principle of subsidiarity to be applied here?  
And should we not make it clear that any powers not assigned by the Treaties to the Union fall within the exclusive  90 
sphere of competence of the Member States? And what would be the consequences of this? 
The next series of questions should aim, within this new framework and while respecting the "acquis communautaire",  
to determine whether there needs to be any reorganisation of competence. How can citizens' expectations be taken as  
a guide here? What missions would this produce for the Union? And, vice versa, what tasks could better be left to the 
Member States? What amendments should be made to the Treaty on the various policies? How, for example, should a  
more coherent common foreign policy and defence policy be developed? Should the Petersberg tasks be updated? Do  
we want to adopt a more integrated approach to police and criminal law cooperation? How can economic-policy  
coordination be stepped up? How can we intensify cooperation in the field of social inclusion, the environment, health  
and food safety? But then, should not the day-to-day administration and implementation of the Union's policy be left  
more emphatically to the Member States and, where their constitutions so provide, to the regions? Should they not be 100 
provided with guarantees that their spheres of competence will not be affected? 
Lastly, there is the question of how to ensure that a redefined division of competence does not lead to a creeping  
expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member 
States and, where there is provision for this, regions. How are we to ensure at the same time that the European  
dynamic does not come to a halt? In the future as well the Union must continue to be able to react to fresh challenges  
and developments and must be able to explore new policy areas. Should Articles 95 and 308 of the Treaty be reviewed  
for this purpose in the light of the "acquis jurisprudentiel"? 
Simplification of the Union's instruments 
Who does what is not the only important question; the nature of the Union's action and what instruments it should use  
are equally important. Successive amendments to the Treaty have on each occasion resulted in a proliferation of 110 
instruments, and directives have gradually evolved towards more and more detailed legislation. The key question is  
therefore whether the Union's various instruments should not be better defined and whether their number should not be 
reduced. 
In other words, should a distinction be introduced between legislative and executive measures? Should the number of 
legislative instruments be reduced: directly applicable rules, framework legislation and non-enforceable instruments 
(opinions, recommendations, open coordination)? Is it or is it not desirable to have more frequent recourse to  
framework legislation, which affords the Member States more room for manoeuvre in achieving policy objectives? For  
which areas of competence are open coordination and mutual recognition the most appropriate instruments? Is the  
principle of proportionality to remain the point of departure? 
More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union 120 
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The European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers  
and instruments it possesses. However, the European project also derives its legitimacy from democratic, transparent  
and efficient institutions. The national parliaments also contribute towards the legitimacy of the European project. The 
declaration on the future of the Union, annexed to the Treaty of Nice, stressed the need to examine their role in  
European integration. More generally, the question arises as to what initiatives we can take to develop a European  
public area. 
The first question is thus how we can increase the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the present institutions, a 
question which is valid for the three institutions. 
How can the authority and efficiency of the European Commission be enhanced? How should the President of the 
Commission be appointed: by the European Council, by the European Parliament or should he be directly elected by  130 
the citizens? Should the role of the European Parliament be strengthened? Should we extend the right of co-decision or  
not? Should the way in which we elect the members of the European Parliament be reviewed? Should a European 
electoral constituency be created, or should constituencies continue to be determined nationally? Can the two systems  
be combined? Should the role of the Council be strengthened? Should the Council act in the same manner in its  
legislative and its executive capacities? With a view to greater transparency, should the meetings of the Council, at  
least in its legislative capacity, be public? Should citizens have more access to Council documents? How, finally,  
should the balance and reciprocal control between the institutions be ensured? 
A second question, which also relates to democratic legitimacy, involves the role of national parliaments. Should they  
be represented in a new institution, alongside the Council and the European Parliament? Should they have a role in  
areas of European action in which the European Parliament has no competence? Should they focus on the division of 140 
competence between Union and Member States, for example through preliminary checking of compliance with the  
principle of subsidiarity? 
The third question concerns how we can improve the efficiency of decision-making and the workings of the institutions  
in a Union of some thirty Member States. How could the Union set its objectives and priorities more effectively and  
ensure better implementation? Is there a need for more decisions by a qualified majority? How is the co-decision  
procedure between the Council and the European Parliament to be simplified and speeded up? What of the  
six-monthly rotation of the Presidency of the Union? What is the future role of the European Parliament? What of the  
future role and structure of the various Council formations? How should the coherence of European foreign policy be 
enhanced? How is synergy between the High Representative and the competent Commissioner to be reinforced?  
Should the external representation of the Union in international fora be extended further? 150 
Towards a Constitution for European citizens 
The European Union currently has four Treaties. The objectives, powers and policy instruments of the Union are  
currently spread across those Treaties. If we are to have greater transparency, simplification is essential. 
Four sets of questions arise in this connection. The first concerns simplifying the existing Treaties without changing  
their content. Should the distinction between the Union and the Communities be reviewed? What of the division into 
three pillars? 
Questions then arise as to the possible reorganisation of the Treaties. Should a distinction be made between a basic  
treaty and the other treaty provisions? Should this distinction involve separating the texts? Could this lead to a  
distinction between the amendment and ratification procedures for the basic treaty and for the other treaty provisions? 
Thought would also have to be given to whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be included in the basic  160 
treaty and to whether the European Community should accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the 
adoption of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic features of such a constitution be? The values  
which the Union cherishes, the fundamental rights and obligations of its citizens, the relationship between Member  
States in the Union? 
    III. CONVENING OF A CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 
In order to pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as possible, the European  
Council has decided to convene a Convention composed of the main parties involved in the debate on the future of the 
Union. In the light of the foregoing, it will be the task of that Convention to consider the key issues arising for the  
Union's future development and try to identify the various possible responses. 170 
The European Council has appointed Mr V. Giscard d'Estaing as Chairman of the Convention and Mr G. Amato and Mr  
J.L. Dehaene as Vice-Chairmen. 
Composition 
In addition to its Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, the Convention will be composed of 15 representatives of the Heads of  
State or Government of the Member States (one from each Member State), 30 members of national parliaments (two  
from each Member State), 16 members of the European Parliament and two Commission representatives. The  
accession candidate countries will be fully involved in the Convention's proceedings. They will be represented in the  
same way as the current Member States (one government representative and two national parliament members) and  
will be able to take part in the proceedings without, however, being able to prevent any consensus which may emerge  
among the Member States. 180 
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The members of the Convention may only be replaced by alternate members if they are not present. The alternate  
members will be designated in the same way as full members. 
The Praesidium of the Convention will be composed of the Convention Chairman and Vice-Chairmen and nine  
members drawn from the Convention (the representatives of all the governments holding the Council Presidency during  
the Convention, two national parliament representatives, two European Parliament representatives and two  
Commission representatives). 
Three representatives of the Economic and Social Committee with three representatives of the European social  
partners; from the Committee of the Regions: six representatives (to be appointed by the Committee of the Regions  
from the regions, cities and regions with legislative powers), and the European Ombudsman will be invited to attend as 
observers. The Presidents of the Court of Justice and of the Court of Auditors may be invited by the Praesidium to  190 
address the Convention. 
Length of proceedings 
The Convention will hold its inaugural meeting on 1 March 2002, when it will appoint its Praesidium and adopt its rules  
of procedure. Proceedings will be completed after a year, that is to say in time for the Chairman of the Convention to  
present its outcome to the European Council. 
Working methods 
The Chairman will pave the way for the opening of the Convention's proceedings by drawing conclusions from the  
public debate. The Praesidium will serve to lend impetus and will provide the Convention with an initial working basis. 
The Praesidium may consult Commission officials and experts of its choice on any technical aspect 
which it sees fit to look into. It may set up ad hoc working parties. 200 
The Council will be kept informed of the progress of the Convention's proceedings. The Convention Chairman will give  
an oral progress report at each European Council meeting, thus enabling Heads of State or Government to give their  
views at the same time. 
The Convention will meet in Brussels. The Convention's discussions and all official documents will be in the  
public domain. The Convention will work in the Union's eleven working languages. 
Final document 
The Convention will consider the various issues. It will draw up a final document which may comprise either different  
options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved. 
Together with the outcome of national debates on the future of the Union, the final document will provide a starting  
point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which will take the ultimate decisions. 210 
Forum 
In order for the debate to be broadly based and involve all citizens, a Forum will be opened for organisations  
representing civil society (the social partners, the business world, non-governmental organisations, academia, etc.). It  
will take the form of a structured network of organisations receiving regular information on the Convention's  
proceedings. Their contributions will serve as input into the debate. Such organisations may be heard or consulted on 
specific topics in accordance with arrangements to be established by the Praesidium. 
Secretariat 
The Praesidium will be assisted by a Convention Secretariat, to be provided by the General Secretariat of the Council,  
which may incorporate Commission and European Parliament experts.
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Fischer-sample 10/05/00-19/05/00 
Denmark 
1) Politiken, 13/05/00A: Euro uden returbillet. 
2) Politiken, 13/05/00B: Vejen til Europas Forenede Stater. 
3) Jyllands-Posten, 14/05/00: Tysk plan for superstat. 
4) Politiken, 14/05/00A: Klar tale og virkelighedsflugt. 
5) Politiken, 14/05/00B: Chefredaktøren skriver: Hvad er  og bliver  EU. Commentary by 
Tøger Seidenfaden. 
6) Politiken, 16/05/00: Prodi jubler over debat. 
7) Information, 16/05/00: Uklar tysk vision for EU. 
8) Politiken, 18/05/00: Danmark i EU: Virkeligheden på vej ind i dansk EU-debat. 
9) Information, 18/05/00: Kronik: Dokumentation: En ny æra. Verbatim of speech.  
England 
1) The Times, 11/05/00: Germans face identity crisis at end of European affair. 
2) The Times, 13/05/00: German threat to isolate Britain. 
3) The Independent, 13/05/00: Germany wants faster progress towards a federalist Europe. 
4) The Guardian, 13/05/00: Berlin ministers federal EU vision. 
5) Financial Times, 13/05/00: World news: Europe: Fischer spells out federalist EU vision. 
6) The Times, 14/05/00: Euroland giants begin to doubt ailing currency. 
7) The Independent, 14/05/00: Euro-prosecutors threat to UK laws. 
8) The Independent, 16/05/00: Podium: Apologies to the UK, but federal is the only way; taken 
from the speech on the future of Europe delivered by the German Foreign Minister, at Berlins 
Humboldt University. Verbatim of speech. 
9) The Guardian, 16/05/00: Envoys warn of an inner EU group with closer ties. 
10) Financial Times, 16/05/00: World news: Europe: EU blueprint for new treaty signals reforms. 
11) The Times, 17/05/00: European superpower plan eclipses euro debate. Letter by Andrew 
Duff. 
12) The Guardian, 17/05/00: Analysis: Green shoots: The Greens have tasted power in Europe, but 
with the right capturing some of their turf the problem of the green political identity remains. 
13) The Guardian, 18/05/00: Britain asked to back flexibility. 
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14) Financial Times, 18/05/00: Comment & Analysis: Europes rocky relationship: Robert Graham 
and Haig Simonian on the weakening axis between France and Germany. Commentary by 
Robert Graham and Haig Simonian.  
15) The Times, 19/05/00A: Federal plan leaves Paris cool. 
16) The Times, 19/05/00B: Patten call for EU constitution renews Tory fears. 
17) The Guardian, 19/05/00: France and Germany keen to rev the euro-engine; Informal summit 
aims to put strained partnership back on track. 
18) Financial Times, 19/05/00A: Comment & Analysis: Thank you, Mr. Fischer: The German 
foreign minister has lifted the European debate with a sense of vision, ambition and pride. 
Commentary by Domonique Moisi. 
19) Financial Times, 19/05/00B: Jogged off Observer column.  
France 
1) Le Monde, 11/05/00: Une avant-garde pour lEurope. 
2) Le Figaro, 12/05/00: Initiative europeenne de lAllemagne. 
3) Libération, 13/05/00: LEurope politique selon Joschka Fischer. Le ministre allemande plaide 
pour une Federation europeenne. 
4) Le Monde, 13/05/00A: Lobjectif et la methode. 
5) Le Monde, 13/05/00B: LAllemagne relance le debat sur le creation dune federation en 
Europe; Le ministre des affaires etrangeres prone lelection directe dun president. 
6) Le Monde, 13/05/00C: La Federation europeenne que propose lAllemand Joschka Fischer. 
7) Le Figaro, 13/12/00: Coup declat du ministre allemand des Affaires etrangeres qui prone une 
federation europeenne. 
8) Libération, 15/05/00: LEurope de Fischer sinvite dans la cohabitation. Lappel lance 
vendredi oblige la France a se positionner. 
9) Le Monde, 15/05/00A: Danke schon, M. Fischer. Leader. 
10) Le Monde, 15/05/00B: Joschka Fischer. 
11) Le Monde, 15/05/00C: LEurope unie selon Joschka Fischer; Nous publions des extraits du 
discours prononce le 12 mai a Berlin par le ministre des affaires etrangeres allemand. Joschka 
Fischer developpe son point du vue sur une veritable federation europeenne dotee dun 
president elu au suffrage universel, dun gouvernement et dun Parlement de duex chambre. 
Verbatim of speech. 
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12) Le Monde, 15/05/00D: Hubert Vedrine, ministre des affaires etrangeres; La proposition Fischer 
dessine une perspective a long terme. 
13) Le Monde, 15/05/00E: Les inquietudes de la presse anglaise. 
14) Le Monde, 15/05/00F: Le projet dEurope federale recoit un large soutien en Allemagne; Le 
chancelier Gerhard Schroder approuve linitiative lancee par son ministre des affaires 
etrangeres, Joschka Fischer. Lopposition affirme y retrouver ses propres propositions. La 
presse salue un texte courageux ou ambitieux. 
15) Libération, 16/05/00: Joschka Fischer requinque Bruxelles. La Commission entend en profiter 
pour relancer les discussions sur la CIG. 
16) Le Monde, 16/05/00: Reactions favorables an France apres le discours de M. Fischer. 
17) Le Figaro, 17/05/00: Europe Enfin, on nomme federal la construction politique quil faut 
viser; Merci a Joschka Fischer. Commentary by Anne-Marie Idrac. 
18) Le Monde, 18/05/00: Chiche, Joschka Fischer! Commentary by Pierre Lellouche. 
19) Le Figaro, 18/05/00A: Union Europeenne. Seminaire franco-allemand demain a Rambouillet; 
Indignation outre-manche. 
20) Le Figaro, 18/05/00B: Union Europeenne. Apres la proposition de Joschka Fischer pour une 
Federation; relancer le moteur franco-allemand. 
21) Le Figaro, 18/05/00C: Union Europeenne. Un besoin de refondation de plus un plus 
imperieux; Un elargissement trop rapide du continent europeen commande le role moteur de la 
France et de lAllemagne. Commentary by Thierry de Montbrial. 
22) Libération, 18/05/00: Linitiative du ministre vert allemand est courageuse: il est temps 
dajouter letage democratique a la construction europeenne affaibilie par la mondialisation. 
Construire lEurope, allons-y Joschka. Commentary by Dominique Voynet, Daniel Cohn-
Bendit, and Guy Hascoet. 
23) Libération, 19/05/00A: Leurodepute Jean-Louis Bourlanges (UDF) applaudit Fischer: LUE 
doit etre une puissance politique. 
24) Libération, 19/05/00B: Quand Strasbourg senthousiasme. Dans lensemble, les eurodeputes se 
felicitent de la relance du debat. 
25) Libération, 19/05/00C: La France et lAllemagne se recontrent ajourdhui a Rambouillet. Le 
plan Fischer au menu europeen. LUnion divisee apres la declaration du ministre allemand. 
26) Libération, 19/05/00D: Paris embarrasse LElysee et Matignon saluent laambition de 
Fischer. Sans ladouber. 
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27) Le Figaro, 19/05/00: Union Europeenne. En attendant le chancelier Schroder auhourdhui a 
Rambouillet; Genscher: Fischer voit loin 
28) Le Figaro, 19/05/00: Europe: le frein de la cohabitation. Commentary by Charles 
Lambroschini.     
Germany 
1) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12/05/00: Sollbruchstellen sind keine Wunden Joschka Fischer: 
Rollenkonflikte eines Aussenministers. 
2) taz, 13/05/00A: Fischer und Europa. 
3) taz, 13/05/00B: Grosse Visionen gegen kleine Zaenkerei. 
4) taz, 13/05/00C: Europa neu entwerfen. 
5) taz, 13/05/00D: Fischer macht Europa Beine. 
6) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13/05/00A: Mit Verstand und ohne Sinn. 
7) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13/05/00B: Fischer wirbt fuer europaeische Foederation Aussenminister 
entwrift personliche Vision. 
8) taz, 15/05/00A: Die anderen. 
9) taz, 15/05/00B: Keine exklusive Avantgarde; Fischer: EU zur Foederation ausbauen. 
10) taz, 15/05/00C: Europa braucht keine Visionen. 
11) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15/05/00A: Stadt, Land, Europa. Commentary by Wolfgang Roth. 
12) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15/05/00B: Frankreich befuerwortet Fischers Vorschlaege Personliche 
Europa-Rede des Aussenministers. 
13) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15/05/00: Das Ziel ist die Europaeische Foederation. 
Verbatim of speech. 
14) taz, 16/05/00: Eine Idee mit Tuecken. 
15) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16/05/00: Prodi lobt Fischers Rede zu Europa. 
16) taz, 17/05/00: Schaeuble lobt Fischer; in kuerze.   
17) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17/05/00A: Berlin und Paris wollen EU-Reformn vorantreiben. 
18) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17/05/00B: Schaeuble lobt Fischers Europa-Rede. 
19) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/05/00A: Beifall fuers Ganze, Kritik im Detail. 
20) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/05/00B: Eine Idee und ihre Geschichte. 
21) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/05/00C: Oel fuer den alten Motor. 
22) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/05/00D: Union verlangt umfassendes Konzept zur Einwanderung 
Treffen der Spitzen von CDU und CSU. 
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23) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/05/00E: Kleine Europaeer. 
24) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18/05/00: Kritik an der Kerneuropa-Idee. 
25) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19/05/00A: Gruene in Frankreich sind stolz auf Joschka Fischer. 
26) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19/05/00B: Monsieur Fischer und Herr Chirac. Commentary by Gerd 
Kroencke. 
27) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19/05/00: Soll main Urgrossvater vor den Bundestag? 
Commentary by Ferdinand von Bismarck.  
Spain 
1) Expansión, 13/05/00: El ministro aleman de exteriores propone una federacion de paises 
europeos Solbes admite que tras la perdida de valor del euro tambien hay razones politicas. 
2) El País, 14/05/00: Francia apoya la idea de Europa federal presentada por Fischer. 
3) El País, 16/05/00: Oh, Jerusalen! 
4) Expansión, 17/05/00A: El eje franco-aleman busca su razon de ser en Rambouillet. 
5) Expansión, 17/05/00B: La guerra de declaraciones contrapuestas entre Francia y Alemania 
rodea de incertidumbre al euro las diferencias politicas en el seno de la Union Europea socavan 
la confianza en la moneda unica. 
6) Expansión, 19/05/00: La crisis del eje franco-aleman. Commentary by Robert Graham and 
Haig Simonian. 
 
Aznar-sample 24/09/00-03/10/00 
France 
1) Le Figaro, 27/09/00: Espagne. Le president du gouvernement espagnol a ete recu hier par la 
redaction du Figaro; Aznar: le seperatisme menace lEurope. 
Germany 
1) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27/09/00: Spanien und Frankreich gemeinsam gegen ETA. 
Spain 
1) El País, 26/09/00: Aznar abordara hoy en Paris con Chirac y Jospin la reforma de la UE; 
propuesta para forzar la bajada del petroleo. 
2) El País, 27/09/00A: Fontaine destaca en el congreso la firme condena de la UE al terrorismo; 
Chirac promete a Aznar que aumentara la cooperacion contra ETA. 
3) El País, 27/09/00B: Aznar hace profesión de europeísmo en París pero mantiene trabas a la 
reforma de la UE. 
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4) El País, 28/09/00: Aznar alerta del riesgo que supone para Europa el terrorismo nacionalista; 
afirma en Le Figaro que ETA es la expresion del nazismo actual.  
 
Blair-sample 04/10/00-13/10/00 
Denmark 
1) Information, 05/10/00: Nyhedsanalyse: Glidebane mod mindre union. 
2) Politiken, 06/10/00: Oprør i Serbien: NATO lader EU føre ordet. 
3) Information, 06/10/00: Blair klar med EU-vision. 
4) Information, 07/10/00A: Mer magt til briterne. 
5) Information, 07/10/00B: Udefra: Europas fremtid. Verbatim of speech. 
6) Information, 07/10/00C: Ledende artikel: Holgers Country Club. Leader. 
7) Politiken, 07/10/00A: Ledende artikel: Blairs vision. Leader. 
8) Politiken, 07/10/00B: Debat: Europa: Europas fremtid. Verbatim of speech. 
9) Information, 12/10/00: Nedtælling til EU-udvidelsen er i gang. 
England 
1) The Times, 04/10/00: Prodi starts fight to bolster Commission. 
2) The Independent, 04/10/00: Prodi says EU states attempting power grab. 
3) Financial Times, 04/10/00: Comment & Analysis: Blair suffers the Danish blues: The bear of 
public opinion may be stifling any enthusiasm among political leaders for a referendum on UK 
entry into the euro. Commentary by Martin Wolf. 
4) The Times, 05/10/00: Frustrated Poles lose faith in EU as wait drags on. 
5) The Independent, 05/10/00A: Mr. Blairs new, practical plans for Europes future: when an 
official complained that tomorrows speech was Gaullist, Blair replied: De Gaulle? Top name. 
Comment by Donald Macintyre. 
6) The Independent, 05/10/00B: Blair plans to reduce the power of Brussels. 
7) Financial Times, 05/10/00: Leader: Brussels role. Leader. 
8) The Times, 06/10/00: Blair to call for Euro senate to control Brussels. 
9) The Independent, 06/10/00A: Leading article: The European debate may be moving Britains 
way. Leader. 
10) The Independent, 06/10/00B: Blair backs multi-speed EU with Eastern states. 
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11) Financial Times, 06/10/00A: National news: Blair to propose second European chamber Future 
of the EU Prime Minister sets out alternative to federalist vision with plans to tackle 
democratic deficit. 
12) Financial Times, 06/10/00B: Comment & Analysis: Mr Blair goes to Warsaw: The answer to 
Europes current difficulties is not rhetoric about tomorrow but addressing the problems of 
today. Commentary by Philip Stephens.  
13) Financial Times, 06/10/00C: Shorts: Blair to propose second chamber for EU parliament. 
14) The Times, 07/10/00A: The Warsaw way. 
15) The Times, 07/10/00B: Blair wins backing for more powerful Europe. 
16) The Times, 07/10/00C: Blairs EU vision. 
17) The Independent, 07/10/00: Blair calls for change in role of bigger EU. 
18) The Guardian, 07/10/00A: Blair calls for Euro superpower. 
19) The Guardian, 07/10/00B: Commentary: Can a touch of pragmatism bring Europe into new 
focus? Commentary by Hugo Young. 
20) The Guardian, 07/10/00C: A superpower, but not a superstate: Warsaw speech: Blair makes 
case for rapid enlargement of EU an sets out vision for responsive, prosperous and civilised 
Union. Verbatim of speech. 
21) The Guadian, 07/10/00D: Europe des patries: Mr Blairs version: do your own thing. Leader. 
22) Financial Times, 07/10/00A Blair spells out vision of Europes future: Prime minister says that 
the EU can become a superpower without turning itself into a superstate. 
23) Financial Times, 07/10/00B: Europe must wake up to new reality: Tony Blairs European 
vision includes a stronger council and speedy inclusion of new member states. 
24) The Times, 08/10/00: Blair offers Europe a superpower vision. 
25) The Independent, 09/10/00A: Letter: democracy in the EU. Letter by Walter Cairns. 
26) The Independent, 09/10/00B: European expansion will require radical reform. Commentary 
by Sarah Hogg. 
27) Financial Times, 09/10/00: Leader: Tony Blairs vision of Europe. Leader. 
28) The Times, 10/10/00: Blairs Warsaw speech and teh EU superpower. Letter by Jeffrey 
Titford. 
29) The Guardian, 11/10/00: Comment & Analysis: Letter: Two cheers for Europe. Letter by 
Sarah Ludford. 
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30) Financial Times, 11/10/00A: Comment & Analysis: Blair enters the real debate on Europe: 
Rather than fear the emergence of a European superstate, Britain should realise it can benefit 
form changes. Commentary by Douglas Hurd. 
31) Financial Times, 11/10/00B: Letters to the editor: Turning a blind eye to confusion over EU. 
Letter by Michael Pearce. 
32) The Times, 12/10/00: Blair on collision course over EU citizens charter. 
33) The Independent, 12/10/00: Blair agrees to lose on seat on EU Commission. 
34) The Times, 13/10/00A: Charter of trouble. 
35) The Times, 13/10/00B: Blair misled nation over EU charter. 
36) The Guardian, 13/10/00A: Chips are down for EU expansion at casino summit. 
37) The Guardian, 13/10/00B: Comment & Analysis: Analysis: A Nice mess: The first wave of 
east European entrants to the EU will alter the balance of the European constitution. But how 
will the scales be reset? Commentary by David Walker. 
38) Financial Times, 13/10/00A: Letters to the editor: Eurosceptic countries lack self-confidence. 
Letter by Miguel G. Orozco. 
39) Financial Times, 13/10/00B: Leader: A Biarritz affair. Leader.  
France 
1) Libération, 04/10/00: Prodi cherhce a reprendre kes renes d lEurope. 
2) Libération, 05/10/00: Aubry presidente, la France isolee; Un intellectuel britanique, proche de 
Tony Blair, se livre a un travail de prospective sur lUnion europeenne 2010 et Paris en 
mauvaise posture. Commentary by Francois Heisbourg. 
3) Libération, 07/10/00: Blair, champion de lelargissement. 
4) Le Monde, 07/10/00: Union Europeenne: Tony Blair veut accelerer lelargissement. 
5) Le Figaro, 07/10/00: Grande-Bretagne. La reponse aux propisitions de Jacques Chirac et de 
Joschka Fischer; Blair refuse une Europe fragmente. 
6) Le Monde, 09/10/00: Tony Blair plaide, a Varsovie, pour une Europe de nations libres, 
independantes et souveraines; Dans son discours devant les pays candidats a lentree dans 
lUnion, il a rejete le model federal. 
7) Le Figaro, 09/10/00: De Belgrade a Biarritz 
8) Le Monde, 10/10/00: Tony Blair: le rejet de leuro par les Danois naura aucun impact. 
9) Libération, 11/10/00: Hypocrisies francaises sur lEurope; Au-dela des mots, Paris se defie de 
toute federation europeenne et se retrouve plus proche de Tony Blair que de Joschka Fischer. 
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10) Le Monde, 13/10/00: Institutions europeennes: le grand marchandage. 
Germany 
1) taz, 07/10/00: Blair gegen Superstaat EU. 
2) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10/10/00: Nur kleinster gemeinsamer Nenner? 
3) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12/10/00: Visionaere und Realisten. 
4) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/10/00: Wenn Schweden ueber Europa nachdenken. 
5) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13/10/00: Verhandlungen in entscheidender Phase. 
Spain 
1) Expansión, 07/10/00: La Comision propone implicar a las empresas y las ONGs en la 
construccion europea Blair responde a Prodi pidiendo mas poder para los estados miembros de 
la UE. 
2) El País, 07/10/00A: El lider laboralista dice que el no danes no afectara a la ampliacion. 
3) El País, 07/10/00B: Aznar dice que ha caido el ultimo pedazo del muro. 
4) El País, 09/10/00: Visiones de Europa. Leader. 
5) Expansión, 11/10/00: Euroexpansion el peso de cada pais, la reforma de la Comision y la 
cooperacion reforzada siguen dividiendo a los quince los quince celebran una cumbre europea 
en Biarritz en medio del atasco de la reforma instituticional. 
6) El País, 13/10/00: Europe en la encrucijada. Commentary by Felipe Gonzalez. 
 
Nice-sample 05/12/00-14/12/00 
Denmark 
1) Information, 05/12/00: Politikerne har svigtet. 
2) Jyllands-Posten, 06/12/00A: Ledende artikel: Før Nice. Leader. 
3) Jyllands-Posten, 06/12/00B: Frankrig: Chirac groggy før EU-topmøde. 
4) Berlingske Tidende, 06/12/00: Tyskland  det rare muskelbundt. 
5) Information, 07/12/00: EU mod Øst: Kommissær-strid sendes til hjørne. 
6) Jyllands-Posten, 08/12/00: Nice-topmøde: Nervekrig om Europas fremtid.  
7) Information, 08/12/00A: EU: Visioner: Forandring i familien påkrævet. Commentary by 
Göran Persson. 
8) Information, 08/12/00B: Interview: Romano Prodi (Resultater: Pessimistisk Prodi glæder sig til 
tiden efter Nice). 
9) Politiken, 08/12/00A: Fakta: Topmøde i Nice: Det slås de om.  
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10) Politiken, 08/12/00B: Topmøde i Nice: Danmark klar til mere union. 
11) Berlingske Tidende, 08/12/00A: Nyrup klar til ny reform af traktaten. 
12) Berlingske Tidende, 08/12/00B: Dramatisk start på Nice-topmødet. 
13) Information, 09/12/00: Ledende artikel: Et hår og en hær. Leader. 
14) Politiken, 09/12/00: Debat: Nicetopmøde: Tal europæisk, din hund. Commentary by Lars 
Egelund. 
15) Jyllands-Posten, 09/12/00: Nice topmøde: Tyskland på vej mod toppen. 
16) Berlingske Tidende, 09/12/00A: [No title]. 
17) Berlingske Tidende, 09/12/00B: Knuder på EU-forsvaret. 
18) Politiken, 10/12/00: EU: Fra kernefamilie til storfamilie. 
19) Jyllands-Posten, 10/12/00: Topmøde-reporter; Heksekedlen i Nice. 
20) Berlingske Tidende, 10/12/00: Frankrigs udspil deler EU-landene i store og små. 
21) Information, 11/12/00: EU mod Øst: Vokseværk i Parlamentet. 
22) Jyllands-Posten, 11/12/00A: Kommissionen: Dansk kommissær i sikker havn. 
23) Jyllands-Posten, 11/12/00B: EU set udefra: Verdens øjne hviler på Nice. 
24) Berlingske Tidende, 11/12/00A: Nervekrig om EU's fremtid. 
25) Berlingske Tidende, 11/12/00B: Vejen til EU's forfatning er lagt. 
26) Jyllands-Posten, 12/12/00A: Nice-traktat: Pres på SF efter Nice. 
27) Jyllands-Posten, 12/12/00B: Nice-traktat: Tilfredshed i Baltikum. 
28) Information, 12/12/00A: Ledende artikel: Stakkels EU. Leader. 
29) Information, 12/12/00B: EU mod Øst: Nedtur i Nice. 
30) Information, 12/12/00C: EU mod Øst: Problemer: Problemerne står tilbage. 
31) Berlingske Tidende, 12/12/00: Eksperter: EU hæmmet af ny traktat. 
32) Politiken, 13/12/00: Kronik: Den store, stygge folkestemme. Commentary by Ebbe Kløvedal 
Reich. 
England 
1) The Times, 05/12/00: Read my lips  Non can only mean Yes. 
2) The Independent, 05/12/00: France angers Britain over EU defence force; Europe on eve of 
Nice summit, foreign secretary voices fears that Nato could be undermined by plans for even 
closer military co-operation. 
3) The Guardian, 05/12/00A: Britain and France clash over defence: Cook fights plan to let 
groups of countries mount own initiatives. 
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4) The Guardian, 05/12/00B: Comment & Analysis: Forget Florida, its Nice we should be 
worried about: There is little cause for optimism at this weeks EU summit. Commentary by 
Hugo Young. 
5) Financial Times, 05/12/00A: Letter to the editor: Like it or not, we are at home in Europe. 
Letter by Chris Blanchard. 
6) Financial Times, 05/12/00B: Britain angers EU ahead of Nice summit. 
7) The Times, 06/12/00A: How joint papers open doors to new countries. 
8) TheTimes, 06/12/00B: Ever-closer union dead: Mandelson. 
9) The Times, 06/12/00C: Secret plan for EU superstate. 
10) The Independent, 06/12/00A: Downing Street says Tories want out of EU. 
11) The Independent, 06/12/00B: The Nice summit: from sovereignty to movies, let the battle 
begin. 
12) The Guardian, 06/12/00: Blair alerted on EU integration moves. 
13) Financial Times, 06/12/00A: World new  Europe: Alpine commissioner set for uphill 
struggle: Reform chief hopes that talks will bring compromises amounting to a useful and 
correct Nice summit. 
14) Financial Times, 06/12/00B: Letter to the editor: EU has underpinned democracy. Letter by J. 
P. Connell. 
15) The Times, 07/12/00A: The nice ambush. 
16) The Times, 07/12/00B: Proletarian protesters take over Cote dAzur. 
17) The Times, 07/12/00C: Cook faces long game of Euro poker. 
18) The Independent, 07/12/00: Blair flies to Nice under pressure on four fronts. 
19) The Guardian, 07/12/00A: Blair bid to avert EU stalemate: PM sees enlargement as priority in 
reform agenda. 
20) The Guardian, 07/12/00B: Comment & Analysis: The national vetoes which must go: The 
president of the European Commission gives his hopes for Nice. Commentary by Romano 
Prodi. 
21) Financial Times, 07/12/00A: Nice could lead to EU doubling its size: Reform and 
strengthening of decision-making process top of the agenda at historic summit. 
22) Financial Times, 07/12/00B: World news  Europe: EU must not aim too high, warns Swedish 
premier.   
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23) Financial Times, 07/127/00C: World news  Europe: Brussels to create agency to improve 
safety at sea. 
24) The Times, 08/12/00A: Jospin hopes charter will become law. 
25) The Times, 08/12/00B: Blair undertakes U-turn over German demand for talks. 
26) The Times, 08/12/00C: Eastern Europe pleads for EU enlargement. 
27) The Independent, 08/12/00: Nice summit: Human rights  rights charter masks division over its 
future legal status. 
28) The Guardian, 08/12/00A: Nice summit: East grows tired of waiting game: Enlargement 
Pressure builds on EU to move quickly towards a united continent. 
29) The Guardian, 08/12/00B: Nice summit: Members back citizens charter: Human rights 
Articles aim to give EU moral dimension. 
30) The Guardian, 08/12/00C: Chirac widens split on defence. 
31) The Guardian, 08/12/00D: Comment & Analysis: France versus the mighty Americans: They 
want a transformed Europe to moderate US dominance. Commentary by Martin Woollacott. 
32) Financial Times, 08/12/00A: Comment & Analysis: Plotting Europes new geometry: 
Enlargement to the east will place Germany at centre of the EU and demands a rethink of the 
Unions purpose. Commentary by Philip Stephens. 
33) Financial Times, 08/12/00B: World new  Europe: Leaders prepare for enlargement EU 
summit in Nice talks begin on boosting decision-making capability to overcome difficulties of 
taking on new. 
34) The Times, 09/12/00A: Chiracs lecturing style angers delegates. 
35) The Times, 09/12/00B: Leaders sharpen wits for 15-hand poker game. 
36) The Times, 09/12/00C: Dirty tricks benefits row leaves Blair in EU cold. 
37) The Independent, 09/12/00: Nice summit: In a locked room. Leaders plot the future of Europe; 
the talks. 
38) Financial Times, 09/12/00: World news  Europe: Pledge to speed entry of ex-Soviet countries 
EU summit in Nice push for 2004 entry. 
39) The Times, 10/12/00A: Call me a Eurosceptic, but give me Boston not Berlin. Commentary 
by David Quinn. 
40) The Times, 10/12/00B: Europe in a disarray at EU summit. 
41) The Times, 10/12/00C: A bigger Europe. Commentary by Ken Livingstone. 
42) The Times, 10/12/00D: What is the EU for? Leader. 
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43) The Times, 10/12/00E: Nice summit: who hopes to join the EU and when, the issues, the 
objectives, dilemmas and results. 
44) The Times, 11/12/00: Big countries grow stronger in Europe. 
45) The Independent, 11/12/00A: Nice summit: The Commission  radical reform rejected for a 
please-all fudge. 
46) The Independent, 11/12/00B: Nice summit: The future  leaders agree on a package of 
reform. 
47) The Guardian, 11/12/00A: Jeux sans frontieres: From here it looked as though the Nice 
summit was all grinning group photos and lofty communiques. But what really went on in the 
corridors and conference rooms of the Hotel Acropolis  and on the streets outside? 
48) The Guardian, 11/12/00B: Nice summit: The future: Focus turns to power split deeper, wider, 
debate on EU due in 2004. 
49) The Guardian, 11/12/00C: Blair holds on to UKs key vetoes: Revolt by small states stalls 
summit. 
50) Financial Times, 11/12/00A: EU leaders draw up outline deal on treaty revisions UK keeps 
veto on tax and social security as voting rights dispute sends Nice summit into overtime. 
51) Financial Times, 11/12/00B: Comment & Analysis: Europes meeting of unequals: Storminess 
at Nice underlines that the EU must choose between clumsy bargaining of national interests and 
empowering common institutions. Commentary by Quentin Peel. 
52) Financial Times, 11/12/00C: Europe: EU leaders agree to try again in 2004 Nice summit future 
conference to define division of powers between Brussels and governments will not be a preco.  
53) The Times, 12/12/00A: Germany triumphs on the EU battlefield. 
54) The Times, 12/12/00B: Welcome to the late, late show. 
55) The Times, 12/12/00C: Blair to EU: We cant go on like this. 
56) The Independent, 12/12/00A: Letter: out of step in Europe. Letter by Martin Rosen. 
57) The Independent, 12/12/00B: Mr Blair has helped Britain to find a role in Europe; this country 
needs to demonstrate its seriousness as a European player by joining the single currency. 
Commentary by Donald Macintyre. 
58) The Independent, 12/12/00C: Blair calls for change after Nice circus. 
59) The Independent, 12/12/00D: Nice summit: the deal  big four emerge triumphant after 
diplomatic coup.  
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60) The Independent, 12/12/00E: Nice summit: the Commission  no reform but new presidential 
powers. 
61) The Independent, 12/12/00F: Nice summit: how the new Europe will work. 
62) The Guardian, 12/12/00A: Nice summit: Belgian hero broke deadlock: The deal Nerve-racking 
end to tiring, tortuous talks. 
63) The Guardian, 12/12/00B: Nice summit: How big powers won big benefits: Modest reforsm 
Defeat and humiliation for integrationists. 
64) The Guardian, 12/12/00C: Tories left floundering by EU deal. 
65) The Guardian, 12/12/00D: Comment & Analysis: Everyone was a winner at the battle of Nice: 
For once it wasnt a contest between Britain and the rest. Commentary by Hugo Young. 
66) Financial Times, 12/12/00A: National news: EU treaty should return some powers says Blair 
Commons Prime Minister condemns conservative opposition to agreement in Nice. 
67) Financial Times, 12/12/00B: Comment & Analysis: A new dynamic at Nice: The Franco-
German axis at the centre of Europes postwar development is giving way to more fluid 
alliances based on individual issues. Commentary by Robert Graham and Brian Groom. 
68) Financial Times, 12/12/00C: World news  Europe: Future members welcome outcome East 
Europe enlargement on course. 
69) Financial Times, 12/12/00D: World news  Europe: Majority voting slowly wins support of 
leaders reforms progress in overcoming national objections. 
70) The Times, 13/12/00A: Blair misunderstood by Nice treaty critics. 
71) The Times, 13/12/00B: Tax veto is a threat to Britains leading role. 
72) The Independent, 13/12/00A: Oh Mr Hague, youve become such a bore about Europe; there 
is no sense of an alternative vision, just the sound of the Kruschevian shoe being banged. 
Commentary by Anne Mcelvoy. 
73) The Independent, 13/12/00B: Europe hits back over Blairs stance on tax. 
74) The Independent, 13/12/00C: Summits could be switched to Brussels. 
75) The Guardian, 13/12/00: Prodi attacks self-serving Blair: Commission president fears 
summit failures will harm EU. 
76) The Independent, 14/12/00: Letter: a two-tier Europe. Letter by Randhir Singh Bains. 
77) Financial Times, 14/12/00A: Comment & Analysis: A doese of Nordi pragmatism: After the 
trials of Nice, Swedens EU presidency will deliver results. 
78) Financial Times, 14/12/00B: Europe: Britain and Spain biggest Nice winners.   
  Appendix 9: List of articles 
15 
 
 
France 
1) Le Monde, 05/12/00A: Dossier Europe: la France acheve son mandat sans cocorico; Le 
sommet de Nice clot six mois dune presidence terne. Sauf accord a larrache, la reforme de 
lUnion risque de capoter. 
2) Le Monde, 05/12/00B: Le president Chirac reste prudent sur les resultats du sommet de Nice; 
berlin pret a maintenir la parite politique avec la France au sein de lUE. 
3) Le Figaro, 05/12/00: Union Europeenne. Le sommet de Nice, qui souvre jeudi, doit boucler 
une reforme ambitieuse, indispensable a lelargissement; Ankara veut aussi son integration 
militaire.   
4) Le Monde, 07/12/00: Nice, en sommet crucial pour lavenir de lEurope; Avant de selargir a 
lEurope de lEst ainsi qua Chyphre et a Malte, les Quinze doivent imperativement reformer 
leurs institutions politiques. Ils vont tenter de trouver un compromis dici a la fin du week-end. 
Parallelement, les antimondialistes se sont donne rendez-vous le long de la baie des Anges. 
5) Le Figaro, 07/12/00:  Union Europeenne. Les chefs dEtat et de gouvernement des Quinze se 
retrouvent a partir daujourdhui sur la Cote dAzur; Les enjeux capitaux du sommet de Nice. 
Commentary by Romano Prodi. 
6) Le Monde, 08/12/00A: Jacques Chirac et Lionel Jospin logent au meme hotel. 
7) Le Monde, 08/12/00B: Les Quinze abordent en rangs disperses la reforme des institutions; Les 
chefs dEtat et de gouvernement de lUnion europeenne ont ouvert, jeudi 7 decembre, le 
sommet de Nice par une rencontre avec leaurs homologues des treize pays candidate a lUnion. 
Lelargissement est la toile de fond dune discussion qui sannonce difficile. 
8) Le Figaro, 08/12/00: Union Europeenne. Le Conseil des chefs dEtat et de gouvernement a 
officiellement ouvert ses travux hier a Nice, dans un climat de violence qui a vu manifestants et 
forces de lordre saffronter. Plusieurs policiers ont ete blesses au cours des echauffourees. La 
charte de droits fondamentaux a ete signee, mais elle na pas ete proclamee; La France joue 
serre a Nice. 
9) Le Figaro, 09/12/00: Union Europeenne, Le Conseil des chefs dEtat et de gouvernement 
poursuit ses travaux a Nice. Les Quinze ont decide hier de creer une Agence alimentaire debut 
2002; Le confessional avant la marchandage Petits calculs pour une grande reforme. 
10) Libération, 11/12/00: La Pologne impose son nome parmi les grands. 
11) Le Monde, 11/12/00: Le droit de veto est un handicap en matiere de negociations 
commerciales. 
The Constitution of Meaning 
 16
12) Le Figaro, 11/12/00A: Verites crues sur lelargissement.  
13) Le Figaro, 11/12/00B: Union Europeenne. Les Quinze negociaient laborieusement, hier soir, a 
Nice, la mise au point dun nouveau traite communautaire; Affrontement entre grands et petits 
pays. 
14) Le Monde, 12/12/00A: Europe: accord minimal a Nice. 
15) Le Monde, 12/12/00B: Quatre ans pour reflechir a un projet constitutionnel. 
16) Le Monde, 12/12/00C: Sur les quatre dossiers de la reforme des institutions, les resultats sont 
tres inferieurs aux ambitions affichees. 
17) Le Monde, 12/12/00D: Dautres mesures pour une Europe plus citoyenne. 
18) Le Monde, 12/12/00E: Le sommet de Nice, nouvelle etabe vers lEurope des vingt-huit; Les 
quinze chefs dEtat et de gouvernement de lUnion europeenne ont obtenu a løarrache, lundi 11 
decmbre, un accord inacheve pour preparer lelargissement a lEst. Les grands pays ont 
consolide leurs positions. 
19) Le Figaro, 12/12/00: Union Europeenne. Apres le laborieux sommet des Quinze a Nice; Le jeu 
du mistigri. Commentary by Charles Pasqua. 
20) Libération, 13/12/00: Les eurodeputes ereintent Chirac. 
21) Le Monde, 14/12/00: A Strasbourg, Jacques Chirac a du affronter le mecontentement des 
deputes europeens; Les resultats du sommet de Nice ont suscite la reprobation. 
Germany 
1) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 06/12/00: EU-gipfel in Nizza. 
2) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06/12/00A: Die charta der europaeischen grundrechte vor 
ihrer feierlichen proklamation. Commentary by Meinhard Hilf. 
3) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06/12/00B: Regieren in Europa. Leader. 
4) taz, 07/12/00: Historische Zufaelle. 
5) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 07/12/00A: Die Affaeren des M. Chirac Frankreich: Der angeschlegene 
Praesident. 
6) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 07/12/00B: Blick zurueck nach Amsterdam. 
7) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 07/12/00C: Ein datum des Erinnerns und des Aufbruchs. 
8) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 07/12/00D: Schroeder gibt Polen Vorrang bei EU-Beitritt Gebot 
historischer Gerechtigkeit. 
9) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 07/12/00A: Die Europaeische Union vor dem Gipfeltreffen in 
Nizza. In Berlin denkt man schon ueber Nizza hinaus. 
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10) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 07/12/00B: Ohne polnisches Freiheitsstreben waere die 
Geschichte der deutschen Einheit weniger gluecklich verlaufen. Verbatim of Schröders 
speech to the Polish parliament. 
11) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 07/12/00C: In Nizza darf es keine Ueberbleibsel geben. 
Commentary by Romano Prodi. 
12) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 07/12/00D: Schroeder in Warschau: Der EU-beitritt Polens ist 
ein Gebot historischer Gerechtigkeit. 
13) taz, 08/12/00: You got to be free.  
14) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 09/12/00. Die Angst der Europaeer vor Europa. Leader. 
15) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09/12/00A: Das Gipfeltreffen der Europaeischen Union in 
Nizza. Ein Erfolg trotz kuenstlich geschuerter Aufregung. 
16) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09/12/00B: Das Gipfeltreffen der Europaeischen Union in 
Nizza. Dir Schatten der Vergangenheit holen Europas Zukunft ein. 
17) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10/12/00A: Elefantentreffen. 
18) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10/12/00B: Der EU-Staatsnwalt ist in Nizza 
steckengeblieben. 
19) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10/12/00C: Zaehes Feilschen um die Zukunft Europas. 
20) taz, 11/12/00: Die Kleinen ueben Kofferpacken. 
21) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11/12/00: Im Wartesaal vom Haus Europa Nizza: Notizen vom einem 
Gipfel, der einem Marathon gleicht. 
22) taz, 12/12/00A: Europaeische Erblasten. 
23) taz, 12/12/00B: Europa macht unendlich muede. 
24) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12/12/00A: Die Irrationalitaet der Maerkte Das Thema des Tages. 
25) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12/12/00B: Salade Nicoise. Commentary by Andreas Oldag. 
26) Süddeutsches Zeitung, 12/12/00C: Held im Auftsand der Kleinen Nizza: Die Rolle des 
Belgiers. 
27) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/12/00A: War da was vor 1871? Commentary by Dieter 
Langewiesche. 
28) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/12/00B: Das Gipfeltreffen der Europaeischen Union in 
Nizza. 
29) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/12/00C: Nach vier Tagen und einer Nacht verabschiedet 
die EU ein Mini-Reform-Paket. 
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30) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14/12/00: Auf dem Rueckmarsch? 
Spain 
1) El País, 05/12/00: Para cuando la ampliacion de Europa? Commentary by Emilio Menendez 
Del Valle. 
2) Cinco Días, 05/12/00: Tribuna Cita europea en Niza. Commnetary by Jose Maria Zufiaur. 
3) Expansión, 07/12/00: Editorial El futuro de Europa pasa por las reformas de Niza. Leader. 
4) El País, 07/12/00A: El poquer de Niza. Leader. 
5) El País, 07/12/00B. Las apuestas por el exito o el fracaso. 
6) El País, 07/12/00C: Schroeder pide a los quince que antepongan la construccion europea al 
interes nacional; el canciller sigue los pasos de Willy Brandt en Varsovia y utiliza argumentos 
historicos para Niza.  
7) El País, 07/12/00D: Niza obliga a los lideres de la UE a superar sus diferencias ante el retor de 
la ampliacion; la incorporacion de nuevos paises exige que los actuales miembros redistribuyan 
el poder. 
8) Cinco Días, 07/12/00A: Los Quince proclaman la Carta de Derechos del Ciudadano. 
9) Cinco Días, 07/12/00B: Editorial Europa, futuro imperfecto. Leader. 
10) Expansión, 08/12/00: La reforma de la Union Europea. Alemania, dispuesta a ceder en su 
exigencia de tener un mayor numero de votos si en 2004 se convoca otra CIG los quince 
prometen a los candidatos del este esfuerzos para evitar el retraso de la ampliacion. 
11) El País, 08/12/00A: Chirac abre la cumbre con la exigencia de que Paris y Berlin conserven el 
mismo peso; grupos violentos causan graves incidentes en Niza. 
12) El País, 08/12/00B: Si Niza fracasa, es un problema para todos. 
13) Cinco Días, 08/12/00: Londres, a favor de otra reforma institucional en 2004. 
14) El País, 09/12/00: Por una Europa de varias capitales. Commentary by Soledad Gallego-Diaz. 
15) El País, 11/12/00A: Alemania logra en Niza la mayor cuota de poder dentro de la UE; Espana 
acepta perder de capacidad de bloqueo que tienen los paises grandes. 
16) El País, 11/12/00B: Francia asume que Alemania sea el pais con mas poder en la UE; Portugal 
y Belgica bloqueaban de madrugada la cumbre de Niza. 
17) El País, 11/12/00C: La cumbre de las dos reconciliaciones. 
18) El País, 11/12/00D: Los lideres europeos pactan abrir una nueva reforma para aclarar el 
futuro. 
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19) El País, 11/12/00E: El parlamento se amplia a 732 diputados para contentar a Alemania; Berlin 
contara con 99 escanos.   
20) El País, 11/12/00F: Espana acepta perder la capacidad de bloqueo que tienen los paises 
grandes; Pique rechaza concretar el reparto de poder en cifras y se dice satisfecho. 
21) Expansión, 11/12/00: La llave el futuro de la Union Europea. 
22) Cinco Días, 11/12/00: Los Quince se compromete a acelerar la negociacion con los candidatos 
del Este. 
23) Expansión, 12/12/00: El acuerdo de la cumbre de Niza pasa desapercibido en los mercados 
financieros el euro pierde un 1,24%, pendiende del resultado electoral en EEUU.  
24) El País, 12/12/00A: Corriere della Sera Europa: Una custion de celos. Commentary by Franco 
Venturini. 
25) El País, 12/12/00B: El presidente de la Comision sera elegido por mayoria. 
26) El País, 12/12/00C: De Europa al Palau. 
27) Cinco Días, 12/12/00A: Italia se felicita por la aprobacion de las cooperaciones reforzadas. 
28) Cinco Días, 12/12/00B: Espana no consigue la paridad con los grandes. 
29) Cinco Días, 12/12/00C: Editorial Europa, de 15 a 27. Leader. 
30) Expansión, 13/12/00: Incertidumbre y gobernabilidad. 
31) El País, 13/12/00A: La astuta Europa. Commentary by Sami Nair. 
32) El País, 13/12/00B: Todas las cumbres se celebraran en Bruselas tras la primera ampliacion. 
33) El País, 13712/00C: El parlamento europeo manifiesta a Chirac su decpcion por el tratado de 
Niza.  
 
Jospin&Prodi-sample 26/05/01-05/06/01 
Denmark 
1) Information, 26/05/01: Frankrig vil tilbage på den europæiske scene. 
2) Politiken, 29/05/01: Jospin vil ikek være en lunken europæer. 
3) Jyllands-Posten, 29/05/01: Frankrig: Jospin: Nej til EU som forbundsstat. 
4) Information, 29/05/01: Jospin afviser forbundsstat. 
5) Jyllands-Posten, 30/05/01: Europa-tale: Tysk-fransk uenighed om EU. 
6) Information, 30/05/01A: Tysk EU-vision skudt ned. 
7) Information, 30/05/01B: Ledende artikel: En ufolkelig sag. Leader. 
8) Berlingske Tidende, 30/05/01: Ros til de franske visioner for EU.  
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9) Jyllands-Posten, 01/06/01: EU: EU-udvidelsen tilbage på sporet. 
10) Politiken, 02/06/01: Debat: Europa: EU  mellem statsforbund og forbundsstat. Commentary 
by Erling Bjøl. 
11) Politiken, 03/06/01: EU's fremtid. Analyse: EU's fremtid i støbeskeen. Commentary by Tøger 
Seidenfaden. 
12) Information, 05/06/01: Interview: Lykke Friis (Vi har det med EU som med folkekirken). 
England 
1) Financial Times, 26/05/01: Multiple identities: Briatin must adapt to constitutional reforms at 
home and in Europe. Commentary by Lionel Barber. 
2) The Times, 27/05/01: Jospins vision of EU fans the federal flames. 
3) The Independent, 28/05/01A: Leading article: Read between the lines of Mr. Jospins euro-
rhetoric. Leader. 
4) The Independent, 28/05/01B: Election 2001: Labour fears the F-word in Jospins vision for 
Europe. 
5) The Guardian, 28/05/01: Comment & Analysis: Election 2001 Our commentators enter the 
euro fray from the just-say-no left and the dithering middle ground while Roy Hattersley 
congratulates Blair on coming clean: There are no certainties. Commentary by Peter Preston. 
6) Financial Times, 28/05/01: Jospin to define his stance on Europe Consensus approach French 
prime minister differs from president Chirac and German leader over how EU should develop. 
7) The Times, 29/05/01A: French lesson. 
8) The Times, 29/05/01B: Jospin sets out vision of a more French EU. 
9) The Times, 29/05/01C: The real rift in Europe is not the Channel. 
10) The Times, 29/05/01D: Jospin fuels Europe row with Labour. 
11) The Independent, 29/05/01A: Election 2001: Rigging the referendum isnt as easy as the Tories 
think. Commentary by Donald Macintyre. 
12) The Independent, 29/05/01B: Election 2001: Prodi undermines Blair on Europe. 
13) The Independent, 29/05/01C: Election 2001: Analysis  very French, very dull but little to fear 
in the Jospin plan. 
14) The Guardian, 29/05/01A: Jospin gives French look to European federation. 
15) The Guardian, 29/05/01B: Jospin rejects federal Europe. 
16) Financial Times, 29/05/01A: UK rejects French plan for EU tax harmony. 
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17) Financial Times, 29/05/01B: Jospin rejects German federalist views French prime minister UK 
Conservatives see advocacy of European superstate. 
18) Financial Times, 29/05/01C: Lionel Jospins vision for the EU. Leader. 
19) Financial Times, 29/05/01D: I want Europe but my nation remains important to me. 
20) The Times, 30/05/01: Cook dismisses Prodi call for European tax. 
21) The Independent, 30/05/01: Election 2001: Prodi raises the stakes with call for new EU tax; 
Europe. 
22) The Guardian, 30/05/01A: The future of Europe: Enlargement shakes the ground under the 
bastions of the EU. 
23) The Guardian, 30/05/01B: The future of Europe: Seven leaders with seven visions: A guide to 
where they think we are going. 
24) The Guardian, 30/05/01C: Prodi speech stirs passions in euro debate: President calls for new 
tax and more integration. 
25) Financial Times, 30/05/01A: Nation state finds new champion in Jospin: French leader focuses 
on more practical issues such as food safety as he sets out his vision for the EU. 
26) Financial Times, 30/05/01B: Brussels boys Observer column. 
27) Financial Times, 30/05/01C: Prodi calls for tax to finance EU budget. 
28) The Times, 01/06/01: Will this Napoleon risk all to unite Europe? 
29) The Guardian, 01/06/01: Election 2001: Euro scare story fears as Blair meets Swedish PM. 
30) Financial Times, 01/06/01A: Grand plans and petty squabbles: Narrow self.interest on the part 
of member states could poison efforts to enalrge Nato and the EU. Commentary by William 
Wallis. 
31) Financial Times, 01/06/01B: Guterres sees gradual EU reform. 
32) The Times, 03/06/01: This is a new kind of Europe. Commentary by Larry Siedentop. 
33) The Times, 04/06/01: Economics and independence in a united Europe. Letter by Robin 
Barrett. 
34) Financial Times, 04/06/01: A European foreign policy built on sacrifice: Nation states must 
relinquish some of what makes them unique if the European Union is to attain credibility in the 
wider world. Commentary by Dominique Moisi.     
France 
1) Le Monde, 26/05/01A: Trois questions oFrederic Michel. 
2) Le Monde, 26/05/01B: LEurope raisonnable de Lionel Jospin. 
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3) Le Figaro, 26/05/01: Les sentiments ambivalnets des Francais. Commentary by Laurence 
dAndlau. 
4) Libération, 28/05/01: La France prend le debat en marche. 
5) Le Monde, 28/05/01: Tony Blair invite les conservateurs britanniques a ne pas tourner le dos a 
lEurope; Le premier minstre travailliste continue neanmoins a eviter les debat sur la monnaie 
unique. 
6) Le Figaro, 28/05/01: Union Europeenne. Le premier ministre francasi presnete aujourdhui ses 
idees sur la reforme de lUE; Jospin descend dans larene europeenne. 
7) Le Monde, 29/05/01A: Tetes chercheuses: Pascal Lamy aupres de Lionel Jospin, et Michel 
Barnier chez Jacques Chirac. 
8) Le Monde, 29/05/01B: Analyse Des reformes institutionnelles qui concilient conservation. 
9) Le Monde, 29/05/01C: Verbatim Parce que je ne suis pas un europeen tiede, je ne veux pas 
dune Europe fade. Verbatim of speech (Jospin). 
10) Le Monde, 29/05/01D: Le debat sur lavenir de lEurope dans le colonnes de Monde. 
11) Le Monde, 29/05/01E: Le retour de Jacques Delors. 
12) Le Monde, 29/05/01F: Lionel Jospin veut faire lEurope de demain sans defaire la France; 
Dans le discours quil a prononce au Centre daccueil de la presse etrangere, lundi 28 mai a 
Paris, le premier minsitre a rappele les valeurs sociales communes aux Quinze et a donne sa 
vision de la Grande Europe. Il sest prononce en faveur dune federation dEtats-nations et 
dune Constitution europeenne. 
13) Le Monde, 29/05/01G: Francois Bayrou, president de lUDF, au Grand jury RTL-Le Monde-
LCI; Si Jacques Chirac avait ete depuis six ans le president quil faut a la France, je le 
soutiendrais. 
14) Le Monde, 29/05/01H: LEurope de Lionel Jospin. Verbatim of speech (Jospin). 
15) Le Monde, 29/05/01I: Jean.Pierre Chevenement se pose en candidat de lantimondialisation; 
Silencieux sur une eventuelle candidature presidentielle, le president du Mouvement des 
citoyens est presse par ses amis dincarner, en 2002, le combat contre lEurope liberale et la 
mondialisation. Les embarras judicaires de Charles Pasqua pourraient lui assurer un espace 
electoral plus grand. 
16) Le Monde, 29/05/01J: LEurope de M. Jospin. Leader. 
17) Le Figaro, 29/05/01: LEurope selon Lionel Jospin. 
18) Libération, 30/05/01: UE: Jospin trop prudent pour Prodi. 
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19) Le Monde, 30/05/01A: LAllemagne et lEurope francaise. 
20) Le Monde, 30/05/01B: En France, le discours de premier ministre ne trouve grace que dans le 
camp socialiste; Les partenaires de gauche du gouvernement ne menagent pas leurs critiques, 
tandis que les representants de la droite fustigent une vision trop timoree, notamment sur les 
institutions. 
21) Le Monde, 30/05/01C: A Bruxelles, les eurodeputes sont partages. 
22) Le Monde, 30/05/01D: Romano Prodi a Paris. 
23) Le Monde, 30/05/01E: Berlin constate le rejet par M. Jospin de son projet dEurope federale; 
Certains commentateurs allemands stigmatisent un discours electoral. 
24) Le Monde, 30/05/01F: Main gauche, main droite. 
25) Le Figaro, 30/05/01: UE. Le president de la Commission critique la conception francaise de 
lEurope des Etats; Romano Prodi plaide pour sa chapelle. 
26) Le Monde, 31/05/01: Un Etat por la nation europeenne! Commentary by Jean Matouk. 
27) Le Monde, 02/06/01: Europe: les oublis de Lionel Jospin. 
28) Le Monde, 04/06/01: Tony Blair ebtre le Grand Large et lEurope. 
29) Le Figaro, 05/06/01A: Grande-Bretagne Face aux travaillistes europholes, les conservateurs 
ont fait du rejet de leuro leur theme de campagne; LEurope dechaine les passions. 
30) Le Figaro, 05/06/01B: Europe Larchitecture et les pouvoirs futurs de lUnion europeenne en 
question; Romano: Les Etats ne sont pas des creatures divines. 
Germany 
1) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28/05/01: Inhalte statt Institutionen. 
2) taz, 29/05/01A: Wahlkampf, wie immmer; Jospins Europa-Rede war kein grosser wurf: es fehlt 
der mut. Commentary by Daniela Wengärtner. 
3) taz, 29/05/01B: Keine Architektur ohne Inhalte; Die wesentlichen Passagen aus der Rede des 
französischen Premierminsiters Jospin: Frankreich und andere europäischen Staaten können 
eine solche Vorstellung von einer Föderation nicht hinnehmen. Verbatim of speech (Jospin). 
4) taz, 29/05/01C: Bewusst ahnungslos; Die Sprecher der Bundesregierung sind bemüht, den 
Eindruck einer Kluft zwischen Frankreich und deutschland möglichst zu verstreuen. 
5) taz, 29/05/01D: Ein Europa der starken Nationen; Jospin plädiert dafür, dass der Europäische 
Rat, das Gremium der EU-Regierungschefs, die Kompetenz erhält, das Europaparlament 
aufzulösen. 
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6) taz, 29/05/01E: Europa: Da gehts lang!; Frankreichs Premier Jospin lehnt den Vorschlag von 
Kanzler Schröder für einen europäischen Bundesstaat ab. Stattdessen spricht er sich für eine 
Föderation der Nationalstaaten aus. 
7) taz, 29/05/01F: Der Euralist. Leader. 
8) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29/05/01A: Fischer und die Folgen.  
9) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29/05/01B: Wir koennen deutsches Modell nicht hinnehmen. 
Verbatim of speech (Jospin).  
10) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29/05/01A: Die Europarede des französischen 
Premierministers Jospin. Verbatim of speech (Jospin). 
11) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29/05/01B: Kritik von Europa-Ageordneten. 
12) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29/05/01C: Fischer: Bedeutender Beitrag Jospins. 
13) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29/05/01D: Was Jospin will. 
14) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29/05/01E: Jospin widerspricht Schröder Festhalten am 
Institutionengefüge. 
15) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29/05/01F: Es knirscht nach wie vor im Gebälk. 
16) taz, 30/05/01: Prodi stützt Jospin; in kürze. 
17) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30/05/01A: Wirtschafts-Regierung Das Thema des Tages. 
18) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30/05/01B: Prodi: EU benoetigt Wirtschaftsregierung. 
19) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01A: Die Kommission stärken. 
20) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01B: Bartoszewski unterstützt Jospin. 
21) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01C: Blair stellt sich gegen Jospin. 
22) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01D: Lob kam nur aus den eigenen Reihen. 
23) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01E: Lob für Jospins europafreundlichen Grundton. 
24) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01F: Spanien begrüsst Vorshläge aus Paris.  
25) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01G: Entlassungsgesetz entzweit die Pariser Koalition. 
26) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01H: Deutsch-französische Konsultationen am 12. 
Juni. 
27) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30/05/01I: EU-Regelung zu Flüchtlingen rückt näher. 
28) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31/05/01: In Raffgier vereint. Leader. 
29) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31/05/01A: Scharping: Kluge Rede Jospins. 
30) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31/05/01B: Europa im Ideenwettbewerb. 
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31) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 01/06/01: Sie kommen nicht zu Wort. Commentary by Timothy Garton 
Ash. 
32) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 02/06/01A: Gemeinsam gegen die Eurosion. Leader. 
33) Süddeutsce Zeitung, 02/06/01B: SZ-Wochenchronik 22/2001 vom 26. Mai bis 1. Juni. 
Spain 
1) El País, 27/05/01: Los socialistas europeos marcan distancias las tesis reformistas britanicas 
son cada vez menos inluyentes en el continente. 
2) Expansión, 29/05/01A: La nueva Europa del primer ministro frances mantiene las politicas 
agricola y regional bajo competencia de Bruselas Jospin apya la tesis alemana de crear un 
gobierno economico europeo, pero se aleja de la vision federal. 
3) Expansión, 29/05/01B: Romano Prodi y Loyola de Palacio se reuniran hoy con Jacques Chirac 
y Lionel Jospin la Comision europea y las autoridades francesas analizan la ofensiva de EDF. 
4) El País, 29/05/01A: Jospin rechaza el modelo federal de Schroeder y propone una Europa de 
estados-nacion. 
5) El País, 29/05/01B: La Europa de Jospin. Leader. 
6) El País, 29/05/01C: Lo que separa a Paris y Berlin. 
7) El País, 29/05/01D: Pique: espana quiere avanzar por la via de los resultados. 
8) El País, 29/05/01E: Union Europea contra EEUU. 
9) El País, 29/05/01F: Jospin propone una Europa de estados-nacion, frente al modelo federal de 
Alemania; Francia quiere que la mayoria salida de las urnas europeas elija al presidente de la 
Comision. 
10) Cinco Días, 29/05/01: Ferreo rechazo al modelo federalista aleman. 
11) El País, 30/05/01A: La Europa de Jospin; Le Monde. Leader. 
12) El País, 30/05/01B: Prodi propone crear un impuesto europeo para financiar el presupuesto de 
la Union; el presidente reclama mas poder oara la Comision en materia economica, diplomatica 
y militar. 
13) El País, 30/05/01C: Hague proclama que queda solo una semana para salvar la libra; Blair 
resalta el europeismo del Reino Unido. 
14) Cinco Días, 30/05/01A: Lealtad, 1 El debate de los tipos llega a Europa. 
15) Cinco Días, 30/05/01B: El presidente exige reformas financieras.  
16) El País, 31/05/01: Soltar lastre. Leader. 
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17) El País, 01/06/01A: Zapatero expondra a Prodi la posicion del PSOE sobre la ampliacion de la 
UE; el martes se reune en Bruselas con el presidente de la Comision europea.  
18) El País, 01/06/01B: Repliegue tactico. 
19) El País, 03/06/01A: Las trampas de lso modelos europeos. 
20) El País, 03/06/01B: Pulso de poder en la Union Europea. Commentary by William Pfaff. 
21) El País, 03/06/01C: El gobierno economico europeo. 
22) El País, 03/06/01D: El discurso de Jospin sobre Europa desata la polemica. 
23) El País, 04/06/01: Asi no se puede. Commentary by Andres Ortega. 
24) Expansión, 04/06/01: Amigos y rivales en el corazon de Europa.  
 
Lykketoft-sample 21/08/01-30/08/01 
Denmark 
1) Jyllands-Posten, 23/08/01: Ledende artikel: Dagens chance. Leader. 
2) Politiken, 24/08/01A: Holger K. vild med EU-udspil. 
3) Politiken, 24/08/01B: EU-visioner med forbehold. 
4) Information, 24/08/01A: Lykketoft: EU skal topstyres. 
5) Information, 24/08/01B: Vision uden vingesus. 
6) Jyllands-Posten, 24/08/01A: SF er tilfreds. 
7) Jyllands-Posten, 24/08/01B: EU-politik: En bro til Europa. 
8) Politiken, 25/08/01: Baggrund: Fra Danmark til EU  uden nye ideer. 
9) Information, 25/08/01A: Ledende artikel: Ayatollah Lykketoft. Leader. 
10) Information, 25/08/01B: Interview: Holger K. Nielsen (Holger: Ja til stærkt EU). 
11) Information, 25/08/01C: Analyse: Lykketofts franske tilbøjeligheder. 
12) Jyllands-Posten, 25/08/01A: Lykketoft følger det øvrige EU. 
13) Jyllands-Posten, 25/08/01B: Borgerlig kritik af Lykketoft. 
14) Politiken, 28/08/01A: Lykketoft satser på Baltikum. 
15) Politiken, 28/08/01B: Ledende artikel: EU-udspillet. Leader. 
16) Jyllands-Posten, 30/08/01: Kronik: Bryd med den uheldige praksis. Commentary by Jens 
Modvig. 
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Laeken-sample 12/12/01-21/12/01 
Denmark 
1) Jyllands-Posten, 12/12/01A: Fogh: Ingen dansk højredrejning. 
2) Jyllands-Posten, 12/12/01B: EU-topmøde: EUs fremtid til debat. 
3) Berlingske Tidende, 12/12/01: Dansk strid om EU-konvent. 
4) Politiken, 13/12/01: EUs fremtid: Borgerne: EU er uinteressant. 
5) Jyllands-Posten, 14/12/01A: Ledende artikel: Europas fremtid. Leader. 
6) Jyllands-Posten, 14/12/01B: EU-topmøde: Den store studehandel. 
7) Information, 14/12/01: EU skal diskutere sig selv. 
8) Berlingske Tidende, 14/12/01: Vi skal bygge en bro. Commentary by Lars Barfoed. 
9) Information, 15/12/01: Fogh: Mere åbenhed i EU. 
10) Jyllands-Posten, 15/12/01A: EU-topmøde: Fogh i hårdt EU-opgør. 
11) Jyllands-Posten, 15/12/01B: EU-topmøde: EU-basar om fremtiden. 
12) Berlingske Tidende, 15/12/01: EU-indrømmelser til Danmark. 
13) Jyllands-Posten, 16/12/01A: EU-topmøde: Den nye Rasmussen. 
14) Jyllands-Posten, 16/12/01B: EU-topmøde: Kampen om fremtiden. 
15) Berlingske Tidende, 16/12/01A: Velkommen til klassens nye dreng. 
16) Berlingske Tidende, 16/12/01B: Europa rydder op på skrivebordet. 
17) Berlingske Tidende, 16/12/01C: Enigt topmøde: Konventet er klart. 
18) Politiken, 17/12/01A: Langt til fælles EU-regler. 
19) Politiken, 17/12/01B: EU-topmøde: Analyse: Hestehandlerne i Laeken. 
20) Jyllands-Posten, 17/12/01: EU-topmøde: EUs topledere sluttede med bittert slagsmål. 
21) Berlingske Tidende, 17/12/01: EU's fremtid. Leader. 
22) Berlingske Tidende, 18/12/01: Spanien vil skærpe EU's terror-kamp. 
23) Jyllands-Posten, 19/12/01: EU: Annonce vækker forargelse. 
24) Information, 19/12/01A: Følelsen af fællesskab er afgørende for EUs fremtid.  
25) Information, 19/12/01B: Ledende artikel: En Laeken-bisken. Leader. 
26) Jyllands-Posten, 20/12/01: Portugal: Europa er på vej ind i højresvinget. 
27) Politiken, 21/12/01: Debat: Hvad kan sikre freden i Europa. Letter by J. H. Wegener. 
England 
1) The Independent, 12/12/01: Parliament & Politics: Europe  EUs law-makers should be 
televised to demystify process. 
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2) The Guardian, 12/12/01: Leading Articel: Hearken to Laeken: A real chance to make Europe 
work. Leader. 
3) Financial Times, 12/12/01: Blair confident of prospects at EU summit European integration 
Downing Street expects watering down of Belgian blueprint seen as too ambitious. 
4) The Independent, 13/12/01: Blair uses last summit before euro launch to advance case for 
Britain. 
5) The Guardian, 13/12/01: Comment & Analysis: Analysis: Only connect: Its now a question fo 
when rather than whether the EU will enlarge. Yet it still has to deal with the disillusionment of 
those who are already in. Commentary by Ian Black. 
6) Financial Times, 13/12/01A: Only time to test the euro is later. 
7) Financial Times, 13/12/01B: Prodi hist at expensive EU delays Commission president states 
pilloried for agreeing decisions but not implementing them through lack of politica. 
8) Financial Times, 13/12/01C: A balance of dissatisfaction may make summit work: Belgian 
hosts could be refereeing bitter squabbles at Laeken.  
9) Financial Times, 13/12/01D: Belgium blues Observer column. 
10) The Times, 14/12/01: Blairs Maastricht. Leader. 
11) The Independent, 14/12/01: Horse-trading top of agenda as Brussels summit plots EU future. 
12) The Guardian, 14/12/01: Leaders gather for EUs great debate: 80,000 protesters urge action as 
Laeken summit charts Europes future on eve of single currency. 
13) Financial Times, 14/12/01A: Europes strategic choice: Todays EU summit at Laeken should 
set out the options after enlargement. Commentary by Gerard Montassier and Keith 
Richardson. 
14) Financial Times, 14/12/01B: Laeken summit seeks prizes for all. 
15) Financial Times, 14/12/01C: The great Europe lark Observer. 
16) The Independent, 15/12/01: Straw says euro launch will persuade Britain. 
17) The Guardian, 15/12/01: EU reaction force comes slowly to life. 
18) Financial Times, 15/12/01: EU leaders in new push over community patent. 
19) The Times, 16/12/01A: EU plans for President of Europe. 
20) The Times, 16/12/01B: Federalist Blair has cashed in his blank cheque on Europe. 
Commentary by William Rees-Mogg. 
21) The Times, 16/12/01C: One-way route. Leader.  
22) The Independent, 16/12/01: Way open for elected European president. 
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23) The Times, 17/12/01: EU summit squabbles over agency share-out. 
24) The Guardian, 17/12/01A: EUs defining moment leaves leaders squabbling. 
25) The Guardian, 17/12/01B: EU leaders argue into the future. 
26) The Guardian, 17/12/01C: Comment & Analysis: Goodies up for grabs: Inside Europe. 
Commentary by Ian Black. 
27) Financial Times, 17/12/01A: EU sets course for new era Leaders agree on constitutional 
convention with aim of creating more democratic Union. 
28) Financial Times, 17/12/01B: A leap of faith at Laeken. 
29) Financial Times, 17/12/01C: Debate over Europe agenda is going our way, says Blair. 
30) Financial Times, 17/12/01D: Sour end to a meeting that changes EU for ever European Union 
in Belgium three targets out of six hit, two near successes, but leaders squabble over who gets. 
31) Financial Times, 17/12/01E: The Finn end of a wedge Observer column. 
32) The Times, 18/12/01: Laekens legacy. Leader. 
33) The Independent, 18/12/01A: Parliament & Politics: Blair accused of caving in on EU 
constitution. 
34) The Independent, 18/12/01B: Suddenly, British foreign policy matters once again; Whats 
more, Mr. Blair has a policy; to lead in the EU while retaining a close relationship with the 
US. Commentary by Donald Macintyre. 
35) Financial Times, 18/12/01A: Milling about Observer column. 
36) Financial Times, 18/12/01B: Spain puts terror fight at top of EU presidency agenda. 
37) Financial Times, 21/12/01: Language fears stall community patent drive. 
France 
1) Le Monde, 12/12/01: Francais et Allemands sont pour une Constitution europeenne. 
2) Libération, 13/12/01: Combattre les cliches et les peurs; Le debat sur lelargissement 
europeen vu par le Premier ministre polonais. 
3) Le Figaro, 13/12/01: Union Europeenne Ouverture demain du sommet des Quinze a Laeken; 
Le tandem franco-allemand doit jouer son role. Commentary by Christian Lequesne, Agnes 
von der Muhll, and Wolfgang Wessels. 
4) Libération, 14/12/01: Des propositions a lhorizon 2003. 
5) Le Monde, 14/12/01: LEurope se penche a Laeken sur son avenir constitutionnel; A deux 
semaines de la mise en circulation de leuro, les chefs dEtat et de gouvernement europeens se 
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retrouvent sous presidence belge pour lancer la Convention chargee delaborer la reforme des 
institutions. La choix de son president sucite des tractations difficiles. 
6) Le Figaro, 14/12/01: Union Europeenne Reforme des institutions, elargissement, et politique 
de dense commune au menu du sommet de Laeken; Michel Barnier: Montrer les perspectives 
pour le citoyen ne sarrate pas aux problemes. 
7) Le Monde, 15/12/01A: Les Quinze tentent de reduire leurs divergences a Laeken; Quelle 
convention, quel mandat et quel president poru elaborer la future architecture des institutions 
europeennes? La question figure en tete de lordre de jour du sommet qui sest est ouvert 
vendredi 14 decmbre en Belgique. Les dirigeants doivent egalement decider de lancer la force 
de reaction rapide. 
8) Le Monde, 15/12/01B: Renouveler la methode communautaire. Commentary by Romano 
Prodi. 
9) Le Figaro, 15/12/01A: Union Europeenne Les Quinze se prononceront individuellement; Pas 
de force commune pour lAfghanistan. 
10) Le Figaro, 15/12/01B: Les Quinze, reunis a Laeken, examinent lavenir des institutions; Une 
journee decisive pour lavenir de lEurope. 
11) Le Figaro, 17/12/01: Lancien president de la Republique designe par les Quinze pour presider 
la convention sur la reforme des institutions; Giscard impose par les grands pays.   
12) Le Monde, 19/12/01: Ecarte, Jacques Delors, sen prend vivement a Lionel Jospin. 
Germany 
1) taz, 13/12/01A: Strategische Perspektive; Die wichtigste Reform der EU wird nicht vond 
Regierungschefs geplant, sonder von Abgeordnete. Sie sollten die Frage klären, wofür die 
Union eigentlich da ist. Commentary by Sabine Herre. 
2) taz, 13/12/01B: Fischer für Reform Europas; Aussenminister will offenes Mandat für EU-
Konvent. Defizite in Aussenpolitik beklagt. 
3) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13/12/01: Letzte Ausfahrt Laeken; Der EU-Gipfel bietet die Chance, die 
Union doch nochrechtzeitig vor ihrer Erweiterung zu stärken. Commentary by Stefan Ulrich. 
4) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13/12/01: Nach der Reform ist vor der Reform. Commentary 
by unnamed academic. 
5) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14/12/01A: Mut zum Machtverzicht; Der Erfolg des Konvents hängt 
vom Spielraum ab, den ihm die Regierungschefs zugestehen. 
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6) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14/12/01B: Es fehlt der Wille zu grossen Projekten Das Wichtigste für 
einen Konvent wird ein starker Präsidetn sein. Ich mache mir Sorgen über die immer grösser 
werdende Ungerechtigkeit.; EU-Kommissionspräsident Romano Prodi kritisiert im SZ-
Interview, dass die Regierungen Europas Entscheidungen verschleppen. 
7) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14/12/01A: Verfassungsschöpfer oder Ideensammler. 
8) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14/12/01B: Hochtrabender name, wichtige Aufgabe. 
9) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14/12/01C: Berlin beharrt nicht auf Verfassung. 
10) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14/12/01D: Am Scheideweg.  
11) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14/12/01E: Verhofstadt: Die EU braucht eine Verfassung. 
12) taz, 15/12/01: Königsschloss von Laeken; Prinz ausquartiert. 
13) Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15/12/01: Club der Eitelkeiten; Gelähmte EU: Auf der Gipfel von 
Laeken scheitern die Finanzministern erneut; Zinsbesteuerung als Menetekel. 
14) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15/12/01A: Schloss Laeken ist nicht Versailles. 
15) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15/12/01B: Hinter den Mauern von Laeken ein trotziges 
Dennoch. 
16) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15/12/01C: Patten: EU wird aussenpolitisch nie mit einer 
Stimme sprechen. 
17) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16/12/01A: Deutschland muss nachsitzen. 
18) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16/12/01B: Familienfeier, leicht bigott. 
19) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16/12/01C: Brüssel will Präsenz zeigen  aber welche? 
20) taz, 17/12/01A: Elegant, arrogant und ohne Selbstzweifel; Valéry Giscard dEstaing wird 
Präsident des Reformkonvents. Der Freund Helmut Schmidts hat seine föderalistischen EU-
Pläne verwässert. 
21) taz, 17/12/01B: EU-Gipfel in Belgien: Wer die Union reformieren soll. 
22) taz, 17/12/01C: Erklärung von Laeken; Europa am Scheideweg. Verbatim of Declaration. 
23) taz, 17/12/01D: Schinken für alte Männer; Nationale Eitelkeiten beim Verteilen neuer 
Behörden zeigen einmal mehr, dass die EU so keine Überlebenschance hat. 
24) taz, 17/12/01E: Alle macht den Parlamenten; EU-Konvent.  
25) Süddeutsche Zeitung. 17/12/01A: Wer den grossen Sprung tut. Geht erst rückwärts; Wie die 
EU die Zukunft mit einem Politiker gewinnen will, der seine Zukunft schon hinter sich hat. 
26) Süddeutsche Zeitung. 17/12/01B: EU-Gipfel in Laeken. 
The Constitution of Meaning 
 32
27) Süddeutsche Zeitung. 17/12/01C: Grosse Worte für grosse Ziele; Gipfelteilnemer wollen die 
neu verfasste EU zu einem Leuchtfeuer für die ganze Welt machen. 
28) Süddeutsche Zeitung. 17/12/01D: Mit Fragen in die Zukunft weisen; Erklärung von Laeken in 
Auszügen. Verbatim of Declaration. 
29) Süddeutsche Zeitung. 17/12/01E: Kuhhandel im Königsschloss; Beim Gipfel der EU. 
30) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17/12/01A: Ist Giscard der Mann der Zukunft? 
31) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17/12/01B: Die Chance des Konvents. 
32) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19/12/01: Wer mich als blosse Verwaltering sieht, hat sich 
getäuscht. 
Spain 
1) El País, 12/12/01: El gobierno pide a la Union Europea que favorezca la participacion de las 
regiones en la toma de decisiones. 
2) Expansión, 13/12/01: El consejo que dirige Alvaro Rodriguez Bereijo inaugura su pagina web 
Espana solicita la opnion ciudadana para dienar la constitucion europea. 
3) Cinco Días, 14/12/01A: Los Quince buscan hoy en Laeken un pacto sobre el modelo politico 
de la Union. 
4) Cinco Días, 14/12/01B: Editorial Europa busca su modelo. Leader. 
5) Expansión, 15/12/01: El europgrupo recibe el encargo de vigilar la aplicacion efectiva de las 
liberalizaciones y de los cambiosestructurales los Quince prometen anadir flexibilidad laboral y 
reformas para mejorar el mercado interior de la UE. 
6) El País, 15/12/01: Fuertes discrepancias impiden eæ reparto de agencias de la UE los Quince 
aparcan otras importantes iniciativas. 
7) Cinco Días, 15/12/01: La UE otorga poderes al Eurogrupo para impulsar la liberalizaciones. 
8) El País, 16/12/01A: La declaracion de Laeken. 
9) El País, 16/12/01B: La UE pone en marcha la futura constitucion para todos los europeos 
Giscard presidira la Convencion para dienar la nueva Europa. 
10) El País, 16/12/01C: La UE introduce el debate de las regiones y Aznar rebaja las referencias 
federalistas habra 6 observadores del comite de las regiones en la Convencion sobre el futuro de 
la Union. 
11) El País, 16/12/01D: Los Quince lanzan la constitucion europea Giscard dEstaing presidira la 
convencion que disenara para 2003 la Europa del futuro. 
12) El País, 17/12/01A: Retorno al unilateralismo. 
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13) El País, 17/12/01B: Del euro a la ampliacion. 
14) Cinco Días, 17/12/01: La Union Europea inicia la senda constitucional con 2004 como meta. 
15) El País, 18/12/01: Un salto de fe en Laeken; Financial Times. Leader. 
16) El País, 20/12/01: El presidente rechaza las demandas de mas participacion de regiones en la 
UE. 
17) Cinco Días, 20/12/01: Tribuna De la UE del futuro. Commentary by Antonio Gutierrez 
Vegara.      
 
Other cited articles 
1) Politiken, 28/10/03: 100 ændringer til EU-forfatning. 
2) El País, 11/12/03: Berlusconi asegura que tiene una propuesta en el bolsillo para convencer a 
Aznar. 
3) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/12/03A: Sterben für Nizza oder Leben für Europa? 
4) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/12/03B: Italien; Vorsitzender. 
5) Le Monde, 13/12/03: Les Europeens recherchent un accord miracle sur la Constitution.
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General topoi Constitutive dichotomies 
Specific topoi Why reforms? How to debate 
reforms? 
What reforms? 
Tropes, figures, and 
argumentative strategies
Part  whole (inclusion) 
 
 
 
-(re)uniting Europe 
(1,2,3)  
 
 
 
 
-national  European 
debates (5) 
-elite  popular debates 
(1,3,4,5,6) 
 
 
 
-nation-states  EU 
(1,2,4,5)  
-national cultures  
European civilisation 
(4,5) 
Part  whole (exclusion/ 
division) 
-Europe  rest of world 
(4,5,6) 
 
-positive debate  
sceptical positions 
(1,2,3,4,5,6) 
-national  European 
debates (1,3,4,6) 
-elite  popular debates 
(2) 
-national emotions  
European utility (3,6) 
Historical narrative -(re)uniting Europe 
(1,3) 
 -Britain at centre of 
Europe (3) 
Definition 
 
-challenge 
opportunity (2,3)  
-withdrawal from  
engagement in EU (6) 
 -federation of nation-
states (4) 
Inevitability -no alternative to 
enlargement (1) 
-no alternative to EU 
(1,2,3,4,5,6) 
  
(Dissolution of) 
incompatibility 
-deepening  widening 
(1,2,3,) 
-benefits  risks of 
globalisation (4)  
-national emotions  
European utility (6) 
-procedural/ 
institutional 
substantial/purposive 
dimensions of 
debate/reform 
(2,3,4,5,6) 
-national identity  
European co-
operation (6) 
-creating Europe 
without undoing the 
nations (4) 
-unity in diversity (4) 
Change of perspective 
 
 
 
-External division 
between groups  
internal duality within 
each individual (6) 
 -becoming EU-
member  never 
having left Europe (2)
- EU is neither state 
nor international co-
operation (4,5) 
Antithesis -erosion  integration 
(1) 
-influence together  
be influenced alone 
(3,5,6) 
 -European opinions 
and values  those of 
the US government 
(4,5,6) 
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Analogy 
 
 
 
-Globalisation  egg on 
frying pan (6) 
-Globalisation  
discovery of America 
(5) 
  
Symmetry 
 
-big ends  big means 
(4,5,6) 
-big scene  big actor 
(4,5,6) 
-citizen expectations  
EU actions (2) 
-ends/purposes  
means/ institutions 
(1,2,3,4,5,6) 
 
(Restoration of) 
harmony 
-EU success/potential  
public support 
(1,3,4,5,6) 
-EUs  peoples 
priorities (3) 
-institutional change  
peoples 
comprehension (3) 
 
Metaphors of 
construction 
-building bridges (6) -building/constructing 
Europe (1,2,3,4,5,6) 
-laying foundations/ 
cornerstones (4,5) 
-following blueprint 
(1) 
-building bridges (3,6) 
 
Metaphors of direction  -leading the way (1,2) 
-continuing along the 
path (1,2,3,4,5,6) 
-direction/momentum 
around peoples 
priorities (3) 
-EU no springboard for 
national interest (2) 
 
Organic metaphors/ 
metaphors of belonging 
 
 
 
 
-deeply rooted will of 
belonging (2) 
-heart of Europe (2)  
-centre of Europe (3) 
-European family of 
nations (3) 
-European core (1) 
Inertia -continuous integration 
(1, 5) 
-short- and long-term 
change (continuation 
of debate/reforms) 
(1,2) 
-(chrono)logical 
developments 
(1,2,3,4,5,6) 
 
Wordplay  -content  container (4)  -superpower, not 
superstate (3) 
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Antimetabole/chiasmus 
 
 -citizens own Europe  
Europe owns them (3) 
 
 
Meaning of words 
 
 -federalism (2)  
-constitution (2,6) 
-federation of nation-
states (4, 6) 
Doctrine of the mean   -intergovernmental  
federal (2,3,6)  
Principle of duality 
 
 
  Europe of nation-
states  Europe of 
citizens (1) 
Authority   -the founding fathers 
(1, 5) 
1 = Fischers speech, 2 = Aznars speech, 3 = Blairs speech, 4 = Jospins speech, 5 = Prodis 
speech, 6 = Lykketofts speech 
 
